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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines adoption of pharmaceutical technologies across the major OECD 
markets during 1999-2008, a period that has witnessed substantial R&D productivity 
shortfalls and increasing supply-side pressure on pharmaceutical pricing. The advent of 
the financial crisis in 2008 has resulted in even more stringent pricing and 
reimbursement (P&R) regulations to contain costs and ensure value for money in 
pricing decisions. The central theoretical question addressed, therefore, is how price 
regulation affects cross-national adoption dynamics of pharmaceutical technologies. I 
address the impact of regulation on: i) innovative technologies, i.e. patent-protected new 
molecules that are central to dynamic efficiency, and ii) imitative generic technologies, 
i.e. lower-priced bioequivalent products that are central to static efficiency. The 
research in this thesis was motivated by the lack of theoretical framework or empirical 
evidence on the dynamics of international technology adoption in general and marked 
delay patterns in the adoption of pharmaceutical technologies observed in practice. It is 
important to understand the regulatory factors driving these delays given the profound 
implications of such delays on consumer and producer welfare as well as healthcare 
provider/payer budgets. The main hypothesis in this thesis is that price controls 
negatively affect adoption speed for new molecules and generics in markets that employ 
price controls as these controls reduce incentives to entry and result in knock-on effects 
in foreign markets because of linkages such as reference pricing and parallel trade. The 
empirical strategy adopts difference-in-difference and survival analysis using IMS data 
from 20 markets and controls for heterogeneity in firm and molecule 
characteristics.Overall findings indicate that adoption of pharmaceutical technologies is 
slower in price-controlled markets and that firms adapt their launch strategies to 
changes in pharmaceutical regulations. Expected market size is a highly significant 
driver of generic launch hazard, which highlights the importance of demand-side 
policies to promote generic use.
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CHAPTER 1
1 INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is an industry of high political and economical relevance. 
It has always drawn the attention of economists in the field of industrial organization 
due to its rich set of features that include patent protection, high research and 
development (R&D) investments, intense product promotion and heavy regulation. The 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries because of safety 
and health concerns of products and relatively high profits the industry has enjoyed 
historically. In 2005, pharmaceutical firms in the Fortune 500 averaged a 10.3% return 
on assets, whereas the median for all US industries was 4.7%*.
Pharmaceutical policies in different countries rely on pricing and reimbursement (P&R) 
schemes to ensure access to medicines according to need; control pharmaceutical and 
total healthcare expenditure; and ensure efficiency (cost-effectiveness) of resources 
allocated to pharmaceutical care. The advent of the recent financial crisis and the need 
for fiscal austerity to tackle budget deficits has increased the reliance on more stringent 
pharmaceutical P&R controls. There is a growing emphasis on value based pricing 
(VBP) in major markets, especially in the UK where the government has recently 
proposed to replace the current Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). 
Although this seems now to be on hold, any new VBP system could have significant 
global knock-on effects in countries that reference the UK, which make up 
approximately 25% of the global market according to the Office of Fair Trading (O.F.T 
2007; Hirschler 2010).
In light of the increasing pressure on drug prices, it is important from a policy 
perspective to analyze the potential effects of price controls on the adoption of 
pharmaceutical products and patient access to necessary treatments. The evidence 
regarding the impact of regulation on the launch timing of pharmaceutical technologies 
across different markets is scanty. The aim of this thesis is to improve our 
understanding of the effects of regulation on the speed of adoption of new 
pharmaceutical products and inform future pharmaceutical pricing policies. Given the 
complementary nature of the branded and generic sector from a social welfare
1 Profit measures, however, may be overstated for R&D intensive industries as R&D expenditures 
are not treated as a capitalised investment (CBO 2006).
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perspective, the thesis aims to investigate the impact of price controls on entry o f both 
innovative products and generic competition in the OECD during 1999-2008.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 provides an introduction into the 
concepts of innovation, competition and static-dynamic efficiency trade-off in the 
pharmaceutical industry that are often referred to in the thesis; Section 1.2 defines 
market barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical sector and discusses the rationale for 
regulation in the pharmaceutical sector; Section 1.3 provides an overview of different 
P&R regulations in the main OECD markets and summarizes main findings on the 
impact of pharmaceutical regulation; and finally Section 1.5 outlines the organization of 
the thesis and states the main research questions and hypotheses in individual chapters.
1.1 Innovation, Competition and Efficiency in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry
An extensive body of research has been carried out on the economics of the 
pharmaceutical industry (Scherer 2000; Schweitzer and Comanor 2007). This section 
will focus on a subset of key concepts such as innovation and competition that define 
the analytical framework in this thesis, and highlight the inherent trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency central to policymaking decisions in the pharmaceutical 
industry.
Innovation is broadly defined as a technological progress that leads to an entirely new 
product or an increase in the therapeutic value of an existing product (product 
innovation), or a change in the cost of production or service (process innovation). 
Product innovation entails new qualities or a combination of existing qualities. It 
usually results in increased production costs compared to existing alternatives. 
Pharmaceutical product innovation can be based on new active substances, new 
indications for existing products or new ways of administering the same product. 
Zweifel and Breyer (2009) also define organizational innovation that involves cost 
reductions in the production of a good or service through a reorganization of production 
processes and/or restructuring of entire firms (e.g. separation of internal medicine and 
geriatric care in hospitals and creation of Health Maintenance Organizations) (Zweifel, 
Breyer et al. 2009). Innovation in this thesis is defined as the development o f new 
molecules (new active ingredients) in a given therapeutic area. This definition ignores 
new indications or forms for a given molecule and process innovations are ignored.
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Innovation is central to the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry. New goods 
are drivers of economic progress and sustainable growth (Bresnahan and Gordon 1997). 
According to empirical evidence pharmaceutical innovation in the form of new drug 
approvals has contributed significantly to longevity increase since 1960’s (Lichtenberg 
2003b; Lichtenberg 2004; Lichtenberg 2005). Pharmaceuticals are considered as one of 
the most cost effective forms of healthcare (Grootendorst, Pierard et al. 2009). Although 
the majority of the pharmaceutical innovation comes in gradual or marginal 
improvements over existing products (Lexchin 2004)2, patients using newer drugs have 
lower mortality rates controlling for age, sex, religion, diagnosis and utilization of 
medical services (Jung and Lichtenberg 2006; Lichtenberg, Grootendorst et al. 2009; 
Lichtenberg 2010).
Pharmaceutical products have several quality dimensions, including efficacy, safety and 
the convenience of the product. Only new molecules that show significant innovative 
benefits over existing treatments in meeting an unmet clinical need can get premium 
prices. Adoption of pharmaceutical innovation therefore is essential to address unmet 
medical needs and improve public health outcomes and quality of life. Pharmaceutical 
innovation is extremely expensive to develop. As one of the most R&D intensive 
industries, for each molecule an investment of $800 million is required, depending on 
the therapy or the developing firm this cost could go up to $2,000 million (DiMasi 
2002; DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003; Adams and Brantner 2006).
Economically efficient R&D investment requires projects with positive net present 
value (NPV) or projects that generate internal rate of return higher than the cost of 
capital. Minimum product prices required to make R&D projects economically 
attractive could be significantly higher than marginal costs of production. Much of the 
R&D cost is incurred to discover new molecules and test their efficacy in clinical trials. 
Imitators could free-ride on a new discovery and clinical trial information by investing 
only in process engineering. This would allow the introduction of the same product at a 
much lower price and destroy incentives for innovation on the incumbent’s side. Patent 
protection and market exclusivity are therefore significant components of profit earning 
expectations and dynamic efficiency, i.e. rate of introduction of new products and 
production processes (Cabral 2000). On the other hand, monopoly power granted by
Based on an assessments of the value of new drugs from Canada, France and the USA, Lexchin 
(2004) claims that at best one third of new drugs offer some additional clinical benefit and perhaps 
as few as 3% are major therapeutic advances.
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patents allows above marginal cost pricing and reduces static efficiency. Therefore, 
competition policy defends market competition to increase overall welfare.
Competition stimulates firms to invest in future innovation and improve 
competitiveness with respect to the rivals. A monopolist will be dynamically less 
efficient compared to firms operating in a competitive environment. This economic 
trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency is inherent in R&D-based 
industries including the pharmaceutical industry itself. That said, the relationship 
between competition and innovation is not monotonically increasing. Too strong 
competition reduces the appropriability of investments and the incentives to innovate. 
An environment with some competition but high enough market power to allow 
appropriability of innovative activities is the most conducive to R&D.
1.1.1 Competitive Structure: Branded vs. Generic Competition
The level of competition is often key to firm and industry behaviour as it drives prices 
closer to marginal costs and provides incentives for innovation. Although the industry is 
dominated by the major pharmaceutical companies (big pharma), it exhibits high levels 
of fluidity with frequent entry and departure of firms. However, the worldwide market 
is witnessing decreasing competitiveness due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and 
consolidation of top selling drugs sales among fewer firms (Schweitzer and Comanor 
2007). The degree of market concentration is much higher within a specific therapeutic 
class comprised of products that compete with one another. Therapeutic classes are 
defined based on the Anatomical Therapeutic Classification System (ATC) that groups 
drug products by anatomical site of action, chemical properties, pharmacological and 
therapeutic properties. Throughout this thesis competition is defined at the 
anatomical/therapeutic/pharmacological and chemical subgroup level (ATC4) (see 
Appendix A.l for the description of the ATC System).
Pharmaceutical markets are subject to two types of competition: pre-patent (branded) 
and post-patent (generic) competition. The prices of both brand-name and generics are 
often lower when a higher number of drugs exist. Competition between patent-protected 
molecules (branded competition) in a given therapeutic category depends on the relative 
qualities of the new molecule and incumbent molecules. The degree of innovation is a 
key driver of new molecule prices and thus dynamic efficiency. The degree of 
competition in the branded sector is not perfect. Single-sourced drugs can raise prices
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above marginal costs due to unavailability of substitutes. Promotion efforts may 
reinforce habits of physicians and result in price insensitivity due to brand loyalty.
Government policies are increasingly promoting the use of generic drugs worldwide. 
Generic drugs are bioequivalent to the brand name reference drug in dosage form, 
safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and 
intended use. Generics, therefore, are typically classified as commodity products that 
compete based on price. Generics offer significant discounts compared to branded 
drugs. Estimated annual savings due to generic drug use are about $8 to $10 bn a year at 
US retail pharmacies, €0.9 bn in Germany, €0.5 bn in France and €0.4 bn in the UK 
(Simoens and de Coster 2006; FDA 2010).
Stronger generic competition increases the importance of the exclusivity period because 
of erosion in price and sales volume of the originator product after patent expiry (which 
increases static efficiency). Firms can target incremental innovation to increase the 
period of market exclusivity. However, bringing completely new products to the market 
is absolutely necessary to maintain a competitive product portfolio. Therapeutically 
important products can easily substitute others in the market. Therefore, generic 
competition drives R&D oriented firms to invest into new products that will gain market 
acceptance quickly and generate sufficient returns.
1.1.2 Static vs. Dynamic Efficiency Trade-off
Static efficiency, the maximization of social welfare at a particular point in time, 
requires that the market structure is highly competitive and no firm holds market power. 
For a given production technology, when prices are above marginal costs the increase in 
producer surplus does not compensate for the reduction in consumer surplus (allocative 
inefficiency). The higher the size of the market and the lower price elasticity of demand, 
the higher is the efficiency loss due to monopoly pricing (Motta 2004). High market 
power might also result in dynamic inefficiencies. A monopolist sheltered from 
competition may not have sufficient incentives to adopt the most efficient technologies 
and to invest in R&D. Eliminating market power ex-post to reduce prices and increase 
static (allocative) efficiency, however, would eliminate ex-ante incentives for 
innovation and decrease dynamic efficiency.
The static versus dynamic efficiency trade-off in the pharmaceutical industry requires 
considering both the on-patent and off-patent sectors for a holistic analysis. The thesis,
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therefore, investigates the impact of price controls on the adoption of new products both 
in the on-patent and off-patent sector.
Static-dynamic efficiency trade-off is becoming more severe as the cost of R&D 
continues to increase substantially (Charles River Associates 2004). A central question 
in competition policy and regulation is the optimum degree of intervention. In an ideal 
environment, competition would not be restricted in a way that is detrimental to society 
but also market power would be preserved for future innovative activities. This thesis 
aims to provide positive empirical evidence regarding the impact of price controls on 
adoption of pharmaceuticals. However, the optimal form of pharmaceutical regulation 
and the degree of price mark-up consistent with dynamic efficiency will not be 
addressed.
1.1.3 Adoption and Diffusion of Innovations
In the economics literature, technology adoption referes to the decision at the individual 
level to acquire a new invention or innovation whereas diffusion refers to the process 
through which technology spreads across a population (Hall and Khan 2003). In the 
pharmaceutical context, adoption is the first contact of the physician with the innovation 
and diffusion is the rate at which the new drug dispensed over time (Serra-Sastre and 
McGuire 2009). There is considerable theoretical framework and empirical evidence 
regarding the diffusion of new technologies (Stoneman 2002; Serra-Sastre 2008). 
Boradly speaking, adoption and diffusion of innovations is decomposed into two levels: 
the inter-firm level and the intra-firm level.
The inter-firm level, also referred as adoption, represents the first contact or use of a 
technology within an organization or a pool of potential adopters. This level does not 
explain the intensity of use once the technology is adopted. The inter-firm concept is 
more related to the time elapsed between technology availability and time to adoption. 
The intra-firm level, on the other hand, represents the intensity of use of the new 
technology conditional on prior adoption of the technology. It refers to the rates at 
which different firms produce goods using the new technology or to the diffusion of a 
particular innovation across the subsidiaries of a company. While inter-firm diffusion is 
dominant at early stages, intra-firm diffusion becomes more prominent at the later 
stages of the technology diffusion process.
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Historically modelling of technological diffusion has relied on: i) epidemic models that 
assume an invariant population of potential adopters where non-users become users 
upon making a contact with prior adopters (Griliches 1957; Bain 1962); ii) the probit or 
rank approach assumes rational profit maximizing behaviour at each time point by 
comparing cost of acquisition and gross benefits of technology adoption (Ireland and 
Stoneman 1986; Stoneman and Battisti 1997; Battisti and Stoneman 2003); iii) the stock 
model that considers reduction in costs of the adopting firm and its impacts on prices of 
firm’s products as well as output levels in the whole industry (Reinganum 1981; 
Schumpeter 1984; Metcalfe 1995); and iv) the order model which considers first mover 
advantages such as the ability to influence the adoption decision of other firms and gain 
higher returns compared to follow-on adopters (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985). Stoneman 
(2002) provides a comprehensive review and technical details of these models 
(Stoneman 2002). Most recently, technology adoption has been considered by 
economists in the real options framework by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Similar to 
investment decicions, the adoption of new technologies is characterized by the 
uncertainty over future profits; sunk costs due to irreversibility and the opportunity to 
delay (Dixit, Pindyck et al. 1994; Stoneman 2001).
All of the above models indicate that the main drivers of diffusion are learning and 
information spreading, cost of new technology acquisition, performance of the new 
technology, price expectations, firm characteristics, risk attitudes, the extent of product 
differentiation, first mover advantages and the extent of new investments to be 
generated by realized profits. Rogers (1995) has highlighted the significant role of 
perceived attributes in new technology adoption. Perceived attributes of innovation 
theory considers the following key attributes: 1) relative advantage; 2) compatability; 3) 
complexity; 4) trialability; 5) observability (Rogers 1995). Relative advantage is the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes. It 
is often expressed as economic profitability, social prestige or other benefits. 
Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the 
existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters. Complexity is the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and to 
use. Trialability represents the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with 
on a limited basis, and finally, observability defines the degree to which the results of an 
innovation are visible to others.
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Theories described above and the relevant empirical evidence has mainly focused on 
adoption and diffusion in a single geographical market. Evidence on technological 
adoption in a cross-country setting is extremely limited. Comin and Hobijn (2003) 
distinguish five main theories/hypotheses about factors that determine technological 
adoption in a cross-country setting: i) vintage capital theory; ii) vintage human capital; 
iii) general purpose technologies with complementary inventions; iv) trade; v) vested 
interests and political institutions (Comin and Hobijn 2003). Caselli and Coleman 
(2001) carry out a cross-country analysis of computer investment. Their results show 
that highly-skilled human capital, high investment rates, property rights and small share 
of the agricultural sector in GDP encourage the investment in computing equipment. 
The research in this thesis aims to improve the evidence base on cross-country adoption 
of new technologies by focusing on the pharmaceutical technologies with a particular 
interest on how regulation affects the differential adoption speed across OECD markets.
1.2 Economics of Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Sector
The idealized competitive market model provides a framework to define efficiency. 
Efficiency is measured with respect to changes in total consumer and producer surplus 
(social surplus or social welfare). Economic theory holds that social welfare is 
optimized by a free market unconstrained by government involvement in a perfectly 
competitive market (consistent with Pareto Efficiency, i.e. utility-maximizing behaviour 
of individuals and profit-maximizing behaviour of firms such that no one could be 
better off without making someone else worse off).
Perfect competition holds under the following key assumptions: i) consumers are 
perfectly informed about all goods, which are all private goods; ii) production functions 
rule out increasing returns to scale and technological change; iii) consumers maximize 
their preferences under budget constraints and producers maximize profits given their 
production function; iv) all agents are price takers and there are no externalities among 
agents; v) a competitive equilibrium exists with a set of prices that clear the market. If 
any of these assumptions fail, equilibrium market behaviour fails to maximize social 
surplus (Viscusi, Vernon et al. 2005; Weimer and Vining 2005).
The economic rationale for regulation arises from market failures. The aim of regulation 
is to correct market failure on the premise that introducing another market distortion 
(regulation) can improve efficiency (the theory of the second best). Given the extensive
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failures in the pharmaceutical market (outlined in Section 1.2.1), it is unsurprising that 
the pharmaceutical market is among the most extensively regulated markets.
Values other than efficiency may also be considered to achieve social welfare beyond 
Pareto Efficiency. Regulation may also arise to correct inequity, ensure human dignity 
and equality in outcomes as access to essential medicines is recognized as a core part of 
the international right to health (Thomas 2006). Disentangling inequities from 
inefficiencies, however, may not be always possible. For example, inequities such as 
lack of access to pharmaceutical technologies, a failure of the market to address demand 
from a social welfare perspective, are also inefficiencies.
1.2.1 Market Failures in the Pharmaceutical Market
The pharmaceutical market demonstrates unique failures different from other industrial 
markets, which include but are not limited to: i) critical nature of patents to incentivize 
research in a high fixed-cost environment; ii) need for costly and long clinical trials to 
resolve the uncertainty regarding the benefits of pharmaceuticals in heterogeneous 
patient populations; iii) delegation of the consumption decision to an agent (the 
physician); iv) the dominant role of third party payment through social and/or private 
health insurance; v) global public good nature of pharmaceutical products; vi) positive 
externalities from the consumption of drugs against infectious diseases and caring 
externalities (altruistic preferences that make individuals care about the health of others) 
(Danzon and Keuffel 2007). The following section discusses market failures in the 
pharmaceutical industry whose correction requires government intervention.
1.2.1.1 Information Problems, Agency and Moral Hazard
The specialized knowledge involved in health care and the inefficiency for each patient 
(principal) to seek out all the relevant information results in the delegation of treatment 
choice to the physician (agent). The separation of the consumer (the patient), the 
decision maker (the physician) and third party payers (the government or insurance 
companies) due to informational asymmetries creates problems of imperfect agency and 
moral hazard (Bloom and Reenen 1998). Moral hazard arises when individuals engage 
in risk sharing (e.g., financial insulation under an insurance contract) and modify their 
behaviour compared to conditions under which they are fully exposed to the risk. Under 
such conditions Pareto-optimal risk sharing is generally precluded as the contract does
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not induce proper incentives for taking correct actions (Holmstrom 1979). Resource 
consumption occurs at a higher level than the optimum where marginal social benefit 
equals marginal social costs as insurance makes consumers price-insensitive.
Doctors may lack information on drug prices or may have limited concern for 
expenditure control unless they are incentivized to do so with budget constraints. This 
may result in inefficiencies either because prescriptions do not offer therapeutic value 
for money or as a result of overconsumption as the physician and/or the consumer do 
not face the full financial risk for pharmaceutical expenses. Similarly, ex-ante moral 
hazard may occur if consumers increase their risky behaviour and take fewer 
precautions to prevent illnesses.
1.2.1.2 Patents and Market Power
R&D in general has public good characteristics and results in positive externalities on 
other firms that free-ride on inventions (spillovers). Spillovers reduce the payoff of the 
innovator, and incentives to R&D, by creating competition in the market. If innovators 
cannot appropriate their R&D efforts, future investment for R&D will be less than 
optimal for society and will reduce dynamic efficiency. A patent provides an exclusive 
right (a monopoly) over the invention and restores incentives for R&D and innovation. 
Patents are key to the innovative activities in the pharmaceutical sector given the 
research intensity and cost of capital invested into pharmaceutical R&D. Given the 
relatively inelastic demand for pharmaceuticals (drug price elasticity is estimated to be 
around -0.209, which is relatively inelastic), patents allow pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to capture significant monopoly rents (Scherer 2000; Motta 2004; 
Gemmill, Costa-Font et al. 2007).
Essentially market power is given to enhance dynamic efficiency but results in a trade­
off between granting firms appropriability of innovation and spread of innovative 
benefits to consumers. This closely ties with the static-dynamic efficiency trade-off 
described in Section 1.1.2, in the sense that patents improve dynamic efficiency 
compared to the no-patent case but inhibits competition and static efficiency. When 
prices are above marginal costs, the increase in producer surplus does not compensate 
for the reduction in consumer surplus. In addition, a loss is incurred because of the 
reduction in improvements made by competitors on the patented invention. This raises
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issues around appropriate price and profit levels, and the optimum design or duration of 
patent protection (Christie and Rotstein 2008).
There is a large literature that discusses optimal length and breadth of patents (Tirole 
1990). Too narrow or too short patent definition results in no incentives for innovation, 
whereas too broad or too long patent definition gives too much power to the incumbent 
and stops other firms innovating. A patent creates social costs through the inhibition of 
competitor innovation and static inefficiency, which increase over the duration of 
monopoly protection. The optimum duration is modelled by equating the marginal 
social benefit of a patent with the marginal social cost of the patent over time. However, 
determining the actual value normatively is not an easy task due to the difficulty in 
specifying the exact nature of marginal social costs and benefits associated with a patent 
(Nordhaus 1972; Wright 1983; Gilbert and Shapiro 1990; Denicolo 1996). Therefore, 
positive empirical evidence is essential in resolving the trade-off between static and 
dynamic considerations.
In many countries, the rationale for price regulation is the concern around excessive 
prices/profits pharmaceutical manufacturers claim in addition to the price insensitivity 
due to insurance coverage as described in Section 1.2.1.1. The extent of market power 
depends on several factors such as the concentration within a therapeutic subgroup, 
price mark-up over marginal costs, extent of vertical and/or horizontal integration, and 
market entry barriers, which are discussed next.
1.2.2 Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical Market
Defining barriers to entry precisely is a controversial issue; several definitions have 
been proposed over time (McAfee, Mialon et al. 2003; Carlton 2005). Bain (1956) 
defined entry barriers as the set of technology or product conditions (economies of 
scale, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages of established firms) that 
allow incumbent firms to earn economic profits in the long-run. Stigler (1968) modified 
the definition as “Cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be 
borne by a firm that seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the 
industry” (Bain 1956; Stigler 1968). Stigler emphasized the cost disadvantages of 
entrants relative to incumbents. Gilbert (1989) proposed a new definition focusing on 
the advantages of incumbents rather than cost disadvantages of entrants. According to 
Gilbert, an entry barrier is a rent that is derived from incumbency, i.e. the additional
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profit that a firm can earn as a sole consequence of being established in the industry. 
Gilbert introduces sunk costs as a barrier to exit for the incumbent, which allows the 
incumbent to commit to a level of output, which in turn deters entry, earning the 
incumbent a rent (Gilbert 1989). Luis Cabral provides a broader, more general 
definition of barriers to entry as “the set of structural, institutional and behavioural 
conditions that allow incumbent firms to earn economic profits for a significant length 
of time” (Cabral 2010).
Barriers to entry could be structural or strategic (Besanko, Dranove et al. 2009). 
Structural Entry Barriers exist when the incumbent has natural cost or marketing 
advantages or when the incumbent benefits from favourable regulations. Strategic Entry 
Barriers are intentionally created by incumbent firms in the market, and include tactics 
to deter entry, which may constitute anti-competitive behaviour.
1.2.2.1 Structural Entry Barriers in the Pharmaceutical Industry
New entrants in the pharmaceutical sector are faced with several structural hurdles due 
to incumbents’ first mover advantages, standards in market authorization and regulatory 
measures.
- Statutory/Regulatory Barriers to Entry: Patents that give the innovating firm the 
right to be the sole producer of a drug product for a maximum of 20 years is one of 
the most significant structural barriers. Pharmaceutical firms have to carry out 
significant preclinical and clinical testing to obtain marketing authorization.
- Economies of Scale: Pharmaceutical firms need a large budget base to sustain 
financial viability of R&D activities, satisfy regulatory standards of efficacy, safety 
(and cost-effectiveness in certain markets) and promote new products following 
commercialization. R&D scale economies emerge due to the need to maintain a 
portfolio of R&D projects as the risk of drug failure before commercialization is 
relatively high; only 1 in 4 drugs that go into clinical trials enter the market 
(Grabowski and Vernon 1990). In addition, significant sunk costs are incurred 
during the discovery process and clinical trials.
- Economies of Scope: Economies of scope are cost advantages that result from 
providing a variety of products rather than specializing in the production of a single 
product. Producing a given level of output for each product by a single firm may be 
cheaper than a combination of separate firms, each producing a single product at the
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given output level. Pharmaceutical companies frequently share research and 
development expenses to bring new products to market through mergers. Sustaining 
diverse portfolios of pharmaceutical research projects that capture both internal and 
external knowledge spillovers helps pharmaceutical firms realize economies of 
scope (Henderson and Cockbum 1996).
- Advertising and Brand Loyalty: Brand loyalty is a significant barrier to entry, 
particularly in the generic sector. Although quality differences between generics and 
branded products are small, consumer or physician perceptions regarding the 
superiority of the brand may impede the take-up of generic drugs. Brand-name 
recognition increases the effective monopoly period for a drug product. Also, first- 
mover advantages may allow originator companies to maintain brand-name prices to 
remain above costs and dominate the market even after patents expire (Santerre and 
Neun 2010). Advertising and promotion enforce habitual prescribing at the 
physician level and constitute barriers to entry by increasing brand loyalty.
1.2.2.2 Strategic Entry Barriers in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Strategic entry barriers may include, but are not limited to, implicit collusion between 
firms (e.g. price fixing), predatory pricing (Lu and Comanor 1998), cross-subsidization, 
vertical integration, and building brand loyalty to limit erosion of market share by 
generics. Originator firms use several entry deterring strategies to block/delay the entry 
of generic competition. Such strategies include:
- Strategic patenting: Originator companies may create “patent clusters” by filing 
numerous additional patents for the same medicine to delay or block the market entry of 
generic medicines. Patent clusters make it more difficult for generic competitors to see 
whether they can develop a generic version of the original medicine without infringing 
one of the many (new) patents of originator companies.
- Patent settlements: Patent disputes between originator and generic companies can 
result in the restriction of generic manufacturer’s right to market its medicine. Both in 
the US and EU, significant number of settlements include a direct payment from the 
originator to the generic company, a license, or a distribution agreement.
- Authorized generics: An authorized generic is a pharmaceutical product that is 
marketed by a brand company (or through a subsidiary or licensed in return for 
royalties) but is relabeled and marketed under a generic name (Banait 2005). Authorized 
generics in the US do not have to abide by the 180-day market exclusivity provision
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granted to the first generic on the market and result in a substantial reduction of the 
economic benefits of the six-month exclusivity period that drives the first generic entry.
- Product hopping/switching: Branded companies may prevent substitution to lower- 
priced generics by introducing new patented products with minor or no substantive 
improvements and switch customer demand to the new products.
Finally, some types of barriers can be both structural and strategic depending on the 
particular situation. Statutory/regulatory barriers, for example, could be either structural 
or strategic depending on whether incumbent firms played an active role in persuading 
the government to create them. Similarly, although sunk costs are typically structural 
barriers, they could be considered strategic if incumbent firms strategically integrate 
vertically and enhance potential entrants to do the same thing (OECD 2007). The thesis 
will dominantly incorporate the impact of structural barriers to entry as they are more 
easily quantifiable compared to strategic barriers to entry. In particular, the main focus 
will be on regulation as a strategic barrier to homogenous entry in different markets and 
on launch strategies developed by pharmaceutical firms as a response to price 
regulation.
To sum up, government intervention in the pharmaceutical market is justified by 
economic theory to correct inefficiencies associated with market failures such as moral 
hazard, informational asymmetries and lack of competition due to exclusivity rights 
granted by patents (McPake, Kumaranayake et al. 2002). Regulation affects the 
pharmaceutical industry on several levels: IP rights; R&D and product registration 
regulations; price and reimbursement regulations (Gassmann, Reepmeyer et al. 2008). 
Pricing and reimbursement (P&R) controls are broadly used to account for lack of 
competition and limit moral hazard. Although theory suggests that regulation is 
potentially welfare enhancing, designing the optimal structure of P&R regulations is not 
simple and relies on positive empirical evidence to inform policy-making. Section 1.3 
will introduce an overview of various P&R mechanisms used across the major OECD 
markets.
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1.3 From  Theory to Practice: P harm aceutical Price & R eim bursem ent 
Regulation
1.3.1 Rising Concerns over C ost-C ontainm ent
Rapid growth in healthcare expenditure has become a universal policy issue in 
industrialized countries especially after 1998. The increase has been particularly 
dramatic in the US market that currently faces the globally highest healthcare 
expenditure relative to GDP (17% of GDP in 2007, as compared to the EU average of 
12%) (see Figure A .l in Appendix A). Health spending per capita over 1997-2007 has 
grown in real terms by 4.1% annually on average across the OECD. Average economic 
growth over the same period was 2.6%, which has resulted in an increasing share of 
economic resources to health in the majority o f the countries (OECD 2009).
Figure 1.1 Total expenditure per capita on pharmaceuticals and other medical non­
durables, US$ purchasing power parity (Source: OECD Health Data, 2009)
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The percentage share o f pharmaceutical expenditures in total healthcare expenditures 
over the past decade ranged from 13-15% in the free-priced markets (US, UK and 
Germany) to about 20% in more stringent price control markets such as Italy, Spain and 
Japan (OECD 2008). Although the percent share o f pharmaceuticals has decreased as a 
response to stringent controls in Italy and Spain (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A), 
pharmaceutical expenditure per capita has invariably increased in absolute terms over 
the past decades in all major pharmaceutical markets, with considerable variation across
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countries due to differences in pharmaceuticals pricing policies and consumption 
patterns (Figure 1.1).
The growth in drug expenditures exceeded the growth in GDP during 1980-2005 
(OECD 2008). Ageing populations, rising prevalence of chronic conditions, adoption of 
new and expensive technologies, treatment of new disease areas and emergence of life­
style drugs have been the main drivers of rising pharmaceutical expenses. There has 
been a shift to more complex products with higher clinical trial costs; the number of 
trials required to support a new product has risen due to the need for comparative trials 
(Charles River Associates 2004).
Rising pharmaceutical expenditures in the last decades have increased the pressure on 
policy makers to adopt supply- and demand-side regulations on a wider scale to curb the 
growth while ensuring equity and efficiency in pharmaceutical spending in the major 
OECD markets. Cost-containment policies employed include direct or indirect price 
controls, reference pricing systems and cost-sharing to moderate demand by increasing 
patients’ price sensitivity, generic substitution, reimbursement restrictions to products in 
positive lists and/or reimbursement exclusion of products on negative lists, physician 
prescribing guidelines and budgetary controls. The success in the implementation of 
different pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement schemes varies among countries 
depending on prescribing habits, industrial policies, and public health measures 
(Mossialos, Walley et al. 2004a; Mossialos and Oliver 2005).
The following sections provide an overview of different pricing and reimbursement 
controls. Appendix A.3 provides more detailed, country-specific pricing and 
reimbursement information on the biggest six pharmaceutical markets (US-EU5 
comprised of the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain). The US-EU5 accounts 
for a major proportion of the global pharmaceutical R&D as well as more than 70% of 
the $1.5 bn global pharmaceutical retail sales. Hence, pricing and reimbursement policy 
implications in these markets are substantial for the global operations of the drug 
industry (Datamonitor 2009; EFPIA 2009).
The Transparency Directive (European Directive 89/105/EEC) is the main legal 
agreement in the area of pharmaceutical P&R in the European Union. Although the 
directive aims to ensure the transparency of P&R procedures established by Member 
States (MS), each MS has the competency to determine the prices and reimbursement 
levels on a national or regional basis. This has resulted in a significant fragmentation in
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P&R policies within the EU. In practice, national pricing and reimbursement regulation 
mainly focuses on the price level ex-factory (manufacturer sale price), the 
reimbursement level (amount paid by public funds) and restrictions on the (proxy) 
demand-side (doctors, pharmacists, patients).
1.3.2 Pricing Controls
Pricing policies are broadly classified as free pricing and price control. Under a free 
pricing policy, manufacturers or wholesalers may freely set pharmaceutical prices; in 
contrast, under price control prices are determined by the authorities. Price control is 
usually exercised through statutory pricing, price negotiations in the outpatient sector 
and public procurement in the inpatient sector. The most common pricing policy across 
the OECD is statutory pricing, whereby the price is set on a regulatory basis through 
laws or decrees. One of the most widely used approaches is to define price caps through 
external referencing. In external price referencing, prices (usually average prices) in a 
set of reference countries are used to determine a cap for the local price. In many 
countries the number of reference countries is 5 or less; only Austria and Belgium refer 
to all other EU Member States (Vogler 2008).
Price negotiations involve bargaining, negotiation to determine drug prices between the 
manufacturer and the government authority (Social Health Insurance or National Health 
Service). Under public procurement, the state (e.g. hospitals) purchase pharmaceuticals 
based on a tendering procedure that grants the contract to the best tenderer 
(pharmaceutical company or importer). Hospitals generally obtain large-scale discounts 
on drugs due to public procurement and/or direct negotiations with the manufacturers. 
Prices of hospital pharmaceuticals, therefore, tend to be lower than in the outpatient 
sector.
In the majority of the markets, prices are controlled in the outpatient sector and the 
control is limited to reimbursable pharmaceuticals. Manufactures/importers are usually 
free to set the price for non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals, usually comprised of OTC 
products. Belgium, Greece and Turkey regulate prices of all pharmaceuticals whereas 
Netherlands and Portugal apply price control for prescription-only (ethical) drugs. In 
Germany, there is free pricing at the ex-factory price level but mark-ups are regulated at 
the distribution level. UK has no direct price control but prices are indirectly affected by 
the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) that sets limits on the maximum
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profits manufacturers can make on their sales. However, there are ongoing discussions 
about replacing the PPRS system with a Value Based Pricing (VBP) when the current 
PPRS expires in 2014.
Another common pricing procedure is internal price referencing, which compares prices 
of identical or similar pharmaceuticals within a country. Internal price referencing is 
applied if a reference price system is in place for reimbursement purposes. Therefore, it 
applies mostly to reimbursable pharmaceuticals, but may also include off-patent 
products and/or parallel imported pharmaceuticals. A less often used pricing approach is 
cost-plus pricing which is based on a proof of certain costs (production cost, R&D cost 
etc) plus a granted mark up. Greece, for example, uses cost-plus pricing to set prices of 
locally produced pharmaceuticals. Other markets that apply several pricing criteria, e.g. 
Finland, may consider costs while setting price.
Prices of generics (bioequivalent drugs of a branded original pharmaceutical with an 
expired patent on the active ingredient) are considerably lower than the original product. 
Additional measures may aim to reduce the prices of the second and further generics. 
Special P&R measures apply to parallel imports in countries where their share is 
important. In Sweden, for example, substitutable pharmaceuticals (including generics 
and parallel imported pharmaceuticals) are grouped together within the system of 
mandatory generic substitution. A price lower than or equal to the highest price within a 
group of substitutable pharmaceuticals is accepted without further investigation.
At the distribution level, majority of the countries have statutory wholesale and 
pharmacy mark-ups, either a linear mark-up or a regressive scheme. Finland, 
Netherlands, and Sweden apply no statutory wholesale mark-up. Similarly, pharmacy 
mark-ups may in addition involve a fixed fee (e.g., Netherlands) or a fee-for-service 
remuneration (the UK). On top of the wholesaler and pharmacy mark-ups additional 
VAT (value added tax) is charged.
1.3.3 Reimbursement
Eligibility for reimbursement, i.e. full or partial coverage of the purchasing cost by a 
third party payer, can be product-based (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, UK), disease-based (for some 
diseases in France and Portugal), population group-based (Turkey) and consumption-
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based (Sweden). Eligibility for reimbursement and the reimbursement rates depend on 
the product in most countries.
Countries have reimbursement lists that define drugs to be included into reimbursement 
(positive lists) or drugs to be excluded from reimbursement (negative lists). Inclusion 
into a positive list is usually based on the therapeutic benefit offered by the drug in 
comparison to existing alternative products. Most countries have positive lists; however, 
Germany and the UK use negative lists.
The reimbursement price is the maximum amount paid by the third party payer. In most 
countries products are partially reimbursed (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.3.2 for a 
summary table of pharmaceutical P&R regulations in the EU5). Only in Austria, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK all reimbursable pharmaceuticals are 100% 
reimbursed (but further co-payments are possible due to a reference price system or in 
the form of prescription fees). Patients may be required to co-pay for reimbursable 
pharmaceuticals out-of-pocket or through complementary insurance. In Austria, 
Finland, Poland, the UK and in some regions of Italy patients have to pay a fixed fee for 
Rx pharmaceuticals (fixed co-payments/ prescription fees).The most common out-of- 
pocket payment for pharmaceuticals is the percentage co-payment. Deductibles, a fixed 
amount that the patient has to pay for a defined period before the cost is fully or 
partially reimbursed, is found in consumption-based reimbursement schemes such as in 
Sweden.
Under a reference price system (RPS), interchangeable pharmaceuticals are grouped 
into a “reference group” at the chemical substance (ATC5) level as in Italy and 
Portugal, or at the therapeutic (ATC4 or above) level as in Germany, Netherlands and 
Poland. Usually, off-patent products are considered for inclusion in a reference price 
system. In Germany, on-patent brands are included into the reference groups. A 
maximum reimbursable amount, the reference price, is determined based on the prices 
of products in the reference group. The methodology used to determine the maximum 
reimbursable amount differs across countries. The patient pays the difference between 
the reference price and the actual pharmacy retail price, in addition to any fixed co­
payments or percentage co-payment rates.
Additional out-of-pocket payments may be incurred as prescription fees, percentage co­
payments and deductibles. Percentage co-payments for partially reimbursed drugs are 
the most common form of out-of-pocket payments. Germany was the first country to
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introduce RPS in 1989; the Netherlands and Sweden followed in the early 1990s. 
Sweden, however, abolished the RPS in 2002 and established a system of obligatory 
generic substitution. In Sweden, substitutable pharmaceuticals are clustered. Prices not 
exceeding the highest price within such a group are automatically accepted for 
reimbursement. Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Turkey and Greece all introduced RPS 
after 2000.
Most countries grant 100% reimbursement to inpatient pharmaceutical expenditures and 
the expenses are borne by the institutions that fund the hospitals. In addition to the 
above mentioned cost-containment mechanisms, measures for rational drug use have 
been adopted. These include prescription guidelines, physician budgets, generic 
promotion through generic substitution and generic prescribing, pharmacoeconomic 
evaluations, prescription and consumption monitoring.
1.3.4 Effects of Pharmaceutical Price & Reimbursement Regulations
According to Stigler the central task of the theory of economic regulation is to explain 
the form of regulation and the effects of regulation upon the allocation of resources 
(Stigler 1971). According to the public interest theory, government policies are aimed at 
increasing efficiency and equity to promote the general interests of the society as a 
whole. In the presence of market imperfections markets fail to allocate resources 
efficiently, i.e. marginal social cost does not equal marginal social benefit for a given 
distribution of income. The government intervenes to ensure distributional justice 
(equity) and correct market failures in the pharmaceutical market by affecting 
producers’ and suppliers’ choices regarding pricing and prescription behaviour.
Government initiatives to correct market failures may result in worse outcomes. The 
public sector analogy to market failure is known as “government failure” and occurs 
when a government intervention causes a more inefficient allocation of goods and 
resources than would occur without that intervention. On the other hand, government's 
failure to intervene in a market failure that would result in a socially preferable mix of 
output is referred to as “passive government failure” (Weimer and Vining 2005; Stiglitz
2009).
Government failure and market failure can coexist. Public/industrial policy should be 
informed not only by an understanding of market failure but of government failure as
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well. The theory of government failure however is not well-developed enough to allow 
to predict the consequences of specific government interventions. Empirical evidence, 
therefore, is extremely important to analyze the contribution of market and government 
failure to inefficiencies in the market.
The impact of regulation in the pharmaceutical industry has been analyzed from several 
perspectives. A significant body of literature investigates how regulation affects 
pharmaceutical prices and competition, R&D and sustainability of pharmaceutical 
innovations, patient access to medical treatments and healthcare cost-containment. 
However, these studies have largely been partial analysis looking at the impact of 
regulation and not the form of optimal regulation.
Isolating the impact of each measure has proven difficult due to differing unmet 
healthcare needs and healthcare system structures as well as simultaneous adoption of 
several measures. Although the overall effect of each pricing and reimbursement 
measure on social welfare remains an unclear contentious issue in the public policy 
arena, major stylized facts that emerge from the literature are summarized in the 
following section.
1.3.4.1 Effects on Pharmaceutical Firm Strategies 
Revenues, R&D Investments and Innovation
According to economic theory firms invest in capital up to the point where the expected 
marginal efficiency of investment in R&D is equal to the firm's marginal cost of capital 
(Vernon, Golec et al. 2006). P&R regulations affect the optimum R&D level in several 
ways. Majority of the regulations reduce pharmaceutical firm revenues and expected 
returns to R&D, with the direct price controls having the biggest impact (Vernon 2003; 
Sood, de Vries et al. 2009). Empirical research by Grabowski and Vernon (2000) 
shows that expected returns and cash flow are important determinants of pharmaceutical 
R&D. Given that sales revenue comprises the primary source of R&D financing , price 
regulation results in reduced pharmaceutical profitability and R&D spending 
(Grabowski and Vernon 2000).
3 External funding sources such as private equity or new debt is available only at higher costs due to 
the risk premium required by investors/lenders
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Price regulations reduce the internal rate of return of R&D projects which results in 
reduced market entry for innovative drugs as fewer projects can compensate for the cost 
of capital (Giaccotto, Santerre et al. 2005; Golec, Hegde et al. 2008). In addition, P&R 
regulations may also reduce expected present value of cash flows by delaying market 
access and reducing the duration of market exclusivity and effective patent protection.
Entry Strategies
How regulation affects timing of entry of pharmaceutical technologies is a question still 
open to empirical investigation4. Although recently several studies have analyzed the 
impact of regulation on the timing of new molecule launches, existing evidence is 
limited, particularly for the off-patent sector. Pharmaceutical price regulation results in 
delays in market access for new chemical entities as well as reduced extent of entry. 
Coutries with a stringent regulation of entry but with relatively little price regulation 
(US, UK) tend to be launched in more foreign markets (Thomas 1994). Pharmaceutical 
companies often aim to launch their products first in markets with highest market size 
and highest prices to influence prices in subsequent markets with price control upwards 
(Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Kyle 2007; Danzon and Epstein 2008).
Pharmaceutical regulation also affects the entry of generic competitors. Danzon and 
Chao (2000) find empirical evidence that generic market shares are lower in prices with 
price regulation (Danzon and Chao 2000a). Different approval processes and the 
national nature of patent rights in Europe have created a major barrier to generic 
penetration in the EU. The requirement for generic products to receive approval in each 
separate state has delayed the diffusion of generics cross-nationally. The mutual 
recognition process aimed to facilitate this in 1995. Differences in supplementary 
protection certificate expiry dates can further delay generic entry. Another major issue 
before generic penetration in the EU has been the late introduction of patent laws in 
several EU countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal. The presence of unregulated 
copy products has created distrust on the demand-side. In general, markets with higher 
branded prices, i.e. less price regulation, are more favourable to generic entry because
4 In the healthcare setting, a clear distinction is drawn between adoption and diffusion although these 
terms tend to be used more interchangeably in general. Adoption is defined as the first contact of the 
physician with the innovation. In the context of this thesis, adoption is used to refer to the first 
launch date of a given patent-protected molecule or its generic copy. Diffusion, on the other hand, 
depends on the rate of prescription of a new drug by physicians over time (Costa-Font, Courbage et 
al. 2009). Timing of adoption in this thesis will be analyzed at the market-level for each country.
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high prices increase both the incentive for payers to use generics and the profit 
potentials for generic players (Schulz 2004).
Additional requirements with respect to pricing and reimbursement delay generic entry 
(DG Competition 2009). The inquiry of the European Commission into the 
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry in 2009 has identified that generic entry 
in the EU is delayed due to the impact of regulation (lengthy marketing authorization, 
pricing and reimbursement procedures) and company behaviour (patent application and 
enforcement strategies).
There are few studies in the literature on generic entry outside the North American 
market that will shed light on the impact of different regulations on generic entry. 
Evidence from the Swedish and Spanish markets shows that expected profits/revenues 
are associated with higher generic entry in a regulated environment. A shorter patent 
protection period for the branded product resulted in a higher number of generic 
entrants in the Swedish market (Rudholm 2001).
Reference pricing can restrain generic entry by depriving generic firms of their main 
advantage, lower prices compared to the brand-name alternatives (Moreno-Torres, Puig- 
Junoy et al. 2007). Evidence from an earlier Swedish market by Ekelund (2001) 
confirms that the reference price system on average decreases the probability that 
generics are launched (Ekelund 2001).
Competition and Pricing Strategies
The evidence on the impact of P&R regulations on pricing strategies is relatively 
limited. Price regulation of branded drugs arguably undermines price competition 
generated by generic firms and results in higher generic prices in price-regulated 
markets than in the US (Danzon and Chao 2000b; Graham 2001). According to Frank 
and Salkaver, the demand for brand-name prescription drugs is composed of two 
segments: a cross-price-sensitive segment that is sensitive to prices of generic 
equivalents and a loyal segment whose demand is unaffected by the price of generic 
substitutes. In a free-priced market, branded manufacturers may opt to target the brand- 
loyal segment and increase prices following patent expiry.
The higher the price difference between the branded and generic alternatives, the higher 
is the probability that the price sensitive segment switches to generic alternatives. Price
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regulation pushes prices of branded medicines downwards and decreases branded- 
generic price differential, undermining the competitive advantage of generics. Similarly, 
in price controlled markets manufacturers usually cannot increase the price to the brand- 
loyal segment.
The impact of reference pricing (RP) on prices and competition depends highly on the 
way clusters are defined, how reference prices are set and whether generic substitution 
exists (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000). In general, reference pricing pushes 
firms to lower prices resulting in narrow price ranges within a cluster. Savings due to 
RP systems have been high in markets with high priced markets with large price 
differentials across drugs in the same reference group and a well-developed generic 
sector such as in Germany (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000). Savings have 
remained more modest in markets such as Spain and Italy where the generic market is 
not very developed and prices are relatively low (Puig-Junoy 2004). Generic 
substitution contributes to a reduction in drug prices and slows down the growth of 
pharmaceutical expenditure (Buzzelli, Kangasharju et al. 2006) (Andersson, Bergstrom 
et al. 2007).
Parallel trade (arbitrage) and external reference pricing have increased the dependency 
of prices between different markets. This precludes firms from setting prices 
individually in each market. Pricing decisions have to consider interactions between 
country prices and the profit knock-on effects across markets. There is empirical 
evidence which suggests that prices in the EU have started to converge as a result of 
strategic pricing by pharmaceutical firms (Kyle 2007).
1.3.4.2 Effects on Public Spending and Welfare
The results regarding policy interventions on public spending or welfare are not easy to 
interpret because measures are usually applied contemporaneously and isolating the 
impact of one measure may be difficult.
A recent study by Lakdawalla et al (2009) measures the impact of different policy 
choices on current and future generations of Americans and Europeans by using a 
global micro-simulation model of health and mortality. The model focuses on price 
controls and copayment reductions. Their main finding is that copayment reduction is a 
robust and welfare-improving policy whereas price controls offer a relatively modest 
benefit (Lakdawalla, Goldman et al. 2009).
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Cost Sharing
Cost-sharing has been accepted as an effective tool in increasing price sensitivity, 
reducing moral hazard and thus health expenditures (Winkelmann 2004; Grabka, 
Schreyogg et al. 2006; Li, Guh et al. 2007). The reduction in demand through cost- 
sharing, however, falls more heavily on the poor and chronically ill individuals. The 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the US that was conducted during 1974-1982 
provides the only randomized study of health insurance and the impacts of different co­
payment levels. This experiment showed that cost sharing reduced both necessary and 
unnecessary medical care, however, with possible side effects due to the decrease in the 
consumption of medical services (Brook, Ware et al. 1983; Brook, Ware et al. 1984).
Reference Pricing
In France, Germany, Italy and Spain reference pricing is used as a cost-sharing means 
for reimbursed pharmaceuticals. Although prices tend to drop following inclusion of 
products into clusters, the exact impact of reference pricing systems on cost- 
containment depends on the clustering and reference price mechanisms as well as other 
incentives in the system. Several studies conclude that RP has failed to control the 
aggregate growth of pharmaceutical expenditures (Pavcnik 2000; Danzon 2001; 
Ioannides-Demos, Ibrahim et al. 2002) (Kalo, Muszbek et al. 2007). Net savings on 
total expenses depend on by how much utilization of other health care services increases 
due to introduction of RP and the budget impact of the pharmaceutical sub-segment to 
which RP is applied (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000; Puig-Junoy 2004). Also, 
firms may increase the prices of other products not subject to RP (Mestre-Ferrandiz
2003).
Savings due to RP systems have been high in markets in high priced markets that have 
large price differentials across drugs in the same reference group and a well-developed 
generic sector such as in Germany (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000). The 
existence of generic competition and introduction of RP in Germany fuelled a price 
decrease (Pavcnik 2000). Savings have remained more modest in markets such as 
Spain and Italy where the generic market is not very developed and prices are relatively 
low (Puig-Junoy 2004).
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Generic Substitution
Buzzelli et. al. (2004) study the impact of generic substitution on pharmaceutical prices 
and expenditures in OECD countries (Buzzelli, Kangashaiju et al. 2006). On average, 
prices were reduced by 3.1% following the implementation of generic substitution, 
controlling for the growth rates in prices, time trend, country-specific differences in 
prices, population age structure, and income levels. The point estimate for reduction in 
expenditures, however, is 1.6% and not statistically significant, which suggests that 
consumption of pharmaceuticals increased as prices were reduced (Buzzelli, 
Kangasharju et al. 2006). The introduction of generic substitution in Sweden shifted the 
increasing expenditure trend, both in patients’ and society's expenditures, to a 
decreasing trend, which shows that generic substitution has contributed to a reduction in 
the growth of pharmaceutical expenditure (Andersson, Bergstrom et al. 2007).
Haas et al (2005) estimated savings of approximately 11% of total drug expenditures 
($5.9 bn) if a generic had been substituted for all brand-name outpatient drugs in 2000 
(Haas, Phillips et al. 2005). Similarly, Simoens and De Coster (2006) estimate that 
substitution of top 10 originator medicines by sales would have generated savings in 
public expenditures by at least 20% in some EU countries (Simoens and de Coster 
2006).
Parallel Trade
Although the benefits of parallel trade mainly accrue to intermediaries, parallel trade 
across the EU has resulted in savings in the pharmaceutical expenditure through 
introduction of lower-priced products and increased competition (Kanavos and Costa- 
Font 2005). For example, direct savings for Germany and the UK have been estimated 
to be 0.4% and 1.7% respectively. Several other studies also observe significant cost- 
containment in the EU with indirect competitive effects through reduced prices (West 
and Mahon 2003), (Ganslandt and Maskus 2004). On the other hand, considering the 
negative effect parallel importing has on the pharmaceutical industry the total negative 
effect of parallel importing on the UK economy has been estimated to be more than 
£290 million (Thomas 2008). However, cost-containment potential due to parallel 
trading is decreasing as a result of pharmaceutical company strategies to reduce price 
differentials across countries and other non-price strategies such as the launch of 
differentiated products across the EU (Enemark, Moller et al. 2006).
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1.4 Thesis Background
This thesis discusses how to model the effect of regulation on the adoption of new 
pharmaceutical molecules and first generic competition. The analysis draws upon sales 
($) and price ($/SU5) data from IMS6,7 during 1998-2008 in a panel of 20 countries, 19 
of which are within the OECD. Adoption of pharmaceutical technologies is modelled 
using time to event analysis (survival analysis), whereby failure times are defined by the 
time elapse between the global launch date of molecules (global adoption) and local 
launch dates (local adoption) of molecules in individual countries. Discrete-time 
survival analysis is carried out controlling for regulation, market attractiveness, 
molecule and firm heterogeneity.
From an economic perspective it is important to analyze relative launch delays across 
countries because delays affect both consumer welfare and industrial welfare, and have 
implications for industrial and public health policy. Delayed access to new drugs 
compromises health outcomes and quality of health care (Schoffski 2002), shifts 
volume to older molecules of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham 2004) and 
increases expenditures on other forms of medical care (Kessler 2004; Wertheimer and 
Santella 2004). Innovative medications offer consumer benefits through fewer work 
days missed and lives saved (Lichtenberg 1996; Lichtenberg 2003a; Hassett 2004; 
Lichtenberg 2005). Delays hit the pharmaceutical industry through reduced market 
exclusivity periods, lower returns to R&D and shrinking pipelines.
Timely generic adoption and uptake following the expiry of originator patents and 
additional exclusivity protections enhances efficiency and competition in the drug 
market. Generics are by definition bioequivalent to originators, and constitute perfect 
substitutes on objective quality grounds. Significant cost-advantages in product 
development and barriers to entry allow generics to compete based on price, which 
makes generics cost-effective alternatives to off-patent medicines that can curb 
expenses effectively. Freed resources can be used to fund and incentivize the 
development of new more effective pharmaceutical technologies. Generics may also 
affect consumer welfare through increased affordability and access.
5 IMS standard units
6 Intercontinental Medical Statistics, www.imshealth.com/
7 Data was collected at Merck Sharp Dome, UK.
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I argue that price regulation slows down the adoption of pharmaceutical technologies, 
both for new molecules and generics, by increasing structural barriers to entry. Lower 
prices result in lower profits, reduced incentives to entry and potentially lower 
competition and higher market concentration. Firms are optimizers of future global 
revenue inflow. Price linkages across markets result in reduced or delayed launch in 
low-priced markets, or result in narrower price bands across countries.
1.4.1 Contributions of the Thesis
The thesis contributes to the economics of regulation literature by providing positive 
empirical evidence on the adoption of pharmaceutical technologies for human use. 
Theory does not tell us much as it depends on precise market structure, number of firms, 
and specific regulation in individual markets. Additional major contributions of the 
thesis can be summarized as follows.
i) Data
- Recent and comprehensive IMS Data: This thesis makes use of recent IMS price, 
volume and launch timing data in the main OECD markets during 1999-2008. IMS 
data is one of the most reliable pharmaceutical sales and price data available, and is 
widely used both academically and commercially. IMS data is validated annually 
and has positioned itself as one of the most reliable sources of healthcare market 
data.
Q
- Country and Molecule Set: The dataset used covers 20 markets . As mentioned 
before, only the US-EU5 account for more than 70% of the global pharmaceutical 
sales and for the majority of the global R&D. The set of molecules comprises all 14 
different ATC1 categories (see Table A.2). The thesis contributes by adopting 
stricter criteria for the global potential of molecules, e.g. the analysis for adoption of 
innovation considers molecules that have launched in more than 10 markets and the 
analysis of first generic adoption considers molecules that have launched a generic 
both in the US and UK to avoid bias due to one-market molecules. The choice of the
8 Australia , Austria, Belgium, Canada , Finland , France, Germany , Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the 
US
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country and molecule set in the regressions therefore increases the importance and 
relevance of results from a policy perspective.
ii) Methodological
- Multivariate Survival Analysis: In terms of statistical methods first analyses in the 
literature used less sophisticated methods such as ordinary least square regressions, 
and Pearson correlation coefficients. The assumed normality for time to an event is 
often an unreasonable assumption. Time-to-event is non-negative, non-symmetric 
and usually positively skewed. Linear regression approaches are not robust to these 
violations (Cleves, Gould et al. 2008). In addition, time-to-event is censored if the 
survival time of some objects is not observed before the termination of the 
observation period. Failure to take censoring into account can introduce serious bias 
in estimates of the distribution of survival time and factors that affect survival time.
Binary response models (probit) have been estimated by defining a threshold period 
for the definition of success (i.e. launch before a pre-determined period) (Heuer, 
Mejer et al. 2007). Such an approach results in severe loss of timing information. 
Methodologically few analyses have adopted multivariate survival analysis methods 
that incorporate more detailed time information and account for the censoring in the 
survival data. Since the failure times in the IMS data are interval censored, I use 
discrete-time survival analysis methods to specify the hazard of launch.
- Identification of Regulation and Competition: The majority of prior studies use 
treatment dummies to account for the impact of regulation. Price control treatment 
dummies cannot capture the diversity and complexity of prices across different 
therapeutic groups and over time. This thesis made use of product level price 
information that allows controlling for changes over time as well as variation across 
different therapeutic areas. Only few studies have made use of price and volume 
information to account for heterogeneity in policy measures across markets 
(Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Danzon and Epstein 2008). Following the approach by 
Danzon (2008), I proxy for the impact of price regulation through average lagged 
competitor prices in the same therapeutic subgroup controlling for country and time 
fixed effects. Use of lagged expected prices also aims to avoid endogeneity of price 
and the launch decision.
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Prior studies have primarily used the number of competitor molecules as the main 
proxy of competition. This approach, however, gives equal weight to each 
competitor. Different from prior studies in the literature, the impact of competition 
was investigated using the Herfindahl Hirschman concentration index for molecule 
sales in the same ATC4 in Chapter 3 and the sales of generic firms in ATC4 in 
Chapter 4.
Incorporation of Molecule and Firm Heterogeneity: Only a few studies have 
attempted to disentangle the effects of firm and molecule characteristics in 
estimating the hazard of launch. Omission of such variables could significantly bias 
parameter estimates, and effect standard errors as well as hypotheses tests. All 
empirical analyses control for market structure, firm and molecule characteristics on 
the probability of launch to estimate coefficients more precisely. Also, errors were 
clustered at the molecule-country level to account for potential autocorrelation over 
time.
- Checks for robustness and multicollinearitv: Substantial robustness checks were
carried out to identify how sensitive parameter estimates are to the regression 
methodology and duration specification. Robustness checks were carried out by 
testing alternative proxies for variables and estimating the model with different 
regression models (Cox, cloglog and logit). Duration dependence was controlled for 
both parametrically and non-parametrically to detect possible misspecification 
errors. Multicollinearity of regressors was investigated by calculating variance 
inflation factors to choose better model specifications that would not result in 
inflated parameter variances.
iii) Contents
- First Analysis of Evolutionary Trends: The thesis provided the first comparison of
launch lag trends across markets and different time periods during 1960-2008.1 also
tested for the impact of the two main regulatory changes using a quasi-experimental 
framework with difference-in-differences analysis as well as fixed and random 
effects Cox proportional hazards model.
- Evidence on Adoption of Innovation: I extend the work by Danzon and Epstein
(2008) which also provided an analysis of launch times using price and volume
information. Their work has been criticized for not inlcluding globally important
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molecules (Garattini and Ghislandi 2007). I define more stringent criteria to select 
the molecules; only molecules that diffused to at least 10 markets were included in 
the analysis of timing of new molecule adoption. I also employ more extensive 
controls for firm, molecule and therapeutic subgroup competition effects to isolate 
the impact of these variables, potentially reducing the variability in the parameter 
estimates.
- Evidence on Timing of Generic Entry: Evidence for timing of generic entry is 
extremely limited. This is the first study that employs substantial cross-country data 
to examine timing questions in the generic sector. No prior analysis has used 
molecule and market-specific price information for timing of launch analysis in the 
off-patent sector.
iv) Results
The analysis in this thesis clearly suggests that pharmaceutical corporations launch 
strategies are highly responsive to changes in the regulatory landscape and the legal 
transaction costs of entry. The thesis provides robust evidence that price regulation is 
associated with delays both locally but also internationally due to price linkages across 
markets. The evidence presented here indicates that firms behave strategically in their 
launch decisions and commercialize their products first in high-priced markets. There is 
an indication that firms are launching products within a narrower price range in the 
European market to reduce the impact of price and profit spillovers across Member 
States. Controlling for delays in the adoption of new molecules, generic launch also 
suffers from price controls. This is mainly because price controls depress originator 
prices and the price mark-up between originators and generics, reducing the incentives 
for generic entry.
The comparison of cloglog and cox models indicates that cloglog is the preferable 
specification with the interval-censored failure times in the IMS data. Logit and cloglog 
estimates, on the other hand, gave very close parameter estimates. Overall, parametric 
and non-parametric duration specification result in similar estimates but the parametric 
approach is preferable in some specification due to the parsimony in parameter 
estimates compared to the non-parametric speficiation.
The next section provides an overview of the organization of the thesis and the main 
hypotheses tested in each empirical chapter.
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1.4.2 Organization of the Thesis and Main Research Questions
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to provide a positive economic analysis of how 
pharmaceutical price regulation affects adoption of pharmaceutical technologies, both 
for innovative new molecules and generic competition, during 1999-2008 across the 
main OECD markets relative to the market where the first global launch occurs. The 
thesis will not address the question of whether or not price regulation improves overall 
social welfare. Quantitative analysis of this nature is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
However, a better understanding of drug adoption to price regulation through positive 
economic analysis will help inform the debate over price controls, free trade in 
pharmaceuticals and the static-dyanamic efficiency trade-off.
The thesis is comprised of three empirical chapters introduced below together with the 
research hypotheses in each chapter.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 is an exploratory analysis that quantifies the delays in the launch of new 
molecules and generics across markets and different periods. This chapter investigates 
the evolution of pharmaceutical corporations’ launch strategies as a response to changes 
in regulation. The analytical framework is defined using two regulatory changes that 
reshaped the barriers to entry substantially: the US Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 and the 
establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMA, abbreviated as EMEA before
2010) in 1995.
This chapter considers potentially global molecules (molecules that launched in both the 
UK and the US) and truly global molecules that launched in all of the 20 countries 
within the IMS data used for the analysis. Non-parametric survival analysis is carried 
out to calculate the mean and median survival times. Failure times of each molecule- 
country pair are defined as the time difference between the first global launch date and 
local launch date of new molecules or first generic product of each molecule. Kaplan- 
Meier survival estimates are calculated for each market in three times using molecules 
(and in the second section generics) that first launched globally during the following 
periods: 1) 1960-1984; 2) 1984-1995; and 3) 1995-2008. Finally, difference-in- 
difference (DiD) analysis is carried out to assess whether policy changes in 1984 and 
1995 had a significant effect on the speed of adoption.
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Hypotheses tested in Chapter 2 are as follows:
H 2.1: Do pharmaceutical corporate launch strategies respond to changes in the 
regulatory environment?
It is expected that pharmaceutical firms will respond to regulatory changes that 
reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency and transparency of market 
authorization procedures. The Hatch-Waxman act has restored the patent term for 
innovative molecules and enabled generics to enter the market without having to 
carry out expensive clinical trials. The establishment of the EMEA has also 
reduced transaction costs by harmonizing market authorization requirements in a 
fragmented EU market.
H 2.2: What is the trend in the differentials in drug adoption over time?
It is expected that drugs diffuse to markets faster over time as result of 
international harmonization of market authorization regulations and globalization 
of pharmaceutical corporations. Also, Bolar provisions granted to generics in the 
US and EU have substantially reduced structural barriers to generic entry over the 
past decades.
H 2.3: What is the impact of centralized authorization on relative delays in new 
molecule launches across the main European pharmaceutical markets?
Establishment of the EMEA is expected to have reduced the transaction costs, and 
thus, differential delays in adoption across the EU for centrally approved 
molecules.
Kaplan-Meier estimates for mean survival time show that pharmaceutical corporations’ 
launch strategies have responded to regulatory developments and changes in barriers to 
entry. The US faced a significant drug lag in comparison to European markets following 
the 1962 Kefauver Harris Amendments that introduced stringent market authorization 
requirements for new pharmaceutical products. This delay was closed after the 1984 
Hatch-Waxman Act that introduced new financial incentives for innovative drugs by 
restoring the patent term lost during drug development. Recent estimates show that 
although a centralized market approval in Europe narrowed the differentials in timing of 
launch across countries, there still exists a pattern of delay across Europe due to
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differences in local pricing and reimbursement regulations (and potential profit 
spillovers as discussed in Chapter 3).
New molecules launch first in higher-priced European markets as a result of threat of 
arbitrage and price dependency created by external reference pricing. A surprising 
finding in Chapter 2 is that Japan, the second largest pharmaceutical market, exhibits 
substantial delay in the adoption of new pharmaceutical technologies. The impact of 
price controls suggests a similar delay pattern in the launch times of first generic 
products. DiD estimates indicate faster adoption both for new molecules and generics in 
the US following the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984; which suggests that the Act has been 
successful in restoring incentives for innovative molecules while stimulating the generic 
sector. DiD estimates for the impact of the establishment of the EMEA in the EU 
indicate that adoption of new molecules is significantly faster; however, the impact of 
the EMEA on generic adoption was not significant.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 aims to answer how regulation affects launch strategies in the on-patent 
pharmaceutical sector and incorporates covariates for regulation, market, firm and 
molecule characteristics. This chapter uses substantial IMS price and volume data from 
20 markets (South Africa and 19 OECD markets) during 1999-2008. Incorporation of 
price information provides a more accurate and sensitive control for the outcome of 
pricing regulations aimed at innovative medicines rather than using dummies to control 
for regulation. Discrete time implementation of the proportional hazard model with 
complementary log log regressions are run to account for the monthly grouping of 
launch times in the IMS database. Results are compared to the continuous time Cox 
model for the base case. The analysis is carried out for molecules that have launched in 
at least half of the markets in the database to avoid bias due to locally oriented 
molecules and increase the generalizability of the results.
Hypotheses tested in Chapter 3 are as follows:
H 3.1: Does the hazard of launch increase in expected new molecule prices?
It is expected that the higher expected prices, the higher the probability of launch 
since price controls reduce returns from R&D investments and jeopardize
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incentives to entry. In addition, launch in low priced markets results in profit 
spillovers to subsequent markets that reference it in price setting.
H 3.2: Do firms strategically launch later in price controlled markets and manipulate 
launch prices?
Firms are global optimizers and have to increasingly consider the 
ineterdependencies across markets to determine launch strategies. Firms can 
adopt two startegies to avoid knock-on effects of regulations in subsequent 
markets. Avoiding launch in small, low-priced markets would block parallel trade 
from the low-priced market to the high-priced markets and prevent price spillover 
due to external referencing (or delay these by launching later in the product 
lifecycle). Alternatively, firms may opt to launch products across markets at 
converging prices and keep the price knock-on effects to a minimum.
H 3.3: Does market size have a significant effect on hazard of launch controlling for 
expected price?
Although prior evidence is contradictory, it is expected that a higher expected 
market size (which is measured at the therapeutic subgroup level rather than at an 
aggregate level) will increase incentives to entry and result in faster adoption.
H 3.4: Does competition increase the hazard of adoption for new molecules?
Industrial organization considers higher market concentration as a structural 
barrier to market entry and predicts that high market concentration is associated 
with lower equilibrium level of entry. Therefore, I expect that market power 
concentration in therapeutic subgroups to reduce the hazard of launch.
H 3.5: Do firm economies of scale and scope increase the hazard of launch?
It is expected that scale and scope economies result in cost advantages in clinical 
trials, advertising, registration and price approvals, and learning effects in R&D 
with knowledge spillovers across different drugs. I expect that the higher global 
sales of the firm and the number of molecules the firm has launched, the higher is 
the hazard of launch.
H 3.6: Do therapeutically/commercially important molecules diffuse faster 
internationally?
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The on-patent sector is an oligopolositic market environment with quality-based 
competition. Therefore, it is expected that therapeutically important molecules (as 
proxied by the extent of global reach and global sales) obtain faster approval and 
price mark-ups that increase incentives for faster entry.
Results in Chapter 3 confirm hypotheses H 3.1-3.3. Price regulation and lower market 
size are significantly associated with reduced delays in adoption of innovative 
molecules. The price effect is more robust across different specifications compared to 
the volume effect, which emphasizes the key role of expected price in new molecule 
launches. Results indicate strategic firm behaviour in terms of late launch (or non­
launch) in low-priced markets and convergence in pricing strategies to avoid knock-on 
effects in foreign markets through external referencing and parallel trade spillovers. 
Consistent with H 3.4, higher therapeutic subgroup concentration was found to 
discourage fast adoption. However, an increase in the number of substitute molecules 
was associated with an increase in the hazard of launch, which suggests that price 
controls may increase concentration at the therapeutic subgroup level further decreasing 
the incentives for entry.
Findings confirm H 3.5 and H 3.6; significant firm and molecule heterogeneity is 
observed in the probability of launch. In particular, pharmaceutical innovations of firms 
that have prior launch experience in several markets are adopted internationally faster. 
Firms with more established local experience (higher number of local molecules) and 
higher sales revenue obtain faster market access, which might be explained by higher 
ability to overcome barriers to entry. Similarly, consistent with prior findings from the 
literature, therapeutically more important molecules are adopted more quickly.
Chapter 4
The main research question in Chapter 4 is how regulation affects timing of generic 
availability relative to the first global generic launch across the main OECD markets 
during 1999-2008 controlling for market, firm and molecule characteristics. Regulation 
is mainly captured by the product of lagged average retail branded prices and the 
median generic-branded price ratio in the destination market, which is a more refined 
approximation compared to using branded prices only or treatment dummies for price 
controls. Due to the grouped nature of survival times in the IMS database, the empirical 
strategy adopts discrete time implementation of the proportional hazard model using
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complementary log log regression and proportional odds model using logistic 
regression. In both cases, parametric and non-parametric duration dependence is used to 
test the robustness of parameter estimates to different model specifications. The 
regressions are estimated for generic molecules that launched both in the US and UK to 
exclude molecules that launched exclusively in one market, and had a first global 
generic launch during or after 1993.
Hypotheses tested in Chapter 4 are as follows:
H 4.1: Does the hazard of generic adoption increase in expected generic prices?
Higher generic prices (proxied by average branded prices times the generic- 
branded price ratio in the market) are expected to increase incentives for generic 
entry. Given that generics compete based on price, the higher the price mark-up 
of brandeds over generics, the higher the market share that generics can capture. 
Therefore, generic entry is expected to be faster in markets with high prices and a 
low generic-branded price ratio (Pg/Pb).
H 4.2: How does hazard of generic adoption depend on the expected generic market 
size?
Generics business model is based on a low-margin price competition. The 
prospect of capturing a substantial volume, therefore, is expeted to be a key driver 
of generic entry. Generic market size is controlled by the multiple of two factors: 
i) branded molecule sales, and ii) average market share captured by generics in 
individual markets. This approach takes into account local variations in generic 
penetration rates across countries.
H 4.3: How do ex-ante expectations about generic competition affect hazard of generic 
adoption?
Higher generic competition drives prices down and reduces the market share 
captured by individual competitors since generic products are commodity 
products that cannot be successfully differentiated through promotion efforts. It 
is, therefore, expected that the higher number of generic competitors in the 
country and the higher the concentration of generic manufacturers at the 
therapeutic class level, the lower the hazard rate.
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H 4.4: Is generic entry faster for therapeutically more important molecules?
Therapeutic importance of the molecule may affect adoption speed in several 
ways. First, the originator has a longer adoption delay as therapeutic importance 
decreases, which reduces the duration of the exclusivity period during which the 
originator builds brand loyalty, the main strategic advantage of branded products 
over generic competitors. Second, therapeutically important molecules are usually 
granted higher price mark-ups due to improved quality attributes, which should 
increase generic entry based on hypothesis H 4.1.
H 4.5: Do firm economies of scale and scope significantly increase the hazard of launch 
in the generic sector?
Scale effects are expected to be less important in the generic sector due to lower 
structural entry barriers associated with R&D and advertising in the branded 
sector. However, economies of scale may allow vertical integration in the supply 
chain as well as mergers with other generic manufacturers to decrease costs, 
which will increase incentives to entry. Economies of scope would allow lower- 
cost entry as the firm can switch quickly and less costly from one product line to 
another. Economies of scope due to knowledge spillovers across different product 
lines may further lower development and entry costs.
Consistent with hypotheses H 4.1 and H 4.2, Chapter 4 finds robust and highly 
significant positive effect of expected generic prices and expected market size on the 
hazard of first generic launch. Controlling for branded prices, the closer the generic and 
branded prices are, the lower is the hazard of launch. Price differentials between 
generics and branded drugs allow generics to capture a higher share from branded sales 
(in markets with reference price systems co-payments, defined as a function of the 
generic-branded price difference, provide incentives for generic use). The significance 
of expected market size suggests that demand-side measures to promote generic demand 
should supplement any supply-side oriented measures to sustain the generic market.
Findings in Chapter 4 indicate that competition slows down entry of generics, which is 
opposite to the impact of competition on the hazard of launch of new molecules. 
Contrary to the hypothesis H 4.3, the higher the concentration of generic manufacturers 
in the ATC4 in each country, the higher is the hazard of launch. This could be due to a
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higher untapped market opportunity in a commodity market when the concentration is 
high.
At the firm level, local sales are better predictors of the hazard of launch compared to 
the global firm sales, which partially contradicts hypothesis H 4.5. Consistent with 
hypothesis H 4.5, firms’ with a higher number of molecules on average have quicker 
generic launch which suggests economies of scope. The fact that local sales predict 
launch better could be a reflection of the fact that generic manufacturers tended to be 
largely regional players in the past. However, global companies are increasingly 
emerging in the generics business (e.g. Teva and Ranbaxy), in particular low-cost 
producers from Eastern Europe, China and India are impacting margings on a global 
scale driving acquisitions to build scale to offset such margin pressure (Jorge 2009).
The final chapter, Chapter 5, wraps up the thesis by reviewing the empirical chapters 
and ties up the hypotheses; presents the results with policy implications and highlights 
the contributions to the literature as well as the limitations in the empirical analyses. 
Finally, suggestions on possible extensions of the analyses carried out in the thesis are 
provided as a direction for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
2 Trends in the Adoption of Pharmaceutical Innovation and Generic 
Competition as a Response to Regulatory Changes during 1960- 
2008
2.1 INTRODUCTION
How regulation affects adoption of innovation is a question open to empirical scrutiny, 
especially in highly regulated industries such as the pharmaceutical industry where 
products are protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The existing evidence in 
the pharmaceutical context is very limited despite the fact that several studies have been 
carried out. Particularly important is the role of the timing of drug launch, which is 
typically carried out by international companies following some corporate strategy. 
Paradoxically, the impact of regulation on generic products within a therapeutic group 
has received even less attention. Expected proliferation of bioequivalent products in the 
near future, rising concerns over cost containment and the resulting push for 
genericization makes timing of generic launch a question of interest both for the 
pharmaceutical industry and the policy makers. The purpose of this chapter is to 
investigate how policy changes related to the regulatory environment impinge on the 
adoption of pharmaceutical innovation (new molecules) and imitation (generic 
products) across the main OECD markets over the period 1960-2008. Comprehensive 
IMS data is used to analyze cross-national adoption of 845 molecules from 14 different 
anatomic therapeutic categories by survival analysis methods.
Regulation of market access and prescribing was historically introduced to ensure 
product efficacy and safety following the Thalidomide tragedy in 1960s. Regulation 
throughout the history has aimed to balance the opposing interests of the industry 
through patents and those of the consumers through regulation of market access and 
price controls. Patents generate the financial incentives to innovate by providing market 
exclusivity. Product efficacy and safety are critical to the health of consumers but are 
not immediately observable. Drug regulations, therefore, aim to keep unsafe and 
ineffective drugs off the market to protect consumers, at the price of diminishing 
incentives to innovate. As descried in Chapter 1, post-launch regulations are aimed at 
correcting the failures in the pharmaceutical sector, of which monopolistic power 
granted by patents and price insensitivity due to third party payment are the most
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prominent ones. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 provide additional background on the 
historical development of pharmaceutical regulation. This chapter aims to assess trends 
in the adoption delays of pharmaceutical technologies as a response to policy changes in 
pharmaceutical regulation.
Firms facing a competitive environment would ideally launch new chemical entities 
(NCE) as quickly as possible into several markets to amortize the substantial R&D 
outlays. However, at least two regulatory hurdles have to be overcome before 
commercializing a new drug product. The first hurdle is that manufacturers have to 
prove the threefold requirement of quality, safety and efficacy of new molecules which 
is estimated to take around ten years of pre-clinical and clinical research (Permanand 
2006). The second hurdle typically includes the review of the new product dossier by 
the regulatory authority (FDA9, EMEA10 or any national authority) and approval of 
marketing authorization (MA). Finally, the third hurdle following marketing approval is 
pricing and reimbursement (P&R) which involves negotiations between manufacturers 
and P&R authorities regarding the price of the new product and its reimbursement 
status. This latter hurdle, namely price regulation, can arguably delay launch through 
the negotiation processes alongside the resulting firm strategies of delaying or foregoing 
launch in low-priced markets11 (Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Kyle 2007). Non­
homogeneity in these hurdles across markets results in launch delays, with welfare
•  •  19implications for the consumer and the pharmaceutical producer .
The importance of innovation lies in that lags in the adoption of new pharmaceutical 
innovations may affect consumer welfare through impaired spatial equity and access to 
new drug products, in particular cost-effective products. Empirical evidence shows that 
lack of access to new drugs leads to compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski 2002), 
shifts volume to older molecules of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham
2004) and results in higher expenditures on other forms of medical care and
9 Food and Drug Administration
10 European Medicines Agency had the acronym of EMEA until December 2009, as of December 
2009 the acronym is EMA. I keep the old acronym to be consistent with the literature until 2010
11 The US, UK and Germany do not require price approval; however, in the UK, Germany and 
several other markets cost-effectiveness evaluation may further delay the adoption of new 
pharmaceutical innovation as the fourth hurdle
1 ^
According to the Sector Inquiry by the European Commission (2009), pharmaceutical companies 
may submit a pricing and reimbursement dossier before the marketing authorisation is officially 
granted in France, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden whereas in most other Member States, a 
submission for pricing and/or reimbursement can only be made after the marketing authorisation has 
been granted (DG Competition 2009).
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compromises in quality of health care (Kessler 2004; Wertheimer and Santella 2004). 
Innovative medications offer economic benefits through fewer work days missed and 
lives saved (Lichtenberg 1996; Lichtenberg 2003a; Hassett 2004; Lichtenberg 2005). 
Delays in the launch of new molecules could be costly to the pharmaceutical industry 
through reduced market exclusivity periods, lower returns to R&D and eventually fewer 
innovations13.
New molecules face an additional source of competition, namely generic competition 
within a therapeutic group, once the product goes off patent. Generic products are by 
definition bioequivalent, and therefore perfect substitutes (on objective quality grounds) 
to the branded versions that usually claim substantial price mark-ups over the marginal 
cost of production14. Generic entry enhances efficiency and competition in the drug 
market; however, the main hurdle before generic entry is the cost of bioequivalence 
tests which are significantly cheaper than the average costs of safety and clinical 
evaluation15. Generic imitations largely freeride on the R&D efforts of originator firms, 
which enables them to compete solely based on price. Timely adoption of generic 
products, therefore, carries significant importance to improve allocative efficiency and 
stimulate competition (DG Competition 2009).
The analysis in this chapter draws upon an extensive database on the timing and entry of 
new pharmaceutical molecules (innovation effects of market regulation) along with the 
entry of bioequivalent competitors (competition effects). The main contribution of this 
chapter lies in the following. First, this is the first study to analyze historical trends 
using an extensive database in contrast to prior studies that restrict the analysis a 
specific, narrow time-period. Second, I examine the adoption of both new on-patent 
active ingredients and older active ingredteints that face generic competition. Although 
the trade-off between innovation and cost cutting competition is one of the most 
important features of pharmaceutical market dynamics, the joint consideration of these 
technologies has been traditionally left out of the analysis of drugs adoption. Finally, the 
analytical framework in this chapter is based on two main regulatory changes that
13 Vemon (2005) shows that both profit expectations and lagged cash flows have significantly 
positive impacts on pharmaceutical firms’ R&D investment intensity (Vemon 2005)
14 A generic is defined by the European Directive 2004/27/EC as “a medicinal product which has the 
same qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical 
form as the reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal 
product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.”
15 18 times cheaper according to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association 1993)
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reshaped the barriers to entry substantially: 1) the US Hatch-Waxman Act in 198416; 2) 
the establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA, currently abbreviated as 
EMA) in 1995 and the adoption of the centralized procedure that grants a Community 
marketing authorization. This framework defines three sub-periods for the analysis of 
launch lags, namely, 1960-1984, 1984-1995 and 1995-2008.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, one of the most significant acts in the U.S. healthcare system, 
was designed to promote generics while improving financial incentives for research and 
development. The Act allowed generics to win FDA marketing approval by submitting 
bioequivalence studies, as opposed to clinical data that are costlier to compile. It also 
granted a period of additional marketing exclusivity to patent protected drugs to make 
up for the time lost in drug development in the research-based pharmaceutical industry 
(Mossinghoff 1999).
The European Medicines Agency was established in 1995 to create a single European 
market for pharmaceuticals. EMEA highlights a key regulatory development for the 
European pharmaceutical market within the last two decades. The Agency is responsible 
for the scientific evaluation of applications for European marketing authorisation for 
medicinal products, centralised procedure that grants a centralised marketing 
authorisation valid in all European Union (EU) and EEA-EFTA states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway). In addition, the EMEA monitors the safety of medicines 
and takes appropriate actions in cases of adverse drug reactions that change the benefit- 
risk balance of a medicinal product.
This chapter posits that adoption of pharmaceutical technologies responds to regulatory 
changes. The main hypothesis is that the Hatch-Watchman Act (1984) speeded up 
adoption of new molecules due to the reduction in legal barriers to entry through the 
provision of additional monopoly period for innovative medicines (patent term 
restoration) and the reduction in transaction costs for generics through Bolar provisions. 
My second hypothesis is that the EMEA has reduced legal costs by harmonizing the 
approval procedures across the EU and speeded adoption of centrally approved new 
pharmaceutical innovations. I used 1995 as the cut-off date due to its significance in the 
creation of a single market in the EU although the Directive 2004/27/EC in 2004 marks
16 Coppinger, Peck et al. (1989) used the same-cut off value and suggested 1984 as a pivotal year in 
the history of drug introduction patterns between the US and the UK (Coppinger, Peck et al. 1989)
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another important regulatory change by the adoption of new rules on pharmaceutical 
data exclusivity and the European Bolar provision clause.
This chapter compares the evolution of the adoption timing over time and across 
markets using 1984 and 1995 as cut-off points to define Kaplan-Meier estimates of 
median delays. The impact of the EMEA centralized procedure is analyzed by 
comparing median delays pre- and post-1995. Median delays in adoption are preferred 
over mean delays due to the skewed nature of the survival time data. The changes in 
median delays are investigated by using Cox proportional hazard model and a 
difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis to investigate whether the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the creation of the EMEA had a statistically significant impact on the adoption of 
pharmaceutical technologies over time.
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methods 
used in the analysis; Section 3 presents the results of the analysis with respect to periods 
defined by the policy changes in 1984 and 1995 in the US and EU respectively; and 
finally Section 4 concludes.
2.2 DATA AND METHODS
2.2.1 Data
The IMS data used in the analysis contains quarterly sales in dollars and standard units
17 1 ftfor molecules from 14 different ATC groups and 20 countries , . Remaining data 
fields include global and local launch dates of drug products, pharmaceutical form, 
anatomic therapeutic class of the product, the distribution channel of sales (hospital vs. 
retail), and patent protection status of the drug. The markets in the data set, all based in 
the OECD except for South Africa, comprise the majority of the global pharmaceutical 
market. In this chapter, I report the results for the seven big pharmaceutical markets 
comprised of the US, Japan and the EU5 (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain).
Multi-country drug lag studies that analyze the time differentials in adoption of drugs 
across multiple countries apply several criteria to identify significant new chemical
17 IMS (Intercontinental Medical Services) MIDAS data was collected at Merck Sharp and Dome 
Limited (MSD) premises in Hoddesdon, UK.
18 Australia (ALIA), Austria (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
Germany (GER), Greece (GRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), Netherlands (NET), Poland (POL), 
Portugal (POR), South Africa (SAF), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), Turkey 
(TUR), the UK, and the US
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entities (NCEs). The choice of molecules is important because some molecules are 
exclusively launched in one geographic market; the inclusion of these molecules would 
introduce a bias in a multi-country survival analysis. Therefore, the analysis excludes 
one-market molecules which are either therapeutically or commercially of limited 
importance. In the IMS database, 969 molecules launched exclusively in one market 
(21% of all molecules) (see Table B.l for the distribution of the number of markets in 
which molecules launched). As a minimum requirement of potential global importance, 
following the approach of Parker (1984) and Danzon (2005), this chapter considers 
molecules that have launched in both the US and the UK as an indication of therapeutic 
significance and potential for global launch. Several studies find a direct relationship 
between the therapeutic contribution of a new drug and its likelihood of achieving 
widespread introduction (Parker 1984; Barral 1985). This finding suggests that most 
one-market new chemical entities (NCEs) do not simply disperse among countries more 
slowly than others but that they are never going to be widely available due to their 
marginal therapeutic advantages. Including molecules that launched in the US and the 
UK, therefore, avoids potential bias. Hereafter, this potentially global set of molecules 
is referred as “US&UK molecules”.
Table 2.1 Number of Molecules by Period of Global Launch
Period US&UK (All) US&UK (Generic)
[1960-1984) 385 214
[1984-1995] 194 90
[1995-2008] 266 46
TOTAL 845 350
In addition, I define a global molecule set comprised of molecules that diffused to all 
twenty markets in the database. These two sets provide a means to compare relative 
drug lags for molecules with different levels of international spread and to assess 
whether there exists a systematic difference between the two. For brevity, I report only 
the results for US&UK molecules only. Findings for global molecules are broadly in 
line with the estimates for US&UK molecules. Table 2.1 presents the breakdown of 
molecules by the period of global launch (see Table B.2 for the breakdown of molecules 
by country). The majority of the molecules had their global launch during 1960-1984. In 
total, 845 molecules were launched in the US and UK since 1960. Less than one-fourth 
of these molecules diffused to all markets. Only 350 of the molecules had a generic
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launch both in the US and UK. The US, UK, Germany, France, Canada and Switzerland 
are among countries that had the greatest number of launches whereas Portugal, Japan, 
Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Turkey had the least number of launches. The highest 
number of generic molecule launches occurred in the US, UK, Germany, Canada, 
Poland, Australia and Netherlands.
2.2.2 Methods
The methodology in this chapter relies on survival analysis to estimate the median 
delays, semi-parametric survival and difference-in-differences analysis to assess the 
impact of regulatory policies such as the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) and the EMEA 
(1995) on the speed of pharmaceutical technology adoption. Survival analysis is a 
methodology used to analyze time-to-event data (also known as survival time data, 
duration data, or transition data). The main shortcoming of commonly used models for 
empirical analysis, such as the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, is the assumption 
of normally distributed errors conditional on the regressors. A key distinguishing 
characteristic of survival data is that survival data are usually censored and have non­
normal, non-symmetric (skewed) distributions. Duration analysis is the appropriate 
methodology to analyze such data as it can accommodate censoring and it does not 
assume normality as the OLS model does. Censoring occurs when the exact failure time 
is unknown. In the context of this chapter, molecules that have not been adopted locally 
in a particular market by the end of Q3 2008 are right-censored19. In such cases, the 
exact failure date is unknown; it is known only that the failure time is greater than the 
time spent under risk following global launch. Survival analysis methods used in this 
chapter assume that the process that gives rise to censoring of survival (adoption) times 
is independent of the survival time process.
First, I use non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates to characterize the nature of lags and 
analyze patterns across markets and over time. The advantage of the nonparametric 
approach is that it provides a reasonably good fit for any distribution without any prior 
assumptions about the functional form of failure times. The analysis takes place at the 
molecule level, whereby I define subjects to be molecule-country pairs. The failure 
event is therefore the launch of a given molecule in a particular market. The failure
19 For truly global molecules right-censoring is not an issue since the exact launch time of every 
molecule is known in all countries.
indicator is set to one if the molecule launches in the given market and to zero if the 
molecule is censored (i.e. does not launch by the end of the observation period 2008). 
The time to failure event is equal to the time lapse from the first global launch date of 
the molecule (the onset of risk) to the date of launch in a particular country (the failure)
90 . The global launch date is the first date the molecule launched in any country in the 
IMS database. The local launch date of each molecule is defined as the minimum launch 
date of drug products with the same active ingredient; this takes account of the fact that 
drug products with the same active ingredient (molecule) may differ across markets 
with respect to the launching corporation, dosage, and form.
Missing global launch dates are proxied by the minimum local launch date across all 
twenty markets. The rationale for this approximation is that global molecules are most 
likely to launch first in any of the 20 countries in the dataset. The first known global 
launch for global molecules in the dataset occurred in one of the 20 markets for 90% of 
the global molecules that launched after 1995. Therefore, the potential bias introduced 
due to this approximation is minimal.
In the case of generic adoption, risk onset is defined as the launch date of the first 
generic copy of a given active ingredient across the twenty markets. Based on this risk 
defintion, this approach analyzes differentials in generic availability across the countries 
in the dataset. An alternative definition for risk onset could be local protection expiry 
dates, which would enable quantifying delays in generic entry post-patent expiry. 
However, I did not follow this approach as expiry dates are not available for the 
majority of the products. Some molecules never had patent protection and were 
launched as generics (e.g. acyclovir). In 56% of cases expiry date of a molecule exceeds 
local launch of the first generic by more than a year, which could be due to the presence
91of copy products in some markets, or launch of pseudogenerics (also known as 
authorized generics). Instead, as in the case for new molecules, I estimate relative 
adoption delays in generic competition with respect to the first global generic launch.
Similarly, differential timing of launch could be due to variations in market 
authorization dates or delays in pricing and reimbursement procedures as well as
20 Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa have only retail channel data; 
therefore, the first local launches in these countries represents launch in the retail sector.
21 Pseudogenerics are generics marketed by brand-name companies to compete against independent 
generics
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strategic firm delays to avoid threats of price spillovers across markets (Danzon, Wang 
et al. 2005). Unavailability of data precludes isolating delays due to these components.
2.2.2.1 Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier Estimates
The survivor function estimate S(t) , the probability that the subject fails beyond time t, 
is given by (Kaplan and Meier 1958):
S(t) = Pr(T > o  = n(! -  Pj )= nfn- ^
j \ t j * \  n j  J
where p j =Pr(r/_1 <T<tj \ tj_\ <T} is the conditional probability that the subject fails 
within the interval [*/_!,*/)• rij is the number of subjects at risk, dj is the number of 
failures at time /yand t]9t2i..Jk are the observed failure times. The estimate of the
survival function is given as the product of conditional survival probabilities over all 
observed failure times (i.e., country-molecule launches) less than or equal to time t .
Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function S(t) at time t are obtained using Stata 
10. The median survival time corresponds to the smallest time point at which the 
survivor function is less than or equal to 0.5 ( S(t) = 0.5), i.e. the time point at which half
of the molecule candidates have launched. Mean survival time, on the other hand, is
00estimated as the area under the survival curve . As mentioned before, I mainly use 
median delays to draw inferences due to the significantly right-skewed nature of failure 
time distributions (see Figure B.l in Appendix B). Additional technical details on non- 
parametric estimation are provided in Appendix B.2.
The median survival times in each market are estimated by period of molecule entry 
into the risk set, i.e. first global launch during 1960-1984, 1984-1995 and 1995-2008. 
The cut-off points 1984 and 1995 were chosen as the two major regulatory changes with 
potential effects on the timing of adoption in the US and Europe respectively. The 
objective of the empirical analysis in this chapter is to provide evidence on the 
behaviour of failure (adoption) times of new molecules and generic competition across
22 The command rmean in Stata calculates mean survival time restricted to longest follow-up 
time. The command emean calculates the mean survival time by exponentially extending the 
survival curve to zero
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the OECD before and after these two landmark changes in the regulatory environment. 
With this framework, the evolution of relative launch lags can be compared both across 
countries and over time.
2,2,22 Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimation
Cox proportional hazard (PH) model was used to estimate the impact of the first launch 
period on the hazard of adoption. The hazard rate for th e /th  subject in a Cox model is 
specified as:
A(';f/0 = ;*>(OexP(z;P*)-
The baseline hazard hQ(t) is not parameterized and is left unestimated but the effects of
the covariates z. = (z]jiz2j9...yz j ) are parameterized. As no assumption is made about
the shape of the hazard over time, the Cox model provides significant flexibility in 
analysis. The parameter J3\ describes the change in the hazard on a logarithmic scale
for a change in the corresponding covariate z* of 1 unit, while all other covariates are
kept fixed. Positive parameter estimates ( ^ > 0  equivalently e x p ^ ) > l )  are
associated with an increased hazard rate. The Cox PH model provides no estimate of the 
intercept as it is subsumed into the baseline hazard. The Cox model estimates 
parameters using partial maximum likelihood that works with likelihood contributions 
at each failure times, i.e. the conditional probabilities of observing the actual subject 
experiencing a failure given that there was a failure at that time instant (see Appendix 
B.3 for details).
2.2.2.3 Difference-in-Differences Analysis for Policy Analysis
The economics literature has made wide use of difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis 
to analyze the impact of policy interventions by treating the policy changes as quasi- 
experimens. This approach makes use of the conceptual framework and terminology of 
“randomized experiments”. Quasi-experiments differ from randomized experiments in 
the lack of randomness in the assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups; 
quasi-experiments are known as natural experiments if nature has assigned subjects to 
groups. Due to lack of randomization, there can be systematic differences between the 
treatment and control groups in quasi-experiments (Meyer 1995).
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The data structure that the DiD approach uses for policy analysis is pooled cross-section 
data over time. During each time period a new random sample is taken from the 
population. This is different from a panel data structure in that panel data is based on 
replicability; the same subject is followed over time. Observations across different time 
periods in a pooled cross-section data are independent, but not necesarrily identically 
distributed. Period dummies are included in the analysis to account for the aggregate 
changes over time. Interaction of period dummies with explanatory variables allows 
partial effects to change over time for policy analysis using natural experiments.
In the simplest case, data is available for two time periods (before and after the 
treatment) and two groups: i) a treatment group where the policy is applied, and ii) a 
control group that does not receive the treatment but is affected by other factors that 
affect the treatment group. The impact of the treatment on the outcome variable is 
assessed by interacing the treatment variable with the time period dummy. The 
underlying model to assess the impact of a policy change assumes the following form 
(Wooldridge 2002)
y  = a  + Sq • dpost + P 'd ?  + 5 \-d post -d j  + s ,
where y is the outcome variable of interest and T indicates the treatment group. d T  is 
the treatment dummy that equals unity for subjects in the treatment group and zero 
otherwise; d T  captures possible differences in the treatment and control group before
the policy change. The dummy variable d p o s t  equals unity for the period following the
policy change and zero before the policy is implemented; it captures aggregate factors 
that affect y  over time in the same way for both groups. S\ is the coefficient of the 
interaction term which equals unity for observations in the treatment group after the 
policy change. The OLS estimator of S\ is known as the difference-in-differences 
estimator. AssumingE[s \ d p o s t , d T ] = 0 :
yr,post~ E[y\ dpost ~ ^ d T = l] = a  + S0 + fi + Si 
yT,pre= E [y \d post= 0 ,d T =\] = a  + P  
yc,post= Ely  I d p o s t  = 1, d T  = 0] = a  + S0 
yc,pre = Ely  I d p o s t  = 0 ,d T =0] = a .
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Using the above equations, d\ can be expressed as:
=(yT,post ~yT,pre)~(yC,post ~ yc,pre) >
where T and C are the treatment and control group; pre and post indicate the period 
before and after the policy change respectively.
Si considers the expected change in the outcome variable in the treatment group
(yT,post - yr,pre) but giyen that factors other than the policy change can affect the
change in the mean response (yc ,Post ~yc,pre) 1S deducted to account for changes in
the mean response that would have occurred without the policy interventions; this 
allows for both group-specific and time-specific effects. The DiD estimator is unbiased 
if the policy change is not systematically related to other factors that affect the outcome.
I use the difference-in-difference estimator to explore the impact of the US policy 
change in 1984 (the Hatch Waxman Act) and the impact of the EU policy change in 
1995 (the creation of the EMEA). To analyze the impact of the 1984 Act on the 
adoption speed in the US, I estimate the following model:
y  = a  + So‘ ^ 1984 + p ' d{JS + 8 \ ' ^ 1984 ' dUS + Y^country + e »
where dus is a dummy equal to unity if the destination market is US and d1984 is the 
period dummy equal to 1 for local launches after 1984. dcountry is a vector of country
dummies excluding the reference country and the US. y  is the failure time of country- 
molecule pairs. The outcome variable y  is specified as both failure time (in years) and 
log of failure time (log years) due to the skewed nature of the survival time data, 
expecting the log transformation to provide a better fit to the regression model. The 
estimate Sx is preferable over the simple difference estimator (yus,post$4 ~yus,pre84)
because reasons unrelated to the policy change could affect the mean response over 
time. For instance, internationalization of pharmaceutical corporations and 
harmonization in MA regulations across countries could explain some of the reduction 
in differential delays in adoption.
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Analogously, the impact of the EMEA on the adoption of pharmaceutical technologies 
in the EU is estimated by the following model :
y  -  a  + S0 • dl995 + p  • dEU + Sx • dl995 • dEU + ydcountry + e , 
where dEU is a dummy variable equal to unity of the destination market is the EU24 and 
dl995 is the period dummy equal to 1 for local launches after 1995. dcountry is the set of 
country dummies excluding the reference country Australia.
2.3 RESULTS
2.3.1 Trends in the Adoption of Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Evolution of Median Delays over Decades
Figure 2.1 shows the overall Kaplan-Meier survival estimates S(t) , i.e. the probability 
that molecules are adopted after time t, for molecules that first launched globally during 
1960-1984, 1984-1995 and 1995-2008 respectively. The higher the curve is, the higher 
the area under the curve, and therefore, the higher the mean and median survival times 
are.
The overall global trend in median (and mean) survival times for US&UK molecules 
across the twenty markets from 1960 to 2008 is decreasing. This implies that relative 
delays in the adoption of new pharmaceutical technologies have decreased over the 
decades. While the overall median is 11 years for molecules with a global launch in 
1960-1985, the median drops to 4 and 2 years for molecules that launched in 1984-1995 
and 1995-2008 respectively (see Table B.3 in Appendix B for median delays in 
individual countries for each period). Log rank test for the equality of the survival
23 With additional covariates in the regression equation, the interpretation of S\ remains unchanged, 
although the representation is no longer given b y ^  = (y T,p 0st - y T ,p r e ) ~ (y c ,p o s t  ~ y c ,p r e )
24 EU countries were comprised of Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Poland was excluded from the regressions since it 
joined the EU only in 2004
67
curves rejected the null hypothesis o f equal survival behaviour for the three periods 
(pO.OOOO)25.
Figure 2.1 Overall median delays with respect to period o f global launch
KM Survival Estimates by Period of First Launch 
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Table 2.2 Median delays and confidence intervals by period o f first launch
Period Subjects Median Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
1960-1984 7186 10.59 0.33 9.92 11.25
1984-1995 3726 4.08 0.11 3.92 4.33
1995-2008 5125 1.67 0.04 1.59 1.75
Non-overlapping confidence intervals for median adoption delays o f new molecules in 
Table 2.2 suggest that difference in medians is significant. Next, I incorporate potential 
country effects on median adoption times and estimate a semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazard model to assess the significance o f the first launch period.
Cox Proportional Hazard Model: Test of Survival Trend Significance
Cox proportional hazard (PH) models were estimated to test for the significance o f the 
first launch period. The Cox model allows incorporating factors that may have an 
influence on the adoption times. Considering the fact that country o f destination may
25 Equality o f survival curves rejected even after stratifying by country
68
have an effect on the adoption speed of molecules and result in possible intra-group 
correlation, I estimated both fixed effects and random effects Cox PH models.
The fixed effects specification assumes countries have a direct multiplicative effect on 
the hazard function. In other words, molecules in all countries have the same baseline 
hazard. The effect of a country multiples the baseline hazard function up or down 
depending on the sign of the estimated coefficients. A direct fixed-group effect is 
modelled by including country-specific indicator variables for each country except
Of*one . The hazard function for molecule j  and country k pair is assumed to be 
hjk (/) = fiQ (/)exp(xy*/?+Sk j , where 8k is the fixed effect for country k. The independent
variables x  are period dummies that indicate whether the first global launch of molecule
11j  occurred in the given period .
In the random effects specification, the effect of a country is assumed to be random and 
have a multiplicative effect on the hazard function (known as Shared Frailty Model or
o
Random Effects Cox Model) . For molecule j  and country k, the hazard is 
hjk(t) = Itq (t)ak exp^Xjk/3^, where ak is the country-level frailty. Frailties are
unobservable positive quantities assumed to have mean 1 and variance 9 that is 
estimated from the data. When 9 = 0, the Cox shared-frailty model reduces to the 
standard Cox model. Assuming vk =ln ak for the random term, the hazard can be
rewritten as hjk (/) = Hq (t) exp f3+vk )- As in the fixed effects specification, I assume
the independent variables x  are period dummies that indicate whether first global 
launch of the molecule occurred in the given period .
Estimates of the fixed-effects and random-effects Cox model are presented in
26 Alternatively, country effects can be accounted for by stratifying on hospital with the strataO 
command in STATA. In this case, the baseline hazard is allowed to be different for each country 
rather than constraining them to be multiplicative versions of each other
27 The command used to estimate fixed effects is
eststo fixed: xi: stcox Global_Launch_in_60-84 Global_Launch_in_95-08 i.country,
where the first two variables are dummy variables that indicate whether the molecule launched 
globally during 1960-1984 and 1995-2008 respectively.
28 A frailty is a latent random effect that enters multiplicatively on the hazard function.
29 The STATA command used to estimated the Random Effects Cox model is
eststo random: stcox Global_Launch_in_60-84 Global_Launch_in_95-08, shared(country)
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Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Both the fixed effects and the random effects indicate that 
hazard of launch is significantly higher for molecules that first launched during 1995- 
2008 compared to 1984-1995. Similarly, the hazard is higher for molecules that 
launched in 1984-1995 compared to 1960-1984. Given that the estimated frailty 
variance 6 is 0.16 and the significance level of the likelihood-ratio test of Ho \0 = 0,
*3 1
under the random effects model there is significant within-country correlation .
The Hausman Test is a generally accepted test for choosing between fixed and random 
effects. This test checks a more efficient model (random effects) against a less efficient 
but consistent model (fixed effects) to make sure that the random effects model also 
gives consistent results, i.e. the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent 
fixed effects estimator. If the coefficients are the same (insignificant p-value, p-value 
larger than 0.05) random effects can be used. If the p-value is significant, however, 
fixed effects are preferred.
The Hausman test used to compare the fixed and random effects specifications indicates 
that the fixed effects model is the correct specification (p-value: 0.0135)32. Based on the 
fixed effects specification, launch in 1960-1984 decreases the hazard of adoption by 
48% and launch in 1995-2008 increases the hazard by 82%, both compared to first 
global launch in 1984-1995. This implies that the trend for decreasing relative delays 
for new molecules in Figure 2.1 across decades is statistically significant.
The acceleration of the international diffusion of pharmaceutical products may be 
attributed to the evolution in barriers to entry as a result of changes in the regulatory 
environment and an increasingly global and interdependent market environment. The 
increasing international reach of pharmaceutical corporations as evidenced by the 
spread of the manufacturing, marketing and innovative R&D activities to different 
countries has overcome prior geographical barriers. Harmonization of safety and 
efficacy and marketing authorization requirements across markets has contributed to a 
reduction in regulatory costs (Busfield 2003).
30 The instantaneous probability of launch conditional on not launching before
31 Discussion of results draws on Section 9.4 in (Cleves, Gould et al. 2008). The interpretation of the 
hazards in this case is conditional on the frailty.
32 STATA command: hausman fixed random
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Table 2.3 Cox regression with country fixed effects: US&UK molecules
Variables Hazard Ratio Std Err z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Int.]
Global launch in 60-84 0.52 0.012 -27.76 0.000 0.497 0.545
Global launch in 95-08 1.826 0.044 24.76 0.000 1.741 1.915
Australia 1.187 0.065 3.11 0.002 1.065 1.322
Austria 0.782 0.045 -4.27 0.000 0.699 0.876
Belgium 1.206 0.065 3.46 0.001 1.084 1.34
Canada 1.035 0.057 0.63 0.530 0.929 1.154
Finland 1.178 0.064 3 0.003 1.058 1.311
France 1.822 0.097 11.26 0.000 1.641 2.023
Germany 0.852 0.047 -2.87 0.004 0.764 0.95
Greece 1.17 0.064 2.89 0.004 1.052 1.302
Italy 0.567 0.034 -9.58 0.000 0.505 0.637
Japan 1.177 0.067 2.88 0.004 1.053 1.315
Poland 0.743 0.041 -5.37 0.000 0.666 0.828
Portugal 0.478 0.03 -11.93 0.000 0.423 0.539
South Africa 0.788 0.046 -4.12 0.000 0.704 0.883
Spain 0.733 0.042 -5.36 0.000 0.655 0.821
Sweden 0.837 0.048 -3.07 0.002 0.747 0.938
Switzerland 1.368 0.074 5.76 0.000 1.23 1.522
Turkey 0.659 0.037 -7.34 0.000 0.59 0.737
UK 2.218 0.116 15.28 0.000 2.003 2.457
US 2.153 0.112 14.73 0.000 1.944 2.384
Table 2.4 Cox regression with country shared frailties: US&UK molecules
Variables Hazard Ratio Std Err z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
Global launch in 
60-84 0.521 0.012 -27.74 0.0000 0.497 0.545
Global launch in 
95-08 1.824 0.044 24.72 0.0000 1.739 1.913
theta 0.160 0.050
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) = 1839.22 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Note: standard errors of hazard ratios are conditional on theta
The following sections present the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis and 
survival estimates for individual markets in the biggest seven pharmaceutical markets. 
Next, regulatory changes that could potentially explain the evolutionary trend in the 
drug lags are explained in more detail.
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Difference-in-Differences Analysis for Pharmaceutical Innovation
Table 2.5 presents the results of the DiD analysis that assesses the impact of the US 
1984 Act on the adoption of new molecules in the US. The response variable y  is the 
relative delay following the first global launch of new molecules. The treatment group 
is comprised of molecule-country pairs for which the destination market is the US, and 
the control group is comprised of molecule-country pairs with a destination in the non- 
US markets. The policy variable d_1984 is unity for launches that occur after 1984, and 
zero if launch is during 1984 or before. The DiD estimator, US_d_1984, is significantly 
negative, which indicates that following the enactment of the 1984 Act has decreased 
the relative delays in new molecule adoption in the US. Due to the skewed nature of 
failure times, log of the failure time as the outcome variable results in a better fit. The 
validity of the DiD estimator is based on the assumption that the underlying trends in 
the outcome variable is the same for both treatment and control groups. I incorporate 
country dummies into the specification to control for country effects that could explain 
some of the variation in the mean delays. DiD results should be interpreted with 
caution, considering the fact that the US and non-US markets might have been subject 
to non-common policy changes that affect adoption differentially in these markets.
Table 2.5 DiD Analysis for 1984 US Hatch Waxman Act (New Molecules)
Variables y=ln(t) y=t
US -0.191 1.061*[0.18] [0.52]
d_1984 0.800*** 6.611***[0.05] [0.15]
US_d_1984 -2.737*** -7.085***[0.24] [0.51]
Country Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 16001 16001
Log Likelihood -35037.94 -62511.5
p-value 0.00 0.00
Akaike Info Criteria 70119.89 125066.9
Bayesian Info Criteria 70288.85 125235.9
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 2.6 presents the results of the DiD analysis for the impact of the EMEA on new 
molecules. The outcome variable is the log of relative delays (yrs) in adoption. The 
treatment group is comprised of molecule-country pairs for which the destination 
market is the EU (Poland is excluded from the analysis because it joined the EU in 
2004) and the control group is comprised of subjects with a destination in the non-EU 
markets. The policy variable d_1995 is unity for local launches that occur after 1995, 
and zero otherwise. The DiD estimator, EU_d_1995, is negative but not significant in 
the first specification that includes the US in the set of non-EU markets. When the US is 
excluded from the analysis the DiD estimator becomes significant. This suggests that 
differences between the US and EU are not limited to the policy change in 1995. 
However, a negative estimate for the DiD estimator, EU_d_1995i suggests that the 
establishment of the EMEA has speeded up adoption of new molecules in the EU.
Table 2.6 DiD Analysis for the Impact of EMEA in EU (New Molecules)
y=ln(t) DID DID (excluding US)
EU -0.992*** -0.843***[0.11] [0.11]
d_1995 -0.859***[0.06]
-0.479***
[0.05]
EU_d_1995 -0.031[0.08]
-0.411 *** 
[0.07]
Country Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 15213 14374
Log Likelihood -33528 -30960.98
p-value 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 67098.03 61961.95
Bayesian Info Criteria 67258.26 62113.42
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001
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2.3.1.1 1960-1984: Stringency in MA Regulations and the US drug lag
The Thalidomide tragedy in the late 1950s, which caused congenital anomalies in 
babies and a degenerative nerve disorder in pregnant women, marked the beginning of a 
new era in modem medicine regulation. Until the early 1960s most countries except the 
Nordic countries and the US had no independent safety and efficacy protocols for new 
drugs. The US had a regulatory office for pharmaceuticals, the FDA, which was 
empowered to license medicines subject to certain safety standards. US drug companies 
had to show only the safety of their new products before 1960. However, in 1962 the 
US Kefauver Harris Amendments followed as a response to the Thalidomide disaster 
and introduced an additional proof-of-efficacy requirement that was not present before. 
Other countries in Europe aligned their marketing authorization procedures for 
increased safety and efficacy only in late 1960s and early 1970s (Permanand 2006).
The debate about launch delays extends back to 1960s when the main concern was the 
significant US drug lag compared to the main EU markets, mainly as a result of the 
more stringent US regulations. Wardell, a pharmacologist, coined the term “drug lag” 
and increased awareness of the unavailability of new drugs in the US, and stressed that 
the delays affected therapeutically important drugs as well (Wardell 1973; Wardell 
1974; Wardell 1978). Later studies by Grabowski (1980), Berlin and Jonsson (1986) 
and Kaitin (1989) confirmed findings of Wardell (Grabowski 1980; Berlin and Jonsson 
1986; Kaitin, Mattison et al. 1989).
The survival estimates in this study for molecules that launched first during 1960-1984 
confirm findings of the early literature that the US market was relatively disadvantaged 
for the timely adoption of pharmaceutical innovations as a result of much stricter 
requirements for regulatory approval. The survival graph in Figure 2.2 shows S(t), the 
probability that molecule launch in a given country occurs after t years following global 
launch, conditional on the fact that the molecule has not launched in that country up to 
time t. Hence, it takes longer for countries with a higher survival curve to adopt new
A
pharmaceutical innovations. The median survival value is given where S(t) = 0.5.
During 1960-1984, Europe is found to be leading in the introduction of pharmaceutical 
innovation. As expected, free price countries such as the UK and Germany are leading 
markets, with a median delay of 3 years and are followed by Italy, France and Spain 
with a corresponding lag of 3.5-4 years. The US lags behind the slowest European 
market by about half a year. Japan has the most dramatic delay of 12 years, which can
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be attributed to geographical barriers and predominantly domestic nature o f the market, 
especially in a period when the global expansion o f pharmaceutical corporations was 
relatively limited.
Figure 2.2 Survival Estimates: 1960-1984
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2.3.1.2 1984-1995: The US Hatch-Waxman Act and Stimulus for Innovation
The Hatch Waxman Act, also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act o f 1984, was enacted to compensate for the loss in effective patent life 
during drug development. The Act extended pharmaceutical patents for the time lost in 
clinical testing and regulatory review, but the entire patent term restored was restricted 
to 5 years and the term o f the restored patent following FDA approval was restricted to 
14 years. In addition, the Act introduced a five-year market exclusivity period for 
NMEs such that once an NME is approved a generic manufacturer cannot submit an 
application until 5 years after the approval o f the pioneer and thus cannot enter the 
market for at least 5 years. These amendments enabled pharmaceutical innovators to 
recoup some o f the revenue losses due to regulatory delay after 1962. The main aim o f 
the Act, however, was to maintain incentives for innovation while ensuring quick 
generic entry. The Act substantially facilitated generic entry by eliminating the entry 
barrier o f duplicative testing required for generic substitutes. Generic entrants would 
only need to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to demonstrate the 
bioequivalence o f the generic drug to the original obviating the need to duplicate the
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safety and efficacy efforts o f the originator firm (Berlin and Jonsson 1986). This would 
allow the generic manufacturer to put its FDA-approved drug on the market as soon as 
the patent expires. The Act increased the availability o f generics and reduced the market 
share o f innovative companies; however, data from the literature suggests that R&D 
funding and R&D intensity increased substantially after the Act. The impact on the 
brand-name drugs, therefore, has remained somewhat contentious as it is not known 
exactly to what extent the stimulation for innovation accounts for the increase in 
innovative activity post 1984 (Branes 2007).
Survival estimates in this study indicate a stark improvement in the US for the timing of 
new product launches vis-a-vis Europe (Figure 2.3). The median delay in the US 
decreased from about 8 years to 3 years following the enactment o f the Act whereas the 
corresponding decrease in the leading markets o f the UK and Germany was on the order 
o f one year only. While the US was the second slowest market to adopt new 
pharmaceutical molecules in 1960-1984, after the 1984 Act the US becomes one o f the 
leading markets along with the UK and Germany. The estimates present a clear 
indication that the 1984 Act has generated a more favourable environment for market 
entry in the US and suggests an increase in overall R&D activity in the US 
pharmaceutical industry.
Figure 2.3 Survival Estimates: 1984 - 1995
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The remaining markets in Europe also experience faster introductions after 1984. In 
particular, the medians in France and Italy decrease by 3 years (to about 3.5 years). The 
one-year reduction in the Spanish median delay is more modest and can be partially 
attributed to the lack of product patent protection for new pharmaceuticals before 
ratification of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. Overall, Spain and Japan emerge as the 
slowest adopters following the 1984 Act. Thomas (2001) who analyzes the Japanese lag 
during 1981-1993 posits that the core factor driving exclusion from Japan is the 
distinctive nature of the clinical trial system. Foreign firms face an asymmetric cost 
with respect to Japanese firms since they have to test their products twice. The second 
factor that drives the exclusion of foreign firms and delays are the price regulations 
since 1981 that sharply lowered launch prices and the life cycle sales of drugs launched 
into Japan (Thomas 2001).
Patent term restoration in Europe was enacted only eight years following the 1984 Act 
in the US. In 1992, Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) extended the protection 
period of pharmaceutical products in the European Community by 5 years following 
patent-expiry or 15 years of protection from the date of first market authorization in the 
European Community, instead of twenty years after patent application as under the 
European Patent Convention . This prolonged the profit life of products as drug sales 
are generally highest during the period of market exclusivity. In addition, the SPC 
prevented generic companies from engaging in R&D prior to patent expiry, which 
essentially ensured a longer shelf-life for branded products and provided stimulus for 
innovation. The relative delay in providing financial stimulus for innovation through 
patent term restoration in the EU could be an additional factor that explains the drastic 
improvement in the timing of new product launches in the US vis-^-vis Europe during 
1984-1995.
2.3.1.3 1995-2008: EMEA and Harmonization across the Globe
The set up of a single market in 1993 and a common currency in 1999 (when exchange 
rates were pegged) ensured free movement of people, goods and services within the EU. 
Since then market authorization has been streamlined by the establishment of the 
EMEA in 1995 although a complete harmonization of the pharmaceutical market has 
not taken place. This was a significant step to speed approval times across Europe
33 The SPC became effective on Jan 1993 and applied to drugs granted market authorization in the 
EU after Jan 1985.
77
which had begun to suffer from increasing number of applications as the industry grew 
and technical and scientific issues became more complex. In addition, EU Directive 
2004/27/EC introduced a uniform level of data protection for 10 years across the EU 
and precluded the launch of the generic copy until the expiry of the 10-year period.
A centralized approval procedure, which grants a Community-wide authorization valid 
in all Member States, would increase efficiency by obviating the duplication of effort 
through a single market authorization process and saving an annual expenditure of 
$3 50m by drug firms to get separate approvals from individual member countries 
(Annon 1994). The centralized procedure, however, does not apply to all products. It is 
mandatory for all biotechnology processes and optional for innovative chemical drugs 
provided the product offers a significant therapeutic, scientific or technical innovation34.
After 1990, the pharmaceutical industry has witnessed further efforts of harmonisations. 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 
1994 strengthened intellectual property rights and provided significant financial 
incentives for companies by blocking generic competition until the expiry of the 20 
years patent life and by extending the scope of patent protection both to products and 
processes (WTO OMC 2003). Similarly, the International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) 
has aimed to achieve greater harmonisation in the application of technical guidelines 
and requirements for product registration across the EU, US and Japan to reduce or
'iC
obviate the need of duplicative testing in the R&D stage .
Figure 2.4 shows that the median delays continued to decrease throughout 1995-2008 as 
a response to the harmonization efforts across the biggest 7 pharmaceutical markets, yet 
the differential delays have not been eliminated totally36. Most of the molecules launch 
immediately in the US followed by launch in the free-priced European markets of 
Germany and the UK within one year. The US emerges as the most favourable market 
because of high profit potentials. This is both because the US has the largest market size 
and a more liberal pricing environment compared to other OECD markets that employ
34 http://www.emea.europa.eu/
35 http ://www. ich. ore
36 Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions indicate that the difference in median delays 
between countries is significant (p-value: 0.0000). In addition, significant heterogeneity exists with 
respect to the ATC group (p-value: 0.0021), which implies that the relative delays vary across ATC 
groups.
78
some form o f price control, either in the form o f statutory pricing whereby the price is 
set on a regulatory basis or through price negotiations (Vogler 2008). Stringent price 
controls have been criticized for having negative implications on the extent and timing 
o f launch via knock-on effects on foreign markets through external referencing and 
parallel trade within the EU; however, the available evidence is limited (Danzon and 
Epstein 2005; Kyle 2007; Danzon and Epstein 2008).
Figure 2.4 Survival Estimates: 1995-2008
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The relative launch delays in Europe suggest an ordering with respect to price levels o f 
pharmaceutical products. Figure 2.5 illustrates the correlation between median delays 
and the bilateral price indexes with respect to US prices for 2004. The correlation is - 
0.47 and is significant at the 0.01 level. France and Italy seem to have a comparable 
speed o f launch with a median delay o f around two years. The median lag in Spain has 
decreased compared to 1984-1995 but it still lags about a year behind France and Italy. 
The lack o f product patent protection for new pharmaceuticals before EU membership 
contributes to launch delays in Spain. EU accession in 1986 required Spain to comply 
with the European Patent Convention (EPC), which allowed the patentability o f both 
products and processes.
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Figure 2.5 Bilateral Price Indexes with Respect to US Prices vs. Median Delays
(for ethical branded products in the retail sector)
2004 Price Index (US=1) vs Median Delay (yrs)
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Spain enacted a new patent law in 1986 that introduced patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals. However, effective patentability was delayed until 7 October 1992 
through Reservation under Article 167 o f the EPC, which essentially meant that 
pharmaceutical and chemical products could not be patented in Spain prior to 7 October 
1992. In 1995, Spain ratified the TRIPS Agreement, which substantially changed the
o o
patent protection landscape . In addition, Spain is one o f the major parallel exporters in 
the EU due to its relatively lower drug prices, which are further pushed downwards by 
unilateral price cuts imposed on pharmaceutical prices. The delay in Spain, therefore, is 
consistent with pharmaceutical firm strategies to avoid parallel trade as suggested by 
Kyle (2007).
37 ALIA: Australia; AUS: Austria; CAN: Canada; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; GER: Germany; 
GRE: Greece; ITA: Italy; JAP: Japan; NET: Netherlands; POL: Poland; POR: Portugal; TUR: 
Turkey; SAF: South Africa; SPA: Spain; SWE: Sweden; SWI: Switzerland
38
https://www.eversheds.com/uk/Home/Articles/indexl .page?ArticleID=templatedata\Eversheds\articl 
es\data\en\Healthcare\BioBrief_Stop_press_Direct_applicability_in_Spain_of_patent_provisions_of 
_the_TRIPS_Agreement
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The Japanese drug lag extends to this period as well although the median Japanese 
delay decreases by two years with respect to the previous period. This is paradoxical 
given the international competitiveness of numerous Japanese high-tech industries 
including electronics and automobiles during 1990s. The Japanese pharmaceutical 
market is the second largest market in the world and offers a great profit potential 
because of a large market size and relatively high drug prices. Nevertheless, the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry still remains predominantly domestic and 
uncompetitive.
Japanese regulations for new drug approval have required Japanese clinical data for 
evaluating the efficacy and safety of the drug even if foreign clinical data are available 
due to racial and ethnic variations in responses to medicines. In the past, all three phases 
of clinical trials had to be carried out on the Japanese population, which has driven 
launch delays in addition to other factors such as language barriers and longer times for 
patient enrolment in clinical trials. In 1998, Japan adopted the ICH E5 guideline entitled 
"Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data" that recommends the use 
of foreign clinical data for new drug approval if there is one additional bridging study39 
showing that the drug will behave similarly in the Japanese population. According to 
Uyama et al. (2005) new drug approvals based on a bridging strategy in Japan have 
increased from 3.2% in 1999 to 25% in 2003. Tabata and Albani (2008) report that 
companies are increasingly trying to leverage their operations globally in order to take 
advantage of the Japanese efforts to comply with the trend for globalising clinical trials 
(Tabata and Albani 2008). These developments suggest that the drug lag in Japan can 
decrease over the next years (Uyama, Shibata et al. 2005).
Ranking countries by median lags, countries may be characterised as leaders (the US, 
UK, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Switzerland) and laggards 
(Belgium, Greece, South Africa, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey). The remaining 
countries (France, Canada, Italy, Australia, and Spain) rank as intermediaries with the 
rank dependant on the period and extent of global launch. The laggards and leaders, as 
defined by countries with median lags above and below the overall delays, are similar 
for the global and the US&UK molecules; however, the extent of the relative lag is 
shorter for the truly global molecules as is expected because global molecules have
39 A bridging study aims to confirm that the efficacy, safety and dose-response relationships of the drug 
in the new population are similar to those in the population evaluated in the foreign studies
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diffused to all markets and have non-censored survival times. Similarly, launch in all 
markets may indicate higher therapeutic or commercial importance at the product level.
2.3.1.4 EMEA Sub-Analysis
Differences in the survival behaviour among the EU markets in Figure 2.4 indicate that 
pharmaceutical firms have adopted different launch strategies across markets in the EU 
and that efforts of harmonization in market authorization procedures have not 
eliminated the differentials in timing of launch across European countries. I carry out a 
sub-analysis for the EU countries40 to further investigate the impact of the establishment 
of a centralized regulatory procedure in the EU. In order to compare relative delays for 
molecules that obtained centralized approval (central molecules) with those that did not 
(non-central molecules), data was collected for all centrally approved molecules from 
the EMEA website (the EMEA publishes information following the grant of a 
Marketing Authorization as a European Public Assessment Report41). This information 
was combined with the IMS database to estimate delays within the EU for molecules 
with a first global launch post-1995.
There is a statistically significant difference in launch behaviours between the central 
and non-central molecules (p-value: 0.000 for the test of the null hypothesis that the 
survival behaviours of EMEA and non-EMEA molecules are identical). The 
effectiveness of a more streamlined authorization is demonstrated by the lower variation 
in launch timing for EMEA molecules compared to molecules that did not go through 
the centralized procedure. The median delay for non-central molecules is greater by 
more than 2 years compared to the median delay of central molecules which is on the 
order of one year.
The faster diffusion of centrally approved molecules can be attributed to the elimination 
of differentials in regulatory approval times as well as a potentially higher 
therapeutic/commercial value of the centrally approved drugs (Figure 2.6). Central 
approval speeds up the introduction of molecules in laggard countries such as France, 
Italy and Spain. Spain exhibits the most dramatic reduction in median delays -a 
reduction from 5 years to 1.5 years- among the five main European pharmaceutical
40 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK
41 http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/human/epar/a.htm
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markets due to central approval. For France and Italy the reduction is on the order of 
half a year only.
Figure 2.6 Delays with respect to central vs. non-central approval in the EU 
Median delays for Central vs Non-Central Molecules in EU5
9 -
UK GE FR IT SP GE UK SP FR IT
Non-EMEA EMEA
(Kaplan-Meier estimate for Spain not available, the restricted mean 
which provides a lower bound for the median is reported)
The centralized EU procedure is compulsory for all medicinal products derived from 
biotechnology and other high technology processes. If the product does not belong to 
the designated disease categories42 for central approval, companies can submit an 
application for a centralized marketing authorization, provided the product offers a 
significant therapeutic, scientific or technical innovation43. A more homogenous cross­
country launch for central molecules across the EU indicates that on average European 
patients have more equitable access to drugs that have priority from a health policy 
perspective-at least to the extent that these drugs are diffused at comparable times (the 
take-up and access post-launch may introduce further differentials in access due to 
differences in reimbursement policies as well as cultural factors).
42 These categories include all human medicines intended for the treatment o f  HIV/AIDS, cancer, 
diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, auto-immune and other immune dysfunctions, and viral 
diseases, and all designated orphan medicines intended for the treatment o f  rare diseases
43 http://www.emea.europa.eu/
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2.3.2 T rends in the Adoption of Pharm aceutical Im itation
The lags in generic entry across countries depend on differentials in patent expiry dates 
or market exclusivity as well as originator firm strategies to block or delay generic 
competition. Due to unavailability o f data to control for patent expiry dates or originator 
firm actions, the estimates provide generic lags as the time elapse between the first 
global generic product launch and local generic launch for a given molecule-country 
pair. This measure cannot assess to what extent generic entry is delayed following 
patent expiry and hence provides only a relative measure across countries.
Evolution of Median Delays over Decades
The trend in overall median delays for generic molecules that launched both in the 
US&UK from 1960 to 2008 is similar to the case in the cross-country diffusion of 
pharmaceutical innovation; the diffusion o f imitative pharmaceutical has accelerated 
over time (see Figure 2.7). In each period, medians are reduced by half compared to the 
previous period. The overall median delay has decreased from 26 to 14.5 years from 
1960-1984 to 1984-1995 and to 8 years during 1995-2008. The confidence intervals o f 
medians estimated by Stata are non-overlapping, which suggests that the difference in 
median delays is significant (see Table 2.7). Next, I test for the significance o f the 
impact o f first generic launch period by semi-parametric estimation.
Figure 2.7 Overall median delays o f generics with respect to period o f global launch
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Table 2.7 Median delays and confidence intervals by period of first launch (generic 
molecules)
Period Subjects Median Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
1960-1984 3924 26.83 0.54 25.75 27.83
1984-1995 1688 14.58 0.23 14.00 14.92
1995-2008 869 7.83 0.31 7.33 8.58
Cox Proportional Hazard Model: Test of Survival Trend Significance
In parallel to the case with innovative molecules, fixed and random effect Cox models 
were estimated for generic drugs using the same specifications in Section 2.3.1. Table 
2.8 presents the estimates for the Fixed Effects Cox Estimates. First global generic 
adoption in 1960-1984 has a hazard ratio of 0.641, and therefore, is associated with a 
46% in the hazard compared to molecules that had first global adoption during 1984- 
1995. Similarly, first generic launch in 1995-2008 is associated with a 3.104 faster 
hazard rate compared to first generic launch in 1960-1984.
Table 2.8 Cox regression with country fixed effects: generics
Variables Hazard Ratio Std Err z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Int. J
Global launch in 60-84 0.641 0.026 -10.89 0.000 0.592 0.694
Global launch in 95-08 3.104 0.179 19.69 0.000 2.773 3.474
Austria 0.777 0.085 -2.3 0.021 0.627 0.963
Belgium 0.602 0.068 -4.47 0.000 0.482 0.752
Canada 1.399 0.146 3.21 0.001 1.140 1.718
Finland 0.738 0.083 -2.71 0.007 0.592 0.919
France 0.781 0.084 -2.31 0.021 0.632 0.963
Germany 1.557 0.162 4.26 0.000 1.270 1.909
Greece 0.825 0.092 -1.73 0.084 0.663 1.026
Italy 0.836 0.093 -1.61 0.108 0.672 1.040
Japan 0.836 0.095 -1.59 0.113 0.669 1.043
Netherlands 0.811 0.090 -1.88 0.060 0.652 1.009
Poland 1.086 0.115 0.78 0.438 0.882 1.338
Portugal 0.655 0.075 -3.68 0.000 0.523 0.821
S. Africa 0.720 0.084 -2.83 0.005 0.574 0.904
Spain 0.786 0.089 -2.11 0.035 0.629 0.983
Sweden 0.607 0.069 -4.37 0.000 0.485 0.759
Switzerland 0.639 0.073 -3.92 0.000 0.511 0.800
Turkey 0.857 0.096 -1.37 0.170 0.687 1.069
UK 2.011 0.202 6.94 0.000 1.651 2.449
US 2.130 0.215 7.51 0.000 1.748 2.595
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Table 2.9 shows the estimates for the random effects Cox model. The estimates for the 
hazard ratio are similar to the estimates in the random effects model, 0.642 and 3.097 
for first generic launch in 1960-1984 and respectively 1995-2008. Overall, the reduction 
in the adoption differentials for generics is also statistically significant. The Hausman 
test comparing fixed and random effects indicates that the shared frailty specification is 
preferable (p-value 0.0784). The acceleration in generic adoption over time can be 
mainly attributed to new regulations in the US and EU that have enabled generic drug 
development before patent expiry and reduced capital requirements by obviating the 
need to reproduce data from clinical trials.
Table 2.9 Cox regression with shared frailty specification for generics
Variables HazardRatio Std Err z P>\z\ [95% Conf. Interval]
Global launch in 60-84 0.642 0.026 -10.84 0.000 0.593 0.696
Global launch in 95-08 3.097 0.178 19.66 0.000 2.767 3.466
Theta 0.139 0.045
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) = 352.99 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Note: standard errors of hazard ratios are conditional on theta.
Difference-in-Differences Analysis for Generics
Table 2.10 and Table 2.11 present the corresponding DiD estimates for the policy 
change effects in 1984 and 1995 on the adoption of generic competition. Estimated 
regression models assume the same specification as outlined in Section 2.2.2.3 and 
2.3.1. The impact of the 1984 Act on the adoption of generics in the US is quantified by 
the coefficient of the DiD estimator US_d_1984, which is negative (indicating a 
reduction in the relative adoption delay in the US) and highly significant. This is 
expected as the Bolar provisions in 1984 were highly effective in decreasing barriers to 
entry for generics.
The impact of the EMEA on generic adoption (parameter EU_d_1995 in Table 2.11) 
indicates a decrease in the adoption time; however, the effect is not significant. In the 
case of new molecules, excluding the US from the control group changed the 
significance of the DiD estimate. However, in the case of generics, excluding the US 
makes no difference. The establishment of the EMEA did not reduce the barriers to 
entry as the Hatch-Waxman did in the US in 1984. Similar Bolar provisions in the EU
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were only accepted in 2004. Therefore, it is not paradoxical that the DiD estimate for 
the policy change in 1995 is not significant in the case of generics.
Table 2.10 DiD Analysis for 1984 US Hatch Waxman Act (Generics)
Variables y=ln(t) y = t
US 0.335** 1.763[0.13] [1.29]
d_1984 0.691***[0.05]
8.128***
[0.39]
US_d_1984 -0.733***[0.13]
-7.112***
[1.24]
Country Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4846 4846
Log Likelihood -6193.07 -18664.4
p-value 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 12430.13 37372.71
Bayesian Info Criteria 12572.82 37515.4
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001
Table 2.11 DiD Analysis for the Impact of EMEA in EU (Generics)
Variables DID DID 
(excluding US)
EU -0.227* -0.233*[0.09] [0.09]
d_1995 -0.295*** -0.310***[0.04] [0.04]
EU_d_1995 -0.023[0.05]
-0.008
[0.06]
Country Effects Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4846 4618
Log Likelihood -6251.86 -5952.06
p-value 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 12547.73 11946.12
Bayesian Info Criteria 12690.42 12081.31
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001
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2.3.2.1 1960-1984: Stringency in MA Regulations and the US drug lag
In the previous sections, significant lags in the US were observed for new molecules. As 
Figure 2.8 2.8 shows, the US exhibits no drug lag with respect to the adoption o f first 
generics. Based on a cross-country perspective, Italy, Spain and France adopt generics 
latest, and are surpassed by Germany and the UK. The delay in generic adoption in 
Spain and France is considerable compared to the free-priced EU markets (the UK and 
Germany). This pattern in Europe is broadly in line with the pattern for innovative 
pharmaceuticals; except for the fact that UK lags behind Germany during this period by 
about 3 years (see Table B.5 in Appendix B for the exact figures). Also, in contrast to 
the case for innovative molecules, adoption o f generic competition in Japan is relatively 
fast during this period.
Figure 2.8 Survival Estimates for Generics: 1960-1984
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2.3.2.2 1984-1995: The Hatch-Waxman Act and Improved Generic Access in the 
US
Although there is no indication that US is lagging in the introduction of generic 
products during 1960-1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act o f 1984 sought to improve generic entry while ensuring adequate return for 
innovator firms through patent restoration (Wittner 2004). As an immediate benefit, the 
1984 Act allowed generic manufacturers to develop generic drugs before patent expiry
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o f the originator product (often referred to as the “Bolar” clause)44. In addition, the Act 
reduced barriers to generic entry by substantially reducing development costs. Generic 
producers were allowed to reference the originator’s safety and efficacy data obviating 
the need to repeat the same tests. In addition, the Act introduced 180 days o f market 
exclusivity period to the first company to file a new generic application (known as 
ANDA, Abridged New Drug Application).
Figure 2.9 Survival Estimates for Generics: 1984-1995
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Figure 2.9 shows the pattern o f differential lags during 1984-1995. Compared to the 
1960-1984 three main differences emerge. First, following the provisions for quicker 
generic entry in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the median delay in the US is reduced by 4 
years (from 14 years to about 10 years). Second, the Japanese lag for generics increases 
by 4 years. Third, UK and Germany show equally fast generic adoption with a median 
lag on the order o f 11-12 years. Finally, France, Italy and Spain follow with a median 
delay o f 14-17 years.
44 The name is derived from a landmark case between Roche and the generic companies Bolar. Bolar 
won the right to start developing the generic copy o f  Roche’s patented compound Flurazepam 
Hydrochloride prior to its patent expiry, which was incorporated into the 1984 Act.
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2.3.2.3 1995-2008: EMEA and New Generic Legislations in Europe
The period from 1995 to 2008 witnessed important regulatory changes in generic 
legislations both in the US and Europe. Europe followed the US in providing incentives 
for generic development and timely market access in Europe. The US, on the other 
hand, focused mainly on the prevention of originator firm strategies to delay or block 
generic competition.
Changes in the US Generic Legislation
Two revisions (McCain-Schumer legislation in 2002, Gregg-Schumer Act in 2003) to 
Hatch-Waxman Act in the US sought to improve the balance between the needs of the 
branded companies and those of the generic companies. First, the new revisions set up a 
new mechanism to prevent the inclusion of frivolous patents or those filed at the last 
moment as a blocking mechanism. Second, the new legislation addressed the use of 
180-day exclusivity period by generic companies for special arrangements with 
originators as a means to prevent market entry of other generics45. Gregg-Schumer 
revisions included “forfeiture” provisions which put the generic company under risk of 
losing the exclusivity if found to have made such an arrangement.
Changes in the European Generic Legislation
Europe’s fragmented market structure has presented a major barrier to generic growth 
compared to the US market where federal law applies uniformly across different states. 
Directive 2004/27/EC has aimed to remove some of these barriers by updating Directive 
2001/83. As with the US Hatch-Waxman Act, the legislation was intended to balance 
the needs of the branded pharmaceutical companies and generics companies. The 
overall body of EU law governing the manufacture and trade in pharmaceuticals 
(Directive 2001/83) had flows such as the lack of a generic-product definition and 
allowed branded companies to withdraw reference products before generic entry.
The new laws introduced a specific “generic” definition. One of the most important 
aspects for generics companies was the “Bolar” clause permitting generic companies to
45 According to the 1984 Act, if the first generic company chose not to market the generic copy, all 
other generic competitors from the market would be excluded and all competition would be blocked 
for a period of 180 days. Authorized generics, copies made under license from the innovator 
companies, were introduced whereby the originator receives royalties on sales in return. For 
example, Par Pharma's generic version of Glaxo's Paxil (Paroxetine) was launched with Glaxo's 
approval even though Apotex had obtained six-month exclusivity for its own generic.
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do their own development work within the EU during the period of patent protection for 
the original molecule. The practical impact of the clause on the timing of product 
launches may be minimal because wherever the development is carried out, generics 
cannot be launched prior to patent expiry. The main benefit however is that companies 
could maintain generic drug development in the EU46.
Under the new legislation, the same product can be used as a reference product for 
generics everywhere in the EU even if not registered in particular countries. This is a 
small step towards unification of European generic legislation. In addition, if originator 
companies withdraw a brand before any generic versions are marketed, the generics can 
still use it as a reference product. Finally, the establishment of the EMEA in 1995 had 
little direct impact on generics companies. However, the centralized procedure is open 
to generics provided that the original is approved through the centralized system 
(Wittner 2004).
Generic Lags across Markets follow the Pattern o f Non-Generic Lags
Figure 2.10 demonstrates that the pattern of launch for the first imitative generic 
product is quite similar to the pattern for innovative molecules47. New generic 
legislations have proven effective in the EU in further reducing the generic lag although 
it is hard to quantify to what extent the reductions are triggered by new legislations. The 
fastest adopters are as usual markets with relatively high originator prices (the US, UK 
and Germany) that offer higher profit prospects for imitative products. The median 
delay for the leaders is on the order of 4-5 years, with a reduction of 5-6 years compared 
to 1984-1995. More regulated markets (Italy, Spain and France) lag by about 5 years 
behind the leaders, with a median delay of 9-10 years (which is a significant reduction 
from 14-17 years in 1984-1995). Japanese lag for the adoption of generic competition is 
not as dramatic as for innovative molecules; however, Japan is still the slowest market 
among the biggest seven markets with a median delay of 11 years.
46 As mentioned before, the SPC had prevented generic companies from engaging in R&D prior to 
patent expiry.
47 Similar to the non-generic case, equality by country, atcl, forml and first launch period rejected 
(p-value < 0.001 for all).
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Figure 2.10 Survival Estimates for Generics: 1995-2008
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Similar survival profiles for new molecules and generic products indicate that the 
negative impact o f price controls on the launch timing o f pharmaceutical innovation has 
spillover effects on the adoption o f generic competition. The bottom-line is that 
regulated markets not only access innovation later, but also face temporal disadvantage 
in terms o f their access to cost-effective generic products. To what extent this is 
balanced by lower branded prices remains an open question for further exploration.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to test the stylized facts suggested by earlier empirical work on 
regulation and the adoption o f pharmaceutical innovation and generic competition. To 
do so, this chapter provided an overview o f the evolution o f the drug lag for new 
innovative molecules and first generic products for off-patent molecules across the main 
OECD markets. The regulatory environment and relative launch times o f new molecules 
and first generic copies were analyzed using non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates for three periods over 1960-2008, which were defined based on two landmark 
events in the regulatory history o f pharmaceutical products: the 1984 Hatch-Waxman 
Act in the US and the establishment o f a central regulatory agency in Europe in 1995. 
This is the first study to provide a descriptive evolution o f relative lags across a number
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of markets over a lengthy period of time and a comprehensive set of molecules, both for 
innovative products and imitative generic copies. The significance of the findings in the 
Kaplan-Meier analysis were further assessed more rigorously by Cox PH models and 
difference-in-difference analysis.
Lower transaction costs due to reductions in geographical barriers and lower regulatory 
costs (harmonized market authorization procedures, strengthened IP rights, patent term 
restorations) have exerted a downward pressure over time on median delays in 
individual countries as well as overall delays across the main OECD markets. All 
markets experience a decreasing trend over time for median delays following global 
launch. With the wider use of the centralized procedure over the coming years, the 
delays in the diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation across the EU may be further 
smoothed out. However, the relative lags across countries remain significant both for 
new molecules and for generic products due to various pricing and reimbursement 
regulations.
A somewhat paradoxical important finding is that the negative impact of price controls 
on new molecules translates to delayed generic availability, which suggests that 
regulation not only delays patient access to new pharmaceutical technologies but also 
creates trade-off between existing competition and potential competition. While lower 
prices may increase the extent of competition between existing rivals, they may also 
consitute a barrier to entry for potential generic competiton. Delaying or blocking 
potential competition implies opportunity costs for governments through foregone 
savings. Assessing the impact on overall welfare, however, would require a comparison 
of savings from lower branded product prices and savings foregone due to late generic 
launch and possibly lower generic penetration. Relative delays in the diffusion of 
generics are expected to decrease further because of the new European legislation in 
2004 and the push for genericization as a cost-containment mechanism in government 
policies facing economic challenges of the recent financial crisis.
Globally, the relative lags exhibit a change in the geographical pattern of lags over time. 
The US lag back in 1960s has switched to more price stringent European markets 
throughout 1960-2008. Relatively free-priced European markets of Germany and the 
UK , which also have strong local pharmaceutical industries, lead in the EU as the
48 However, prices may be indirectly affected through regulations in other parts of the market. In the 
UK profits are regulated through the PPRS (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme) and products 
are subject to NICE appraisals for Cost-Effectiveness (“the fourth hurdle”). Flexible Pricing schemes
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fastest adopters of pharmaceutical innovation (and imitation). Product launch 
strategically takes place first in higher-priced EU markets as a result of threat of 
arbitrage and price dependency across the member states, which puts European markets 
with low prices and/or small market sizes such as Spain and Portugal at a disadvantage. 
Paradoxically, the Japanese market with its large market size and relatively high prices 
remains a laggard throughout 1960-2008. The idiosyncratic nature of clinical trial 
requirements in Japan has been the major driver of asymmetric costs for foreign 
pharmaceutical firms. Harmonization efforts on foreign clinical data use seem to be 
taking effect slowly and expected future rise in the use of the bridging strategy may 
further reduce the Japanese drug lag in the upcoming years.
The R&D activity of leading pharmaceutical companies is largely carried out in the 
major OECD markets. Reducing delays in these markets will increase the 
appropriability of R&D investments and stimulate further innovation contributing to 
dynamic efficiency over the long run. On the other hand, new pharmaceutical 
technologies impose additional pressure on the tight health care budgets and quick 
diffusion of new technologies with uncertain benefits could lead to inefficiencies in the 
provision of health care (Garber and Skinner 2008). The introduction of new drugs in 
individual markets, therefore, should be balanced out with the expansion of drug 
expenditure and the evidence of cost-effectiveness. From a cross-country perspective, 
reducing the differential delays for globally important molecules will enable a more 
equitable access to new and possibly more effective treatment alternatives.
and Risk Sharing Agreements introduced in the 2009 PPRS will further emphasize value-for-money 
in NHS purchases of medicinal products. In Germany reimbursement regulation through reference 
pricing includes patented pharmaceuticals in reference groups unless novelty and therapeutic 
improvement is demonstrated and companies take this into consideration when setting prices.
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CHAPTER 3
3 Price regulation and speed of adoption of pharmaceutical 
innovation: evidence from the main OECD markets (1999-2008)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has traditionally had an international character with 
substantial foreign direct investment in marketing and production in order to recoup 
R&D costs or satisfy local clinical trial requirements. Multinational pharmaceuticals are 
faced with increasing challenges in developing international market strategies for new 
products. The first and arguably most important challenge following product 
registration is the international launch strategy, i.e. timing and order of market entry, 
which is compounded with difficulties due to the unique and often country-specific 
regulatory nature of the pharmaceutical industry. Pricing and reimbursement regulation 
is geared towards cost containment goals, along with other objectives such as promoting 
rational drug use, ensuring value for money and less commonly protecting national 
industry against international competition. While there is a small literature on the effect 
of regulation on drug prices and competition, the evidence regarding the impact of 
regulation on the launch timing of pharmaceutical innovation is scanty.
The aim of this chapter is to improve our understanding of the effects of regulation on 
the speed of adoption of new pharmaceutical products (adoption in this paper is 
specified by the first launch date of a given molecule). This chapter contributes to the 
literature by empirically exploring the launch timing of new molecules in different 
countries that make up the world innovative drug market. Drawing upon duration 
modelling on IMS (Intercontinental Medical Statistics) data I investigate how regulation 
affects the diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation across the major OECD markets and 
identify strategies that firms employ to dampen the effect of price and profit spillovers 
in an interdependent market environment. In order to identify the effect of regulation 
more neatly, I control for firm and molecule heterogeneity in predicting the speed of 
launch across markets.
The impact of regulation on entry and social efficiency has been highlighted by various 
economists (Djankov, La Porta et al. 2002). Several studies have addressed how 
regulation affects adoption of innovation in different industries, including the domestic
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construction industry (Jaffe and Stavins 1995; Dewick and Miozzo 2002), electrical 
utilities (Sanchez and Post 1998), the global mobile telecommunications market (Gruber 
and Verboven 2001), chlorine manufacturing (Snyder, Miller et al. 2003), information 
technology (Wallsten 2005), and agrochemicals (Sheppard, Shaw et al. 2006). The 
pharmaceutical industry, however, is one of the most heavily regulated industries and 
provides a perfect test bed to assess how regulation affects adoption of innovation 
across interdependent markets49.
Pharmaceuticals deserve specific attention because consumption is channelled through 
an agency relationship. Accordingly, besides regulation other characteristics of the 
agency relationship will appear to influence the speed of adoption. Reimbursement is 
carried out by third party payers, which limits financial responsibility on the demand 
side leading to price insensitivity and moral hazard in consumption. The industry 
significantly depends on monopoly rights granted by patents to recoup costly R&D 
outlays and maintain sustainability of future investments50. Such monopolistic power, 
however, allows pricing above marginal costs, which has historically focused 
regulators’ attention on pharmaceutical prices as a major means of cost-containment.
Governments are faced with the challenge of protecting the general population health, 
ensure access to safe and effective medicines, constrain rising pharmaceutical 
expenditures and provide incentives to stimulate pharmaceutical R&D. Regulation of 
the pharmaceutical sector is used as a tool to correct market failures and balance 
conflicting public health and industrial policy goals (Mossialos, Walley et al. 2004b). 
Hence, regulation in each country is the result of solving this trade off.
New pharmaceuticals tend to be products that contain global public good characteristics, 
as they are part of health care treatments that apply across the globe. Access to essential 
medicines is also increasingly recognized as a core part of the international right to 
health (Thomas 2006). Patents confer temporary market power to single multinational 
corporations as a mechanism to reimburse the costly research and development process.
49 Regulation in the pharmaceutical sector can be targeted at either the demand or supply side, or both. 
Supply-side measures affect pharmaceutical prices directly or indirectly and therefore target the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Demand-side controls, on the other hand, are directed at physicians, 
pharmacists or patients and aim to control volume through financial and non-financial incentives 
(Mossialos and Oliver 2005). Supply-side controls have been the most pervasive and controversial type of 
control among the OECD markets.
50 R&D investments are estimated to be on the order of $800 million, with a range of $500 million to 
$2,000 million depending on the therapy or the developing firm (DiMasi 2002; DiMasi, Hansen et 
al. 2003; Adams and Brantner 2006).
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Due to this monopolistic power, pharmaceutical prices have become the main focus of 
insurers and regulators as a means of cost-containment. The monopoly rights offered by 
patents create incentives for innovation; however, such power allows firms to set prices 
higher than the prices in a more competitive environment. The quantity and quality of 
pharmaceutical innovation significantly depends on the monopoly rights to recoup the 
risky R&D investments, which are estimated to be on the order of $800 million (with a 
range of $500 million to $2,000 million depending on the therapy or the developing 
firm) (DiMasi 2002; DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003; Adams and Brantner 2006). In 
addition, patents help to insulate firms against the risk of easy and cheap replication of 
drugs since manufacturing expenses are marginal compared to the capital requirements 
needed for product development51.
Compared to other patent dependent industries, the lengthy drug development process 
leaves a short period of patent exclusivity free from generic competition52. Given the 
reliance of the pharmaceutical industry on returns to R&D investments while the 
product is still under patent protection, speedy and simultaneous introduction across 
markets would be the optimal launch strategy to maximize commercial success. 
However, different regulatory hurdles for pricing and reimbursement after market 
authorization and the dependence of prices across markets may hamper the speed of 
introduction of pharmaceutical innovation and an equitable access across different 
markets. In particular, price controls have received sharp criticism for reducing the 
innovative activity in the sector through lower returns to R&D (Giaccotto, Santerre et 
al. 2005; Vernon 2005) over the lifecycle of a product and creating differentials in the 
adoption and diffusion of new technologies across markets (Danzon and Epstein 2005; 
Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Lanjouw 2005; Kyle 2007; Kyle 2007; Danzon and Epstein 
2008; Danzon and Furukawa 2008). Regulations, therefore, may result in negative 
implications on equitable access to health enhancing pharmaceutical technologies.
Pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in the EU is still a national competence, 
which results in different pharmaceutical P&R systems. The drug lag can have different 
components in different countries, depending on specific local regulations. Several 
studies in the literature have addressed delays due to the review process (Dranove and 
Meltzer 1994; Thomas, McAuslaine et al. 1998; Bolten and DeGregorio 2002;
51 www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/lehman.pdf
52 additional extensions of exclusivity have tried to rectify this but have not totally addressed the 
time lost from the effective patent life
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Carpenter, Chemew et al. 2003; Carpenter and Turenne 2004), while others have 
focused on differentials in first marketing days across countries, which could be either 
due to regulatory delays or pricing and reimbursement delays.
In sum, regulation measures aimed at protecting consumer safety and enhancing 
efficiency might be exerting some dynamic effects on the diffusion of new 
pharmaceutical products. This chapter will test the hypothesis that regulation has a 
significantly negative effect on the speed of new molecule adoption in markets that 
apply these regulations and investigate the ramifications of price linkages across 
individual markets created by external reference pricing and parallel trade. Drawing 
upon duration modelling applied to IMS (Intercontinental Medical Statistics) data I 
estimate the impact of regulation, identified by expected launch prices, on the 
probability of new molecule launch across the main OECD markets during 1999-2008 
controlling for market structure, firm and molecule heterogeneity. I also further examine 
a sub-set of markets, within the EU, to assess whether firms employ strategic pricing 
behaviour.
This chapter aims to address some of the methodological shortcomings of previous 
studies. Prior few studies with IMS price and volume data used semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazard (PH) model and discrete-time implementation of the PH model by 
complementary log-log (hereafter referred as cloglog) regression. Due to interval 
censored nature of the launch (failure) times in the IMS data, this chapter adopts the 
discrete-time failure model as the main specification and compares marginal effects the 
continuous-time specification with the Cox PH model. In addition, I control for drug 
and firm level characteristics to avoid omitted variable bias. In contrast to the approach 
followed by Kyle (2007), I consider only the first indication of molecules in each 
market as new indications face lower barriers and costs to entry both pre- and post­
authorization. This approach also avoids attenuation in standard errors due to the 
potential correlation in errors for different indications of a given molecule-country pair. 
In addition, the data used encompasses a different drug mix and a more up-to-date 
analysis period compared to previous studies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the evidence from 
the literature and sets the theoretical framework; Section 3.3 describes the methods; 
Section 3.4 presents the estimation results and finally Section 3.5 discusses the findings 
and policy implications.
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3.2 MARKET BARRIERS TO ADOPTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE
The literature on international diffusion of new pharmaceutical technologies starts with 
discussion of the drug lag in the US during the 1970s following the regulatory 
amendments after the Thalidomide disaster. More recently, however, the literature has 
shifted its focus to the drug lag in markets subject to pricing and reimbursement 
controls (particularly within the EU). These control measures affect the local 
commercial demand factors and increase the interdependency between international 
markets due to spillovers from application of reference pricing and the profit 
implications of parallel exports. Also, these markets tend to be the most significant 
pharmaceutical markets in terms of their share in the global sales.
Both the early and the more recent empirical literature investigate similar issues, in 
particular the impact of market characteristics (market size, wealth, IP protection, 
competition, regulation), drug attributes (therapeutic importance), firm characteristics, 
stringency of regulation and the national origin of pharmaceutical products on the
STlaunch differentials in local markets following the first global launch date . Appendix 
C.l reviews the earlier, technically less sophisticated literature as well as the evidence 
regarding review times in the US and EU. Basic findings of the earlier literature are as 
follows:
The term “drug lag” was coined by Wardell in 1970s to raise awareness of the 
unavailability of new drugs in the US following the 1962 Drug Efficacy 
Amendments (Warded 1973; Warded 1974; Warded 1978).
- Besides regulation, the impact of market size, price levels, and ease of marketing are 
also considered as influential factors on mean lags per country and the number of 
new products launched in each country (Cullen 1983; Parker 1984).
- The drug set selected for multi-country analysis has a significant effect on mean 
delays in adoption. There is a direct relationship between the therapeutic 
contribution of a new drug and its likelihood of achieving widespread introduction 
(Parker 1984; Barral 1985; Coppinger, Peck et al. 1989).
Stringency of the drug regulatory systems emerges as an important determinant of 
drug delays in the early literature (Andersson 1992; LaFrancis Popper and Nason 
1994).
53 Global launch indicates the first launch among the countries within the analysis
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Product and firm attributes (therapeutic importance and scale economies) may have 
an affect on the review times (Dranove and Meltzer 1994; Carpenter and Turenne 
2004).
- Several studies investigate the impact of different legislative acts in 1970s-1990s on 
drug availability and adoption across multiple countries (LaFrancis Popper and 
Nason 1994; Reichert 2003). Overall, legislations that encourage the development of 
innovative products reduce clinical development and approval times.
The following section reports on the later literature that is more relevant to the analysis 
undertaken in this chapter.
3.2.1 Price Controls as a Market Barrier to Entry
Following the changes in the regulatory and commercial landscape of the 
pharmaceutical market throughout the 1990’s, a body of literature examining the impact 
of price controls on the extent of launch and launch delays of new pharmaceutical 
products across different countries has emerged. An overwhelming majority of these 
papers, however, focus on developed markets. These studies can be broadly categorized 
into two with respect to the way regulation is identified. The first category uses proxy 
measures for regulation (such as dummies for price control) at the time of first global 
launch that are rough and may be inaccurate since regulation is multidimensional and 
complex (Lanjouw 2005; Heuer, Mejer et al. 2007; Kyle 2007). In addition, dummies 
exhibit multi-collinearity with the country effects. The second category incorporates 
product-specific data on actual prices to account for the impact of regulation (Danzon 
and Epstein 2005; Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Danzon and Epstein 2008). Incorporating 
price information provides more insight into the net effect of regulation since price 
levels provide more variation over time, across products, firms and countries.
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3.2.1.1 Identification of Regulation
Treatment dummies for some or extensive price control
Lanjouw (2005) investigates how policy choices regarding patent rights and price 
regulation affect decision and speed of launch by using IMS data for the launch of 836 
new drugs in countries across all income levels over the period 1982-2002. Stringency 
of price control is measured by dummies indicating some or extensive price control. 
The analysis is carried out separately for high-income and low-middle income countries. 
For high-income countries, models are estimated on a high-quality subset of NCE’s54 
whereas for the low-middle income group the focus is on blockbuster drugs55. The 
models account for local technical capacity (country R&D expenditure in all areas as a 
share of GDP) and strength of patent protection (availability of product and process 
patents, and patent rights restriction on a 0-1 scale).
According to Lanjouw’s findings lower income countries have fewer drugs launched 
and longer delays56. Long term product patents do not increase drug availability in 
lower income countries. Short-term IP (4 years for product patents) or long term process 
protection only shortens launch delays in the developing world. In developing countries, 
price regulation does not prevent products from entry but influences timing, although 
moderate price regulation has no impact on timing.
In high-income countries both extensive and moderate regulation negatively impact 
extent of market entry; and extensive control damages the likelihood of a quick launch. 
Essential drug lists reduce market entry and national formularies are associated with less 
rapid entry. The probability that blockbuster drugs are launched within two years is 
considerably higher (Lanjouw 2005).
Treatment dummies for direct or indirect price controls
Other studies control for direct price controls (international price comparisons, 
therapeutic value/cost-effectiveness, pharmaceutical contribution to the economy) and 
indirect price controls (profit control, reference pricing) to test how different price and 
reimbursement regulation schemes affect the probability of early launch (launch within 
8 months of first global launch). For example, Heuer, Mejer et al. (2007) analyze the
54 NCE’s launched in the US or UK within 2 years of marketing approval
55 A blockbuster drug is a drug generating more than $1 billion of revenue each year
56 Parker 1984 observes a similar result
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launch delay of new chemical entities approved by the EMEA’s centralized procedure 
between 1995 and 2004 (Heuer, Mejer et al. 2007). This approach isolates the impact of 
market authorization regulations. The study uses IMS Drug Launches database to 
analyze the launch experience of NCEs within the former EU15 in the outpatient (retail) 
sector during 1995-2005. A probit model, where success is defined as launch within 8 
months of market authorization approval, is estimated.
The basic finding of the study is that countries with the highest probability of launch 
impose the lowest regulation on prices. The use of international price comparisons has a 
significant negative impact on the timing of new drug launches. Indirect price controls 
do not turn out to be a significant factor to explain launch delays, at least for on-patent 
drugs. The main shortcoming of this analysis is the loss of time information since the 
probit model does not make use of duration data and only distinguishes between 
launches within 8 months of approval and those that took longer than 8 months. This 
study does not control for drug and firm level heterogeneity, and ex-ante price and 
profit expectations are not considered.
Treatment dummies for different types of price controls and price ranks
Another stream in the literature uses price ranks to account for different price levels in 
addition to including regulation dummies, (e.g. control measures for prescription 
budgets, reference pricing, the use of pharmacoeconomic evidence, and price freezes 
and controls) (Kyle 2007). Kyle (2007) finds evidence of the spillover of regulatory 
controls to other international markets in her analysis of new drug launches in 28 
countries (21 of which belong to the OECD) over 1980-2000. Launches are modelled as 
a function of competition, market (country-therapeutic class-year triple), firm and drug 
characteristics. Price controls affect entry decisions not only in the country that imposes 
them but in potential markets as well. Launch in a price-controlled country reduces the 
likelihood of introducing products in additional markets whereas launch in a high-priced 
market has the opposite effect. Methods used by Kyle (2007) include a negative 
binomial model to analyze the number of countries in which the drug is marketed, and a 
discrete-time hazard model to assess whether price controls delay launch, both of which 
use time to launch data.
An important contribution of Kyle (2007) has been to investigate the impacts of 
competition (non-generic), firm and molecule effects on launch in addition to
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controlling for regulation57. Competition, firm and drug effects are identified as 
significant factors that explain differentials in launch (Kyle 2006; Kyle 2007). The 
existence of competing drugs is associated with an increased rate of entry. Speed of 
launch increases with drug importance (proxied by the share of Medline citations) and 
the number of other markets the drug has entered. Extensive international and local firm 
experiences shorten launch delays. Firms with many drugs in their portfolios tend to 
launch their drugs in fewer countries, which according to Kyle indicates firm efforts to 
match a market to the most appropriate treatments. No evidence is found regarding the 
negative effect of demand-side controls on launch.
Criticisms applied to Kyle (2007) may be directed to the definition of a new drug. Each 
new indication for a given molecule is treated as a new drug. However, new indications 
do not face the same barriers of entry as the first indication since price negotiations may 
be simpler and clinical trial requirements less for new indications. In addition, different 
indications for a given molecule-country pair would have correlated errors which could 
result in attenuation of the standard errors of the coefficients. Another issue is the static 
nature of the price ranks. In reality, price ranks may be heterogeneous with respect to 
the therapeutic subgroup or across time.
Prices as a Proxy of Regulation
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that mechanisms such as parallel trade 
and external reference pricing that create interdependencies in price and profits have 
increased launch delays and decreased the extent of launch in low-priced countries. The 
effects of these spillovers effects on the launch delay of new drugs have been studied by 
Danzon and Wang (2005), Danzon and Epstein (2005), Danzon and Epstein (2008) by 
using different sets of drugs and different time periods. A common measure of launch 
delays in all these analyses is the difference between the global launch date and country- 
specific launch date. Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish between finer delays due 
to market authorization and P&R approval. Danzon and Wang (2005) use a Cox 
proportional hazard model whereas the remaining papers adopt a discrete time
57 Control variables include the number of potential competitors (number of molecules that have 
launched in other markets), corruption and market competition indexes (entry costs as percentage of 
GDP per capita), firm-level variables such as the number of countries in which the firm has launched 
any drug; number of drugs marketed by the firm in the country of launch and portfolio size; drug- 
level variables such as drug age, the number of countries in which the drug has been introduced, and 
the share of Medline citations
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implementation of the proportional hazard model with complementary log log 
regression.
Expected price: Lagged average competitor price per SU prior to global launch
Danzon and Wang (2005) analyze the launch of 85 NCE’s in 25 markets, including 14 
EU countries, by using IMS price and volume data over 1994-1998 presented in annual 
quarters. Controlling for market size58 and per capita income, the effects of expected 
price on launch probability and launch delay are analyzed. Expected price is proxied by 
the lagged average price per standard unit 59 (SU) for the therapeutic class (ATC3) in 
quarters 3 and 4 prior to the first global launch. Expected market size is proxied by sales 
in SUs in the therapeutic class in the two quarters prior to the first global launch date. 
Control variables include the firm’s worldwide sales at the beginning of the study 
period, domestic launch, therapeutic category (ATC1 code), GDP per capita and country 
indicators relative to the UK. Estimates indicate that the hazard of launch is positively 
related to expected price, expected sales volume, home country and worldwide sales of 
the firm. Extent of launch is highest for markets with uncontrolled prices (US, Germany 
and the UK) whereas lower priced countries have both fewer launches and longer 
launch lags. Major parallel export EU countries have longer launch delays controlling 
for expected price and volume.
Danzon, Wang et al. (2005) use the expected price and volume before the global launch 
date; the impact of the change in prices and volumes over time after the global launch is 
not accounted for. A limitation of this study is that it does not identify the effect of 
time-varying factors such as age of the new chemical entity (NCE), the change in the 
market structure and the competitive landscape of the therapeutic subgroup. The Cox 
proportional model implicitly assumes that there is an average and linear price effect in 
the hazard that is valid for every NCE; interactions of time and price are not modelled. 
In addition, incorporation of generic prices in the calculation of expected prices may 
underestimate the expected price in countries with loose price regulation and strong 
generic penetration (US, UK, Germany) and result in imprecise coefficient estimates.
58 Sales in  standard units in  the therapeutic class in the two quarters prior to the first global launch date
59 IMS standard unit is defined as the smallest dose for each product form, for example, one tablet, one capsule, 5 ml 
of liquid
Expected price: Lagged average competitor price per SU prior to local launch
The other two main papers utilizing price information are by Danzon and Epstein (2005, 
2008). These papers estimate a discrete-time implementation of the proportional hazard 
model to identify the effects of price and competition on launch timing decisions 
(Danzon and Epstein 2005; Danzon and Epstein 2008). In addition, prices at which new 
drugs are launched are estimated by OLS regression. Average lagged competitor prices 
in the therapeutic subclasses are used to measure the net effect of regulation. The papers 
differ by the number of therapeutic classes and the analysis period. Danzon and Epstein 
(2008) analyze launch experience in 15 countries60 for drugs in 12 therapeutic classes61 
over the decade 1992-2003, whereas the 2005 paper covers the sales of drugs from 4 
therapeutic classes62 in 9 countries63 during 1990-2001. Products are categorized into 
new (superior) and old (inferior) subclasses which provides a pseudo classification of 
innovation. However, the exact definitions of what constitutes “old” and/or “new” is not 
clearly reported64. It is suggested that most superior molecules are potentially global 
molecules that can meet the safety and efficacy standards of all the major regulatory 
agencies, whereas the inferior classes may include molecules with different mechanisms 
of action, some of which might not meet the more stringent regulatory standards of the 
US FDA or the EMEA (Danzon and Epstein 2005). Such a division, as authors claim, 
aims to investigate the dynamic (between subclasses) vs. static (within subclass) 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry by carrying out separate analyses of launch 
experience in new vs. old subclasses.
Danzon and Epstein (2005) estimate the launch hazard equation by using baseline price 
levels of branded and generic competitors prior to global launch, baseline market size of 
the therapeutic class, and the changes in these covariates for superior and inferior 
molecules from baseline to time t. Danzon and Epstein (2008), on the other hand, 
consider only lagged average price and volume in SUs of competitor brand products in
60 UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland, USA, Brazil, and Mexico
61 Anti-asthmatics, anti-clotting, anti-depressants, epileptics, anti-nauseants, parkinsons, anti- 
psychotics, anti-ulcerants, lipid lowering, migraine, osteoporosis, anti-hypertensives
62 Anti-depressants (tricyclics, SSRI, SNRI), anti-ulcerants (H2 antagonists, PPIs), anti- 
hyperlipidemics (statins), anti-rheumatics (NSAIDs, COXII)
63 UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, USA, Belgium
64 Old age dummies in the regression model represent molecules that launched before 1990
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the therapeutic class. The cloglog model investigates the effects of competition, market 
attractiveness, firm characteristics, and spillover potentials65.
Differential Impact o f Prices on Old vs. New Molecules
There exists robust evidence that the higher the expected price, the higher is the hazard 
of launch. However, the impact of price depends on whether the subclass is new 
(superior) or old (inferior). Launch hazards of superior products are significantly and 
positively related to the mean prices of competitor brand products in the subclass. For 
inferior subclass, however, the effect is not significant (Danzon and Epstein 2008). 
Danzon and Epstein (2005) find that it is the baseline average competitor prices that 
affect the launch hazard in inferior subclasses whereas for superior products launch 
hazard increases with the increase in prices from global launch.
To summarize, a reduction in drug prices as a result of price regulation may contribute 
to launch delay in the home country, while low-price countries referenced by high-price 
countries in the EU may suffer welfare losses. Surprisingly, sales volume of the 
therapeutic class, i.e. potential market size, is not a significant determinant of launch. 
This might be due to the fact that the volume effect is captured by prices since prices for 
compounds with large potential sales are set more stringently. However, this is not the 
case for free priced markets and the a priori expectation is that the higher the potential 
market size the higher the hazard of launch, at least in free or high-priced markets.
Impact o f Generic Competition
There exists contradictory evidence regarding the impact of generic competition in the 
therapeutic category on the timing of launch. Danzon and Epstein (2008) observe that 
generic substitutes are not a significant deterrent to the launch of new brand products 
and that generic prices have no significant effect on launch prices of new superior 
brands which implies weak price competition between new brands and old generics. 
According to Danzon and Epstein (2005), however, firms delay launching innovative 
products in countries with generic competition and receive lower launch prices if 
generic competition is present in the therapeutic subclass.
65 Spillover effects are measured by a dummy that controls for parallel import shares in the 
therapeutic subclass and three count variables: the number of countries a molecule has launched in 
low-price EU countries, high-price EU countries and high-price non-EU countries. These variables 
are in addition interacted with whether the potential launch is in low- vs. high-price EU country. 
Competition is measured by the number of generic manufacturers in superior and inferior subclasses 
and the number of molecules in superior and inferior subclasses
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Impact o f  Domestic Launch on Timing o f  Launch
Many studies find significant evidence that local launch increases the speed of launch. 
Danzon and Epstein (2008) claim that local launch is faster only in certain regulated 
markets such as France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland and Japan (Danzon and Epstein 
2008), which have strong pharmaceutical industries and industrial policies to support 
the local industry.
Impact o f  Centralized Authorization in the EU on Timing o f  Launch
The evidence on how EMEA affected adoption speed is not robust. Danzon and Epstein 
(2005, 2008) use an indicator for molecules launched since 1996 to test for the effects of 
the EMEA regime, which is expected to be positive if the cost-reducing effects of the 
EMEA outweigh the increased risk of spillovers. They find that the impact of the 
EMEA process is dependent on the innovativeness of the molecules: the likelihood that 
new drugs would be widely diffused increased for superior products whereas inferior 
products that were first launched after 1996 were less likely to diffuse widely (Danzon 
and Epstein 2005). In the 2008 paper, the impact of the EMEA regime is insignificant 
for superior drugs.
The tentative outcome of these two papers is that the EMEA has not affected the speed 
of diffusion, which contradicts my findings in Chapter 2. Several studies have shown 
that EMEA centralized procedure reduced approval times making mean approval times 
for the EMEA and the FDA comparable (Healy and Kaitin 1999; Faden and Kaitin 
2008). According to Faden and Kaitin (2008), mean approval times for products 
approved by both the EMEA and the FDA were similar (15.8 versus 15.7 months 
respectively) during 2000- 2005. However, greater variability in FDA approval times is 
observed. Among 71 products that were approved both by the FDA and the EMEA, 
nearly three times as many were approved first in the United States (Faden and Kaitin 
2008).
Central community authorization reduced the variation in launch delays across the EU, 
however, it has not eradicated the differentials in timing of launch across the member 
states. For centrally approved molecules Danzon (2005) observes that there is great 
variation across the member states both in terms of the number of markets the 
molecules reach and the timing of launch (Danzon, Wang et al. 2005). Chapter 2 
confirmed that although centralized approval reduced variation in delays, it has not
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eradicated them. However, it remains unknown to what extent price regulation explains 
delays vsersus firm strategies to avoid profit spillovers across markets.
The evidence regarding the impact of parallel imports on timing of launch is weak. The 
presence of parallel imports is found not to be associated with decreased launch hazard 
in the importing country. Similarly, the presence of parallel imports does not affect 
launch prices of superior molecules but decreases launch prices of older inferior 
molecules (Danzon and Epstein 2008).
3.2.2 Firm Strategies as Insider Market Barriers
Section 3.2.1 outlined the existing evidence regarding the impact of price controls as a 
market barrier to entry due to regulation. There is also preliminary evidence that launch 
delays are partly due to strategic behaviour and not just bureaucratic lag. Manufacturers 
may delay launch in low-price markets to avoid undermining higher prices in other 
countries. Spillover effects are observed to be greatest from high-price EU to low-price 
EU countries. Prior launch in a high-price country (Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden) increases the probability of launch in a lower-price country (Spain, Italy, 
France and Belgium). Prior launch in a high-price EU country has a greater impact on 
the launch hazard in a low-price EU country than prior launch in another low-price EU 
country. Similarly, launch in a low-price EU country has a higher impact on launch in a 
high-price EU country than prior launch in a high-price non-EU country (Danzon and 
Epstein 2008). This suggests that firm strategies can impose welfare losses, particularly 
those of the lower-price countries.
Kyle (2007) provides further evidence that prior launch in a low-priced country reduces 
the number of markets the drug is launched in. However, Danzon and Epstein (2005) 
find no significant effect of prior launch in a low-priced EU country on next launches, 
and they posit that launch in low price countries is strategically timed so that it does not 
affect launches in other countries.
Launch price is negatively related to launch delay for innovative products (Danzon and 
Epstein 2005). This suggests that delay is not a bargaining strategy pursued to obtain a 
higher price for superior drugs but represents firm’s acceptance of a low price only once 
higher prices have been established for the drug in other countries. In contrast, inferior 
drugs have a positive association between launch delay and price, which suggests that 
the delay for these molecules is a result of a bargaining strategy.
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Full account of the literature is now given. The next section highlights basic findings 
and gaps in the literature.
3.2.3 Basic Findings and Gaps in the Launch Delay Literature
Table 3.1 Basic Findings from the Literature on Delays in New Drug Entry
Factor Effect Reference
Stringency of 
regulation/ 
Price controls
Stringency of regulation, in particular price 
controls, negatively affect the timing and 
occurrence of launch.
Andersson 1992; 
LaFrancis Popper 
and Nason 1994; 
Parker 1984; 
Lanjouw 2005; 
Danzon, Wang et al. 
2005; Danzon and 
Epstein 2008
Products of firms headquartered in a price- 
controlled market reach fewer markets.
Launch in a price-controlled market reduces 
probability of launch in additional markets.
Expected price
Expected price levels are in general significantly 
and positively related to launch prices; lower 
expected prices result in fewer products and longer 
launch delays.
Danzon, Wang et al. 
2005; Danzon and 
Epstein 2008
Expected market 
size
Although some studies find that markets with 
larger populations have shorter delays, there is no 
robust evidence that confirms the significance of 
expected volume in units.
Cullen 1983; Parker 
1984; Danzon, Wang 
et al. 2005; Danzon 
and Epstein 2008;
Price spillovers
Price spillovers due to reference pricing and 
parallel trade negatively affect launch by creating 
incentives for firms to delay or not launch in low- 
priced countries.
Danzon and Epstein 
2008; Kyle 2007
Competition
Existence of competing drugs increases the rate of 
entry Kyle 2007
Drug importance
Important drugs diffuse widely and at a higher 
speed
Parker 1984; Barral 
1985; Coppinger, 
Peck et al. 1989
Firm effects
There exist significant firm effects. Multi­
nationality of firms and worldwide outpatient sales 
reduce launch delays
Carpenter and 
Turenne 2004; 
Kyle 2007
Domestic
Launch
Drugs of domestic firms are approved earlier than 
foreign firms. However, Danzon and Epstein 
(2008) observe that this is only the case in 
countries where the pharmaceutical industry plays 
a key role in the local economy.
Parker 1984; 
Danzon, Wang et al 
2005; Danzon and 
Epstein 2008
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3.2.3.1 Gaps in the Literature
Early attempts to determine the nature of the relationship between the time lag and the 
influential factors tend to use average delays, and Pearson correlation coefficients/first 
order partial correlation tests (Wardell 1978; Cullen 1983). The more recent literature 
has used more sophisticated methods such as binary response models (probit) by 
defining a threshold period such that launch before that threshold is defined as success 
and launch after the threshold or non-launch is defined as failure. The main drawback of 
these analyses is the loss of time information as the actual duration data is not used. 
Methodologically the most powerful analyses have adopted multivariate duration 
analysis methods that incorporate more detailed time information.
Danzon, Wang et al. (2005) adopted the Cox proportional hazards model, which 
essentially assumes continuity of the failure times and relies on the proportional hazards 
assumption with respect to different subjects. The plausibility of this assumption has not 
been investigated by the inclusion of time interactions or other statistical tests. Danzon, 
Wang et al. (2005) include country indicators and ATC1 indicators and cluster errors at 
the molecule level, and do not control for firm heterogeneity. The empirical analysis in 
this chapter improves the specification by accounting for firm-level heterogeneity and 
clustering the standard errors by molecule-country. Molecule-country pairs define the 
subjects under risk with potential autocorrelation between errors of the same pair over 
time. Also, macro-trends are captured by including calendar year dummies which are 
not considered by Danzon, Wang et al. (2005)
Studies in the launch delay literature have been criticized for the definition of the 
molecule set. Garattini and Ghislandi (2007) suggest introducing the distinction 
between innovative and me-too drugs ex-ante in order to control for NCE heterogeneity 
(Garattini and Ghislandi 2007). Danzon and Epstein (2005, 2008) account for this 
heterogeneity by defining superior and inferior therapeutic subclasses based on how old 
the given subclass is. However, this seems to be a subjective time-based evaluation. A 
few studies use prior launch in the US or UK as an indication of global importance. This 
assumption can be tested by choosing molecules that have launched not only in the US 
or the UK but in more countries. Regressions in this study will consider prior launch in 
at least the average number of markets a molecule reaches (i.e. launch in more than 10 
markets). This will provide the opportunity to test the impact of regulation on a more 
global set of drugs, which is the main interest from a policy perspective.
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The market structure has so far been analyzed in terms of the number of competitor 
molecules. Concentration within the therapeutic subcategory has not been considered. 
This chapter will therefore also investigate the impact of therapeutic category 
concentration as a barrier of entry, in addition to the number of competitor molecules.
So far, only three studies have investigated the impact of volume in standard units on 
the hazard of launch. Given the same expected price, the higher the expected volume, 
the shorter should be the delay. However, main empirical evidence from Danzon and 
Epstein (2005, 2008) indicates that volume (in SUs) is not a statistically significant 
factor for timing of launch. This evidence dates back to 1992-2003. This chapter will 
provide further evidence on a more recent database that includes sales and price 
information during 1999-2008.
None of the studies isolate the delays due to authorization from the delays due to 
price/reimbursement delay which could be due to administrative reasons or due to the 
bargaining process. The main reason is the difficulty in obtaining such data. Delays due 
to authorization have been isolated for a subset of molecules that were approved 
through the centralized EMEA procedure.
Taking the price of competitor drugs already in the market as a proxy for expected price 
essentially assumes exogeneity of prices, i.e. countries commit to these prices ex-ante 
before the firms have decided timing of launches. However, prices might potentially be 
endogenous if they are correlated with an omitted variable. Similarly, entry by 
competitors (number of competing molecules) is taken to be exogenous. It is possible 
that this variable is also endogenous because factors speeding the launch of one 
molecule may induce entry of other potential competitor molecules.
Most importantly, no empirical research so far draws conclusions about the effect of 
price controls/regulation on total social welfare. The costs associated with delays to 
market or reduction in incentives for R&D can be outweighed by increased affordability 
of pharmaceuticals due to lower drug prices. In addition, the impact on total social 
welfare depends on the extent to which cost-effective technologies are delayed. 
However, no analysis so far considers cost-effectiveness criteria in assessing the launch 
delays.
This chapter aims to address some of the gaps in the literature. First, the set of 
molecules used in the regressions will be of higher global importance; therefore, the
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conclusions will have more relevant policy implications. Second, a more recent time 
period and a more comprehensive molecule set will be considered to investigate if there 
are any different dynamics in the factors that determine launch hazards. Third, this 
analysis aims to combine findings from the economic literature with strategy and 
marketing literature that emphasize the significance of firm and product heterogeneity 
in international product rollouts. Expected prices will be used as a proxy for regulation 
instead of using dummies or price ranks, which will enable better control for the impact 
of regulation. The panel nature of the data will allow exploiting the variation in prices, 
i.e. regulation, and country, firm and molecule effects over time. Efficiency of the 
estimates will be improved by clustering errors at the molecule-country level. 
Robustness of the impact of regulation will be assessed by comparing outcomes for 
different specifications as well as including other control variables such as firm, 
molecule and market structure effects which have been established as influential 
determinants in industrial organization market entry literature.
3.2.3.2 Research Questions
The main question in this chapter is:
• How do expected prices of new molecules affect adoption of new 
pharmaceutical technologies?
Controlling for expected prices, additional questions that this chapter aims to address 
are:
• How do market size and competition in the therapeutic subgroup affect the 
timing of molecule launch?
• What is the impact of firm and molecule characteristics on the adoption of 
new pharmaceuticals?
• Is there any evidence of strategic firm behaviour to avoid the knock-on 
effects of price divergence in an interdependent market environment?
Detailed hypotheses tested empirically are presented in Section 3.3.4.
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3.3 METHODS
A semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model and a discrete time proportional 
hazard model are used to estimate the hazard of launch for molecule-country launches 
relative to the first global launch date (see Appendix B.3 and Appendix C.2 for 
technical details of the Cox model and discrete time survival analysis with cloglog 
regression). For the Cox proportional hazard model, the launch hazard of molecule j  in 
country k at time t is defined as:
hj k ( t ) = h0 (0  exP {z jk COP} >
where h${t)is the non-negative, unspecified hazard function which is common across 
different subjects, z ^ ( t )  = [ z \ j k  (0» z 2jk  (0»—> z Pj k  (0) are the covariates for molecule j
- country k  pair, and p i s a  p x  1 vector = of unknown parameters to
be estimated.
The Cox PH model assumes continuous failure times. Sometimes data summarizing 
spell lengths (duration from risk onset till failure) are grouped although the underlying 
process occurs in continuous time. Under such grouping discrete-time specifications are 
used. The key issue in choosing continuous versus discrete specification is the relative 
lengths of the intervals used for grouping the data and the typical spell length. The 
smaller the ratio of the interval used for grouping the data to the typical spell length, the 
closer is the approximation provided by the continuous time specification. The median 
failure time for launches after 1993 in the sample used is 14 months (the restricted mean 
is 30 months). Since it is not well defined how small the monthly grouping is with 
respect to the typical launch time, complementary log-log (cloglog) specifications are 
estimated for comparison. Estimation of the hazard of launch predominantly adopts the 
discrete-time implementation in the few papers that have emerged recently, mainly due 
to the grouping in the launch dates. In the cloglog model, the interval hazard rate for the 
launch of molecule j  in country k, assuming quadratic duration dependence, is defined 
as:
hjk  ( 0  = 1_ exP(- exPO/ + z j k  (OP)) = 1 -  exp(- exp(/!? + y2t2 + Zy* (OP)) or 
log (- log {1 — h ( t )}) = f i t  + r 2 {2 + z j k  (OP 66>
66 log(-log(.)) transformation is known as the complementary log-log (cloglog) transform
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where yt is the pattern of duration dependence in the interval hazard67 and pis the 
vector of regression coefficients for remaining covariates. The p coefficients are the 
same ones as those characterizing the continuous time hazard rate 
hjk  (t) = ft()(t)exp^zjk ( t)p j. Different restrictions can be imposed on the pattern of
duration dependence yt to identify the precise pattern of duration dependence in the
continuous time. A semi-parametric form can be assumed for yt by including dummies
for each month, quarter or year following onset of risk (see Appendix B.4 for additional 
information about discrete time duration analysis).
Duration dependence in the main regressions is assumed to be a second order 
polynomial in time. This specification was chosen empirically over a linear duration 
dependence in time and is line with the assumption by Danzon and Epstein (2005, 
2008). In addition, semi-parametric estimation is carried out by including year dummies 
following global launch, which essentially assumes a constant hazard during each year 
following global launch.
3.3.1 Data
The Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) data used in this study was collected at 
Merck Sharp and Dome Limited (MSD) premises in Hoddesdon UK. Quarterly MIDAS 
sales data was obtained from IMS for the period 1999 Q1 -  2008 Q3. The data covers
/■O
20 countries which represent the major pharmaceutical markets in the OECD (except 
for South Africa). The IMS database contains quarterly USD ($) sales, and sales volume 
in standard units (SU69), molecule name, IMS generic and license status classification,
H(\global and local launch dates, pharmaceutical form, therapeutic class (ATC4 ), the
67 y, = lo g | H 0{u)du = log (/f0( f ) - i / 0( f - l ) )  is the log of the difference between the
/ - i
integrated baseline hazards evaluated at the end and beginning of the interval
68 The country set in alphabetical order is: Australia (AL), Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada 
(CA), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Netherlands 
(NE), Poland (PO), Portugal (PO), South Africa (SA), Spain (SP), Sweden (SW), Switzerland (SZ), 
Turkey (TR), the UK, the US
69 SU represents the number of “standard dose” units sold and is determined by taking the number of 
counting units sold divided by the standard unit factor which is the smallest common dose of a product 
form as defined by IMS Health. For oral solid forms, the standard unit factor is one tablet or capsule 
whereas for syrup forms the SU factor is one teaspoon (5ml) and for injectable forms it is one ampoule or 
vial. SU is a useful volume measure when packs or products being compared are different in form.
70 And hence ATC3, ATC2 and ATC1
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ethical or OTC sector sales, and breakdown of sales by the distribution channel. Spain, 
Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa have only retail channel data71; 
for Sweden retail and hospital sales are combined. Non-US distribution channels are 
either hospital or retail. The US market has numerous distribution channels: retail 
channels (drugstores, foodstores and mail service) and non-retail channels (clinics, 
federal facilities, HMOs, home health care, long term care, non-federal hospitals and 
other miscellaneous channels).
The ex-manufacturer price level for molecules is calculated by dividing the ex-
nomanufacturer USD sales by volume in SU . The cost incurred by the end-purchaser 
will depend on the marketing discounts, volume of purchase, and distribution margins. 
The analysis in this study uses ex-manufacturer retail prices since these are the prices 
that regulation affects; hospital prices are mostly determined on a tender-based 
procedure73.
Supplementary data was obtained from online resources. OECD statistical extracts74 
were used to get additional data for country populations, percentage of population above 
the age of 65, life expectancy, and GDP per capita. Based on findings from the 
literature, these confounders were chosen to control for potential market size and 
different demand structures among markets. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) explore new 
drug introduction as a response to predictable demand increases due to demographics. 
They find a large effect of potential market size on the entry of new molecular entities 
and nongeneric drugs (1% increase in potential market size leads approximately to a 4% 
growth in the entry of new nongeneric drugs and new molecular entities) (Acemoglu 
and Linn 2004). Similarly, it has been estimated that population aging may increase 
drug expenditures by 1 to 3 % per year making market entry for new drugs more 
attractive (Van Tielen, Genaert et al. 1998; Merlis 2000; Gerdtham and Lundin 2004). 
In addition, GDP per capita controls for variations in willingness to pay levels in 
different markets. Sales data were deflated using GDP deflators obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database 2008. Finally, 
Corruption Perception Index scores were downloaded from the website of Transparency
71 Launch in these countries therefore represents launch in the retail sector.
no In this study, only ex-manufacturer price levels are considered and regulation along the 
distribution chain is ignored
73 The average price level during a quarter is assumed for each month in a given quarter.
74 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx
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International, a global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption75 
(supplementary data is presented in Appendix C.4).
The analysis is carried out at the molecule level. Molecules in the IMS data are 
characterized by the Anatomic Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system (see Appendix 
A.l for the description of the ATC system). The literature has used 3-digit ATC 
(Pharmacological subgroup) and 4-digit ATC (Chemical subgroup) as a proxy for a 
given product’s potential market. This study uses ATC4 as the potential market to 
calculate expected price and volume since immediate competition between molecules 
occurs at the ATC4 level. Although some studies consider additional indications as a 
separate market (Kyle 2007), the analysis in this study considers the first indication, i.e. 
the first ATC4 subgroup in which the molecule launches first. This approach is 
consistent with the approach followed in other papers and focuses on the launch of a 
given molecule for the first time when no clinical prior experience exists related to the 
molecule in the local market.
Observations with negative sales representing products returned to the manufacturer 
after withdrawal from the market, and which accounted for about 5% of the total 
number of observations, were dropped. This avoids bias due to inclusion of low-quality 
products that do not meet standards of safety and efficacy in the post-marketing phase. 
Sales figures in USD dollars were deflated by IMF GDP deflators for each country-year 
using 2000 as the base year (see Table C.23 in Appendix C.4 for GDP deflators)76.
The global launch date of a given molecule defines the onset of risk for further launches 
in the remaining markets as in Chapter 277. The IMS data has launch dates recorded in 
months and years; without loss of generality, the fifteenth of each month is assigned as 
the day of launch. Failure time for molecule y-country k pair is defined as the difference 
between the global launch date of molecule j  and the local launch date of molecule j  in 
country k. The molecule set in the IMS database is restricted to include (potentially) 
global molecules, I adopt a more stringent measure of global importance compared to 
studies in the literature. Prior studies at best consider either US or UK molecules 
whereas this study analyses molecules that launched in more than ten countries, which
75 http ://www. transparency ,org
76 Real sales figures were calculated as : Real Sales = Nominal Sales* 100/GDP deflator
77 If the local launch date is not available in the IMS data for launches after 1999, the first sales 
period is assigned as the local launch date. Missing global dates are proxied by the minimum launch 
date in the 20 markets.
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corresponds to half of the markets in this dataset. Due to different dynamics after the 
establishment of a single European market in 1993, the molecule set is further restricted 
to account for launches that occur after 1993.
The dataset is expanded such that for each molecule-country pair there exists 117 
months (from January 1999 till September 2008) which brings the dataset into a panel 
data format. Time intervals are defined in months since launch dates are reported in 
years and months.
3.3.2 Model
Entry of a molecule in a given country can be considered as a binary-outcome model 
defined as unity if entry occurs at time t and zero otherwise (Geroski and Machin 1991). 
Letting represent the discounted post-entry profits for molecule j  in country k if
entry occurs at time t, the entry decision d j^  is defined as:
J 1 if Ilyfo > 0 and d = 0, for all n < t-\
^  1 0 otherwise
riyfo is composed of the discounted future profit stream, net of any costs of entry. Hjfa 
is a latent variable which is not observed directly; only the launch decision d j^  is 
observed. In an isolated market, the expected discounted future profit stream at time t
LTjk
ignoring marginal costs is Ujkt = £  8l {pjki 'Q jkl)~Ejkt +vjkt> where p  is the
/=1
expected local price; Q is the expected market size for molecule j  in country k\ E is the 
fixed cost of entry; LT  is the expected life-time of the molecule in the destination 
market and 8  is the discount factor. Considering the difficulty in raising prices post­
entry due to regulation or competition, companies would like to launch as quickly as 
possible. However, in interdependent markets such as the EU, there would be an 
additional loss term (L) due to external referencing or parallel trade between the 
destination market k and markets r that have already adopted the technology and 
reference prices in market k (Danzon and Epstein 2008). The profit equation would then 
become
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L T r
n j h  = Z  $ l y j k i ' Q j k i  ~ YaL 
1=1 { r*k
international character of pricing and launch strategies of new pharmaceutical products.
The size of the loss L would depend on prices and market sizes in markets k and r.
Companies could forego launch in small sized and low-priced markets to preserve
profits in bigger markets with higher prices. The expected price P is also a function of
price controls and the degree of competition in the therapeutic subgroup.
One of the key product attributes of on-patent pharmaceutical technologies is quality. A 
quality advantage (addressing unmet needs or offering improved effectiveness and/or 
fewer side effects) potentially results in a price mark-up. Even in price-controlled 
markets, e.g. France, where the pharmaceutical sector plays an important role in the 
economy, price mark-ups are given as an incentive to stimulate pharmaceutical 
innovation.
The expected market size Q depends on total sales in the therapeutic category, which is 
a function of the population and the prevalence rate of the condition as well as demand- 
side controls that may define limits on Q through price-volume agreements. Depending 
on firms economies of scale, firms can invest in promotional efforts to influence 
prescribing decisions of physicians to increase the volume of sales.
Let R , C ,  M ,  and Fbe row vectors of regulation, market size and competition, 
molecule, and firm characteristics respectively. Vector R includes price P, cost of entry 
E , and the size of the loss L. Market size and competition vector C includes expected 
market size Q and market structure variables such as number of firms and concentration 
index. Vector M captures heterogeneity in molecules; therapeutic importance affects 
commercial success of new molecular entities through higher price mark-ups (P) and 
higher global sales. Finally, vector F captures heteroegeneity in firms that affect firm 
capability on overcoming costs of entry E. The additive reduced-form profit function 
can be specified as:
^jkt  = Ry' /^Pi? + ^jktPc  + M jk\t$M + + Yt +ujkt = z jkt$ + Yt +ujkt>
jkrl f -  E jkt + Vjht, which shows the
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where P/?> Pc> Pa/> and p^r represent corresponding column vectors of 
parameters to be estimated. yt is a function of time since global launch t of molecule j .
Let z j k (t) be a \ x p  matrix defined as: z Jkt = [ r  Jkt,C Jkl,M  jk t^ jk t ]  ■
Given that launch has not occurred up to time interval t, the conditional probability of 
launch during interval t, i.e. the interval hazard rate is:
Pr(^jkt — MTjk ^ ^ )= Pr^Ry^p^ + Cjkt$C + M y ^ p ^  +Fy^p^r + y t + Ujkt > ^)
h jk (0 = Pr(z ]h p + yt +uj k l >0)
hjk (0 =  Pr(“ jkt > " z y f e P  -  Yt ) =  1 -  F (~  z y t o P  -  Yt  ) =  P ’i z y f a P  +  Yt)
9
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of u and is the launch time of
molecule j  in country k. For the cloglog model F(zy^p + yt )=1 -  exp j -  exp(zy^p + yt ) J 
and thus the hazard rate can be defined as:
* jk (0 = 1 -  exp(- exp(z jh  p + y , )).
The marginal effect of the hazard with respect to Zj has the same sign as the parameter 
estimate and is given by:
dh—  = exp {-exp (zyP + y,)} exp ( z f i  + y,) Pl .
The discrete time failure analysis assumes two different duration specifications: i) a 
parametric specification for yt = y±t + y2t ; and ii) a semi-parametric specification that 
includes dummies for each year following global launch.
Similarly for the Cox model the hazard of launch is defined as:
hj k  (0 = M 0exp{zyfap} = h0(t)exp{RjktfiR + Cjh pc  + M j b pM +Fyfopyr}
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Given the risk set RS (t ) at time t defined as molecule-country pairs (/,/) , the 
probability that molecule j  launches in country k, i.e. failure of the pair ( /,/) , is defined 
in the Cox model as:
effects and parameter interpretation.
3.3.3 Variables: Key Drivers and Market Barriers to Adoption of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation
I classify variables that define the decision of entry broadly as external environment and 
internal environment factors (see Table 3.1). External environment variables are those 
defined outside the boundaries of the firm, whereas internal environment variables are 
defined by firm strategies and internal managerial decisions. This approach brings 
together the conceptual framework used in the marketing and strategy literature with the 
findings from the industrial organization (10) literature regarding the drivers of market 
entry (Chryssochoidis and Wong 1998; Wong 2002). A list of descriptive statistics for 
the variables is provided in Appendix C (Table C.2). External environment variables 
include regulation (R), market environment and competition (C), whereas internal 
environment is defined by variables that control for firm (F) and molecule heterogeneity
3.3.3.1 External Environment 
Regulatory Environment
This is the main variable of interest in this chapter. Due to the complexity and diversity 
of the regulatory environments in the markets under study, the impact of regulation is 
captured by the average competitor prices in the same therapeutic sub-group lagged by 
one quarter prior to local launch. Expected prices are still significant if a moving 
average is used for molecules launched after 1993. Short-term fluctuations in the raw 
price data are smoothed out by using the moving average of prices, which provides a 
more general picture of the underlying price trend over time. Instead of using a simple
See Appendix C.2 for a fuller discussion of the model including definition of marginal
(M).
120
moving average, I defined moving averages over the past four quarters by giving more 
weight to recent quarters, i.e. 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 respectively for the first, second, third 
and fourth lags. In Section 3.4.1.1,1 investigate how the price effect changes over time 
by interacting lagged prices with time since global launch.
Identification of regulation by lagged prices has been adopted only by few papers that 
had access to price information (Danzon and Epstein 2005; Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; 
Danzon and Epstein 2008). In addition, several studies that investigate the relation 
between price regulation and R&D spending have used price as a proxy for the effects 
of price regulation (Giaccotto, Santerre et al. 2005; Golec and Vernon 2006). In light of 
the evidence from the entry literature it is expected that higher expected prices will 
increase the hazard of launch.
Market Environment
The second main variable of interest is the expected market size. Expected market size 
for a new molecule is the sales in SUs within the ATC4 category in individual markets 
lagged by one quarter78. ATC4 classes represent molecules within the same chemical 
subgroup and therefore account for the most immediate branded-branded competition. 
Although theoretically, higher market size attracts more entry, the empirical evidence 
regarding the impact of volume in SUs on the timing of entry is mixed. Some studies 
have found a significant positive effect on the probability of launch (Danzon, Wang et 
al. 2005), whereas others have concluded that volume is not a significant variable for 
superior (new) molecules but has a significant role in the timing of launch of inferior 
(old) molecules (Danzon and Epstein 2008). The molecule set in this study is relatively 
new; however, no subjective evaluation can be made regarding the superiority of the 
subclasses. Market environment includes other variables that define the attractiveness of 
the market (GDP per capita, population, age profile of the population, life expectancy) 
or barriers to entry (e.g. corruption as a proxy for bureaucratic delays in entry). Several 
studies have identified that the extent of entry is significantly positively related to GDP 
per capita and population.
78 Several regressions were run by defining the market at the ATC3 level to account for cross-class 
effects. Results indicate that cross-class effects may be significant. However, to conserve space and 
to enable comparison with prior results from the literature, results for market defined at the ATC4 
level are reported.
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Corruption has been shown to significantly reduce foreign direct investment through its 
effects on firm performance. Corruption affects entry-mode decisions of firms and 
diminishes firm-level growth. Evidence from the management literature suggests that 
firms prefer short-term contracting and partnering or entry through wholly owned 
subsiiaries in corrupt markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck et al. 
2005; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez et al. 2006).
This should introduce additional entry costs through extra search costs and additional 
bribe implications, and therefore, delay launch of new molecules. Kyle (2007) uses the 
corruption perception index (CPI) score provided by the Transparency International. 
She concludes that less corrupt markets are less attractive for quick entry. I incorporate 
the same CPI, which varies over the observation period. During 1999-2008, based on 
average scores the top 4 most corrupt markets are Turkey (3.65), Poland (3.94), Greece 
(4.48), Italy (5); and the top 4 least corrupt markets are Netherlands (8.85), Switzerland 
(8.85), Sweden (9.26), and Finland (9.64)79. Findings from Chapter 2 suggest that there 
is negative correlation between perceived corruption and the speed of innovation 
adoption. Incorporating the same variable as in Kyle (2007) allows testing for the 
impact of corruption.
Competitive Environment
Economic theory predicts that entry depends on the level of competition and market 
structure. The pharmaceutical industry exhibits two types of competition: branded- 
generic and branded-branded. Branded-generic competition is the competition that 
occurs between products with the same active ingredient once the patent for the 
originator product expires. Branded-branded competition is defined as the competition 
between products with different active ingredients within the same therapeutic subgroup 
and is proxied by the number of competitor molecules within the therapeutic subgroup. 
Kyle (2007) uses a similar definition and observes that higher number of competitors 
increases the probability of entry.
Although the extent of generic competition affects sales and market power in the later 
stages of the product life cycle, several studies in the literature empirically demonstrate 
that intermolecular competition reduces the net present value of a drug product more 
than due to the entry of generic competition (Stem 1996; Bemdt, Bui et al. 1997;
79 A score of 10 indicates the least corrupt market, and 0 the most corrupt
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Lichtenberg and Philipson 2002). Since no chemically equivalent generics exist for 
molecules that are entering a market for the first time, generic competition within the 
ATC4 subgroup is proxied by the number of molecules with existing generic 
competition. Danzon and Epstein (2005, 2008) use the number of generic manufacturers 
per molecule lagged by one quarter, which turns out to be statistically insignificant.
No studies so far have considered the impact of molecule concentration on the hazard of 
launch. The number of competitors on its own does not account for how concentrated 
the market power is in the therapeutic subgroup. It is a stylized fact that high 
concentration reduces the equilibrium level of entry in several industries. This study 
incorporates concentration by defining the concentration index for the therapeutic 
subgroup based on the market share of molecules within the same ATC4, namely the 
Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index ( I HH). I HH is a convex function of market shares which is 
sensitive to unequal market shares. The concentration index of a therapeutic subgroup in 
each country is defined as the sum of the squares of market shares of molecules within
the ATC4, i.e. I HH ), where s, is the market share of molecule i and N  is the
/= i
number of molecules in the therapeutic subgroup.
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Table 3.2 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Data used in Survival Analysis
External Environment Variable Name Descriptive Statistics5
Regulatory Environment Mean Std Dev Min Max
Expected Price Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4a 0.43 2.5 -10.161 8.16
Relative Price High Price EU 0.29 0.46 0 1
Price Setting External Referencing 0.83 0.37 0 1
Market Environment
Expected Market Size Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 7.03 3.27 -6.91 14.7
GDP per capita Log GDP per capita ($) 10.13 0.39 8.99 10.74
Population Log Population (000s) 10.08 1.03 8.55 12.62
Age profile of the population Population > 65 yrs (000s) 6128 7765 762 38678
Health profile of the population Life expectancy in yrs 78.61 2.73 69.5 82.8
Corruption Corruption Perception Index 7.06 1.931 3.1 10
Competitive Environment
Market Concentration Log Molecule Concentration in Ctry-ATC4(IHH) 10.058 1.158 5.72 15.94
Intermolecular Competition Log Number of Molecules in Ctry-ATC4 1.401 1.795 -4.61 5.42
Generic Competition Number of Molecules with Generic Comp in Ctry-ATC4 0.647 2.253 -4.61 5.29
Internal Environment
Firm Characteristics
Economies of Scope
Log Firm Sales (global) in 2007 14.9 3.21 -4.56 17.45
Log Number of Countries Firm has Launched in 2.45 1.03 0 3
Economies of Scale
Log Firm's Total Number of Molecules 5.49 1.47 0.00 7.22
Log Local Firm Experience (number of molecules launched) 4.09 1.33 0 6.65
Location of Firm Headquarters Domestic Launch 0.11 0.31 0 1
Molecule Characteristics
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Therapeutic/Commercial Importance
Log Global Molecule Sales in 2007 11.038 2.194 -4.88 16.26
Log Molecule's Global Reach (total markets launched in) 2.713 0.211 2.3 3
Cumulative Markets Diffused at t Log Markets Launched in at t 1.307 1.11 0 3
Period of Global Launch (old vs new) First Launch Before 1999 0.67 0.47 0 1
N ote:a All lags are by one quarter. bDescriptive Statistics are for the transformed form used in the regressions. See Table C.2 in Appendix C.3.1, for 
descriptive statistics of non-transformed variables.
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3.3.3.2 Internal Environment
Firm Characteristics
Firm effects have been found to be significant in the strategic entry decisions within the 
pharmaceutical sector (Scott Morton 1999; Kyle 2006; Kyle 2007). I account for firm 
effects by using proxies for economies of scope and economies of scale in determining 
firms’ timing of launch. I do not use firm fixed effects due to the large number of firms 
in the dataset, which prohibits estimation. Including firm dummies resulted in 
insufficient memory to complete the regressions runs (there are 578 different firms, 
which results in 622 dummies in total together with country, ATC1 and calendar year 
effects).
Firms with higher economies of scale have better prospects of entry through licensing 
in foreign markets and cost advantages compared to smaller firms to overcome costs of 
entry (both for the clinical trials stage and registration and price approval). Similarly, 
economies of scope are expected to speed international diffusion through R&D and 
knowledge spillovers for different drugs. The higher the number of molecules launched 
in a given market, the higher the familiarity of the firm with the requirements of the 
regulatory authority. These learning effects can enable firms to come up with more 
efficient launch strategies. Similarly, clinical trial data obtained in one country can 
generally be used for launch in further markets. Log transform of firm sales in 2007 and 
the number of countries the firm has launched in are used to account for economies of 
scale. I proxy economies of scope by the number of different molecules (active 
ingredients) a firm has marketed, which gives an indication of past portfolio diversity.
Numerous studies observe home-country advantage for launching firms (Danzon, Wang 
et al. 2005; Kyle 2006; Kyle 2007). A domestic launch is represented by firms 
launching in markets where their headquarters are located.
Firm attributes may have an affect on review times as well. Carpenter and Turenne 
(2004) observe a large-firm advantage in pharmaceutical regulation primarily due to 
familiarity of the regulator with large firms and regulators favouring early entrants 
(Carpenter and Turenne 2004).
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Molecule (Product) Characteristics
Branded-branded competition in the pharmaceutical sector is based on quality rather 
than price. Therapeutic benefits of a new molecule define the quality and enable product 
differentiation due to an improved quality profile. Therapeutic importance, therefore, 
may result in quicker entry as firms may strategically push for a faster international 
rollout to obtain higher net returns. Faster launch may also occur due to regulatory 
reasons since therapeutic importance of molecules is the main criteria used in many 
countries for price setting and reimbursement decisions. Products that have a significant 
therapeutic advantage may be eligible for a fast track approval and may receive a price 
mark-up compared to already existing products.
Dranove and Meltzer (1994) provide evidence from the US suggesting that more 
important drugs are developed and approved more rapidly. Within the US this also 
translates to quicker launch since products do not have to go through pricing 
negotiations as in the EU. Importance is found to affect both the time from first 
worldwide patent application to new drug application (NDA) and time from NDA to 
NDA approval. However, the generalizability of the results to the EU context is limited 
due to the different dynamics in the EU (Dranove and Meltzer 1994).
Both the early and recent literature find evidence that therapeutically important drugs 
diffuse internationally quicker and to a wider set of markets. Therefore, the total number 
of markets in which a molecule has launched (global extent of launch) is used as a 
proxy for relative therapeutic importance. A second proxy is defined as molecule’s 
global sales in 2007 since therapeutic importance and commercial success are highly 
positively correlated. Finally, the cumulative number of markets a molecule has 
launched on a yearly basis is included as a third measure. This is expected because firms 
optimize launch strategies for a given product jointly for different markets. The faster 
the molecule diffuses following global launch; the lower the probability of launch in the 
remaining markets.
Several other measures have been used in the literature to define therapeutic 
importance. FDA ratings of novelty has provided a proxy in the past for products that 
were approved in the US (Dranove and Meltzer 1994; Lu and Comanor 1998). Parallel 
to the rising importance of health technology assessment and the drive to get value for 
money, such evaluation is currently implicitly or explicitly being carried out by several 
markets in Europe as well. For instance, French authorities define therapeutic value as
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the medical benefit and the improvement in medical benefit over existing products. 
However, such information is not publicly available for empirical testing.
3.3.4 Hypotheses
The set of hypothesises tested in this chapter are presented in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Hypotheses for the key drivers o f  adoption in the branded pharmaceutical sector
Factor Testable Hypotheses Evidence from  
the Literature Expected Sign o f  the Coefficient
Regulation
HI a.l: High expected prices increase 
the speed of cross-country diffusion 
of pharmaceutical innovation; 
therefore, price regulations that 
reduce prices result in delayed access 
to pharmaceutical innovation.
Exists, but 
limited
+ Price Coefficient 
(Expected due to price spillover effects, also high-priced 
markets usually have fewer pricing controls which 
allows quicker market access)
Market
HI b.l: Pharmaceutical innovations 
with a higher expected market size 
(sales volume in ATC4) diffuse 
internationally faster, controlling for 
the effect of expected price.
Contradictory
+ Market Size Coefficient 
(Controlling for expected prices, high-volume markets 
[in $] should have quicker launch to maximize returns 
on R&D and benefit from longer market exclusivity)
External
Environment HI b.2: Corruption reduces the speed of adoption of pharmaceutical 
innovation
Contradictory 
(- in tele­
communications, 
+ in pharma­
ceutical sectors)
- Corruption Coefficient
(Corruption results in complicated entry mode, favours 
joint ventures and partnerships, increases entry costs due 
to time costs as well as demand for bribes, and 
diminishes potential firm-level growth).
Competition
HI c.l: A higher therapeutic 
subgroup concentration (molecule 
concentration in ATC4) reduces the 
hazard of launch.
No evidence
- Concentration Coefficient 
(According to the industrial organization literature 
concentration reduces the equilibrium level of entry in 
several industries)
HI c.2: Branded-branded competition 
is a significant determinant of the 
launch hazard and more important 
compared to the extent of generic 
competition in the therapeutic group.
Exists, but 
limited
- Branded Competition Coefficient 
(For new molecules the most imminent competition is 
branded competition. Competition drives prices down if 
differentiation is not strong enough and reduces 
incentives for entry)
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Internal
Environment
Firm
HI d .l: Firm economies of scale and 
scope increase the hazard of launch 
(proxied by global firm sales and 
number of molecules in the portfolio)
Exists
+ Economies of Scale/Scope Coefficient
(Cost advantages in clinical trials, registration and price 
approvals; Learning Effects: R&D and knowledge 
spillovers of different drugs)
HI d.2: Probability of launch is 
higher for domestic launches.
Exists
+ Domestic Launch Coefficient
(Evidence from the literature suggests domestic 
launches are quicker either due to the familiarity of the 
regulators with local firms or regulators favouring 
domestic firms)
Product/
Molecule
HI e.l: Therapeutically/commercially 
important molecules diffuse 
internationally faster (importance 
proxied by extent of global sales and 
global launch for the molecule)
Exists
+ Therapeutic Importance Coefficient 
(Therapeutic importance is a defining characteristic for 
quality since competition between on-patent molecules 
is based on quality. High-quality products should obtain 
faster approval as well as price mark-ups which increase 
incentives for faster entry)
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3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3.4 presents a number of competing specifications for the base case analysis to 
test for robustness. Complementary log log and Cox regression estimates (non­
exponentiated) are reported for molecules that first launched globally after 1993. The 
results show that regulation has a significant impact on timing of launch through its 
effect on expected prices. In all regression specifications the estimates for price and 
volume are highly significant at the 0.001 level. The cloglog regressions with quadratic 
duration dependence include a second-order polynomial in time since global launch to 
control for the shape of the hazard with respect to time. Semi-parametric cloglog 
regressions assume constant hazard during each year following global launch and 
include dummies for each year following the first launch date worldwide.
Model (1) includes no control for country characteristics. Introducing controls for 
country characteristics (Model 2) slightly reduces the parameter estimates for expected 
price and expected market size as prices are positively correlated with some of the 
country characteristics such as GDP per capita. A positive parameter estimate for GDP 
per capita ($) indicates that the higher the GDP per capita, the higher is the probability 
of launch at a given time point t (the marginal effect of log GDP per capita, i.e. 
dy/d(Log GDP per capita) is 0.05, which essentially implies that if GDP per capita is 
multiplied by e =2.718, the hazard of launch increases by 0.05 (see Table C.6 in 
Appendix C.3.2 for marginal effects). Corruption perception index score relates to 
perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts 
(a score of 10 means highly clean whereas a score of 0 indicates a highly corrupt 
business environment)80. In contrast to findings of Kyle (2007), a market perceived less 
corrupt has quicker adoption of pharmaceutical innovation, which might be because of a 
larger sample in this study (or confounding factors).
Although previous studies find a positive impact of population on the timing of launch, 
estimates in Table 3.3 suggest that the log population is not a significant factor 
controlling for percentage of people above the age of 65, which means that measures of 
need appear to associate with higher diffusion. Underlying variables proxying the 
potential demand for medical care such as life expectancy and the age profile of the 
population (population above the age of 65 years) have a significant impact on timing of
on
CPI scores are provided by the Transparency International. Available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/
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launch (Model 2). While an older population profile speeds launch, a healthier 
population profile as proxied by life expectancy decreases the hazard of launch 
controlling for the population above 65 years old.
Note that country characteristics (except for GDP per capita) are no longer significant 
once country fixed effects are introduced (Model 3). Model 4 incorporates only country 
fixed effects to account for country heterogeneity. The parameter estimates for the 
expected price and volume are almost identical in Model 3 and Model 4. In addition, 
Akaike's information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) are pretty 
close, which indicates that the two specifications are comparable in terms of statistical 
fit. Further robustness checks in the next section will, therefore, consider only country 
fixed effects.
The sign and significance of parameter estimates are consistent in the Cox and Cloglog 
estimates; however, Cox model estimates are consistently slightly higher than Cloglog 
regressions estimates, regardless of the specification of the duration dependence (i.e. 
whether it is quadratic in time since risk onset or semi-parametric). Adding more 
variables to control for country heterogeneity maintains the efficiency of the parameter 
estimates in both regressions; only a slight increase in the standard error of the expected 
price is observed. This could also be due to the fact that the number of observations is 
decreased for Models (2) and (3) as these models exclude South Africa. Cloglog and 
Cox regression estimates for parameters are highly comparable as expected. Although 
the Cox model is an approximation to the discrete case, lower values of AIC and BIC 
suggest that the discrete time implementation of the proportional hazard model provide 
a better fit. This is also suggested by more robust marginal effects in the cloglog 
regressions; marginal effects in the Cox model vary widely across model specifications 
(Table C.6). The fit and parameter estimates of the quadratic and semi-parametric 
specifications are comparable; the robustness checks in the next section, therefore, will 
report only results for the quadratic specification. Schonfeld residuals test rejected the 
proportionality assumption. Currently no test in Stata tests the proportionality 
assumption in a cloglog regression.
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Table 3.4 Base Case Cloglog and Cox Estimates. Molecules with First Launch after 1993
Variable
Cloglog quadratic duration dependence Cloglog Semi-Parametric (year dummies) Cox Semi-Parametric
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Lagged 
Avg Non- 
Generic 
Price/SU in 
Ctry-ATC4
0.085***
[0.01]
0.064***
[0.02]
0.074***
[0.02]
0.075***
[0.01]
0.086***
[0.01]
0.062***
[0.02]
0.071***
[0.02]
0.072***
[0.02]
0.098***
[0.01]
0.081***
[0.02]
0.093***
[0.02]
0.093***
[0.01]
Log Lagged 
Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4
0.053***
[0.01]
0.049***
[0.01]
0.059***
[0.01]
0.059***
[0.01]
0.054***
[0.01]
0.048***
[0.01]
0.059***
[0.01]
0.058***
[0.01]
0.056***
[0.01]
0.057***
[0.01]
0.070***
[0.01]
0.069***
[0.01]
Years since 
global 
launch (t)
0.001
[0.02]
0.044
[0.03]
0.083**
[0.03]
0.096***
[0.03]
Years since 
global 
launch 
squared (t2)
-0.007**
[0.00] 0.011***[0.00]
0.014***
[0.00]
0.015***
[0.00]
Log
Population
(000s)
-0.032
[0.02]
-3.207
[2.07]
-0.025
[0.02]
-3.024
[2.12]
-0.048
[0.02]
-2.545
[2.03]
Population > 
65 yrs
0.069***
[0.01]
0.001
[0.06]
0.071***
[0.01]
-0.004
[0.06]
0.066***
[0.01]
0.01
[0.06]
Life
expectancy 
in yrs
0.245***
[0.021
0.071
[0.12] 0.253***[0.02]
0.07
[0.12] 0.229***[0.021
0.079
[0.12]
Log GDP 
per capita 
($)
1.263***
[0.18]
1.158*
[0.58]
1.294***
[0.18]
1.273*
[0.59]
1.120***
[0.17]
1.374*
[0.58]
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Corruption
Perception
Index
0.081***
[0.02]
0.071
[0.06]
0.090***
[0.02]
0.082
[0.06]
0.089***
[0.02]
0.079
[0.06]
Country
Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
ATC1
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar
Year
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
Observation
s
58530 54794 54794 58530 58530 54794 54794 58530 58530 54794 54794 58530
LogLikeliho
od -10727 -10058 -10001 -10541 -10697 -10023 -9962 -10497 -16860 -15848 -15790
-16682
Akaike's 
Info Criteria 21506 20179 20100 21171 21470 20129 20045 21108 33765 31751 31671 33449
Bayesian 
Info Criteria 21740 20455 20537 21575 21811 20503 20589 21620 33972 32001 32081 33826
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter 
estimates reported . Models (2) and (3) have fewer observations because data to control for country characteristics is not available for South Africa in 
the OECD database. Semi-parametric specification includes dummies for each year following global launch, in addition to dummies for calendar years.
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Akaike and Bayesian information criteria indicate that the cloglog specifications overall 
fit the data better than the Cox semi-parametric model. The choice between semi- 
parametric and quadratic duration dependence is less obvious. While AIC is lower for 
the semi-parametric specification, BIC tends to be lower for the quadratic duration 
specification. Overall, their performance is very close. However, I use mainly the 
quadratic specification for robustness check (Section 3.4.1) due to the need to estimate 
fewer parameters.
The quadratic duration dependence specifications in the cloglog regressions provide an 
insight regarding how the hazard behaves over time following global launch (t), which 
cannot be deduced from Cox estimates directly. The evidence regarding duration 
dependence is mixed. Danzon and Epstein (2005) observe that the launch hazard 
increases with time since global launch for superior molecules. Danzon and Epstein 
(2008), however, find that hazards first decrease then increase with time since global 
launch. Estimates of duration dependence in this study differ from the already existing 
limited evidence in the literature. There is a strong indication that the hazard of launch 
first increases in time and then decreases. Ideally firms would like to launch in as many 
markets as possible to amortize the R&D outlays as quick as possible. However, since 
firms optimize strategic decisions jointly across markets, including launch and timing of 
launch decisions, delays may be incurred in markets where profits are jeopardized. The 
converging prices in Europe to avoid spillovers due to parallel trade and external 
referencing also indicate that firms strategically would like to launch early not to lose 
the competitive innovative edge of the new molecule as delays increase the chance of 
facing further competition later in time (Kyle and National Bureau of Economic 2007). 
The difference found between this study and Danzon and Epstein (2008) regarding 
duration dependence could be that the molecule set in this analysis includes molecules 
that are more recent (post 1993) and have a higher extent of global reach overall.
The estimates in Table 3.4 are consistent with the hypothesis that regulation reduces the 
speed of adoption of pharmaceutical innovation when price controls result in lower 
expected prices. This result is broadly consistent with prior findings in Danzon and 
Epstein (2005, 2008) , Kyle (2007) and Lanjouw (2005). Danzon and Epstein (2005, 
2008) provide estimates both for superior and inferior therapeutic subclasses. Danzon 
and Epstein (2008) estimate a model which is closer to specifications provided in Table 
3.4 by considering only expected price and market size at time t. Their estimates for 
expected price are 0.11 for superior brands and 0.07 for inferior brands. It is expected
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that estimates in this study will fall broadly within the range of 0.07-0.11 since I assume 
no classification regarding the inferiority or superiority of the brand. My estimates for 
the cloglog specification with quadratic specification are in the range of 0.65-0.85, 
which is broadly consistent with findings of Danzon and Epstein (2008).
The marginal effect of the expected price in Danzon and Epstein (2008) is 0.0053 for
superior molecules and -0.0001 for inferior classes. Marginal effect of expected price in
this study is 0.003-0.004, which is again expected as superiority/inferiority of the
therapeutic class is not modelled (and given that the molecule set is relatively more
recent, the estimate is expected to be closer to the value for superior classes). The
marginal effect of expected price is not significant for inferior brands in Danzon's
estimates. Standard error estimates of expected price are slightly lower because I cluster
by molecule-country rather than my molecule since autocorrelation may exist between
£ 1
consecutive error terms of a molecule-country pair .
I find new evidence regarding the impact of the expected market size. The literature so 
far has presented conflicting evidence regarding the impact of expected market size. 
Danzon and Epstein (2005, 2008) conclude that volume is not a significant determinant 
on the hazard of launch whereas Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005) find that it is a 
significant factor. In line with the findings of the earlier paper by Danzon, Wang and 
Wang (2005) my estimates for expected market size are highly significant and are 
within the range of 0.06-0.07. These estimates are pretty close to the estimate of 0.066 
in Danzon and Epstein (2008) and 0.06-0.14 in Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005). In 
Danzon and Epstein (2008), the estimate of 0.066 is not significant for superior brands; 
however, the estimate of 0.12 for inferior brands is significant.
This finding suggests that it is not only price controls that may hamper timely launch. 
Price is only one factor that determines net present value. Any policy directed at 
restricting the market size may have a decelerating effect on timely innovation adoption; 
however, price as a regulation tool has a slightly larger impact. According to the 
marginal effect 3Pr(launch at t)/d(Log lagged expected market size) is 0.002. On the 
other hand, 3Pr(launch at t)/d(Log lagged expected price) is 0.003-0.004 (see Table C.6 
in Appendix C for marginal effects).
81 The marginal effect of price in the cloglog regressions is comparable to the marginal effect of the 
Corruption Perception Index score, life expectancy or the percentage of the population above the age 
of 65.
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Price has gained strategic importance in the pharmaceutical industry during the past 
decade as price interdependency across international markets has increased due to 
external referencing and price knock-on effects in foreign markets through threat of 
arbitrage. This may drive firms to manipulate prices by drawing price levels closer 
across markets at the expense of foregoing some short-term profits in order to avoid 
negative impacts of price controls on firm’s international launch strategies. I test for 
this by restricting the sample to the EU market where prices are interrelated due to 
external referencing and risk of parallel trade. I test for the significance of the extent of 
deviation between expected local price and the average EU price for the launching 
molecule (see Table 3.5). The absolute difference between the local expected price and 
the average EU price significantly decreases the hazard of launch. The sign of this 
difference or the interaction of the absolute difference with the sign of the difference are 
not statistically significant. This implies that pricing and launch strategies are now 
increasingly considering implications for future markets. Firms are global revenue 
optimizers and therefore strategic reactions to regulations may spillover to external 
markets. In particular, estimates in Table 3.5 suggest that global pricing strategies 
appear of increasing importance with firms launching their products at closer prices 
across markets as much as possible, and potentially reducing global prices assuming 
they cannot raise prices in the price-controlled markets.
The difference in estimates with respect to the innovativeness/superiority of the 
therapeutic class in Danzon and Epstein (2008) suggests that the parameter estimates for 
price and volume are sensitive to the choice of the molecule set. Danzon’s findings 
indicate that for less important molecules volume is more important than price, which is 
expected because inferior molecules tend to be older and low-priced. Price spillovers for 
these products will not be an issue. Similarly, old products are unlikely to obtain a price 
premium through differentiation. Hence, firms launching older or less therapeutically 
important products will base their decision mostly on the expected market size. I tested 
for this by estimating the impact of price and volume for average molecules that 
launched in 10 markets, and for truly global molecules that launched in 20 markets and 
are potentially more important therapeutically/commercially. Estimates indicate that 
volume is more significant for average molecules and price is more important for more 
superior molecules (estimates for market size are 0.14 and 0.56; and estimates for 
expected price are 0.27 and 0.117 for global and average molecules respectively). An 
insight into the impact of therapeutic class age is provided in the robustness check
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section on time effects where the age of the therapeutic group is interacted with the 
expected market size and the expected price of the launching molecule.
Regression estimates confirm the hypothesis that price regulation slows down the 
adoption speed of pharmaceutical innovation across the main OECD markets, 
controlling for the expected market size. The next section will investigate how robust 
the estimates are with respect to the inclusion of other covariates which have been 
theoretically and empirically suggested as key drivers of the firm decision of market 
entry; namely, the competitive environment, firm and molecule characteristics.
Table 3.5 EU Subsample: Test for Expected Price Deviations from the Average Price of 
the Launching Molecule
Variable
Parameter Estimates by Cloglog 
(quadratic in t)
1 2
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 0.083***[0.02]
0.079***
[0.02]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 0.056***[0.01]
0.055***
[0.01]
Absolute Difference btw Local Expected Price and 
Average EU Price ( AP = Local Expected Price -  
Average EU Price)
-0.124*
[0.06]
-0.141**
[0.04]
Absolute AP * Sign(AP) -0.031[0.07]
Sign(AP)a -0.001[0.06]
Years since global launch (t) 0.106**[0.04]
0.105**
[0.04]
Years since global launch squared (t2) -0.018***[0.00]
-0.018***
[0.00]
Country Dummies Yes Yes
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 27322 27322
LogLikelihood -5624.5 -5624.58
Akaike's Info Criteria 11326.99 11327.16
Bayesian Info Criteria 11647.4 11647.56
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors [in brackets] clustered at molecule- 
country level. Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported. 
a Sign Defined to be 1 if AP >0 and 0 otherwise.
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Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity in independent variables increases estimates of parameter variance, 
produces parameter estimates of the incorrect sign and results in the unstability of the 
regression coefficient estimates. Multicollinearity issues for the base case models were 
investigated by computing the variance inflation factors (VIF). VIF is a measure of the 
multi-collinearity in a regression matrix (independent variables) and provide a measure 
of how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of 
collinearity. Collinearity can also be determined from pairwise collinearity between 
independent variables; however, correlation matrixes do not reveal higher order 
collinearity. VIFs are scaled versions of the multiple correlation coefficients between a 
given variable and the rest of the variables.The minimum value of a VIF is 1, which 
occurs when there is no correlation between the variable of interest and the rest of the 
variables. As a rule of thumb, VIF values greater than 10 indicate potential multi­
collinearity problems. Collinearity should be removed by eliminating one or more 
variables and/or combining variables into one.
VIF estimates of the base-case models are presented in Appendix C.3.2.1. It can be 
observed that inclusion of both country dummies and variables such as GDP per capita, 
life expectancy, and population that control for destination country heterogeneity 
(Model 3) results in serious multicollinearity issues. Removing country dummies almost 
removes the multicollinearity issues (Model 2). Model 4 drops variables that define 
country heterogeneity (GDP per capita, life expectancy, population, corruption 
perception index) and keeps country dummies whereas Model 1 drops both dummies 
and the country heterogeneity variables. Both Models 1 and 4 are free from 
multicollinearity problems as all VIFs are less than 10. In the robustness checks, I drop 
country-specific variables and keep country dummies to account for country effects. 
Robustness checks assume quadratic duration dependence as semi-parametric and 
parametric specifications have similar fit but the parametric specification is more 
parsimonious in the number of parameter estimates.
3.4.1 Robustness Checks
Robustness checks were carried out by estimating the Cox model and the Cloglog 
model with the quadratic specification (since estimates for quadratic duration 
dependence are very similar to the semi-parametric specification). However, only
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estimates for the Cloglog model are presented since the marginal effects of the Cox 
model in the base case did not turn out to be very stable.
3.4.1.1 Time Effects
Time may affect regression estimates in several ways. First, macroeconomic trends in 
the sector may have an impact on price levels. This is accounted for by including 
dummies for each calendar year in all regressions. Second, time captures information 
about the relative innovativeness of new molecules. When a new molecule is about to 
launch, it represents incremental (or breakthrough) innovation compared to the 
molecules in its therapeutic subclass. The longer the time lapse from global launch, the 
higher is the probability that new competitors will enter to compete against the molecule 
lowering its comparative therapeutic advantage. To capture the impact of time elapsed 
since first global launch on price and volume, the two main variables of interest, both 
expected price and volume are interacted with time since global launch.
Estimates so far have been obtained for molecules that launched after 1993, which is the 
year when a single European Market was established. The observation period, however, 
is from 1999 to 2008 since price and volume information in the database is available 
only during this period. This implies that molecules with first global launch in [1993, 
1999) are left-truncated. In semi-parametric models left-truncation is easily dealt with 
by omitting the subject from all binary outcome analyses during the truncation period 
since the subject could not have failed in that period (Cleves, Gould et al. 2008). The 
dummy "First Launch Before 1999" accounts for left-truncated molecules and tests if 
the hazard of launch statistically is different for these molecules.
Table C.l l  (Appendix C.3.2.2) presents the robustness checks with respect to time 
effects. The marginal effects of expected price and market size remain unchanged. Time 
interactions of price and volume are significantly negative, which suggests that the 
impact of price and volume decays over time following the global launch of the 
molecule. Model 2 and 3 estimates indicate that left-truncated molecules (molecules that 
launched first before 1999) have a significantly lower hazard rate compared to 
molecules that entered launched after 1999. This dummy also partially captures 
innovation as left-truncated molecules are older, which suggests that innovative 
molecules diffuse faster. Model 4 tests for the effect of excluding left-truncated 
molecules by estimating parameters only for molecules that launched after 1999. The 
estimates for price and volume are slightly lower and the standard errors are higher due
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to the loss in the number of observations. Marginal effects, however, are comparable to 
the results in previous models.
Finally, as mentioned before parameter estimates of t and f2 show the duration 
dependence of the hazard with respect to time since global launch. Assuming the form 
a.t + b.t1, the hazard achieves its maximum at t = -b/2a. For all 4 model estimates -b/2a 
range from 4.5-5.5 years. This implies that the probability of launch in an average 
market is highest around year 5 after global launch, and thereafter, the probability of 
launch starts to decline. This value could be lower or higher depending on the individual 
destination country (e.g. US and UK will have the hazard maximized at a lower t).
I also consider the interaction of therapeutic class age with expected price and market 
size to assess how the age of the therapeutic class affects the importance of price and 
volume (see Table C.12 in Appendix C.3.2.2). Age of the therapeutic class ATC4 is 
defined by the difference between time t and the first available launch date in the ATC4 
among the 20 markets in the dataset. Expected price and market size are still significant 
after accounting for the age of the therapeutic class. Table C.12 shows that the 
importance of expected price and market volume is reduced as the therapeutic class gets 
older; this is because newer classes represent more innovative products. Interaction of 
time since global launch of the molecule and expected price ceases to be significant 
once expected price is interacted with therapeutic class age (these two interactions are 
highly correlated 0.68).
3.4.1.2 Market Structure and Competition
Regression estimates presented in Table C.13 (Appendix C.3.2.2) confirm that 
intermolecular competition is more influential on the decision of entry compared to the 
extent of generic competition. The number of competitor molecules in the same ATC4 
significantly increases the hazard of launch, while the number of molecules with generic 
competition has no effect on the launch decision of new molecules. The observation that 
extent of competition increases entry is consistent with findings of Kyle (2007). 
Regulation, therefore, may have another indirect effect on entry through reduced 
competition since lower prices result in reduced entry. In fact, estimates for the effect of 
existing competition are much higher than the price effect. The marginal effect of 
expected price is 0.003-0.004 whereas marginal effect of log number of competitors is 
0 . 12.
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Due to differences in definition of branded-branded or branded-generic competition, 
parameter estimates for competition in this study are not directly comparable to prior 
studies in the literature. Kyle considers the count of drugs in a given therapeutic class- 
country; however, her definition of entry includes different class combinations for a 
given molecule, i.e. different indications. Danzon and Epstein (2005, 2008), on the 
other hand, consider only the number of generic manufacturers per molecule and 
include a dummy variable to model the first entry into a therapeutic subclass and do not 
have a measure of the extent of branded-branded competition other than the average 
competitor prices.
Model 1 (Table C.13) shows that subgroup concentration, as expected constitutes a 
barrier to entry. The more concentrated the subgroup is, the lower is the probability of 
entry at a given time t. Models 3 and 4 show that expected market size and subgroup 
concentration are no longer significant once the number of competitor molecules is 
included as a control variable. This effect occurs because number of competitor 
molecules and sales volume in ATC4 are positively correlated (correlation is 0.22 and is 
significant at the level of 0.001). Similarly, concentration is negatively correlated with 
the number of molecules (though the correlation is relatively weaker at the level of 
0.08). Marginal effects of price and time interactions are robust to the inclusion of 
competition variables.
3.4.1.3 Firm Characteristics
Firm heterogeneity as expected plays a significant role in international launch strategies 
for pharmaceutical innovation (Kyle 2006). Table C.14 (Appendix C) suggests that 
firm effects are at least as significant as price and market size effects. In particular, 
variables that control for firm economies of scale have the same marginal effect on the 
hazard of launch. Economies of scope as proxied by firm’s global pharmaceutical sales 
and number of countries the firm has launched before have even slightly higher impact 
than regulation.
In line with findings of Kyle (2007) the number of countries the firm has launched in is 
significant and has a marginal effect of 0.009; i.e., dPr(launch at t)/ d(Log number of 
countries launched in) is 0.009. Kyle’s estimate of marginal effect for international 
launch experience is 0.0003; however, in her case this figure corresponds to 3Pr(launch
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at 0/d(number of countries launched in). These two marginal effects are related as 
follows:
dy _ dy dlnx _ dy 1 
dx d k ix  dx d\nx  x
The average number of countries a firm has launched is 16. Plugging in x  = 16 and 
dy/d\nx = 0.009 gives dy/dx= 0.0005, which is close to Kyle’s estimate.
Similarly, marginal effect of local experience is 0.003. This variable is not directly 
comparable to the estimate of 0.0013 in Kyle (2007) since number of drugs in Kyle’s 
case includes additional indications for a given molecule. The log of firm sales has a 
positive significant parameter estimate around 0.12 and a marginal effect of about 
0.004. Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005)’s Cox estimate of log firm sales is 0.208 (also
significant at the level of 0.001) (Cox regressions in general result in slightly higher
•  82 parameter estimate) .
Results in Table C.14 indicate that the diversity of firm’s prior portfolio is associated 
with quicker launch, which differs from prior evidence that a higher number of drugs in 
the firm portfolio reduces the extent and speed of launch (Kyle 2007). In terms of 
magnitude, past portfolio diversity, has as big effect as the average expected price.
Finally, I find no robust evidence that domestic launches are associated with quicker 
international diffusion. The effect of domestic launch is significant in Model 4 but not 
in Model 3. Home advantage has mostly been associated with speedy launch in the 
literature. However, Danzon and Epstein (2008) suggest that domestic launch may be 
associated with industrial policies of supporting the local pharmaceutical industry and 
restricted to countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Japan where the 
local pharmaceutical industry plays a role. I tested for this observation, by creating an 
interaction with these 5 markets and firms headquartered locally. However, I obtained 
no evidence that local firms in these markets launch quicker compared to firms that are 
not headquartered in these countries.
82 See the Appendix for a Box plot of the distribution of Cox and Cloglog parameter estimates from 
the robustness checks
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3.4.1.4 Molecule Characteristics
Estimates presented in Table C.15 (Appendix C.3.2.2) suggest that heterogeneity in 
molecules also plays a key role in explaining launch hazards. In particular, the extent of 
global reach has the biggest impact on launch hazard. Marginal effect of log of total 
markets reached is 0.059. Given that the average number of countries a molecule 
launches is x = 18.3, marginal effect of the extent of global reach on launch hazard is 
dy fdx -  0.003 for an average molecule, which is close to Kyle (2007)’s estimate of 
0.004. Log of molecule sales has a significant positive marginal effect of 0.003, and is 
comparable to the impact of regulation. Overall, this suggests that regulation will have a 
more pronounced effect on non-global molecules, or therapeutically less important 
molecules.
3.4.1.5 Regulation: EU subsample
Finally, the country set was restricted to European countries in order to check for the 
impact of external referencing and launch in a high-priced EU market. There is an 
indication that external referencing slows down adoption of innovation and that launch 
in a high-priced EU market compared to launch in a lower priced EU-market increases 
the hazard by 0.042 for molecules that launched first after 1993 (Table C.16, Appendix 
C.3.2.2). The marginal effect of launch in a high-priced EU country is 0.051 for 
molecules that first launched after 1999, implying that the importance of price has risen 
after 1999. Accordingly, the parameter estimate for expected price is higher when more 
recent launches are considered.
Comparison of Cloglog and Cox specifications using Akaiake and Basyesian 
information criteria indicates that discrete-time specification with Cloglog is preferable 
over the continuous-time Cox specification. Figure C.l and Table C.17 -  C.18 present a 
comparison of the parameter estimates for expected price and volume by Cox and 
Cloglog estimation . Summary statistics for the mean show that Cox estimates 
overestimate the parameters compared to the cloglog specification.
A summary of the main hypotheses tested, expected and estimated coefficient signs are 
presented in Table 3.6.
83 For brevity Cox estimates are not presented in the robustness check section
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Table 3.6 Comparison of Expected and Estimated Signs of the Coefficients
Factor Hypotheses Evidence from  
the Literature Expected Sign o f  the Coefficient
Estimated 
Sign o f the 
Coefficient
Regulation
HI a.l: High expected prices increase the 
speed of cross-country diffusion of 
pharmaceutical innovation; therefore, price 
regulations that reduce prices result in 
delayed access to pharmaceutical innovation.
Exists, but 
limited
+ Price Coefficient 
(Expected due to price spillover effects, also 
high-priced markets usually have fewer 
pricing controls which allows quicker 
market access)
+
Market
HI b.l: Pharmaceutical innovations with a 
higher expected market size (sales volume in 
ATC4) diffuse internationally faster, 
controlling for the effect of expected price.
Contradictory
+ Market Size Coefficient 
(Controlling for expected prices, high- 
volume markets [in $] should have quicker 
launch to maximize returns on R&D and 
benefit from longer market exclusivity)
+
HI b.2: Corruption reduces the speed of 
pharmaceutical innovation adoption
Contradictory
(- in tele­
communication 
s, + in pharma­
ceutical 
sectors)
- Corruption Coefficient
(Corruption results in complicated entry 
mode, favours joint ventures and 
partnerships, increases entry costs [due to 
time costs as well as demand for bribes] and 
diminish potential firm-level growth)
-
Competition
HI c.l: A higher therapeutic subgroup 
concentration (molecule concentration in 
ATC4) reduces the hazard of launch.
No evidence
- Concentration Coefficient 
(According to the industrial organization 
literature concentration reduces the 
equilibrium level of entry in several 
industries)
-
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HI c.2: Branded-branded competition is a 
significant determinant of the launch hazard 
and more important compared to the extent 
of generic competition in the therapeutic 
group.
Exists, but 
limited
- Branded Competition Coefficient 
(For new molecules the most imminent 
competition is branded competition. 
Competition drives prices down if 
differentiation is not strong enough and 
reduces incentives for entry)
No
Significant
Evidence
Firm
HI d.l: Firm economies of scale and scope 
increase the hazard of launch (proxied by 
global firm sales and number of molecules in 
portfolio)
Exists
+ Economies of Scale/Scope Coeff
(Cost advantages in clinical trials, 
registration and price approvals; Learning 
Effects: R&D and knowledge spillovers of 
different drugs)
+
HI d.2: Probability of launch is higher for 
domestic launches.
Exists
+ Domestic Launch Coefficient
(Evidence from the literature suggests 
domestic launches are quicker either due to 
the familiarity of the regulators with local 
firms or regulators favouring domestic 
firms)
No
Significant
Evidence
Product/
Molecule
HI e.l: Therapeutically/commercially 
important molecules diffuse internationally 
faster (importance proxied by extent of 
global sales and global launch for the 
molecule)
Exists
+ Therapeutic Importance Coefficient 
(Therapeutic importance is a defining 
characteristic for quality since competition 
between on-patent molecules is based on 
quality. High-quality products should obtain 
faster approval as well as price mark-ups 
which increase incentives for faster entry)
+
146
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter aimed to investigate how regulation, in particular price regulation, affects 
the adoption of innovative pharmaceutical products across the main OECD markets 
during 1999-2008. I have investigated the impact of regulation on adoption of a recent 
set of molecules that have diffused across more than 10 markets within the OECD, 
controlling for the external and internal firm environment. Results suggest that the 
effect of price regulations on timing of launch is significant and robust across different 
specifications. High ex-ante price expectations increase the speed of cross-country 
diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation. Regulations that reduce prices or put limits on 
the sales volume result in delayed access to pharmaceutical innovation.
Results suggest a statistically significant and robust effect of price on timing of launch 
across different specifications. High ex-ante price expectations increase the speed of 
pharmaceutical adoption internationally, which is consistent with hypothesis HI a.l 
(Higher expected prices increase the speed of cross-country diffusion of pharmaceutical 
innovation. Regulations that reduce prices or create price linkages across markets may 
lead to delayed access to pharmaceutical innovation as a result of reduced incentives to 
entry, profit implications in subsequent markets and strategic firm delays; empirical 
results would indirectly support this argument. Consistent with hypotheses HI b 
(Pharmaceutical innovations with a higher expected market size diffuse internationally 
faster, controlling for the effect of expected price), findings indicate a significant and 
robustly positive market size effect that increases the likelihood of new pharmaceutical 
adoption.
Regulation is a key factor in the external firm environment, as it defines not only the 
attractiveness of the local market but also creates interdependencies across different 
countries. The internal firm environment, however, also has a substantial effect on the 
speed of adoption of pharmaceutical innovation. In particular, firm economies of scale 
and molecule’s therapeutic importance grant substantial advantages for timely rollout 
internationally. Significant firm and molecule heterogeneity exists, which is consistent 
with hypotheses HI d.l (Firm economies of scale and scope increase the hazard of 
launch) and HI e.l (Therapeutically or commercially important molecules diffuse 
internationally faster). Products of larger firms that have launched in more countries and 
have more local experience are less prone to delays in adoption, controlling for expected 
prices, market structure and market size. Firms with more diverse R&D portfolios (as
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proxied by the number of molecules that have accessed the market successfully) have a 
higher probability of quick launch, which demonstrates advantages of economies of 
scale. Contrary to what the prior literature suggests, I find no significant advantage to 
domestic launch, which contradicts hypothesis HI d.2 that probability of launch is 
higher for domestic launches.
Regulation has a non-homogenous effect on molecules with different therapeutic value. 
More recent molecules, and hence more innovative molecules, have higher probabilities 
of launch. This is partially attributable to the price effect of regulation, the speed of 
market authorization and price approval negotiations. Regulatory authorities generally 
grant a price mark-up to products that offer therapeutic novelty or public health 
advantages with significant implications on health budgets. Tentative evidence suggests 
that for molecules that are more recent price has a greater impact whereas for old 
molecules volume is strategically more important than price.
Consistent with hypothesis HI c.l higher therapeutic subgroup concentration constitutes 
a market barrier to timely adoption of new technologies, which confirms the importance 
of policies directed at fostering competition in the pharmaceutical sector. Regulation, 
therefore, affects market entry decisions both directly and indirectly through its effect in 
prices and market structure/competition respectively. Consistent with hypothesis HI 
c.2, branded-branded competition is far more important in determining firm’s launch 
strategies for new molecules compared to existing generic competition. This is mainly 
explained by the fact that already existing generic competitors are not exact substitutes 
for new molecules and thus do not compete directly.
Findings in this chapter suggest several policy implications. First, price regulations slow 
down the adoption of pharmaceutical adoption on a global scale and may impose 
welfare losses, particularly when the delayed innovations are cost-effective from a 
societal perspective. Although lower prices increase static efficiency in the short term 
by reducing the mark-up of price over marginal cost, empirical evidence from this 
chapter suggests that price controls could have negative implications on dynamic 
efficiency by reducing incentives to (timely) entry and the extent of competition. Delays 
in adoption reduce the net present value of R&D investments by delaying cash flows 
and shortening the exclusivity period, which has been observed to reduce future R&D 
outlays and innovation (Giaccotto, Santerre et al. 2005). That said, the optimal form of
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pharmaceutical regulation and the degree of price mark-up consitent with dynamic 
efficiency are not addressed here and lie outside the scope of this thesis.
From a public health perspective, late adoption and lack of access to new drugs may 
lead to compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski 2002), shift volume to older 
molecules of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham 2004) and compromise the 
quality of health care (Kessler 2004; Wertheimer and Santella 2004). Innovative 
medications offer economic benefits by avoiding expenditures on other forms of 
medical care (such as hospitalization) as well as reducing missed work days 
(Lichtenberg 1996; Lichtenberg 2003a; Hassett 2004; Lichtenberg 2005). Again, in a 
wider context, the assessment of short-term efficiency gains brought about through 
price regulation should be weighed against potential long-term implications on public 
health outcomes and dynamic efficiency. This study has merely provided evidence on 
the impact of price on adoption, and the continuation of debate over static and dynamic 
efficiency gains falls outside the scope of this work.
Second, findings suggest that industrial policies should promote competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Extensive price controls could reduce incentives to entry and 
result in a less competitive environment to stimulate further innovation. Third, local 
controls can affect firms’ launch decisions in foreign markets and impose welfare 
losses, especially in lower-priced markets. Finally, due to scale advantages in 
international roll-out strategies, price controls may increase incentives for mergers and 
acquisitions, further increasing concentration levels and barriers to entry.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the dataset 
allows exploitation of the variation both over time and across molecule-country pairs. 
The robustness of the results has been assessed by different duration specifications and 
alternative proxies for risk factors. Second, the dataset is more comprehensive and up- 
to-date than comparable empirical studies in the literature. Third, the analysis makes use 
of reliable price and volume information. The price effect is calculated controlling for 
firm and molecule heterogeneity that could bias the estimates if omitted. Finally, the 
analysis is carried out for potentially global molecules, which ensures findings are 
relevant from an international perspective.
The analysis, however, presents several limitations. Expected prices and market 
competition are assumed to be determined exogenously, although the potential impact 
of endogenous affects has been partially accounted for by incorporating lagged prices
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and undertaking subsample analysis. A future extension could involve endogenizing 
prices and entry. Second, the constituents of launch delays cannot be completely 
isolated since data regarding regulatory authorization and price review times are not 
available. Finally, overall societal welfare implications cannot be inferred from this 
analysis. Both markets and government are imperfect institutions; it remains an open 
question which institution accomplishes overall pharmaceutical policy objectives in a 
more efficient and equitable manner.
150
CH APTER 4
4 Price Regulation and the Adoption o f Generic Competition: 
Evidence from the m ajor OECD m arkets during 1999-2008
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Expanding pharmaceutical expenditures and growing pressure on budgets due to the 
recent financial crisis has further increased the emphasis on value for money in public 
policy making. Generics that are by definition cost-effective alternatives to branded 
medicines offer the most visible source of savings and efficiency gains. Delays in the 
entry of generic competition following patent expiry imply substantial opportunity costs 
for the sustainability of healthcare systems. Despite the increasing economic importance 
of generic competition, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on generic 
adoption and drivers of delays across major pharmaceutical markets. The purpose of 
this chapter is to empirically examine how different pricing regulations influence the 
adoption of generic competition using price and volume data from 1999 to 2008 in the 
OECD market.
A generic drug is chemically bioequivalent to the originator reference product with the 
same qualitative and quantitative composition in active ingredients, same form, route of 
administration, safety, and efficacy (Scott Morton 1999; Lichtenberg and Philipson
2002). Given little potential for differentiation, generics predominantly engage in price 
competition resulting in a significant pressure on branded price levels and market 
competition. Branded share of market revenues in the US within 2 yrs of patent 
expiration generally falls by 50% (Griliches and Cockbum 1994). Similarly, average 
prices in Europe drop by 25% after the second year exclusivity is lost (DG Competition 
2009). Generic competition, therefore, improves equity of access to pharmaceutical 
treatment by lowering procurement prices.
Timely generic entry is important not only from a static efficiency perspective but also 
from a dynamic perspective. Incentives to invest in future innovation are higher when 
branded manufactures face generic competition. Economic theory predicts that 
monopolists have little incentive to develop new products that will compete directly 
against their products (known as the replacement effect) (Tirole 1990). Resources saved 
by payers because of generic use can be transferred to stimulate future innovation in the 
branded sector, ensuring both the improvement in health benefits with new medicines
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and the sustainability of the generic sector. Given aging demographic profiles, growing 
trend towards chronic life-style diseases, and expected patent expiries, policy measures 
conducive to fast generic adoption and diffusion offer significant savings in the near 
future (Gorka 2009).
From a strategic perspective, timing to market is a key dimension of competition in the 
generic sector. Legislations in certain markets grant market exclusivity to the first 
generic company that files for authorization (e.g. in the US exclusivity is 180 days). In 
general, first generics are expected to launch at higher prices and maintain generic 
market leadership as the demand-side may be reluctant to switch across alternative 
generics. Pharmacies, for instance, would avoid stocking multiple generics for a given 
molecule due to efficiency concerns (Competition Bureau Canada 2007).
Regulatory and financial barriers to market entry in the generic sector are highly 
asymmetric compared to the branded sector. Sunk costs are much lower in the generic 
sector since substantial R&D outlays for drug discovery and clinical trials to prove 
safety and efficacy are not required84. The cost of a bioavailability test has been 
estimated to be 18 times cheaper than the average costs of safety and clinical evaluation, 
which allows generics prices to be 20-80% cheaper than originators (Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association 1993; Simoens 2007). Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study 
(2007) estimates bioequivalence study costs in the range of $1-1.5m per product. 
Second, the technical and market risks faced by generic manufacturers are much lower 
as the therapeutic and commercial success of the originator has been tested by the time 
of patent expiry. Third, countries in the OECD have adopted several measures to further 
ease generic entry: generic substitution, Bolar provisions, market exclusivity grants to 
first generics (US), and generic reference pricing (the relevant legislations are discussed 
in Chapter 2 and a summary table is provided in Appendix D, Table D.l). Additional 
discussion about generic substitution in the US-EU5 is presented in Appendix A.3.
Bolar provisions allow generic manufacturers to experiment with a drug before the 
expiry of the patent and apply for market authorization (MA). Bolar provisions were 
granted in the US by the Hatch Waxman Act in 1984, and Europe followed with a delay 
of twenty years in 2004. In countries such as the US, UK and Germany, generic 
medicines obtain immediate price and reimbursement approval following MA. In
84 Entry costs are greatest for the first generic due to legal challenges and costs fall for follower 
generics.
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contrast, most markets that require price and reimbursement approval may delay market 
access of generic products. Time delays for generics following MA were on average 
153 days in the EU, with a significant variation across Member States depending on 
local pricing and reimbursement (P&R) regulations (Bongers and Carradinha 2009). 
Generic price may be established as a percentage of the reference product, as the 
average price in reference countries, as a maximum (index) price or negotiation-based 
price (price-volume trade-off).
Overall, the time it takes a generic drug from the research lab to the patient is 3-5 years, 
whereas branded drugs take about 12 years. On the other hand, generics may be subject 
to behavioural barriers to adoption and diffusion as a result of virtual perceived quality 
differences between branded and generic products. In particular, price-insensitive 
consumers or physicians may show a strong loyalty for brand-name drugs (Frank and 
Salkaver 1992), and physicians may have sticky prescribing habits that hamper 
switching to generic drugs (Hellerstein 1998; Coscelli 2000).
The main hypothesis in this chapter is that the variation in the timing of first generic 
availability for a given molecule can be explained by ex-ante price and volume 
expectations. Free-priced markets not only avoid additional delays due to P&R 
approval but also offer higher incentives to market entry as a result of higher generic 
prices and higher generic penetration. Generic volume varies significantly across 
countries due to different demand-side policies, consumer attitudes and healthcare 
infrastructures. I hypothesize that ex-ante volume expectations is a significant 
determinant of probability of launch given lower profit margins and faster price erosion 
in the generic sector once fierce competition sets in.
Although issues related to the utilization of generic drugs and their impact on the on- 
patent sector have been studied more extensively, there is currently no study in the 
literature that empirically analyzes differentials in launch for first generics across a 
comprehensive set of markets. This chapter aims to provide preliminary evidence to fill 
this gap in the literature. Our empirical strategy uses discrete-time duration analysis to 
estimate the impact of regulation on the probability of launch across twenty 
pharmaceutical markets controlling for market size, expected competition, molecule and 
firm heterogeneity.
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the 
literature and sets the theoretical framework; Section 4.3 describes the methodology
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used; Section 4.4 presents the estimation results and finally Section 4.5 discusses the 
findings and policy implications.
4.2 GENERIC ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
4.2.1 Regulation as a Barrier to Generic Entry
Market power of patent-protected medicines reduces allocative efficiency. However, it 
is needed to stimulated innovation since the prospect of appropriating the R&D 
investments is the main push force for firms to improve drug quality and address unmet 
medical need. Eliminating market power would be detrimental to firms’ incentives to 
innovate and would severely undermine dynamic efficiency and technological progress 
that drives health improvements and economic growth. On the other hand, it is also 
desirable to spread the benefit of innovation to other firms to stimulate future 
competition. This trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is at the core of 
pharmaceutical policies and has generated a vast literature on the optimal length of 
patent life. A too short patent protection period would not grant enough appropriability 
to innovators but a too long period would preclude rival firms from challenging the 
incumbent innovator. In the pharmaceutical context, savings due to generic entry could 
be used to reimburse new innovative, cost-effective medicines. Therefore, policy 
makers would like generic competitors to enter the market as soon as patent protection 
expires. Regulations such as Bolar exemptions have enabled generic manufacturers to 
carry out necessary bioequivalence tests on on-patent medicines without infringing 
patents in the US since 1984 and in the EU since 2004.
Within Europe, pricing of generic medicines has remained an area of national 
responsibility. The impact of different generic pricing policies on adoption and patient 
access has remained largerly unexplored. The following sections summarize the 
available evidence on the impact of regulation on the extent and timing of generic entry.
4.2.1.1 Impact of Regulation on the Extent and Timing of Generic Entry
Evidence from North America
Most of the evidence regarding generic entry belongs to the North American market, 
partially because the generic sector has matured faster in the US as a response to 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Analogous regulations have been enacted in 
Europe but with a lag of about 20 years. Previous empirical studies on generic entry
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have demonstrated that pre-entry market size and expected profits (Grabowski and 
Vernon 1992; Scott Morton 1999; Scott Morton 2000; Reiffen and Ward 2005; Saha, 
Grabowski et al. 2006; Appelt 2009; Iizuka 2009; Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 
2009), firm and drug characteristics (Bae 1997; Scott Morton 1999), the brand-name 
drug's goodwill stock (Hudson 2000; Hurwitz and Caves October 1988) as well as 
pharmaceutical price regulation (Danzon and Chao 2000b; Ekelund 2001; Moreno- 
Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 2009) and market structure/competition (Bae 1997; Iizuka 
2009; Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 2009) are important factors in the generic 
firms’ entry decision. Moreover, entry dynamics differ strongly across therapeutic- 
classes (Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006).
There is a significant body of literature that investigates the extent of generic entry; 
however, the evidence on the differentials in adoption is scarce. Bae (1997) investigates 
the speed of generic entry post-patent expiry in the US market using a proportional 
hazard model with continuous failure times (Bae 1997). Higher revenues before patent 
expiry, proxied by the sales revenue of the brand-name manufacturers before patent 
loss, are associated with higher generic entry. Bae (1997) finds that the higher the 
degree of competition as proxied by the number of brand-name competitors, the slower 
the generic entry. Saha (2006) shows that the number of new generic entrants is lower 
as the number of generic incumbents increases due to lower profit expectations (Saha, 
Grabowski et al. 2006). Frank and Salkaver (199&) find direct evidence that revenue 
and the extent of entry are positively related for off-patent molecules during 1984-1987 
(Frank and Salkever 1997). Similarly, Hudson (2000) identifies market size (original 
brand sales, deflated by the consumer price index) at patent expiration as the most 
significant determinant of generic entry in the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan. 
Increases in sales reduces the generic entry lag after patent expiration in these markets 
(Hudson 2000).
According to evidence from the US market during 1984-1994, generic firms enter 
markets with similar operating conditions to the drugs they already produce (Scott 
Morton 1999). Generic entry rates are also affected by the proportion of hospital sales. 
Drugs with higher hospital sales and drugs that treat chronic conditions exhibit higher 
entry rates in the US during 1986-1991. The number of brand-name competitors reduce 
generic entry whereas no significant evidence is found regarding the number of off- 
patent brands in the same therapeutic-group (Scott Morton 2000). In contrast to findings 
from the US studies by Bae (1997) and Scott Morton (2000), a more recent study by
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Magazzini et al observes that different brand names have a positive effect on generic 
entry in USA, UK, Germany, and France (Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004).
Evidence from Europe
Several studies have identified pharmaceutical price regulation (Danzon and Chao 
2000b; Ekelund and Persson 2003; Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 2009) as a 
significant factor in generic firms’ entry decision. However, the evidence on the impact 
of different regulations on generic entry is limited.
Rudholm (2001) analyzes generic entry during 1972-1996 in the Swedish market. 
Similar to the findings from the American market, Rudholm (2001) finds that expected 
profits are associated with higher generic entry in a regulated environment. The shorter 
the patent protection for the branded product, the higher the number of generic entrants 
(Rudholm 2001). Subsequent evidence from the Spanish market confirms that drivers of 
generic entry in a market with tough price regulations are similar to those in less 
regulated markets. Moreno-Torres et al (2009) estimate the number of generic firms that 
enter into different active ingredient markets during 1999-2005, ignoring firm’s follow- 
on launches with different forms and doses. Both a higher number of generic incumbent 
firms and a higher number of molecules per therapeutic group decrease the average 
number of generic entries. This study concludes that reference pricing squeezes the 
potential market for generics by lowering branded drug prices and depriving generic 
firms of their main competitive advantage (Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy et al. 2009). 
Generic use is discouraged if originator prices cluster around the reference price level as 
potential profits for generics are reduced (Simoens and de Coster 2006). Findings from 
a Swedish study confirm that the reference price system on average decreases the 
probability that generics are launched (Ekelund and Persson 2003).
Evidence from Javan
More recently, Iizuka (2009) examines generic entry in the Japanese pharmaceutical 
market during 2003 - 2005. The sample used in the analysis is comprised of all 
prescription (ethical) drugs that experienced generic entry in 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
Iizuka examines the entry of generics only during the first year once generic entry 
becomes possible by using pooled cross-section data and estimating a count model
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(negative binomial model). 57 molecules are included in the analysis, which 
corresponds to 97 different markets (molecule-form-strength triple 85).
Contrary to findings from the US market, evidence from Japan indicates that fewer 
generics enter if the drug is more frequently prescribed in large hospitals and at 
institutions where prescribing and dispensing are separated. This is due to price 
regulation in Japan that provides higher price-cost mark-ups for institutions that both 
prescribe and dispense generics. Also, there are significant behavioural barriers as 
doctors keep strong connections with medical schools where professors have high-level 
involvement in developing brand-name drugs and treatment guidelines. A more 
competitive branded sector in Japan, proxied by the number of brand name drugs 
already in the market, negatively affects generic entry. Economies of scope in entering 
multiple markets and brand revenues are important determinants that explain generic 
entry in the Japanese market (Iizuka 2009). The contribution of this study is that it uses 
micro-data rather than aggregate, market data, and can therefore control for demand 
heterogeneity.
4.2.1.2 Impact of Regulation on Generic Penetration
Studies that address generic penetration and impact of generics on branded product 
prices have highlighted the significant role of price regulation. The literature suggests 
generic diffusion may suffer in markets that have strict regulations for on-patent product 
prices. Although price control measures may be effective in cutting prices and hence 
curbing pharmaceutical expenditures, in the long run more stringent price regulation (as 
in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) may result in limited diffusion of 
generics and reduced incentives for generic entry (Danzon and Chao 2000a; Garattini 
and Ghislandi 2006).
Weaker price regulation is not only associated with higher levels of entry but also more 
intense competition among generic manufacturers as well as higher competitive 
pressure on branded prices. Free priced markets (US, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK) generally have higher drug prices and a higher originator-generic price differential, 
increasing incentives for generic entry. In price-regulated markets with reference 
pricing systems, generic use might be further discouraged if originator prices cluster 
around the reference price level, which lowers potential profits for generics and
85 Molecule: active ingredient of the drug. Form: oral, topical vs injectable. Strength: the amount of 
active ingredient
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discourages generic entry and diffusion. Generic penetration can be promoted by 
integrating demand-side policies (physician budgets with rewards for surpluses and 
sanctions for deficits, generic substitution schemes that financially reward the 
pharmacist, patient co-payment schemes) with supply-side policies (Simoens and de 
Coster 2006).
4.2.2 Strategic Barriers to Generic Entry
Economic theory predicts that generic entry should lead to a sharp decline in the price 
and market power of the originator molecule. To counteract market erosion induced by 
generic entry, innovator companies have developed several strategies for product life­
cycle management to counteract the combined impact of increasing patent losses over 
time and the decrease in pharmaceutical R&D efficiency (Karwal 2006). A significant 
body of literature analyzes the dynamics of branded-generic competition after patent 
expiry and strategies originators pursue to minimize the impact of generic entry on life­
cycle profits (Caves, Whinston et al. 1991; Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Frank and 
Salkever 1997; Suh, Schondelmeyer et al. 1998; Aronsson, Bergman et al. 2001; 
Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004; Lexchin 2006).
4.2.2.1 Generic Entry-Deterring Strategies by Originator Firms
Based on the bioequivalence requirement generics constitute a perfect substitute to the 
branded product. Economic theory predicts that generic entry should lead to a sharp 
decline in the price and market power of the originator molecule. Innovators have 
increasingly become more aggressive in defending their brands market share at the face 
of generic competition and have developed new strategies for product life-cycle 
management to counteract the combined impact of increasing patent losses over time 
and the decrease in R&D efficiency (Karwal 2006).
A significant body of literature analyzes the dynamics of branded-generic competition 
after patent expiry and the strategies of originators to minimize the impact of generic 
entry on life cycle profits (Caves, Whinston et al. 1991; Grabowski and Vernon 1992; 
Frank and Salkever 1997; Suh, Schondelmeyer et al. 1998; Aronsson, Bergman et al. 
2001; Lexchin 2004; Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004). Traditionally, innovators have 
defended market shares through patent protection strategies that include patent clusters 
and patent litigations to restrict generic penetration. The patent holder may opt for 
obtaining additional patents for the improved version of the base product while making
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the old one obsolete. Also, line extensions can be created by obtaining patents for use in 
the treatment of additional diseases (Pearce 2006)86.
Other common strategies are reformulation of the original molecule to shift demand; 
switching from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) status that allows direct to 
consumer marketing in the US and defensive pricing. Reformulation may involve 
combining the active ingredient with another molecule; changing the dosage, route of 
administration or creating controlled release versions. Defensive pricing involves 
lowering the price of the originator molecule for certain formulations or doses or 
discounts for repeat prescriptions. Another pricing strategy to maintain market share is 
based on market-segmentation by consumer brand loyalty. In free-priced markets, the 
originator may increase off-patent molecule prices to capture more revenue from the 
insensitive segment of the market and retain shares, which is known as the "generic 
paradox" (Frank and Salkaver 1992; Frank and Salkever 1997; Regan 2007; Schweitzer 
and Comanor 2007)87. Price manipulation as a strategic tool may be restricted in price- 
controlled markets that prohibit price increases. Therefore, several non-price tactics to 
discourage, delay, and even block generic entry have been investigated by anti-trust and 
competition authorities such as the DG Competition of the European Commission88, the
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US Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice .
The DG Enterprise has recently raised concerns over extension of market exclusivity 
through tactics including the use of patent clusters; patent related contacts/disputes and 
litigations; settlements with generic manufacturers that involve direct payments for later 
entry of the generic; launching follow-on products with only marginal improvement to 
displace generic medicines based on the original product; and misleading claims about 
the inferiority of generics (DG Competition 2009). Similar anti-competitive actions 
have been spotted in the US market90.
86 Pearce (2005) argues that in industries that rely on innovation (pharmaceutical, semiconductor, 
software) three pre-expiration strategies are available to preserve market dominance after patent 
expiry: pre-emptive launch of a generic product; layering innovations (patenting innovations on a 
base product) and creating line extensions (promote revised versions of the original drugs).
87 Frank and Salkaver (1992) develop a segmented market model with one branded producer 
and a competitive fringe producing the generic version and find conditions under which the 
branded price increases.
88 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquirv/index.html
89 http://www2.ftc.gov/bc/intemational/docs/genericpharma.pdf
90 http://www.hst.org.za/news/20001207
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More recently branded manufacturers have shifted from defence strategies to strategies 
that allow value creation from generics such as alliances with generic companies, 
authorized and in-house generics strategies (Scottom 2009). Authorized generics 
include agreements between branded and generic manufacturers that allow generic 
manufacturers to produce and market the active pharmaceutical ingredient before any 
generic competitor enters the market. Authorized generics may block competition and 
dissipate the first mover advantage that grants 180-day market exclusivity provisions to 
the first generic entrant in the US (Peny and Covilard 2007). The branded manufacturers 
can avoid litigation costs and utilize their advantage in manufacturing and marketing by 
in-house manufacturing of generics.
Several papers in the literature have identified that licensing or partnership agreements 
can be used by branded firms as entry-deterring strategies in the pharmaceutical sector.
It has also been demonstrated theoretically that an incumbent can deter entry by 
licensing its technology (Yi 1999; Kong and Seldon 2004)91. Mestre-Ferrandiz shows 
theoretically that in a market with two firms producing two branded drugs if one of the 
drugs goes off-patent then the originator firm has incentives to produce its generic 
alternative rather than allowing a third firm (competitive fringe) enter with a generic 
competitor (Mestre-Ferrandiz 1999). Such a strategy allows the originator to increase 
the price of the branded product.
Aggressive promotion (pre-patent expiry brand advertising) has also been empirically 
investigated as entry-deterring strategies. Evidence broadly suggests that more 
aggressive advertising by branded competitors is not a key strategy to deter generic 
entry. On the contrary, branded manufacturers prefer to reduce most promotion 
expenditures before patent expiry (Caves, Whinston et al. 1991; Ellison and Ellison 
2007; Hurwitz and Caves October 1988). There is little potential for effective product 
differentiation through advertising in the generics industry as generics are equally 
effective copy products (Scherer 2000; Scott Morton 2000).
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) find pre-patent brand advertising to decline substantially 
with patent-expiry, with no significant effect on the probability of generic entry. Scott 
Morton (2000) examines the impact of pre-patent brand advertisement on the number of 
generic entrants in a market. Based on Poisson-regression estimates, she concludes that
91 Rodrigues (2006) argues that a large-enough cross-effect between the branded and the generic 
equivalent a sufficient but not necessary condition for branded incumbents to blockade generic entry 
by marketing pseudogenerics (Rodrigues 2006)
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pre-patent brand advertisement has no significant effect on the extent of generic entry 
and thus confirms the previous study's result. In cases where branded producers 
introduce new product formulations to extend market exclusivity of products that are 
about to lose patent protection, advertising efforts may be transferred from the original 
brand to the reformulation before generic entry (Huskamp and Donohue 2008).
4.2.3 Game Theoretic Models of Generic Entry/Pricing
The pioneering work belongs to Frank and Salkaver (1992) who consider a market 
segmentation model to characterize the behaviour of the branded producer and identify 
conditions under which the originator raises prices upon generic entry (Frank and 
Salkaver 1992). Market demand for the branded product is comprised of two 
components: i) Demand of consumers insensitive to generics, and ii) Demand of 
consumers whose decision depends on both generic and branded prices. The brand 
name drug behaves as a Stackelberg leader and chooses profit-maximizing price level 
considering the reaction of the generic manufacturers in the market. Generic entrants 
play a Bertrand price game taking the branded price as given. Frank and Salkaver 
conclude that generic entry makes the reduced-form demand of the branded producer 
steeper, as the most plausible proposition for the increase in branded prices following 
generic entry (by assumption generic entrants are competitive fringe and generic prices 
fall as the number of entrants increases approaching marginal cost in the limit).
Ferrandiz (1999) uses the same market segmentation approach to characterize 
conditions under which a branded produce has incentives to produce its own generic 
alternative, in a market with two branded perfect substitute goods produced by two 
firms (Mestre-Ferrandiz 1999). Under the market segmentation model, the branded firm 
has an incentive to produce its generic alternative and increase the price of its branded 
good.
Several theoretical papers analyze the duopoly between the branded product and the 
first generic within a vertical product differentiation framework (Cabrales 2003; 
Merino-Castello 2003; Brekke, Konigbauer et al. 2007), where vertical differentiation is 
defined based on perceived quality differences between the branded drug and the 
generic equivalent. Such differentiation is presumed to exist because of advertising 
efforts and goodwill stock of the branded producer, information level of the physicians 
and consumers about generic equivalence, sticky prescribing habits, switching costs on
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the physicians and consumers’ side as well as regulatory tools that promote generic use. 
Konigbauer (2006) analyses how price regulation affects the generic market entry 
decision in the presence of advertising, and shows that strict price regulation reduces the 
generic firms expected return from market entry and increases the likelihood that the 
incumbent overinvests in pre-entry advertising to deter or block generic entry 
(Konigbauer 2007), which is in contrast to general empirical findings about advertising 
strategies of incumbents discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Merino-Castello (2003) and Brekke (2007) analyze the welfare effects of introducing a 
reference price system (Merino-Castello 2003; Brekke, Konigbauer et al. 2007). 
Cabrales and Merino-Castello model a two-stage game where branded and generic 
producers choose their “perceived” quantities in the first stage and compete in prices in 
the second stage. They show that under a reference pricing system branded prices 
decrease resulting in more intense price competition; however, market shares of 
generics remains constant or decreases.
Brekke et. al. (2007) consider a market with three firms: two branded drugs and a 
generic in the same therapeutic class. They define high- and low-type consumers that 
have high and low gross valuations respectively and capture vertical differentiation by 
deflating the gross valuation for the generic drug by a factor 6? e (0,1) (Brekke, 
Konigbauer et al. 2007). According to their findings therapeutic reference pricing (i.e. 
forming reference clusters based on similar therapeutic effects) results in the most 
competitive market structure as expected, but at the same time reduces incentives to 
new drug entry. Brekke et. al. (2007) conclude that if costs of launching are not low, 
generic reference pricing (where clusters are defined by active ingredient) may be 
preferred over therapeutic reference pricing.
Mestre-Ferrandiz (2003) considers a duopoly with a branded drug and its generic 
alternative and compares the outcomes under a copayment system with outcomes under 
a reference pricing system. He identifies a profit-reducing effect of the Spanish 
reference pricing system for the branded and the generic producers (Mestre-Ferrandiz
2003). Mestre-Ferrandiz identifies an interval for the reference price such that prices of 
both the generic and branded product decrease upon the introduction of the reference 
price. Importantly, profits for the generics are invariably reduced compared to a 
copayment system if the reference price is set in this interval. The higher is the 
reference price, the higher is the branded price and the lower the generic price. These
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findings imply that introduction of a reference price system can decrease the extent of 
generic entry by driving generic profits down in the equilibrium, in particular in systems 
where the reference price levels are lower.
Within the context of generic entry, the impact of reference pricing (RP) on branded 
prices and welfare has been widely studied both theoretically and empirically (Lopez- 
Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy 2000). These studies broadly conclude that RP is a 
successful mechanism conditional on the existence of price differentials between 
products in the same group and a strong generic market, and that RP achieves its goals 
if pharmaceutical cost escalation is due to high prices rathen than excessive 
prescription. Firms may behave strategically to increase prices not covered by RP and 
recover losses in process under RP.
4.2.4 Basic Findings and Gaps in the Launch Delay Literature
A summary of the findings from the literature is presented in Table 4.1, which classifies 
studies by risk factors and specifies the observed effect in each study as well as markets 
to which the evidence belongs.
163
Table 4.1 Findings from the Literature on generic drug entry (and timing o f generic entry)
Risk Factor Observed Effect Evidence from Author (s)
Pre-entry market 
size and 
expected profits
Increases speed and extent of generic entry
US, UK, 
Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Japan
Grabowski, Vernon 92; Scott Morton 99, 
00; Reiffen and Ward 05; Saha 06; 
Moreno-Torres 09; Appelt 09; Iizuka 09
Firm
Characteristics
Economies of scope (entry in several markets; 
number of form strengths for a given molecule) US, Japan Bae 97; Scott Morton 99; Iizuka 09
Drug
characteristics
• Drugs for chronic conditions exhibit a higher entry 
rate
• Entry dynamics depend on Therapeutic Class
US, Japan Bae 97; Scott Morton 00; Saha, Grabowski 06; Iizuka 09
Price regulation/ 
Reimbursement
• Reference pricing restrains generic entry by 
reducing generic profits (the empirical evidence is 
weak however)
• Higher price premium for branded drugs over 
generics increases generic share
Spain, Sweden 
US
Moreno-Torres 09; Ekelund 01; 
Konigbauer 06; Rudholm 01; Danzon & 
Chao 00
Hurwitz, Caves 88
Competition/ 
Market structure
Slower if market is highly competitive (importance of 
generic vs. branded competition is market-dependent)
• Number of generic incumbents negatively affects 
extent of entry in Spain
• Impact of branded competition is not clear [US and 
Japanese evidence suggests slower entry with 
increasing number of competitor molecules; 
Magazzini (2004) finds counter evidence]
Spain, Japan; 
France,
Germany, UK, 
US
Iizuka 09; Moreno-Torres 09; Saha 06; 
Bae 97; Scott Morton 00; Magazzini 04
Proportion of 
hospital sales
Market Dependent. Increases generic entry in the US 
but not in Japan; a study on France, Germany, UK,
US, Japan; 
France, Iizuka 09; Scott Morton 00; Magazzini 04
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and US indicates size of hospital sales has negative 
impact on generic shares
Germany, UK
Branded firm 
strategies Partnerships and agreements deter entry US, Canada
Hollis 03; Reiffen 05; Bemdt et al. 07; 
Reiffen 07
Goodwill Stock 
of the Branded 
Product
• More entrants if patent protection period is shorter
Mixed Evidence regarding Pre-Patent Expiry Brand 
Advertising
• Higher promotion during patent exclusivity 
preserves brand shares (brand loyalty)
• Pre-patent advertising declines with patent expiry; 
no significant effect on generic entry
Advertising in the Generic Industry
• Not effective since little potential for differentiation
Sweden
US
US
US
Rudholm 01 
Hurwitz, Caves 88
Caves, Whinston 91; Grabwoski, Vernon 
92; Ellison, Ellison 07
Scherer 00; Scott-Morton 00
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4.2.4.1 Gaps in the Literature
The majority of the evidence regarding generic entry belongs to the North American 
market; there is a paucity of evidence from the major regulated markets within the 
OECD. Some evidence from the Spanish and Swedish market accounts for the impact 
of regulation on generic entry; there is, however, no comprehensive comparative study 
that looks at dynamic entry across a variety of markets with different pricing 
mechanisms for generics. The majority of the studies have focused on the extent of 
generic entry rather than the timing of generic adoption. The literature offers very 
limited evidence on determinants of generic entry lags across markets with different 
pricing mechanisms. From a policy perspective both timely generic entry and fast 
generic uptake for a given molecule is important for cost-saving. This chapter aims to 
provide the first comparative analysis of generic adoption across 20 markets in the 
OECD by incorporating local expected generic price, extent of generic penetration, 
concentration of the generic sector in each market92, firm and molecule heterogeneity.
Previous studies have used pre-entry market size and expected profits by using the sales 
of branded products for the given molecule, ignoring the extent of potential market 
penetration by generics. The literature on reference pricing clearly indicates that if 
branded prices are driven close to reference prices, the gap between branded and generic 
prices narrows which may reduce incentives for generic entry unless strong demand- 
side incentives are employed contemporaneously. This suggests that the impact of 
regulation in the context of generic entry can be proxied by relative branded-generic 
prices. As mentioned in Chapter 3, studies that control for regulation through prices are 
limited, both in the context of timing of launch of new molecules and generic copies. 
This study aims to close this gap by incorporating local expected generic price 
information as well as relative branded-generic prices in the country. In addition, this 
chapter will consider the extent of generic penetration in each market to estimate the 
expected generic market size.
Studies investigating determinants of generic entry have estimated the impact of 
competition using the number of branded and generic competitors. Findings in Chapter 
3 demonstrated that concentration index at the therapeutic level is a significant
92 The country set in alphabetical order is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and US (South Africa is an enhanced engagement country of the 
OECD).
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determinant of hazard of launch for new molecules and high concentration acts as a 
barrier to entry. No studies have yet considered the impact of how concentrated the 
generic sector is on the timing of generic availability. In addition, there is a paucity of 
evidence regarding firm and product effects on the timing of first generic launch within 
the European market. The empirical analysis in this chapter will investigate whether 
there is significant heterogeneity with respect to launching firms and molecules in the 
availability of first generic products.
4.2.4.2 Research Questions
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature by addressing the following research 
questions:
• How do expected generic prices and profits affect timing of first generic 
entry?
• How does timing of first generic entry depend on potential competition in 
the local market and competition at the therapeutic class level?
• How do firm and molecule characteristics affect timing of generic product 
launch?
More detailed hypotheses tested in this chapter are presened in Table 4.3 in Section 
4.3.4.
4.3 METHODS 
4.3.1 Data
IMS data used in the study contains quarterly MIDAS sales data for the period 1999 Q1 
-  2008 Q3. MIDAS is a database that combines information from IMS Health’s detailed 
audits of retail pharmacy sales. The data covers 19 major pharmaceutical markets in the 
OECD and South Africa and includes USD ($) and standard unit (SU) sales for each 
product by quarter, molecule name, IMS generic and license status classification, global 
and local launch dates, pharmaceutical form, therapeutic class (ATC4), and breakdown 
of sales by the distribution channel. Launch in Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, South Africa represents launch in the retail sector; for Sweden launch 
could be either in the retail or hospital sector. Launch in the US market could be in the
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retail sector (drugstores, foodstores and mail service) or non-retail sector (clinics, 
federal facilities, HMOs, home health care, long term care, non-federal hospitals and 
other miscellaneous channels)93
The ex-manufacturer price level for molecules is calculated by dividing the ex­
manufacturer retail USD sales by volume in SU. Marketing discounts and margins 
along the distribution chain are ignored. The unit of analysis is molecule-country pairs. 
Once the generic version of a given molecule launches in one of the twenty markets, the 
remaining countries get under risk for the launch of the first generic version of the same 
molecule. This definition allows analyzing differentials in relative adoption speed with 
reference to the first global generic availability. This choice of risk onset cannot 
differentiate if the protection period has expired in individual markets, and therefore, is 
not an absolute measure of post-expiry delay but relative delay with respect to 
availability in other markets. However, all regressions control for the delay of the 
originator entry following the first global launch of the new molecule.
Failure time for the first generic product of molecule /-country k  pair is defined as the 
difference between the first global generic launch date of molecule j  and the local 
launch date of the generic in country k. Missing launch dates are approximated by 
period of first positive sales for those molecules that had the first generic launch after 
the first quarter of 1999. The number of generic molecules that launched in each market 
by period is presented in Table D.2 (Appendix D.l), and the distribution of the number 
of countries where molecules in the data have launched is presented in Figure D.l, 
Appendix D.
The molecule set in the IMS database is restricted to include molecules that have 
launched a generic in both the UK and US in order to reduce potential bias due to 
exclusively one-market molecules. To account for different dynamics in the 
pharmaceutical sector after the establishment of a single European market in 1993, the 
molecule set is further restricted to account for launches that occur after 1993. The 
analysis considers only plain molecules and ignores combination molecules composed 
of several active ingredients. In addition, molecules in ATC1 classes P (parasitics) and 
V (various drugs), anti-acne soaps, skin lotions, medicated shampoos, cleansing agents,
93 Sales figures in USD dollars were deflated by IMF GDP deflators for each country-year using 
2000 as the base year (see the Appendix for GDP deflators). Observations with negative sales, which 
represent products that have been returned to the manufacturer after the product has been withdrawn 
from the market, were dropped (about 5% of total observations).
168
mouth washes/rinses and contact lens solutions have been excluded. With all these 
restrictions, the total number of molecules analyzed is 349.
The dataset is expanded such that for each molecule-country pair there exists 117 
months (from January 1999 till September 2008). Discrete time intervals are defined in 
months because failure times (launch dates) are interval-censored monthly. For the 
discrete time implementation of survival analysis each period is indexed sequentially 
following the onset of risk (first global launch date of the generic copy) and ends when 
the subject fails or is censored.
4.3.2 Model
Entry of first generic product in a given country is considered as a binary-outcome 
model defined as unity if  entry occurs at time t and zero otherwise. The first generic 
alternative of molecule j  launches in country k if expected profits are positive. Let n
represent the discounted post-entry profits for the generic of molecule j  in country k  
The entry decision d observed at time t is:
The profit depends on the discounted future revenue stream net of entry costs and
potential spillovers to markets that reference market k for generic price setting. The 
discounted future profit stream at time t ignoring marginal costs can be expressed as:
of molecule j  in country k\ E  is the fixed cost of entry; LT  is the expected life-time of 
the generic product in the destination market; 8 is the discount factor and L is the extent 
of price spillover to market r due to external price referencing.
The expected price P is a function of branded price levels in the local market and 
branded-generic price mark-up which is a function of regulation and competition in the 
therapeutic subgroup. In markets such as the US generic prices are determined freely 
but face significant price competition upon the entry of follow-on generics. In the EU,
d  jkt  =
1 if H f a  > 0 and d jfa  = 0, for all n < t-1 
0 otherwise
^  jkt ~ X  d \ Pjkl 'Qjkl X  Ljkrl f ^ jkt + v jkt > where
P is the expected generic price. Q is the expected market size for the generic alternatives
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on the other hand, generic prices are regulated in the majority of the countries (83% of 
European countries). Generic medicine prices can be set as a percentage below the 
originator price level, as the average of a selected number of European countries or as a 
combination of both. Also, in markets with reference pricing, regulators set a common 
reimbursement level for a group of interchangeable medicines, which may constitute a 
barrier for further price competition beyond those imposed by regulation (Dylst and 
Simoens 2010).
The expected market size Q depends on total sales of the branded drug and the 
percentage of generic penetration in the given market. Penetration of generic medicines 
is more successful in countries with free pricing than in countries with price regulation. 
Higher medicine prices achieved under free pricing facilitate market entry of generics 
(Schulz 2004; Martikainen, Kivi et al. 2005). In price controlled countries, regulation 
drives down the price of the originator medicine discouraging market entry of generics. 
Also, the price difference between originators and generics tends to be higher in free- 
priced countries, which results in higher incentives to switch to generic alternatives. 
Molecule’s therapeutic importance affects braned sales, and hence, increases incentives 
to entry. Generic firms compete based on price, hence any cost reducing scale effects 
will provide competitive edge.
Appendix D.3 considers the two-stage price-setting game between the branded producer 
as a Stackelberg leader and N  identical generic entrants. The subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is found by backward induction to characterize how generic prices depend 
on the level of branded price, the number of generic competitors and costs of entry. In 
the second stage, the generic manufacturers assume the branded price level as given and 
determine their optimum response function. In the first stage of the game, the branded 
producer sets the optimum branded price by using the response function of the geneircs 
found in the second stage. Findings from the equilibrium indicate that equilibrium 
generic price increases in the branded price set at the first stage and decrease in the 
expected number of generic competitors. Equilibrium profits of generic manufacturers 
are decreasing in fixed costs of entry and the marginal cost of production.
Let R , C , M , and F be row vectors of regulation, market size and competition, 
molecule, firm characteristics respectively, where R includes price P, cost of entry E , 
and the size of the loss L; C includes expected market size Q , a priori expectations for 
the number of generic competitiors and the concentration index of generic competitors
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in the same therapeutic group; M and F capture heterogeneity in molecule and firm 
characters respectively. Using these vectors the additive reduced-form profit function 
can be specified as:
n jkt  =  R j k t $ R  + C j h V c  + M j k \ t $ M  + ¥ j k \ t $ F  + / t + u  jkt = z jk t§  + / t + u jk t ,  whe 
re , P c , p ^ ,  and p F represent corresponding column vectors of parameters to be 
estimated. yt is a function of time since global launch t of molecule j  and Uj^ is a 
random error term.. Let z ^ (f)  be a lx p  matrix defined as:
z j k t  =  ’ ^ j k t »^  j k t »^ j k t  ]  •
Given that launch has not occurred up to time interval t, the conditional probability of 
launch during interval t, i.e. the interval hazard rate is:
Pr(rfjk!= \ \T Jk > 0  = hJk (t) = Pr(n jk, > 0)
= P r (R y'*Pfi+ CytoPc + M j7c|(Pa/ + F y'i|rPf +7t + ujkt > 0 )
=  P T ( z j k l p  +  y t + U j k t > 0 )
hj k ( 0 = Pr(wjkt > jktP- r t ):= i - F(-zy*<P~ r t ) = F {2 jki(i + r , } ,
where F(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of u and Tjk is the launch time of
molecule j  in country k. For the cloglog model F(zy^p + yt ) = l -  exp |-exp(zy^p + yt )J 
and thus the hazard rate can be defined as:
hjk(<) = ] -  exp(- exp(z jkl p + y , )) or 
cloglog(A;fe) = zJjbp + f,
The discrete time failure analysis again assumes two different duration specifications: i) 
a parametric specification yt -  yxt + y2t ; and ii) a semi-parametric specification that 
includes dummies for each month following risk onset, i.e. first global generic adoption.
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Based on statistically more robust outcomes for cloglog regression in the previous 
chapter this chapter estimates parameters using cloglog regression. The binary outcome 
model logit is used as a robustness check. Using the logistic cumulative function the 
hazard is parameterized as follows:
hjk  ( 0 = rj ~  “ TTT» [4-6][l + exp(-(zy*,p + ft))J
where yt is the vector of duration dependence. Transforming the hazard using a logit
link function gives the following discrete-time logistic hazard regression model (Xie, 
McHugo et al. 2003): 
hIn
1 - h = 7‘jkt$+rt
The marginal effect has the same sign as the parameter estimate both in the cloglog and 
logit models. For small hazard values, cloglog and logit regressions for discrete survival 
analysis yield similar estimates. However, in general the estimated coefficients in the 
logit model will be larger than the coefficient estimates in the cloglog model (Abbott 
1985). The logit model has the proportional odd assumption; as such it might be the 
appropriate model if the proportional odd assumption is correct in instances when the 
hazard rates are not “small” (see Appendix D.l). A second issue is the appropriateness 
of the duration-dependence specification for the baseline hazards. To avoid potential 
bias due to incorrect specification of the baseline hazard as a quadratic in months since 
risk onset, I also estimate the models assuming a non-parametric duration-dependence 
by including dummies for each month.
4.3.3 Variables
As in the previous chapter generic firm’s entry decision and timing of entry is estimated 
controlling for factors both in the external and internal firm environment. External 
environment variables control for regulation (through expected generic prices, dummies 
for reference pricing and generic substitution) and expected market size; while the 
internal environment variables control for firm’s economies of scale/scope and 
characteristics of the molecule. The definitions of the variables and summary statistics 
are provided in Table 4.2.
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4.3.3.1 Regulation: Expected Generic Prices
Regulatory complexity and diversity is captured through expected generic prices of the 
launching molecule. This approach has not been used before for the analysis of generic 
launch timing, and is a natural extension of the recent studies that use price information 
to measure the impact of regulation on the timing of new patent-protected molecules. 
As lower prices squeeze the market for generics, it is expected that higher generic prices 
will increase hazard of launch, controlling for market size and structure as well as firm 
and product characteristics.
When the first generic is about to enter the market, there are no generic products for the 
same active ingredient. The prices of non-generic products define the maximum price 
limit for generic versions which are commodity products that compete based on price. 
In addition, regulations in some countries may require that generic prices are lower than 
branded products by a certain percentage (i.e. 30-35%). The expected generic price is, 
therefore, proxied by the product of the average branded price of the launching 
molecule and the median generic-branded price ratio in the local market. The average 
non-generic product prices in each country for the same molecule are calculated by 
using volume (in SU) as weights.
Generic/Non-generic Price Ratios
Several studies have identified that the market share captured by generics depends on 
the relative prices of the generic and originator product. Anis (2003) uses the generic- 
branded price ratio, Pg/Pb, as a measure of how regulation affects generic prices and 
competitiveness (Anis, Guh et al. 2003). Aronsson (2001) also finds that the price of the 
originator drug relative to the average price of the generic substitutes significantly 
affects the changes in the market share of the originator(Aronsson, Bergman et al. 
2001). This ratio (Pg/Pb) is observed to decrease significantly over time as new 
generics enter the market (Caves, Whinston et al. 1991; Grabowski and Vernon 1992).
In the context of branded-generic competition, an alternative ratio that has been used to 
explain the market share captured by generics is - Pg j^/ Pjj, where P  ^ and Pg are 
generic and branded wholesale prices for prescription drugs. Hurwitz and Caves (1988) 
observe that the originator's market share is decreasing in the ratio of ^  - Pg j^/ P^ ,
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which they interpret as the proportional price discount offered by generic competitors 
(Hurwitz and Caves October 1988). I mainly use the ratio R = Pg /Pb to calculate
directly the expected generic price as E(Pg ) = Pb - R , where Pb is the average branded
price of the molecule and R is the median ratio of ^Pg. / Pb, ) across different molecules 
i that have a generic competitor in the destination market of launch.
Alternatively, expected generic prices could be controlled for using the average generic 
prices for the patent-expired molecules in the same therapeutic class (ATC4 group) 
since different molecules in the same ATC4 chemical group are the most imminent 
competitors. In some countries reference groups are defined at the chemical subgroup 
(ATC4 level) or even at the higher pharmacological level ATC3, which implies that 
average generic prices at the ATC4 level proxy expected prices either due to reference 
pricing or impact of competition at the chemical subgroup level. This proxy would 
ignore the first in class generic products for each therapeutic subgroup and further 
restrict the number of observations
Regulatory Dummies
Dummies for the existence of a reference price system (RPS) and generic substitution 
(GenSubst) are used as an additional control for the impact of regulation. Although 
testing the sign of these variables gives an idea of their impact on relative speed of entry 
for the first generic, there is considerable uncertainty regarding these measures.
Each country employs different criteria to set the reference groups and reference prices. 
The European Generic Association’s survey of generic markets has shown that 71% of 
European countries use reference pricing (RP) as a tool to control the reimbursement 
level of medicines (Perry 2006). The reference groups can be defined at three different 
levels: 1) the active ingredient (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal); 2) 
pharmacological class (e.g. in Poland); 3) therapeutic subgroup (e.g., Germany and 
Netherlands). The reference price can be set at the price of the cheapest generic (e.g. 
Italy and Poland); at the median price of all medicines in the group (e.g. Netherlands); 
highest price of available generic medicines (e.g. Portugal) (Simoens and de Coster 
2006). Reference price systems (RPS) may not aid generic penetration if the prices of 
the originators are reduced to the reference price levels. On the other hand, RPS are
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successful in generic promotion in markets where medicine prices and the price 
difference between generics and branded drugs are high.
Similarly, generic substitution is mandatory in some countries whereas it is promoted in 
others, and the incentives for substitution at the pharmacist level vary greatly across 
countries. For example, pharmacists’ remuneration in Portugal and Spain is set as a 
fixed percentage of the public prices; whereas the percentage remuneration decreases as 
prices increase in Italy and Poland. In France and Belgium the absolute pharmacist 
margin is the same for originators and generics. Some countries such as Netherlands 
reward pharmacists for substitution by medicines priced below the reference price by 
allowing them to retain one-third of the price difference between the medicine 
dispensed and the reference price level. In France, pharmacists can obtain higher 
discounts for generic medicines, which increases generic substitution levels by 
pharmacists with the discount benefits being captured by the pharmacist. Another 
demand-side factor that may increase generic take-up are patient co-payments; in 
particular, for price sensitive segments co-payments should stimulate generic medicine 
use unless the co-payments are covered by private insurances as in France (Simoens and 
de Coster 2006).
Due to the significant heterogeneity in the definition of RPS and generic substitution 
incentives, the impact of regulation will be measured mainly through its effect on 
prices. The estimates for RPS and generic substitution, however, are presented in the 
Robustness Checks section.
4.3.3.2 Expected Market Size
There is little conceptual literature on determinants of timing of generic entry. Findings 
from the empirical literature on entry suggest that expected profits is an important 
determinant of entry and delays in entry. The likelihood of generic launch increases and 
lags in delay are reduced if the expected market size is bigger. Potential profits are a 
function of the branded molecule sales prior to patent expiry and the share that can be 
captured by generics post-patent expiry. Generics have lower profit margins compared 
to non-generic branded products; therefore, market success of generics depends on 
capturing a high share from non-generic sales.
The expected generic market size is proxed by the product of total molecule sales prior 
to generic entry and the average market share captured by generics (calculated over all
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molecules with generic competition in individual markets). In addition, I test for the 
significance of market size in volume units (SU) by using the product of total molecule 
sales in SU and the average share of SUs captured by generics. Previous studies 
investigate market size in USD ($) units. Since capturing a high volume plays a critical 
role in the generic sector due to intense price competition, market size in USD ($) and 
SUs are both expected to increase the probability of quicker launch for generic products.
4.3.3.3 Market Structure and Competition
Post-entry competition is one of the most influential factors other than regulation that 
restricts potential profits for would-be entrants. One of the strongest signals for 
extensive competition following entry is the number of generic firms active in each 
country prior to entry. Once manufacturing infrastructure is established, the marginal 
cost of producing generic drugs is relatively low and switching to another molecule is 
relatively easy (except for certain formulations that are difficult to manufacture). 
Therefore, each firm that already has generic sales in the country is a potential 
competitor. In particular, if incumbent generic firms in the local market have prior 
experience with the same form, probability of launching a same-form generic might be 
higher (Scott Morton 1999). Complex formulations (e.g. injectables) may offer a degree 
of barrier to entry and better margins for generics (Karwal 2006). Ideally, potential 
competitors should be defined according to past experience with the same formulation. 
However, since generics are aggregated for the same molecule, irrespective of the form, 
the number of generic manufactures in the country is used as a primary proxy measure 
for potential competition.
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Table 4.2 Variable Definitions, Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics
Expected Price Description Level N mean sd min max
ln_Pb Log of NonGeneric Retail Price of the Molecule Ctry-Mol-Qrt 521376 0.147 2.10 -7.055 7.739
LMAvgPb Log of Moving Average of NonGeneric Retail Price of the Molecule Ctry-Mol-Qrt 462450 0.138 2.10 -5.622 7.714
medRatioPgPb Expected Price Ratio Pgen/Pnongen Ctry-Qrt 614538 0.765 0.15 0.220 1.035
LMAvgExpPg Log Moving Average of Expected Generic Price [Log Pb * medRatioPgPb ] Ctry-Mol-Qrt 462450 -0.158 2.09 -5.796 7.458
InExpPg Log Expected Generic Price [Log Pb*medRatioPgPb ] Ctry-Mol-Qrt 521376 -0.148 2.09 -7.273 7.550
RPS Dummy for Reference Pricing System Ctry-Qrt 816660 0.551 0.50 0 1
GenSubst Dummy for Generic Substitution Ctiy-Qrt 775827 0.677 0.47 0 1
M arket Size Description Level N mean sd min max
LM AvgUSDmolCtr Log Moving Average of Molecule Sales in the Country ($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525018 6.152 2.74 -7.012 14.407
LMAvg_SU_molCtr_ Log Moving Average of Molecule Sales in the Country (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525057 6.068 3.31 -6.908 13.789
InUSDmoleculeCtryi Log Molecule Sales in the Country ($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 590559 6.076 2.82 -7.650 14.412
InSUmoleculeCtryi Log Molecule Sales in the Country (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 590622 5.981 3.39 -6.908 13.886
MAvg_avgGenShare_SU_ Moving Average Generic ($) Share Ctry-Qrt 795720 42.958 13.59 9.015 76.976
MAvg_avgGenShare_USD_ Moving Average Generic (SU) Share Ctiy-Qrt 795720 38.502 12.08 6.668 63.715
avgGenShare_USD_ Average Generic ($) Share Ctry-Qrt 816660 38.526 12.10 6.614 64.023
avgGenShare_SU_ Average Generic (SU) Share Ctry-Qrt 816660 42.980 13.62 8.945 77.041
ExpMarketSizeSU Expected Market Size (SU) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 525057 9.795 3.34 -3.715 18.028
ExpMarketS izeUSD Expected Market Size ($) [LogMAvg USD molCtr * avgGenShare USD ] Ctiy-Mol-Qrt 525018 9.764 2.76 -3.911 18.507
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Competition Description Level N mean sd min max
NumbMolCtryAtc4_ Number of Molecules in the ATC4 category (number of substitute molecules)
Ctry-Qrt-
Atc4 296010 10.040 10.60 0 191
NumbMolCtryRETAtc4 Number of Molecules in the ATC4 category (in the retail sector only)
Ctry-Qrt-
Atc4 294606 9.568 10.38 0 186
NumGenFirm Number of Generic Firms in the Country Ctry-Qrt 816660 143.78 77.37 47 380
NumGenFirmMed Number of Generic Firms in the Country/Median Ctry-Qrt 816660 1.188 0.64 0.388 3.140
firmSqMed Squared number of generic firms in the Ctr/Median of Firms squared Ctry-Qrt 816660 1.821 2.20 0.151 9.863
IHHgen Herfindahl Index for Generic Sector Ctry-Mol-Qrt 296010 4151.8 4056.63 0 10000
norm IHH gen normalized Herfindahl index for generic sector: (IHH_gen-mean)/std dev Ctry-Mol-Qrt 296010 0 1 -1.023 1.442
Molecule Description Level N mean sd min max
MolGlobal Reach Number of Markets the molecule has launched in Mol 816660 16.779 4.242 2 20
In MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ Log Annual Molecule Sales ($) Mol-Year 811260 11.535 2.277 -4.881 16.279
ln_MolGlobalUSDMedian_ Log Molecule Sales ($) [median of annual sales over 1999-2008] Mol 816660 11.606 2.222 2.908 16.023
ln_lag_yrs Lag Years of the Branded Version (Local Launch - Global Launch Date) Mol-Ctry 602316 1.279 1.256 -2.554 4.681
PercRetailUSD_ Percentage Retail Sales ($) Ctry-Mol-Qrt 388461 71.843 37.543 0 100
Firm Description Level N mean sd min max
InLocalCorpSales Log Local Sales of the Firm Firm-Cty-Qrt 287133 9.690 2.474 -7.078 15.762
InglobalFirmSales Log Global Sales of the Firm Firm-Qrt 289110 12.186 3.041 -7.078 16.225
CorpGlobal Reach Number of Markets in which the firm has sales Firm-Qrt 293319 11.837 7.578 0 20
FirmMolDivAtT_ Firm's number of molecules Firm-Qrt 291291 375.761 310.072 1 1112
178
The number of firms directly affects expected profits through its impact on prices. As 
the number of generic competitors increases, price competition intensifies, generic- 
branded price ratio decreases and the reference price is pushed down; this further 
decreases generic prices and profits. According to Reiffen and Ward (2005) eight or 
more generic entries result in near-competitive generic prices (Reiffen and Ward 2005). 
In the US, it has been shown that generic prices are driven down to marginal costs 
within a few months once the number of generic competitors is between 10 and 20 
(Saha, Grabowski et al. 2006).
The number of firms in the whole market is an aggregate measure of generic sector 
competition in the whole market and does not account for competition at the therapeutic 
class level. I use the number of competitor molecules in the ATC4 subgroup (defined 
quarterly) as an alternative measure of competition in the robustness checks to account 
for the closest possible therapeutic substitution effects. A limitation of this variable is 
that it cannot differentiate between degrees of substitutability across active ingredients 
in the same ATC4 and does not incorporate possible substitution from molecules in the 
same pharmacologic group (ATC3)94.
Finally, for each therapeutic subgroup (ATC4) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (IHH) 
is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of individual generic firms. The 
advantage of controlling for IHH  is that IHH  takes into account the relative firm size 
and the distribution of sales across firms. The IHH  is small when there are numerous 
firms of comparatively equal sizes whereas the IHH  increases as the number of firms in 
the market gets smaller and the disparity between firm sizes increases. Therefore, a high 
IHH  value is an indication of little potential competition in the generic sector and that 
the first entrant can capture a relatively firm share from the potential market. IHH  at 
ATC4 level captures the heterogeneity in competitive landscapes across different 
therapeutic categories.
4.3.3.4 Firm-level
Generic firms attain competitive advantage in a given market through cost competition 
within a given market. In a fierce price-competition environment, lower costs result in 
higher profit margins. The pressure for lower costs is rising due to increasing
94 In the context of generic entry, a more refined proxy can be defined in terms of the number of 
molecules with existing generic competition in the same ATC4 subgroup.
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globalization of generic firms, especially generic manufacturers from emerging markets 
such as India and China. Economies of scale and scope, therefore, might be important 
factors that give competitive edge to generic manufacturers as evidenced by the 
increasing mergers and acquisitions and vertical integration in the generics sector 
(Karwal 2006).
According to Karwal (2006) geographical diversification spreads out business and 
regulatory risks across markets, which reduces business volatility. In addition, scale 
economies or higher firm size reduce the financial risks associated with litigation and 
launch risk. Firm volatility is decreased for firms that produce a variety of products 
whose patent protection has expired.
Economies of scope in the pharmaceutical industry exist when it is more efficient to 
carry out different R&D projects by one firm rather than several different firms because 
knowledge can be pooled and physical assets can be shared across different R&D 
projects. The impact of scope effects is expected to be less important in the generic 
sector compared to the branded sector which incurs substantially higher R&D costs. 
Economies of scope are proxied by the number of molecules launched by each firm95. 
Additional heterogeneity in scale of firms is controlled for by quarterly local and global 
firm sales, and global reach of the firm proxied by the number of markets in which the 
firm has sales (across the 20 countries in the dataset).
4.3.3.5 Molecule Characteristics
As mentioned in the previous chapter, therapeutically more important molecules diffuse 
internationally quicker and to a wider set of markets as branded-branded competition in 
the pharmaceutical sector is based on quality defined by the therapeutic benefits it offers 
over existing competing molecules. I hypothesize that the same effect is observed for 
generic drugs. Therapeutically important molecules offer higher profit potential to 
generic manufacturers because they can capture higher price mark-ups compared to 
molecules of lower qulity and a higher market share that increases the ex-ante 
expectation for generic manufacturers. Following the approach in the previous chapter, 
the global reach of the originator molecule (the total number of markets to which the 
molecule has diffused) is used a proxy for relative therapeutic importance. 
Heterogeneity across molecules is also captured by total annual sales of the molecule
95 Returns to scope could be defined at the therapeutic level and/or firm level.
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(USD$) in the twenty markets, which changes on a yearly basis. To define an aggregate 
sales measure, in some specifications I include the median of annual global sales 
(USD$) during 1999-2008.
The empirical literature suggests that brand loyalty may play a role in decisions 
regarding generic launch. Brand loyalty depends on the duration of patent exclusivity as 
well as promotion efforts of the originator firm when the molecule is still under 
protection. The evidence, however, is mixed. Rudholm (2001) finds that a longer 
monopoly period reduces entry whereas Grabowski and Vernon (1992) found no 
significant effect of patent protection duration. Due to lack of information about 
protection expiry dates of molecules, this study cannot directly control for the 
exclusivity period in the market. However, launch delays (time elapse between the first 
global launch date and local launch date) of originator products are used as a control for 
the monopoly period loss in each market. The higher the delay, the shorter is the period 
available for building brand loyalty96.
Finally, the literature suggests that the share of hospital vs. retail sales also has 
implications for the extent of generic entry (but no evidence exists on timing of entry 
conditional on entry in the EU5). For example, Scott Morton (2000) finds a positive 
relationship between the share of hospital sales and the entry of generic products due to 
institutional factors that facilitate generic entry in the hospital sector. On the other hand, 
Magazzini (2004) finds evidence to the contrary that the size of the hospital sector has a
0 7negative impact on generic market share in USA, UK, Germany, and France .
4.3.4 Hypotheses
Based on economic theory and findings from the literature, the empirical analysis will 
test the following main hypotheses for drivers of launch timing in the generic sector:
96 As the empirical results of the previous chapter showed, launch delays of the original molecule is 
strongly associated with price-controlled markets, and therefore, partially captures regulation effects 
in each market
97 For US retail sales are composed of foodstores, drugstores and mail service. For Sweden sales are 
combined so percentage retail sales are not known. Belgium, Greece, Portugal, South Africa, Spain 
and Turkey have retail only sales. Remaining markets that have both hospital and retail sales are 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, 
Switzerland, and the UK.
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Table 4.3 Hypotheses for the key drivers o f  launch timing in the generic sector
Factor Testable Hypotheses Evidence from the Literature Expected Sign o f  the Coefficient
Regulation
HI a.l: High expected generic prices 
increase the hazard rate (decrease launch 
lag) for generic products
No direct empirical 
evidence
+ Price Coefficient 
(Higher generic prices, controlling for other factors, increase 
expected revenue and profitability for generic manufacturers)
HI a.2: Higher branded prices increase the 
hazard of launch of generic products
Evidence exists
+ Pb Coefficient 
(generic prices may be directly linked to branded prices; 
markets with higher prices tend to have higher generic prices)
HI a.3: Generic-branded price ratio Pg/Pb 
negatively affects hazard of launch.
No evidence on 
timing of generic 
entry
- Pg/Pb Coefficient 
(Keeping branded price fixed, lower generic prices allow 
generics to capture a higher volume share)
Market Size
HI b.l: The higher the branded molecule 
sales prior to generic launch (in $ or SU), 
the higher the hazard of launch
Empirical evidence 
exists for sales (in $) 
of branded products
+ Market Size Coefficient 
(Both the sign of SU and USD sales are expected to be 
positive)
HI b.2: The higher the expected generic 
market size (= branded molecule sales * the 
average generic share in the local market), 
the higher the hazard of launch
No direct empirical 
evidence
+ Expected Market Size Coefficient 
(Market size increases incentives for entiy as the net present 
value of entiy is increased)
Competition 
& Market 
Structure
HI c.l: A higher number of expected 
generic competitors decreases the hazard of 
entry
No evidence
- Coefficient for number of competitor firms 
(Theoretically, I have shown that number of generic entrants 
has a negative impact on expected profits)
HI c.2: The higher the number of substitute 
molecules in the therapeutic class, the lower 
is the hazard rate
No evidence
- Coefficient for Substitute Molecules 
(Either reference pricing or competition will drive prices and 
potential profits down)
HI c.3: The higher the Herfindahl 
concentration index of generic 
manufacturers at the therapeutic class level, 
the lower the hazard rate
No evidence
- Concentration Coefficient 
(in Chapter 3 concentration in on-patent sector had a negative 
coefficient estimate. Industrial organization literature predicts 
that concentration reduces the equilibrium level o f entiy)
Hid. 1: Generic entry for 
therapeutically/commercially important 
molecules is faster
No evidence + Coefficient for Molecule’s Global Reach and Global Sales 
(higher branded prices and higher profit potentials)
Molecule
Hld.2: The longer the lag for the entry of 
the originator molecule, the faster the 
generic entry
No evidence
+ Coefficient for the Lag of the Originator 
(longer lags imply shorter exclusivity and lower brand loyalty)
Hld.3: Percentage of molecule sales in the 
retail sector increases hazard of launch
Contradictory
?
(Prices in the hospital sector tend to be lower than in the retail 
sector but volume effect could dominate)
HI e.l: Firm economies of scope (number 
of molecules in the portfolio) increase the 
hazard of launch
Evidence exists
+ Economies of Scope Coefficient 
(Economies of scope allow lower-cost entry as the firm can 
switch quickly and less costly from one product line to 
another. Also, knowledge spillovers across different product 
lines may further lower development and entiy costs)
Firm
HI e.2: Firms’ scale has positive effect on 
the hazard of launch.
Evidence from the 
branded sector; No 
firm empirical 
evidence exists for 
the generic sector
+ Coefficient for Firm’s Global/Local Sales 
(Scale effects are expected to be less important than in on- 
patent sector because R&D and advertising costs are much 
lower compared in the generic sector. However, economies of 
scale may allow vertical integration in the supply chain as well 
as mergers with other generic manufacturers to decrease costs)
+ Coefficient for Firm’s Global Reach 
A wider global reach indicates potentially bigger firm size and 
higher familiarity with diverse regulatory environments)
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4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section estimates the hazard of first generic product launch in individual markets 
following the first global generic launch of the originator molecule. All regressions 
control for the lag of the originator molecule as well as heterogeneity in anatomic 
therapeutic categories and country of launch. All errors are clustered by molecule- 
country since there might be dependency across the errors of the same molecule-country 
pair. Regressions are run for molecules with first global launch after 1993, the year the 
European Union was legally created.
Parametric Duration Dependence Base Case Results
Table 4.4 presents the marginal effects (dy/dx) for molecules that had the first generic 
launch globally after 1993. Maximum likelihood estimation was carried out using 
discrete time implementation of the proportional hazard model with complementary log 
log regression and logit regression for robustness check. Marginal effects and 
coefficient estimates are very close or identical across cloglog and logit estimations98. 
Regressions presented in Table 4.4 assume parametric duration dependence of the form
/zq (f) = t + In {t2 j for the hazard function.
Base case results show that regulation proxied by expected generic prices for the 
launching generic product has a significant impact on the hazard of launch following the 
first global generic launch. This effect is robust across different model specifications 
and inclusion or exclusion of calendar year dummies. Marginal effects are comparable 
in magnitude across cloglog and logit estimates. The significance level depends on 
whether calendar year dummies are included or not. With no calendar year dummies the 
significance is at the 0.001 or 0.01 level, whereas with calendar year dummies the 
significance level reduces to 0.05. This could be due to the fact that calendar year 
dummies capture some of the variation in expected generic prices (for example, 
expected generic prices would reduce over time in price-controlled markets due to 
downward pressure on branded prices). The marginal effect of log expected generic 
prices on the hazard of first generic launch is on the order of 0.002.
98 Preliminary runs with cox regression could not achieve meaningful marginal effects. Alternative 
estimations that assume common frailty for each molecule-country pair using xtcloglog had 
difficulty in converging due to non-concavity.
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The mean of expected generic price is 21.125$/SU and the standard deviation is 
86.728$/SU. Therefore, considering the average price level, an increase of one standard 
deviation in expected generic prices (rather than log prices) increases probability of 
launch by approximately 0.8%
The marginal effect of log average branded prices is also 0.002. Considering the mean 
branded price of 28.971$/SU and standard deviation of 119.646$/SU, an increase of one 
standard unit increase in branded prices increases probability of launch again 
approximately by 0.8%100.
Expected market size in USD is significant across all specifications. However, expected 
market size in SU is only significant in specifications without the calendar year 
dummies. The marginal effect of log expected market size for generics in USD varies 
from 0.002 to 0.004 depending on whether calendar year dummies are included or not. 
The mean of the expected market size of observations used in the regressions is 
472,723.3 (USD$) with a standard deviation of 3,255,101 (USDS). An increase of one 
standard deviation in the expected generic market size increases hazard of launch by 
1.4%-2.8%101. On average, an increase in market size (in USDS) by one standard unit 
increases probability in launch more than a corresponding increase in the expected 
generic price by one standard unit. It should be noted, however, that the uncertainty 
around the expected market size is higher. The standard deviation for expected market 
size is 6.8 times higher than the mean, whereas for expected generic prices the standard 
deviation is 4.3 higher than the mean expected prices.
The impact of the number of generic competitors in the market depends on whether 
calendar year dummies are included or not. When calendar year dummies are included 
the higher the number of competitors the lower is the hazard of launch. On the other
99
(86.728)—  = (86.728)—^ — • = (8 6 .7 2 8 ) -^ -  • -
dp d k ip  dp d \n p  p
= (86.728)(0.002)2 i -1—  = .008 ~ 0.8%
100 (119.646) ^  = (119.646)(0.002).— l-—  = 0.008 ~ 0.8%
V Jd \n p b p b v A '  28.971
101 (3255101)----^ = (3255101)(0.002).------ l--------= 0.014 -1.4%
v '  d InMSize MSize v /v ’ 472723.3
(3255101)---- ^ = (3255101)(0.004).------ l-------= 0.028 -  2.8%
v '  a In MSize MSize v A '  472723.3
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hand when calendar year dummies are excluded, number of competitors significantly 
increases the hazard of launch. The effect of competition is further investigated in 
robustness checks, Section 4.4.1.3, through alternative proxies.
Surprisingly, molecule and firm effects show no robust statistical significance. Marginal 
effects of global molecule sales alternate from positive to negative values. On the other 
hand, marginal effects of global firm sales is consistently positive across different 
specifications suggesting that firm scale increases the speed of launch for generic 
products. The effect of firm scale, however, is significant at the 0.075 level.
There is robust evidence that the hazard of launch is concave in the number of months 
elapsed since risk onset. The variable sequence indicates the number of months elapsed 
since the first global launch of the generic version of the originator molecule. The 
marginal effect of both number of months and log number of months squared since risk 
onset is significant at the 0.001 level. This is in line with the duration dependence in the 
previous chapter that analyzed the launch timing of new molecules. The probability of 
launch in individual countries following the first launch initially increases and then 
decreases.
Comparing the information criteria statistics across the models with calendar year 
dummies and no calendar year dummies indicates that the model with calendar year 
dummies has a better overall fit.
The corresponding coefficient estimates for the models in Table 4.4 are presented in 
Table D.4, Appendix D.2.1. The coefficient estimates for cloglog and logit are very 
close to each other, which suggests that the hazard of launch on average is small. As 
expected, in cases where the coefficients are not exactly identical, logit estimates are 
marginally higher than the cloglog estimates.
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Table 4.4 Parametric Duration Dependence : Marginal Effects for Base Case Cloglog anc
Variables
With Calendar Year Dummies No Calendar Year Dummies
CLOGLOG LOGIT CLOGLOG LOGIT
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expected Generic Price
LMAvgExpPg
LM AvgPb
medRatioPgPb
0.002*
[0.0006]
0.002*
[0.0011]
0.002*
[0.0006]
0.007
[0.0155]
0.002*
[0.0007]
0.003*
[0.0011]
0.002*
[0.0007]
0.008
[0.0160]
0.002**
[0.0007]
0.004***
[0.0013]
0.002**
[0.0007]
-0.018
[0.0190]
0.002**
[0.0007]
0.005***
[0.0013]
0.002**
[0.0007]
-0.02
[0.0192]
Expected Market Size
ExpMarketS izeU SD 
ExpMarketSizeSU 
LM AvgUSDm olCtr 
avgGenShareUSD
0.002**
[0.0008]
0.001
[0.0008]
0.002*
[0.0008]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.002**
[0.0008]
0.001
[0.0008]
0.002**
[0.0008]
0
[0.0003]
0.004***
[0.0010]
0.002*
[0.0010]
0.003***
[0.0009]
0.002***
[0.0003]
0.004***
[0.0010]
0.003**
[0.0010]
0.003***
[0.0009]
0.002***
[0.0003]
Competition
NumGenFirmMed -0.032
[0.0175]
-0.032
[0.0176]
-0.031
[0.0175]
-0.029
[0.0180]
-0.029
[0.0180]
-0.029
[0.0179]
0.127***
[0.0184]
0.131***
[0.0185]
0.100***
[0.0169]
0.129***
[0.0186]
0.133***
[0.0187]
0.101***
[0.0170]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_lag_yrs 0.002*
[0.0011]
0.002
[0.0011]
0.002*
[0.0011]
0.002*
[0.0011]
0.002
[0.0011]
0.002*
[0.0011]
0.001
[0.0012]
0
[0.0013]
0.001
[0.0012]
0.001
[0.0013]
0
[0.0013]
0.001
[0.0012]
Logit Estimates for First Generic Launch
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InMolG lobalUSD Annual_ -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.001
[0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
InsequenceSq -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008***
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0007]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of Observations 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698
Log Likelihood -2218.21 -2221.42 -2218.47 -2220.04 -2223.32 -2220.28 -2326.57 -2332.77 -2306.01 -2327.9 -2334.26 -2307.48
chi2 737.92 736.01 749.44 681.63 681.78 687.45 418.16 406.76 447.5 380.01 371.24 413.37
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4530.422 4536.85 4534.93 4534.08 4540.65 4538.56 4731.13 4743.53 4694.02 4733.79 4746.53 4696.95
Bayesian Info Criteria 4901.17 4907.59 4921.46 4904.83 4911.4 4925.08 5038.77 5051.17 5017.44 5041.44 5054.17 5020.37
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Marginal effects (dy/dx) reported . 
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and In sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log of squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + 
In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported.
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Non-Parametric Duration Dependence Base Case Results
For robustness checks, non-parametric regressions were run with cloglog and logit 
specification by including dummies for each month following the risk onset and 
specifying noconstant option in Stata. This avoids prior assumptions of the 
parametric estimations regarding the functional form of the hazard with respect to 
time. Non-parametric duration dependence assumes a constant hazard rate during 
each monthly interval.
The coefficient estimates using non-parametric duration dependence are provided in 
Table D.5 (Appendix D.2.1). The signs of the coefficients are broadly in line with 
the parametric specification. Non-parametric estimates also suggest that launch 
hazard for generics is higher when expected price and market size is higher. 
However, the significance of price estimates with calendar year dummies included is 
weaker. For specifications with no calendar year dummies a lower generic-branded 
price ratio is negatively associated with a lower hazard rate and is statistically 
significant. Higher generic share in molecule sales is associated with higher hazard 
rates and is statistically significant.
The impact of competition, proxied by the number of generic firms, is not robust 
and shows the same trend as in the parametric duration specification. Launch hazard 
is decreasing in the number of generic firms when calendar year dummies are 
included and increasing if year dummies are excluded. A higher number of potential 
generic competitors indicates that the entrant will capture a lower share of the 
market and that price competition will be more intense. Therefore, the extent of 
potential generic competition affects the entry decision negatively.
Findings for molecule and firm effects are more robust in terms of the sign of the 
parameter estimates. The coefficients of therapeutic importance (global molecule 
sales) are positive and statistically significant in few model specifications whereas 
the coefficients of global firm sales (scale effect) are also positive but not 
statistically significant.
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria for non-parametric specifications are 
much higher compared to the parametric duration specifications. This can be 
explained by the fact that the number of estimated parameters increases 
considerably due to the inclusion of 117 dummies for each month (from 1999 Q1 to
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2008 Q3) in the non-parametric specification, whereas the parametric specification 
has only 2 parameters to be estimated for duration dependence, t and ln^/2J.
Parametric specifications where calendar year dummies are excluded have the 
lowest information criteria in general, and therefore, potentially provide a better 
overall fit to the data.
Multicollinearity
Before proceeding with the robustness checks for the results obtained I tested for 
potential issues of multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation factors 
(VIF). In particular, the change in the sign of the coefficient of number o f generic 
firms depending the inclusion or exclusion of calendar dummies raises suspicions of 
multicollinearity. The main problem of multicollinearity is the inflation in variances 
of the least squares estimators of coefficients. This may result in wide swings in the 
parameter estimates with small changes in the data and coefficients may have the 
wrong sign and implausible magnitudes. A maximum VIF greater than 10 is thought 
to signal severe collinearity (Mansfield and Helms 1982; Mason and Perreault Jr 
1991).
VIFs were calculated by first running an ordinary least squares regression and then 
calculating the VIF by the command estat VIF in Stata. VIF estimates are presented 
in the Appendix D.2.3 in Table D.29 and Table D.30. The variance inflation factor 
for the proxy of competition (number of generic firms) is 244.7 and the mean value 
is 16.58, which indicates a severe multicollinearity problem. When the normalized 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index within therapeutic categories is used instead of the 
number of generic firms as a proxy for competition the multicollinearity problem 
subsides and the mean VIF reduces to 2.91. It should be noted that although the VIF 
factors for calendar year dummies is less than 10, they remain predominantly above 
5, which may explain some of the sensitivity in the coefficients with respect to the 
inclusion or exclusion of calendar year dummies from the regressions.
Table 4.5 presents the marginal effects dy/dx for the same model specifications as in 
Table 4.4 after replacing the control for competition from number of generic firms 
to the normalized Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index to avoid potential bias due to the 
high inflation factor of number of generic firms (see Table D.31 in Appendix D.2.3 
for coefficient estimates). The marginal effects are slightly higher compared to the
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marginal effects in Table 4.4 for specifications with no calendar year dummies. The 
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria indicate that models with the Herfindahl 
index provide a better fit overall. Therefore, the robustness checks in the following 
section control for competition by using the normalized Herfindahl Index at the 
therapeutic class level to avoid problems due to multicollinearity.
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Table 4.5 Parametric Duration Dependence: Marginal Effects using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for competition
with calendar year dummies no calendar year dummies
Variables cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expected Generic Price
LMAvgExpPg 0.002*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005***
[0.0006] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0012] [0.0007] [0.0012]
LMAvg_Pb 0.002***
[0.0006]
0.002***
[0.0006]
0.002***
[0.0006]
0.002***
[0.0006]
medRatioPgPb 0.000
[0.0133]
0.004
[0.0136]
-0.022
[0.0147]
-0.022
[0.0151]
Expected Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.002*
[0.0007]
0.002**
[0.0007]
0.004***
[0.0009]
0.004***
[0.0009]
ExpMarketSizeSU 0.001
[0.0007]
0.001
[0.0007]
0.003***
[0.0009]
0.003***
[0.0009]
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.002*
[0.0007]
0.002**
[0.0008]
0.003***
[0.0008]
0.003***
[0.0008]
avgGenShare_USD_ 0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.001***
[0.0002]
0.001***
[0.0002]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
[0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010]
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ln_lag_yrs 0.001
[0.0010]
0.001
[0.0010]
0.001
[0.0010]
0.001
[0.0010]
0.001
[0.0010]
0.001
[0.0010]
-0.001
[0.0011]
-0.001
[0.0011]
-0.001
[0.0010]
-0.001
[0.0011]
-0.001
[0.0011]
0
[0.0011]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales 0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0004]
0.000
[0.0004]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.0004]
0.000
[0.0004]
0.000
[0.0003]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.000***
[0.0001]
0.000***
[0.0001]
0.000***
[0.0001]
0.000***
[0.0001]
0.000***
[0.0001]
0.000***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
0.001***
[0.0001]
ln_sequenceSq 0.005***
[0.0006]
0.005***
[0.0006]
0.005***
[0.0005]
0.005***
[0.0006]
0.005***
[0.0006]
0.005***
[0.0006]
0.007***
[0.0006]
0.007***
[0.0006]
0.007***
[0.0006]
0.008***
[0.0006]
0.008***
[0.0006]
0.007***
[0.0006]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies 
Country Dummies 
Calendar Year Dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Model Stats
Number o f Observations 
Log likelihood 
chi2 
p-value
Akaike Info Criteria 
Bayesian Info Criteria
19698
-2083.37
798.35
0.000
4260.73
4631.48
19698
-2086.36
798.11
0.000
4266.72
4637.47
19698
-2083.47
817.25
0.000
4264.94
4651.46
19698
-2082.67
668
0.000
4259.34
4630.09
19698
-2085.94
669.02
0.000
4265.87
4636.62
19698
-2082.87
682.63
0.000
4263.75
4650.28
19698
-2192.41
617.43
0.000
4462.82
4770.46
19698
-2199.68
604.45
0.000
4477.37
4785.01
19698
-2170.06
615.58
0.000
4422.13
4745.55
19698
-2194.79
521.4
0.000
4467.58
4775.23
19698
-2202.22
510.85
0.000
4482.45
4790.09
19698
-2172.71
530.79
0.000
4427.42
4750.84
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Marginal effects (dy/dx) reported. 
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t +  
In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported.
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4.4.1 Robustness Checks
Robustness checks were carried out using the same structure as in the base case 
regression runs. Each model specification was estimated using both parametric and non 
parametric duration dependence (see Table 4.6). The parametric specifications assumed 
a quadratic in months elapsed since the risk onset (/ + li^/2)) and the non-parametric 
specifications included dummies for each month interval following global launch by 
suppressing the constant in the regressions. Based on differences in coefficient 
estimates in preliminary results, all specifications were run with and without calendar 
year dummies, cloglog and logit regressions were estimated to test the significance of 
regulation, expected market size, competition, molecule and firm characteristics by 
using different proxies for each category. All regressions include country and ATC1 
dummies.
Table 4.6 Structure of the Robustness Regressions
Parametric Duration Dependence Non-Parametric Duration Dependence
With Calendar Year 
Dummies
N o Calendar Year 
Dummies
With Calendar Year 
Dummies
N o Calendar Year 
Dummies
C loglog & Logit Cloglog & Logit Cloglog & Logit C loglog & Logit
Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation
Market Size Market Size Market Size Market Size
Competition Competition Competition Competition
M olecule M olecule M olecule M olecule
Firm Firm Firm Firm
4.4.1.1 Regulation
This section tests for the robustness of expected price effects using different proxies for 
the expected generic price and controlling for expected market size, competition, 
molecule and firm effects, lag of the originator molecule, country, ATC1 and calendar 
year effects. The expected generic price is defined as the product of average branded 
price and the median Pg/Pb ratio in the country. In addition, the significance of the 
reference pricing systems (RPS) and generic substitution (GenSubst) is investigated. 
The impact of regulation is estimated using the following variables:
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• log moving average of expected generic prices over the past 4 lags 
(LMAvgExpPg)102,
• lagged log expected generic prices by one quarter (L31n_ExpPg),
• log moving average of branded prices for the launching molecule (L31n_Pb) 
and median generic-branded price ratio (medRatioPgPb),
• log of expected generic prices (ln_ExpPg) and median generic-branded price 
ratio (medRatioPgPb),
• log moving average of expected generic prices over the past 4 lags 
(LMAvgExpPg) and RPS dummies
• log moving average of expected generic prices over the past 4 lags 
(LMAvgExpPg) and generic substitution dummies.
Lagged or moving average prices are used to avoid problems of endogeneity. The 
moving average approach also tests significance of price when short-term fluctuations 
are smoothed out to highlight longer-term trends in price. Estimates are presented in 
Appendix D.2, Section D.2.2.1 (see Table D.7 - Table D.10). Higher expected generic 
prices (average branded price of the molecule times the median generic/branded price 
ratio) significantly increase the hazard effect, regardless of whether lagged expected 
generic price or the moving average is used. Therefore, regulations that drive first 
generic prices down before launch are associated with longer delays. The effect is 
robust across cloglog and logit regressions as well as to the inclusion or exclusion of 
calendar year dummies. Coefficient estimates for expected generic prices are slightly 
higher with parametric duration dependence compared to non-parametric duration 
dependence estimates.
As expected, generic launch hazard is increasing in the log lagged average branded 
price controlling for country heterogeneity by dummies for each market. The positive 
impact of branded prices on generic launch is significant across all specifications. This 
implies that price controls that depress branded prices may have spillover effects in 
terms of slower generic launch. Also, in specifications where calendar year dummies are 
excluded, there is an indication that controlling for expected generic prices, a higher 
Pg / Pb ratio lowers the hazard of launch. This is consistent with the fact that generics
may capture a higher share from branded sales with a lower Pg / Pb ratio which may
102 Moving averages are defined with the weights of 0.4 for the first lag, 0.3 for the second lag, 0.2 
for the third lag and 0.1 for the fourth lag.
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compensate for the reduction in the generic prices. In Model 3 the coefficient for Pg / Pb
is significantly negative controlling for expected generic prices. However, when 
calendar year dummies are included the effect of Pg / Pb is not significant over and
above the effect of average branded prices or expected generic prices.
The impact of reference pricing (RPS) schemes and generic substitution is tested by 
dummies, on top of the effect of expected generic prices. There is significantly robust 
evidence that generic substitution and RPS increase the speed of first generic entry 
when calendar year dummies are excluded. When calendar year dummies are included, 
however, generic substitution significantly increases speed of generic entry only for 
non-parametric duration specifications, even after controlling for non-generic price 
levels of the launching molecule. It should be emphasized that the dummies for RPS 
and generic substitution do not account for the heterogeneity across countries in 
reference pricing and generic substitution schemes.
Generic launch is considered relative to the first generic launch date observed across the 
20 countries and does not consider whether the original molecule has expired in 
individual markets103. However, all regressions control for the delay in the originator 
molecule. Longer delays in the launch of the originator molecules would reduce the 
exclusivity period and reduce the potential for brand loyalty. The literature suggests that 
shorter monopoly periods reduces brand loyalty and increases generic entry. In all 
specifications with calendar year dummies, the higher the lag of the originator molecule 
(i.e. the shorter the exclusivity period), the higher is the hazard of launch for the first 
generic product.
Finally, the interaction of time since global launch and expected generic price was 
tested (see Table D.l l  in Appendix D.2, Section D.2.2.1). Two specifications use the 
lagged expected generic price and two use the moving average price104. Including time 
interaction results in positive estimates for the price effect and price-time interaction; 
however, neither are significant105.
103 If generic launch occurs prior to patent expiry, this could be an indication of launch of an authorized
generic by the originator firm to delay entry of follow-on generic competition, which I cannot control for. 
04 There was no multicollinearity problem with these specifications (VIFs for all variables is less 
than 10)
105 For specifications that exclude calendar year dummies price and price-time interactions are 
significant at the 0.07-0.09 level. If calendar year dummies are included p-value for the expected 
price ise 0.13
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4.4.1.2 Potential Market Size
This section tests for the robustness of market size effects (in USDS and SUs) 
controlling for expected generic price, competition, molecule and firm effects, lag of the 
originator molecule, country, ATC1 and calendar year effects. Potential market size 
estimates are based on quarterly molecule sales and the percentage of shares captured 
by the generics. The following proxies were used to estimate the robustness of the 
impact of potential market size (see Appendix D.2, Section D.2.2.2, Table D.12 - Table 
D.15):
• Expected generic market size (in USDS) for the Molecule (ExpMarketSizeUSD): 
defined as the product of molecule sales in USDS and the average generic share over 
molecules in the country,
• Expected generic market size (in SU) for the Molecule (ExpMarketSizeSU): defined 
as the product of molecule sales in SU and the average generic share over molecules 
in the country.
Weaker proxies that ignore generic shares include:
• Log Moving Average of Molecule sales (in USDS) in the country 
(LMAvg_USD_molCtr_J: defined over the past 4 quarters with decreasing weights 
for older quarters 106,
• Log Moving Average of Molecule sales (in SU) in the country 
(LMAvg_SU_molCtr_): defined over the past 4 quarters, with the weights being 
0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 respectively from the first lag to the fourth lag,
• Log Lagged Molecule Sales in (USD $) in the country 
(L3 ln_U SD_moleculeCtry_i),
• Log Lagged Molecule Sales in (SU) in the country (L31n_SU_moleculeCtry_i).
Expected generic market size in USDS is significant across all specifications and robust 
to the inclusion or exclusion of calendar year dummies. Expected generic market size in 
SUs increases hazard of launch but is significant when calendar year dummies are 
excluded. Significance level of market size is higher in non-parametric models (0.01 
compared to 0.05 in the parametric specifications).
106 Weights are 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1 respectively.
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4.4.1.3 Competition
This section tests for the robustness of the impact of market structure and competition 
on the timing of generic launch controlling for expected generic price, expected generic 
market size, molecule and firm effects, lag of the originator molecule, country, ATC1 
and calendar year effects. Market structure is captured through the number of firms 
(NumGenFirmMed) and squared number of firms (firmSqMed) in the country, both 
divided by the median values to get meaningful standard errors. Competition at the 
therapeutic category level is controlled for by the number of substitute molecules in the 
ATC4 category (NumbMolCtryAtc4_107) and the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index for generic firms by ATC4-country and quarter (see Appendix D.2, Section 
D.2.2.3, Table D.16 - Table D.19).
Concentration ratio has the most robust and significant effect across different 
specifications. Regardless of whether regressions are estimated by cloglog or logit, 
parametrically or non-parametrically, the effect of concentration in the ATC4 is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The higher the concentration of generic firms in the 
therapeutic category, the higher the hazard of generic launch. This is contrary to the 
findings in the previous chapter where concentration coefficient had a negative 
coefficient. Strong generic competition at the therapeutic level, therefore, seems to be a 
barrier to entry for the follow-on generic products.
The effect of the number of substitute molecules in the therapeutic category is not 
significant and not robust across specifications. This indicates that inter-molecular 
competition within a therapeutic subgroup is not a significant determinant of generic 
entry decisions. The effect on the launch hazard is positive with calendar year dummies 
and negative without calendar year dummies, both for parametric and non-parametric 
specifications.
Similarly, the effect of the number of generic manufacturers in the market depends on 
whether calendar dummies are included. With calendar year dummies added, the higher 
the number of competitors, the lower is the hazard rate, i.e. the higher the potential 
generic competition, the slower is the international diffusion of generics. This can be 
explained by the fact that the incentives for entry are reduced as potential competition 
increases. The coefficient of the squared number of firms is negative in all 
specifications (and significant in models where calendar dummies are excluded), which
107 NumbMolCtryRETAtc4_ tests for the number of molecules in atc4 in the retail sector only
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suggests a concave relationship between the hazard of first generic launch and the 
number of potential competitors.
4.4.1.4 Molecule Heterogeneity
The robustness of molecule effects is tested by controlling for expected generic prices, 
expected market size, competition and firm effects. Proxies that capture molecule 
heterogeneity include:
• Global reach of the molecule (MolGlobalReach), i.e. the number of countries in 
which the molecule has launched,
• Annual sales (USD$) of the molecule in each country (ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_),
• Median sales (USDS) of the molecule during 1999 Q1 -  2008 Q3 in each country 
(ln_MolGlobalU SD Annual_),
• Log years of delay for the originator to enter the local market following the global 
launch of the new molecule,
• Percentage of molecule sales in the retail sector (PercRetailUSD_).
Estimates for the global reach of the molecule are negative in all specifications, but are 
not statistically significant (see Appendix D.2, Section D.2.2.4, Table D.20 - Table 
D.24). Similarly, the coefficient of annual sales of the molecule is negative in 
parametric specifications and positive in non-parametric specifications. The effect of 
global molecule sales is not significant in either of the specifications. The coefficient of 
the median molecule sales is negative across different specifications too (except for 
non-parametric estimates with calendar year dummies). These estimates overall suggest 
that for decisions regarding generic entry the impact of molecule’s importance is not 
statistically significant after accounting for expected price and market size effects. Local 
sales (expected market size), on the other hand, is significantly important. The fact that 
global sales of the molecule are not a significant determinant of hazard of generic 
launch suggests that local effects are more important in generic launch decisions in 
contrast to the estimates in Chapter 3 where global molecule sales were highly 
significant.
Finally, this section controls for the impact of the percentage retail sales for each 
molecule. This variable aims to control partially for the purchasing power of the 
demand side. Hospital purchases are usually determined by tendering with a high 
concentration among purchase groups. For example, hospitals and trusts in the UK
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group together to negotiate price reductions with suppliers108. In addition, hospital 
prescriptions may be governed by formularies that restrict presentations of drugs to be 
selected within a therapeutic category in order to achieve bulk discounts. In general, 
prices in the hospital sector are lower compared to the retail sector because brand 
recognition is usually weak; single-providers are preferred for multi-source products, 
and cost is the main driver in contract tenders / bidding process109.
Table D.24 in AppendixD.2, Section D.2.2.4 presents the robustness check with respect 
to percentage of molecule sales in the retail sector (this variable is defined quarterly as 
the percentage of retail sales in total sales of individual molecules for markets that have 
both retail and hospital sales in the database). A significant number of observations are 
lost because some countries have only retail channel data (Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
Sweden, South Africa and Turkey) or the combined sales for retail and hospital sectors 
(Sweden). For the US, retail sales are assumed to be composed of food stores, 
drugstores and mail sales. The overall evidence suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between share of retail sales and the hazard of first generic launch.
For parametric time duration specifications, the coefficient of percent retail sales is 
usually positive but not significant. On the other hand, for non-parametric estimates, the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for cloglog and 0.01 for logit. 
These findings are in line with the findings of Magazzini (2004) who observes that the 
size of the hospital sector has a negative impact on generic market share in USA, UK, 
Germany, and France, in contrast to findings of Scott Morton (2000) which suggest a 
positive relationship between the share of hospital sales and the entry of generic 
products.
4.4.1.5 Firm Characteristics
The robustness of firm effects is tested by controlling for expected generic prices, 
expected market size, competition and molecule effects. Proxies that capture firm 
heterogeneity include:
• Log local sales of the corporation (USD$) quarterly (InLocalCorpSales),
108 The NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) coordinates the tendering process. The supplier 
with a competitive tender (i.e. competitive prices) is selected to supply a given product at the 
specified price whenever it receives an order from one of the hospital trusts taking part in the 
tendering process
109 http://www.publications.doh.gov.uk/generics/oxera report a6.htm
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• Log global sales of the corporation (USDS) quarterly (ln_globalFirmSales),
• Global reach of the corporation, i.e. the number of geographical markets in which 
the firm has sales (CorpGlobalReach),
• Firm’s molecule diversity which is measured as the number of molecules quarterly 
(FirmMolDivAtT_).
As in the case for molecule heterogeneity, firm effects show no robust significant 
effects across different specifications (see Appendix D.2, Section D.2.2.4, Table D.25 - 
Table D.28). Both for parametric and non-parametric specifications, local and global 
firm sales have a positive effect on the hazard of launch if calendar year dummies are 
excluded. When calendar year dummies are included firm sales have a negative 
coefficient. However, firm sales coefficients are not significant. Only the parametric 
specification with no calendar year dummies yields positive coefficient estimates for 
local firm sales.
The coefficient of firm’s number of molecules is small but is robustly positive across 
different specifications, and significant for parametric specification with no calendar 
year dummies. Global reach of the corporation, i.e. the number of geographical markets 
in which the firm has sales, has positive coefficient estimate in 6 out of 8 different 
specifications; however, the effect is not significant.
These findings are in stark contrast to the findings regarding the firm effects in the 
launch of new molecules. For new molecules, speed of international launch depends 
significantly on firm size and economies of scope, whereas for generic launch 
international reach of the firm carries less importance (estimates are positive but not 
significant). Local firm sales seem to be better proxies compared to global firm sales in 
predicting the launch hazard for generic launch, which suggests generic launch 
strategies are more locally oriented compared to new molecules. This could be due to 
the fact that historically generic firms have been more locally oriented but generic 
companies are becoming increasingly global and growing through mergers to decrease 
their cost base. The significant importance of local firm sales may also indicate 
advantages in the tendering or price negotiation procedures with bulk purchasers such as 
hospitals.
A summary table for the main robustness checks and a comparison of the expected and 
estimated coefficient signs is presented in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7 Comparison o f Expected and Estimated Signs o f the Coefficients for the hazard o f  first generic launch
Factor Testable Hypotheses Evidence from  the Literature Expected Sign o f the Coefficient
Estimated Sign o f  
the Coefficient
Regulation
HI a.l: High expected generic prices increase 
the hazard rate (decrease launch lag) for 
generic products
No direct 
empirical 
evidence
+ Price Coefficient 
(Higher generic prices, controlling for other 
factors, increase expected revenue and 
profitability for generic manufacturers)
+
HI a.2: Higher branded prices increase the 
hazard of launch of generic products
Evidence exists
+ Pb Coefficient 
(generic prices may be directly linked to 
branded prices; markets with higher prices 
tend to have higher generic prices)
+
HI a.3: Generic-branded price ratio Pg/Pb 
negatively affects hazard of launch.
No evidence on 
timing of 
generic entry
- Pg/Pb Coefficient 
(Keeping branded price fixed, lower generic 
prices allow generics to capture a higher 
volume share)
-
Market Size
HI b.l: The higher the branded molecule 
sales prior to generic launch (in $ or SU), the 
higher the hazard of launch
Empirical 
evidence exists 
for $ sales of 
branded 
products
+ Market Size Coefficient 
(Both the sign of SU and USD sales are 
expected to be positive)
+
HI b.2: The higher the expected generic 
market size (= branded molecule sales * the 
average generic share in the local market), the 
higher the hazard of launch
No direct 
empirical 
evidence
+ Expected Market Size Coefficient 
(Market size increases incentives for entry 
as the net present value of entry is increased 
)
+
Competition 
& Market 
Structure
HI c.l: A higher number of expected generic 
competitors decreases the hazard of entry
No evidence
- Coefficient for number of competitor 
firms
(Theoretically I have shown that number of 
generic entrants has a negative impact on 
expected profits)
- (concave 
relationship); effect 
not robustly 
significant
202
HI c.2: The higher the number of substitute 
molecules in the therapeutic class, the lower is 
the hazard rate
No evidence
- Coefficient for Substitute Molecules 
(Either reference pricing or competition will 
drive prices and potential profits down)
+ ; effect not 
significant
HI c.3: The higher the Herfindahl 
concentration index of generic manufacturers 
at the therapeutic class level, the lower the 
hazard rate
No evidence
- Concentration Coefficient 
(in Chapter 3 concentration in on-patent 
sector had a negative coefficient estimate. 
Industrial organization literature predicts 
that concentration reduces the equilibrium 
level of entry)
+
H ld .l: Generic entry for 
therapeutically/commercially important 
molecules is faster (higher branded prices and 
higher profit potentials)
No evidence
+ Coefficient for Molecule’s Global Reach - but not significant
+ Coefficient for Molecule’s Global Sales No robust evidence
Molecule
Hld.2: The longer the lag for the entry of the 
originator molecule, the faster the generic 
entry
No evidence
+ Coefficient for the Lag of the Originator 
(longer lags imply shorter exclusivity and 
lower brand loyalty)
+ across models; 
not significant
HI d.3: Percentage of molecule sales in the 
retail sector increases hazard of launch
Contradictory
?
(prices in the hospital sector tend to lower 
than in the retail sector but volume effect 
could dominate)
+; significant for 
non-parametric 
models
Firm
HI e.l: Firm economies of scope (number of 
molecules in the portfolio) increase the 
hazard of launch
Evidence exists
+ Economies of Scope Coefficient 
(Economies of scope allow lower-cost entry 
as the firm can switch quickly and less 
costly from one product line to another. 
Also, knowledge spillovers across different 
product lines may further lower 
development and entry costs)
+ and significant
HI e.2: Firms’ scale has positive effect on the 
hazard of launch.
Evidence from + Coefficient for Firm’s Global/Local Sales 
(Scale effects are expected to be less
+ for local; no 
robust evidence for
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the branded 
sector; No firm 
empirical 
evidence exists 
for the generic 
sector
important than in on-patent sector due to 
lower R&D and advertising costs. But scale 
economies may allow vertical integration in 
the supply chain and mergers with other 
firms to decrease costs)
global sales
+ Coefficient for Firm’s Global Reach 
A wider global reach indicates potentially 
bigger firm size and higher familiarity with 
diverse regulatory environments
+ but not 
significant
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4.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter aimed to investigate how regulation affects the relative adoption 
speed of first generic products across the main OECD markets during 1999-2008 
controlling for expected market size, competition, molecule and firm 
characteristics. Consistent with hypothesis HI a.l (High expected generic prices 
increase the hazard of generic adoption), expected generic prices increase the 
hazard of first generic launch across OECD markets, with higher priced markets 
adopting generic products quicker. This is consistent with the trade off between 
static efficiency and dynamic efficiency, or cost cutting competition and 
innovation. Controlling for branded prices, a higher price differential between 
generic and branded prices increases hazard of launch, which is consistent with 
hypotheses HI a.3 (Generic-branded price ratio Pg/Pb negatively affects hazard of 
launch.). Second, consistent with hypotheses HI b.l (The higher the branded 
molecule sales prior to generic launch (in $ or SU), the higher the hazard of 
launch) and HI b.2 (The higher the expected generic market size, the higher the 
hazard of launch), empirical findings suggest that expected generic market size (in 
USD$) is a significant determinant of launch, controlling for price, competition, 
firm and molecule characteristics.
Competition plays a significant role in the adoption of first generic products. The 
higher the concentration of generic manufacturers in the ATC4 in each country, 
the higher is the hazard of launch, which contradicts hypothesis HI c.3 (The 
higher the Herfindahl concentration index of generic manufacturers at the 
therapeutic class level, the lower the hazard rate). This implies that if the generic 
sector is highly fragmented at the therapeutic level, then incentives for entry are 
reduced. This is in contrast to the findings for new molecules, where competition 
at the therapeutic level was found to increase the entry of patent-protected new 
molecules (see Chapter 3). Generics are commodity products with little room for 
differentiation and compete solely on price. Consistent with hypothesis HI c.l (A 
higher number of expected generic competitors decreases the hazard of entry), a 
fragmented generic market with a higher (potential) number of generic 
manufacturers depresses generic prices, profitability and incentives for launch. On 
the other hand, molecules in the branded sector compete based on quality, 
product-differentiation and brand loyalty built through advertising. New
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molecules in a given therapeutic category are usually improved versions of older 
molecules, with fewer side effects, and hence, can capture market share from 
already existing molecules.
Another difference in determinants of first launch for branded and generic 
products is the impact of the number of molecules in the therapeutic category. 
Number of molecules for the branded sector increases the hazard of launch for 
branded products significantly (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.2). However, the 
number of substitute molecules in the ATC4 therapeutic group is not statistically 
significant in generic launch timing decisions after controlling for expected 
generic price and market size, which neither confirms nor refutes hypothesis HI 
c.2 (The higher the number of substitute molecules in the therapeutic class, the 
lower is the hazard rate). This result can be explained by the fact that existing 
molecules are not exact substitutes for the launching generic. Substitute molecules 
in the therapeutic subgroup, however, can affect generic viability directly if 
reference groups are defined at the therapeutic sublevel. Regulators tend to favour 
groups defined by active ingredients and chemically related active substances that 
are pharmacologically equivalent; the concern being that therapeutic referencing 
may lead to the prescription of less effective medicines within the therapeutic 
group if this allows the patient to avoid co-payments (Simoens and de Coster 
2006).
Overall, logit and cloglog parameter estimates are very close. Also, AIC and BIC 
are very close for cloglog and logit specifications; the logit specification is 
marginally better based on the AIC and BIC but the difference is not significant. 
In general, parametric specification results have significantly lower AIC and BIC 
compared to the non-parametric specification both in cloglog and logit 
specifications. This might be due to the fact that the parametric specification is 
much more parsimonious compared to the non-parameteric specification that can 
include up to 117 dummies for monthly intervals. Also severe multicollinearity 
was observed for the number of generic firms in the country (proxy for 
competition) and calendar year dummies. However, multicollinearity was 
resolved by using the concentration index for generic firms at the therapeutic 
subgroup level.
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The most unexpected finding in this chapter is that molecule or firm 
characteristics do not have a robust effect across different specifications. 
Consistent with hypothesis HI e.2 that firm scale has positive effect on the hazard 
of launch, local firm sales are more significant in predicting hazard of launch 
compared to global firm sales, controlling for expected generic price, market size 
and competition. Competitive advantage in the generic business is based on either 
a low-cost base or differentiation in forms that are difficult to manufacture and 
market (Gorka 2009). Global players would normally be expected to have a 
higher ability in overcoming the barriers to entry and launching quicker on 
average; however, the empirical evidence indicates that local presence of the firm 
is more significant in timing of generic launch decisions. This result, however, 
may change in the near future as the generic firms become more globalized and 
grow through mergers and acquisitions. In addition, firms’ portfolio diversity 
(number of molecules) suggests that there are economies of scope which can be 
shared across different molecules. Consistent with hypothesis HI e.l that firm 
economies of scope increase the hazard of launch, firms with a higher number of 
molecules on average have quicker generic launch.
The most significant findings regarding heterogeneity in molecules are the 
impacts of the originator product launch delays and percentage of molecule sales 
in the retail sector versus the hospital sector. Consistent with hypothesis HI d.2 
(the longer the lag for the entry of the originator molecule, the faster the generic 
entry), the delay of the originator product relative to the global launch date of the 
molecule increases the relative delay in the timing of generic availability in 
models with calendar year dummies.
In markets where data is broken down by hospital versus retail sales, the hazard of 
first generic launch increases with higher percentage retail sales. This is 
potentially explained by the fact that prices in the hospital sector are lower 
compared to the retail sector due to predominant use of tendering contracts for the 
purchase of medicinal products. Hospitals prefer single-providers for multi-source 
products, and cost is the main driver in the bidding process. By restricting 
presentations of drugs to be selected within a therapeutic category hospitals may 
negotiate substantial price reductions off the list price of medicines. Given the 
increasing use of tendering procedures in ambulatory care (Dylst and Simoens
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2010), this finding suggests that incentives for generic entry and extent of generic 
competition might be further reduced.
Generic entry has profound implications on the competitive landscape and the 
average price levels of the originator as well as the sales volume of the originator. 
Moreover, generics affect prices of other molecules within the same therapeutic 
category through competition or reference pricing systems. Generics increase 
access to drugs by the reduction in branded product prices. According to Simoens 
and de Coster (2006) increased generic substitution in 2004 would be expected to 
reduce public expenditure on originator medicines by at least 20% in the main 
European countries (Simoens and de Coster 2006). DG Competition estimates that 
average prices dropped by 20% after the first year and 25% after 2 years, and that 
immediate generic entry following patent expiration would offer 20% savings on 
expenditures110.
Given the potential savings offered by generics to public health systems, 
improving access to generics and reducing delays for existing treatments is highly 
important from a public health policy perspective. Many pharmaceutical markets 
such as France, Spain, Italy and Japan all have very low volume penetration rates 
in the off-patent sector, less than 20% vs. over 70% in the US, which suggests 
there is a great potential for generic growth in these markets (European Generic 
Medicines Association 2007b; Gorka 2009). Empirical evidence in this chapter 
demonstrated that the impact of expected generic prices and market size on timing 
of generic entry decisions is statistically significant. Furthermore, demand-side 
measures such as generic substitution aimed at promoting generic utilization is 
effective in reducing international differentials in the adoption of first generics.
Limitations
The main limitation in this study is that the hazard of generic availability is 
estimated with respect to the first generic availability in the global market. 
Ideally, the delay should be defined relative to the country-dependent patent 
expiry or SPC protection expiry dates. Availability of patent expiry dates would 
enable to characterize the monopoly period during which the originator develops 
brand loyalty. However, the relative delay of the originator molecule in each
110 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/fact_sheet_l .pdf
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market is used as a control to account for the reduced exclusivity period in each 
market.
In addition, the study is not able to quantify the delays due to price approval 
procedures within price-controlled markets. Following market authorization in the 
majority of European markets generic products face additional delays due to 
pricing and reimbursement approval except for free-priced markets such as UK, 
US, Germany, and Netherlands. Although the Transparency Directive 
89/105/EEC has set a 90-day limit for both pricing and reimbursement decisions, 
in practice delays have been shown to exceed these limits substantially (European 
Generic Medicines Association 2007a; Simoens 2008). Due to unavailability of 
protection expiry dates and pricing and reimbursement approval dates these 
delays could not be quantified in this study.
This study does not account for potential cases where the first generic is an 
authorized generic, i.e. a generic medicine marketed by the originator company 
(either directly or via a license to a generic manufacturer) but sold under a generic 
name for a lower price. Authorized generics may reduce the incentives to entry 
for other generic manufacturers by entering before or at the time of patent expiry 
(Peny and Covilard 2007). Authorized generics have been suggested as a 
potentially significant cause of delay both in the US and most recently in Europe 
by the DG competition (2009). In the US, authorized generics may dissipate the 
first mover advantage that grants 180-day market exclusivity provisions to the 
first generic entrant111,112. Finally, this study does not account for the 
heterogeneity in Europe’s local legislations regarding the current patent and 
registration systems. Patent validity and infringement issues are governed by 
national laws and handled by different rules in each country, which increases 
financial costs as well as time burden on the generic manufacturers within Europe.
1,1 In 2003, the Gregg-Shumer Act included forfeiture provisions that result in the generics company 
losing its exclusivity if the generic company is found to have made an agreement with the originator 
not to launch or to take product from the originator.
117 A recent US legislation (Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009) has been 
proposed to ban anticompetitive settlements of patent infringement litigations. Most commonly such 
agreements involve payments (also known as reverse payments) made by branded manufacturers to 
generic companies in return for a commitment to delay the entry of generics extend the market 
exclusivity for high-priced brands and defer legitimate competition from generics
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Future Research
Additional data on the expiry dates of exclusivity protection, pricing and 
reimbursement approval and whether the first generic is an authorized generic 
would allow quantifying the magnitude of delays due to pricing or reimbursement 
in individual markets. From a policy perspective promotion of both timely entry 
and rapid take-up are important. This study considers time to the first generic 
entry only. A natural extension would be to consider the extent of entry and 
generic diffusion across different markets conditional on the number of existing 
competitors. Usually, the first generic entrant has asymmetric costs with respect to 
the following entrants because of the patent litigation cases that have to be 
overcome. This suggests differential barriers to entry with respect to first and later 
generic entrants. Also, first entrant mainly competes against the originator 
whereas price competition intensifies as more and more follow-on manufacturers 
enter the market. There are only few studies that model the intensity of generic 
entry and uptake in markets outside North America.
Finally, this chapter has focused on investigating mainly the impact of supply-side 
measures through expected generic prices and reference price system dummies. 
On the demand-side only the availability of generic substitution option to the 
pharmacist has been included as a dummy variable. The analysis could be further 
extended to assess the impact of other demand-side measures such as physician 
incentives and patient co-payments. Co-payments are important as they determine 
patients’ price sensitivity and the demand for generic medicines in the context of a 
reference pricing system. Although in most European countries the patient’s 
contribution to the cost of pharmaceuticals is limited, it would be interesting to 
investigate how risk-sharing through co-payments affect incentives to generic 
entry and timing of generic availability.
An area which is gaining importance and attention is the upcoming patent expiries 
of biopharmaceutical patents; patents of most current biologies are expected to 
expire during 2010-2024113. Biosimilars, generic versions of molecules produced 
by biotechnological means, are expected to offer new opportunities for the growth
113 Regulatory developments facilitating follow-on biologies (biosimilars) are already on the way.
Europe adopted a legislative framework for biosimilars in 2004 and the US has introduced new bills
on biosimilars to the US Congress in 2009.
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of the generic industry. Biologies constitute some of the most-expensive 
medicines and are therefore major targets for potential cost containment114. The 
analytical framework in this chapter can be extended to analyze the entry of 
biosimilar products to inform policy makers about the nature of the hazard of 
launch of follow-on biologies.
Contribution
The main contribution of this chapter is that timing of first generic entry has been 
analyzed for the first time using a multi-country perspective controlling for 
expected generic prices and market size, competitive environment, firm and 
molecule heterogeneity. IMS price and volume data used in this analysis is one of 
the most reliable data source both in the industry and academic research. The 
analysis period comprises the last two decades (1999-2008) and therefore has 
immediate policy implications. The panel data structure exploits variation both 
over time and over country-molecule pairs in regressions. Although I have aimed 
to minimize issues of endogeneity by using lagged or moving average prices, the 
analysis could be extended to endogenize price and entry.
1,4 According to the Federal Trade Commission, Remitade used to treat rheumatoid arthritis costs 
$20,000; Avastin used to treat lung cancer costs $100,000 and Cerezyme used to treat Gaucher 
disease costs $300,000 per patient-year (Jorge 2010)
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CH APTER 5
5 CO NCLUSIO N
5.1 Introduction
New technologies contribute to economic growth because of their superior competitive 
advantage generating more efficient production processes. Healthcare technology and 
technological innovation play a key role in the delivery of health services and are main 
drivers of optimal health outcomes (OECD 2005b). Health technologies include 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, diagnostic agents, surgical procedures and 
organizational systems that provide health care. Policy-makers face the need to develop 
policy instruments that promote timely adoption and optimum level of technology 
diffusion ensuring that new technologies adopted are cost-effective and consumers have 
an equitable access to these technologies. This thesis has explored the cross-country 
adoption of pharmaceutical technologies in the health care sector within the OECD 
during 1999-2008 focusing on the impact of price regulations.
The thesis adopted a cross-country perspective because most theories and empirical 
evidence on technology adoption and diffusion so far have been in a single geographical 
market setting (Stoneman 2002). According to Stoneman (2002), there are “no 
modelling frameworks to reflect or even stand up against the models provided for 
analysing diffusion within firms, industries or economies”. The lack of theory and 
empirical evidence on the international adoption and diffusion of technology to inform 
policy-making on how and why technologies spread from country to country and lack of 
empirical evidence on the impact of regulation on cross-country technology adoption 
formed the main motivation for the research carried out in this thesis. The thesis offers a 
major empirical contribution to our understanding of drivers of pharmaceutical 
technology adoption in the healthcare sector.
Pharmaceutical technologies considered in the thesis include: i) new innovative 
molecules that offer improved benefits over existing alternative treatments or address 
unmet medical needs; and ii) generic imitative technologies that offer the same 
therapeutic benefits as the originator products at lower prices. The static-dyanmic 
efficiency trade-off has been a key challenge for pharmaceutical policy makers. The 
sustainability of the pharmaceutical sector depends on balanced interplay between on-
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patent products that improve health outcomes but are usually cost-increasing 
technologies and cost-saving off-patent technologies that create incentives for future 
innovations through fierce price competition. The adoption of these complementary 
technologies was analyzed using the first launch date of products with the same active 
ingredient as the adoption date of the technology. The scope was limited to adoption 
only and diffusion, i.e. the differential intensity of new pharmaceutical molecule or 
generic drug use in individual markets, was not analyzed. The thesis offers a significant 
contribution to the literature by empirically analyzing the impact of expected prices, the 
main proxy of price regulation, on the probability of launch for potentially global new 
molecules and first generic competition controlling for market structure, competition, 
and firm and molecule heterogeneity.
Launch delays in the adoption of new breakthrough or cost-effective technologies have 
significant equity, efficiency, and health outcomes implications. Development of new 
drugs has been proposed as a more cost-effective way of improving population health 
and increasing life expectancy (Lichtenberg 2004; Grootendorst, Pierard et al. 2009). 
Delays in launch or non-launch of new medicines, therefore, have clear negative 
implications both on dynamic efficiency and public health outcomes. On the one hand, 
new drug products are granted market power through patents to allow appropriability of 
R&D investments and ensure the sustainability of future innovations. On the other hand, 
above marginal cost pricing results in allocative inefficiencies (Motta 2004). Policy 
makers are under increasing pressure to contain rising pharmaceutical expenditures and 
reduce budget deficits. In the majority of the OECD markets, price controls are in place 
to correct market failures by putting limits on new medicine prices or on the amount 
reimbursed by public payers. Together with significant generic promotion strategies 
undertaken across the OECD to create low-price competition post-patent expiry, pricing 
pressures have increased for generics as well (Schulz 2004).
The trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency has become even more severe with 
the rising drug development and market access costs coupled with the advent of the 
economic and financial crisis in the past few years. The picture gets even more 
complicated when the second dimension of social welfare, equity in access to health 
improving technologies, is considered. Policy makers in all OECD countries show 
concern for distributional justice, i.e. equity of access to health care, albeit with varying 
degrees in individual markets. Equity in health has widely been defined as the absence 
of systematic disparities in health (or in the major social determinants of health)
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between groups with different levels of underlying social advantage/disadvantage115. 
Equity in health is also closely related to the right to health stated in the WHO 
Constitution and international human rights treaties (Braveman and Gruskin 2003).
Differences in the likelihood of receiving appropriate treatment for a disease within a 
given country or across different markets causes concern from an equity perspective. 
Delayed adoption of new breakthrough drugs could lead to compromises in heath 
outcomes and disparities in health compared to populations that have significantly faster 
access to these technologies. Timely adoption of cost-effective technologies such as 
generic pharmaceuticals increases the affordability of drugs. Given that equity of access 
to healthcare implies access to healthcare based on need rather than ability to pay, 
prompt generic adoption will improve the access to pharmaceutical technologies for the 
socially less well-off individuals in the society.
How adoption of new technologies changes with respect to different regulatory schemes 
has been a question open to empirical scrutiny in many sectors. This question, however, 
is highly relevant for the pharmaceutical sector as it is one of the most heavily regulated 
industries and one that thrives on innovation and sustainability of R&D investments. 
The complexity of regulatory systems and changing dynamics in prices and across 
therapeutic groups in individual countries makes a normative analysis extremely 
challenging. Therefore, positive empirical evidence carries an important role in 
informing policy making. There is a lack of empirical evidence in the literature that uses 
product specific price and volume information to control for the net effect of regulation 
on the hazard of launch, mainly due to the difficulty in obtaining such data. The paucity 
of the evidence in the off-patent sector, in particular, is striking and has recently 
received increasing attention from the competition authorities in the US and EU as the 
importance of this sector continues to increase with the expected expiries in the near 
future, including the expiries of biotechnology products that tend to be highly priced.
This chapter will summarize the conclusions and findings from each chapter in Section 
5.2; highlight the contributions to the literature in Section 5.3; discuss policy 
implications in Section 5.4; acknowledge limitations and suggest future research areas 
in Section 5.5.
115 Discussion on the main theories of equity can be found in Pereira (1993); Olsen (1997); Sassi, 
Archard et al. (2001).
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5.2 Conclusions from Each Chapter
Chapter 1 introduced the motivation of the thesis and the research hypotheses to be 
tested in individual empirical chapters. Chapter 1 also provided an overview of 
economics of regulation in the pharmaceutical industry and outlined the main types of 
pricing and reimbursement schemes in the US-EU5.
Chapter 2 explored the nature of drug delays for new molecules and generics both 
across the main OECD markets and over time from 1960 to 2008 to set the motivation 
for the following empirical chapters. The analysis period was broken down into three 
sub-periods (1960-1984; 1984-1995; 1995-2008), with the cut-off dates defined by the 
US Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 and the establishment of the European Medicines 
Agency in 1995. IMS local and global launch dates were used to estimate mean (and 
median) survival times for each market during these three periods by non-parametric 
survival analysis (Kaplan-Meier estimates). In addition, the impact of these regulatory 
changes was assessed by random and fixed effects Cox proportional hazard model and 
difference-in-differences analysis.
Chapter 2 found that stringent market authorization requirements for new 
pharmaceutical products in the US after 1962 resulted in a significant US drug lag in the 
introduction of pharmaceutical innovation vis-a-vis Europe during 1960-1984. 
However, financial incentives of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act proved effective in 
closing this lag. Over decades, a considerable increase in speed of market access is 
observed following the global launch of molecules. This evidence was robustly 
consistent with the view that adoption of pharmaceutical products is responsive to 
changes in the regulatory environment.
Reduction in legal transaction costs due to harmonization in marketing authorization 
requirements has been effective in reducing relative delays across countries. In addition, 
a more streamlined central approval procedure by EMEA has reduced differentials in 
new pharmaceutical technology adoption in a fragmented European market enabling 
more even access to new molecules. However, a pattern of delay still exists due to 
country-specific differences in pricing and reimbursement regulations following 
marketing authorization. The evidence suggested that new molecule launch strategically 
takes place first in higher-priced EU markets because of threat of arbitrage and price 
dependency across the member states. Finally, Chapter 2 concluded that markets with
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more aggressive pricing controls face temporal disadvantage in access to cost-saving 
generic products relative to the market of first generic launch.
Chapter 3 investigated the impact of various factors on cross-national roll-out speed for 
new pharmaceutical innovations that address existing unmet medical needs through the 
introduction of either first-in-class molecules or molecules with an improved quality 
profile over existing alternatives in the market. Chapter 3 used semi-parametric and 
parametric discrete-time survival analysis methods to incorporate the impact of 
regulatory (structural) and strategic barriers to market entry (regulation, market, firm 
and molecule characteristics) on the time to local launch. IMS data on local launch dates 
of new molecules were used to define the survival period for molecule-country pairs 
relative to the first global launch date. Lagged competitor prices in the same therapeutic 
subgroup were chosen as the main proxy for regulation. Cox regressions and discrete 
time survival analysis using complementary log log regressions were carried out for 
molecules that have launched globally (in at least 10 markets) to avoid bias resulting 
from locally-oriented molecules and increase the generalizability of the results, which 
has been the main criticism directed at previous studies in the literature.
Chapter 3 found that expected prices and market size significantly increases the hazard 
of launch of global molecules. Pharmaceutical corporations optimize launch sequences 
globally to optimize profits by delaying the launch of innovative molecules in markets 
with lower prices and/or lower market size. Higher molecule concentration at the 
therapeutic subgroup discourages fast adoption as the industrial organization literature 
predicts. This fortifies the impact of low prices on competition. Lower potential profits 
result in fewer entrants, which in turn results in higher concentration at the therapeutic 
subgroup, further decreasing the incentives for entry. Among factors that shape the 
external firm environment, expected prices emerged as the most significant factor. This 
is expected for new molecules because prices not only affect local profit potentials but 
also have knock-on effects in foreign markets through external referencing and parallel 
trade.
Chapter 3 found significant firm and molecule effects on the probability of launch in 
markets following first global launch. Firms with a more established local presence 
have advantages in timing of launch, which could be due to negotiation power in the 
pricing and reimbursement approval. Similarly, firms with a wider global reach and 
firms of a larger size (higher global sales and number of molecules) access markets
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faster compared to smaller firms. This suggests significant advantages due to economies 
of scale and scope in distributing R&D costs and knowledge across more markets and 
product pipelines to overcome fixed costs of entry. Similarly, therapeutically more 
important molecules, of wider global diffusion, have higher hazard rates and diffuse 
across international markets faster.
Chapter 4 focused on differentials in adoption of first generics, imitative competition 
that offer healthcare providers and payers an effective tool for containing 
pharmaceutical expenditures without jeopardizing health outcomes. The main research 
question addressed was how pricing and reimbursement regulations affect timing of first 
generic launch across the major OECD markets during 1999-2008. The motivation for 
this chapter stems from the increasing focus on genericization as a cost-effective tool to 
cut expenses for bioequivalent treatments that are more expensive while freeing up 
resources for payers to afford more innovative treatments directed at unmet medical 
needs. Chapter 4 estimated the impacts of various cofactors (regulation, market, firm 
and molecule characteristics) on the hazard of the first generic launch for each 
molecule-country pair following the first generic global adoption.
Regulation is mainly captured by lagged expected generic prices defined as the product 
of lagged average retail branded prices and the median generic-branded price ratio in 
the destination market. This approach offers a more refined approximation compared to 
controlling regulation exclusively by treatment dummies for regulation. Based on the 
outcomes in Chapter 3 and the grouped nature of survival times in the IMS database, the 
survival analysis was carried out with discrete time implementation of the proportional 
hazard model using complementary log log regression. Proportional odds model using 
logistic regressions were carried out for robustness checks and to control for potential 
violations of the proportional hazard assumption. Parametric and non-parametric 
duration dependence specifications were estimated both for cloglog and logistic 
regressions to capture patterns in coefficient estimates. Estimates were obtained for 
generic molecules that launched first after the establishment of a single European 
market in 1993 and that launched both in the US and UK to exclude generics launched 
exclusively in one market.
The most significant and robust finding of Chapter 4 is the highly significant positive 
effect of expected generic prices and expected market size on the hazard of first generic 
launch. Controlling for branded prices, a wider difference in branded and generic prices
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favours quicker launch as this offers generics to capture a higher market share. Increase 
in expected market size by one standard unit for generics was associated with a higher 
increase in the hazard of launch compared to an increase of one-standard unit in 
expected prices, which confirms the importance of capturing a significant volume for 
the viability of the generic market. Extent of potential generic competition was found to 
inhibit quick entry of generics. Intra-molecular competition in the therapeutic subgroup 
did not have a significant effect on the hazard of generic launch. Firm-level controls 
exhibited more locally oriented strategies for generics compared to new molecules in 
Chpater 3 where firm’s global sales were substantially significant.
5.3 Contributions of the Thesis to Literature
Economic theory predicts that structural and strategic barriers to entry reduce the extent 
of entry. One of the main structural barriers in the pharmaceutical industry different 
from more traditional manufacturing sectors is regulation. To date, there is relatively 
scanty evidence regarding the impact of regulation on the adoption of innovative 
pharmaceutical technologies; the evidence is even scarcer on the timing of generic 
adoption. This thesis has focused on the impact of regulation as a structural barrier to 
entry in the on-patent and off-patent pharmaceutical markets in the main OECD 
markets. In addition, as Stoneman (2002) has highlighted, the economics literature 
suffers from a severe lack of theoretical framework and empirical evidence on the 
international adoption and diffusion of technology. The research in this thesis has also 
addressed this gap by analyzing determinants of pharmaceutical technology adoption in 
a cross-country setting.
Although the thesis has provided evidence on the impact of pharmaceutical regulation 
on time-to-market launch, the optimal form of pharmaceutical regulation and the degree 
of price mark-up consitent with dynamic efficiency were not addressed. The results, 
however, shed some light on potential implications of price controls on efficiency and 
equity. Consistent with economic theory, price regulation pushes prices down towards 
marginal costs and brings short-term efficiency gains through lower prices both for 
pharmaceutical innovation and generic competition. However, the delays in adoption 
due to price controls and price linkages across interdependent markets results in 
temporal inequity in access to health improving and cost-saving pharmaceutical 
technologies. Therefore, the short-term efficiency gains brought about through price
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regulation should be weighed against potential long-term implications on public health 
outcomes and dynamic efficiency.
Additional contributions of the thesis, which are summarized below, comprise the 
quality of the data used, the robustness of the methodology adopted and the scope which 
includes the first time comparison of differential delays in adoption of generics across 
the OECD markets.
5.3.1 Data
The thesis uses a comprehensive IMS Health dataset on drug prices, sales volume, 
launch dates and launching corporations during 1999-2008 in the OECD. This is the 
most up-to-date and reliable data in the literature. The data includes all of the 
therapeutic subgroups with positive sales during 1999-2008 in 20 countries. Such data is 
extremely difficult and costly to access. Therefore, previous studies have broadly relied 
on treatment dummies to control for price regulation.
Treatment dummies cannot capture the nuances in individual therapeutic subgroups and 
the variations in prices and sales volume over time, which are the main drivers of 
pharmaceutical corporations’ launch strategies. Using IMS data, I was able to define 
expected launch prices and expected market sizes for launching products, which is a 
more sensitive and correct proxy for the impact of price controls and heterogeneity in 
the market environment.
The data covers the major countries of interest in the global pharmaceutical market, 
which account for more than 80% of global pharmaceutical sales. Also, these countries 
include markets where the major proportion of global R&D takes place. The molecules 
analyzed were restricted to potentially global molecules. The policy implications of 
price controls in these markets, therefore, are substantial for the global industry.
5.3.2 Methods 
Discrete Survival Analysis
The most sophisticated methodological approach in the literature that has been adopted 
so far is discrete time survival analysis using complentary log log analysis (Danzon and 
Epstein 2008). In the last two empirical chapters, the thesis has adopted this 
methodology to account for the interval-censoring in failure (launch or adoption) times
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as well as right censoring for molecule-country pairs that did not launch until the end of 
Q3 2008. However, overall I have used more extesive control variables to avoid omitted 
variable bias. In addition, the thesis investigated the robustness of the cloglog model by 
comparing it to other common methodologies such as Cox and logit regressions. In 
Chapter 3 ,1 compared estimates from a continuous Cox proportional hazard model with 
estimates from a discrete time proportional hazard model with cloglog regression. 
Overall, I concluded that discrete-time specification fits the data better, which I 
expected a priori given the interval-censored nature of the launch dates. In Chapter 4 ,1 
compared estimates from proportional hazards model with complementary log log link 
(cloglog regression) with estimates from proportional odds model with a logit link (logit 
regressions). Parameter estimates and marginal effects turned out comparable across 
these two different regression models, which highlights the fact that the hazard of 
adoption is relatively small. Overall, Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC 
and BIC) were comparable across the logit and cloglog estimates. The logit model, 
however, had slightly lower AIC and BIC in some of the robustness checks.
Identification of Regulation and Competition
The main limitation in previous studies has been heavy reliance on treatment dummies 
to control for the effect of regulation. The thesis relied on lagged ex-manufacturer prices 
as a more sensitive control for the net impact of regulation. In the on-patent sector, 
expected prices were defined using average prices of molecules in the same therapeutic 
subgroup (ATC4) and in the off-patent sector the expected price was defined as the 
average price of the originator molecule times the median generic-branded ratio in the 
market. Similarly, expected market size was estimated by lagged sales (in $ and SU) in 
the therapeutic subgroup ATC4 for new molecules, and for the generic entry analysis by 
lagged branded sales prior to generic entry times average generic share in the local 
market.
Different from prior studies in the literature, the impact of competition was investigated 
using the Herfindahl Hirschman concentration index for molecule sales in the same 
ATC4 in Chapter 3 and the sales of generic firms in ATC4 in Chapter 4. This measure 
of competition accounts for unequal market shares. A crude number of competitors as a 
proxy of competition gives equal weight to each individual firm and molecule, and thus, 
may not be able to capture the importance of market share that these firms or molecules 
account for.
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Control for Market Structure, Product and Firm Heterogeneity
Disentangling the effects of market structure, firm and molecule characteristics on the 
probability of launch enabled estimation of price and market size coefficients more 
precisely. Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 exploited the variation over time and molecule- 
country pairs due to the panel nature of the data. The errors were clustered at the 
molecule-country level (i.e. objects under risk in the survival analysis) to account for 
potential autocorrelation over time.
Extensive Robustness Checks
The second major contribution is that the thesis carried out extensive robustness checks 
to identify how sensitive parameter estimates are to the regression methodology and 
duration specification. Results were compared across cox and cloglog estimates in 
Chapter 3; cloglog and logistic estimates in Chapter 4. Duration-specification in 
discrete-time survival models was estimated: 1) parametrically by assuming a quadratic 
in time since risk onset, and 2) non-parametrically by including dummies for each 
monthly interval obviating the need for prior assumptions about the time dependence of 
the baseline hazard. In addition, in Chapter 4 ,1 investigated the sensitivity in parameter 
estimates with respect to the inclusion/exclusion of calendar year dummies that were 
multicollinear with the market structure variable, number of generic firms over time.
5,3.3 Content
First Analysis of Evolutionary Trends
The thesis provided the first comparison of launch lag trends across markets and 
different periods during 1960-2008. This analysis clearly indicated that pharmaceutical 
corporations launch strategies are highly responsive to changes in the regulatory 
landscape and the legal transaction costs of entry. I have tested for the impact of the two 
main regulatory changes using a quasi-experiment framework with difference-in- 
differences analysis as well as fixed and random effects Cox proportional hazards 
model.
Evidence on Adoption of Innovative and Generic Competition
The sustainability of pharmaceutical innovations and generic competition is a key 
policy goal to maintain the balance in static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. The 
thesis, therefore, provided a more holistic approach by analyzing the impact of price
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controls both on the adoption of innovation (new molecules) and imitative competition 
(generics).
The analysis for adoption of new molecules extended the work of Danzon and Epstein 
(2008) by using molecules that launched in at least 10 markets. Methodologically, I also 
employed extensive controls for firm, molecule and therapeutic subgroup competition 
effects to isolate the effects of these variables, potentially reducing the variability in the 
parameter estimates.
The literature had a significant evidence gap regarding the impact of price controls on 
timing of generic entry. The thesis analyzed for the first time the impact of differing 
pricing controls on the adoption of first generics across main OECD markets using 
discrete-time survival analysis. In addition, I used proxies that are more refined for 
expected generic prices and market size by controlling for branded-generic price ratios 
and average generic shares captured in individual markets.
5.4 Policy Implications
Different cost containment policies directed at the supply and demand side in order to 
contain costs and increase efficiency have clear and significant implications on the 
adoption of pharmaceutical innovations and commoditized generic copies. These 
policies may distort the process whereby new medicinal products and first generics are 
adopted and should be weighed against the potential implications of late access to 
medicinal products in the on-patent and off-patent sectors. Generics introduce 
competition and increase incentives for innovation. On the other hand, growth in the 
generic sector thrives on the expiry of new molecules; reduced incentives to entry for 
innovative molecules will eventually hamper the sustainability of the generic sector. 
Policy makers should consider long-term implications of hampered market entry and 
distortions in the incentives for innovation.
Empirical results provided significant evidence that product launch strategically takes 
place first in higher-priced EU markets as a result of threat of arbitrage and price 
dependency due to external reference pricing. This positions European markets with low 
prices and/or small market sizes such as Portugal at a significant disadvantage. Price 
regulations may impose welfare losses through slower adoptions of new medicines, 
particularly in cases when the innovations that are delayed are cost-effective from a 
societal perspective. Empirical evidence shows that lack of access to new drugs leads to
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compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski 2002), shifts volume to older molecules of 
lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham 2004) and results in higher expenditures 
on other forms of medical care and compromises in quality of health care (Kessler 
2004; Wertheimer and Santella 2004). Innovative medications offer economic benefits 
through fewer work days missed and lives saved (Lichtenberg 1996; Lichtenberg 2003a; 
Hassett 2004; Lichtenberg 2005). Therefore, savings to be accrued from lower prices in 
the short-run should be weighed against long-term implications of reduced and delayed 
access to innovation on public health outcomes and implications on the innovative 
activity in the pharmaceutical sector.
Significant advantages to economies of scale and scope in the on-patent sector emerged 
from the analysis in this thesis. Given the incentives for mergers and acquisitions, this 
may sequentially result in higher concentrations, higher barriers to entry and reduced 
competition. There is strong evidence that innovation diffuses quicker to more 
competitive therapeutic subgroups. Policy makers should actively promote competition 
in the branded sector by reducing barriers to entry due to transaction costs in pricing and 
reimbursement approval.
R&D activity of leading pharmaceutical companies is largely carried out in the major 
OECD markets included in the analysis; in addition, the sales generated in these 
markets accounts for a significant proportion of global profits. Findings regarding the 
impact of regulation on timing of launch and negative profit implications have global 
implications. Low prices have already been shown to discourage R&D and future 
innovation (Giaccotto, Santerre et al. 2005; Vernon 2005). Reducing delays for pricing 
and reimbursement by setting more transparent and objective criteria will allow higher 
returns to R&D for companies stimulating further innovation and allow more timely 
patient access to new medicines, as well as timely access for cheaper alternatives both 
for the patients and payers. From a cross-country perspective, reducing the differential 
delays for globally important molecules will enable a more equitable access to new and 
possibly more effective treatment alternatives.
The growing importance of pharmacoeconomic assessments (known as “the fourth 
hurdle”) and the drive for value-for-money has been a growing concern for 
pharmaceutical corporations in Europe, the US and increasingly in emerging 
pharmaceutical economies. Pharmaco-economic assessments are promising the efficient 
use of resources and the promotion of the right type of R&D investments. The
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likelihood of getting cost-effectiveness approval or approval for restricted indications 
significantly affects price negotiations and the potential market of new medicines, and 
therefore, may have implications in market entry decisions. Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
free-priced markets have faster new pharmaceutical adoption. However, these markets 
are also the ones who have the most stringent criteria for reimbursement through heath 
technology assessments. Although these evaluations do not have direct impact on time 
to market, they have an indirect impact on allowable price and potential profit. The 
complexity of launch and market decisions is further increasing due to risk sharing and 
early access schemes. The implications on differentials in market access remain to be 
seen and can be explored as further research.
Chapter 4 provided evidence that a fragmented pricing and reimbursement environment 
across Europe causes delays in the market entry of first generic medicines. The evidence 
shows that price regulation may delay the timing of entry for the first generic if 
expected generic prices are lowered and/or the generic-branded price differential is kept 
small as a result of policies such as reference pricing. Generics tend to be more 
expensive in countries that adopt a free market approach and in countries that have a 
mature generic medicine market (Simoens 2007)116. In markets that have stringent price 
regulations prices of originator molecules are driven down throughout the product 
lifecycle, which discourages market entry of generic medicines. The originator price in 
free markets, on the other hand, may increase following patent expiry. Limited 
diffusion of generics in markets with strict price controls restricts competition post­
patent expiry (Adriaen, De Witte et al. 2007). In addition, competition between generics 
is important to reduce prices in excess of price reductions imposed by price controls and 
increase the price difference between the originator and generics.
Price linkages between generic and originator medicines in some member states may 
hamper achieving a competitive generic-branded price ratio. Generic prices in the US 
and the EU will be subject to further downward pressure on prices as generics are 
increasingly manufactured in Asian countries such as India, which will have further 
implications on the importance of capturing high volume share for generics.
116 Also penetration of generic medicines is more successful in countries that permit relatively 
free pricing of medicines than in countries that have pricing regulation (Simoens and de Coster
2006). In countries with free market pricing, the price difference between originator and generic 
medicines tends to be higher than in countries with pricing regulation (Adriaen, De Witte et al.
2007)
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Generics offer significant cost-saving opportunities and play a key role in stimulating 
innovation through increased competition. The ability to achieve and sustain a high 
volume is the most important factor for generics as suggested by findings in Chapter 4. 
Generic firms offer more competitive prices if they can capture a higher share in the 
market, which drives the generic-branded price ratio down. These results imply that 
demand-side policies carry significant importance to ensure higher volumes for generics 
by encouraging physicians to prescribe low-cost medicines and pharmacists to 
substitute generic medicines unless indicated otherwise by the physician. Supply-side 
policies directed at generics will not be enough to promote generic entry. The slowdown 
in the economy and the on-going pressure on budgets is expected to push governments 
to promote generics (and increasingly biosimilars) more aggressively, through eased 
generic entry, generic substitution, and physician incentives for generic prescribing.
Finally, both the “Innovation through generics” timetable in the European Parliament in 
2008 (Simoens 2008) and the Inquiry the DG Competition on the competitiveness of the 
pharmaceutical sector identified the key importance of eradicating shortcomings in 
current patent and registration systems to allow quicker generic entry following patent 
expiry (DG Competition 2009). The Sector Inquiry also foresees that use of specific 
strategies (e.g. settlements where originator pays generics to limit their entry) by 
originator companies to delay generic entry will be subject to scrutiny if deemed to be 
anti-competitive. Although these factors have not been included in the analysis in this 
thesis, they clearly constitute potential improvement areas in the European generics 
policy-making. Following a stick approach, audits or periodic industrial competitiveness 
analysis can be used to overcome some of these strategic barriers. Alternatively, 
following a carrots approach, incentives other than patents for pharmaceutical 
innovation can be developed to overcome some of these strategic barriers.
Prizes, granting a reward with fixed royalties, restricting the rights of the patent holder 
in cases of research funding by public institutions are some of the alternative ways of 
pharmaceutical R&D financing that have been suggested to overcome the insufficines 
of the current intellectual property rights (IPR) systems. Similarly, the current IPR 
system can be improved to improve quality of patents by making the requirements for 
novelty and non-obviousness stricter, which can partially overcome the evergreening 
patent strategy of branded firms trying to block generic entry (Rovira 2009). Such an 
approach may reduce litigation and uncertainty to all stakeholders.
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5.5 Limitations and Further Research
The main limitation in this thesis is that survival times are estimated with respect to the 
first global launch of a new molecule or generic copy. The delays therefore do not 
capture variations in market authorization dates, pricing and reimbursement procedures 
and company strategies to delay launch due to profit spillover concerns in the on-patent 
sector. However, this approach still provides insight into the magnitude of the effects of 
various risk factors in explaining the international variation in launch dates for new 
molecules and first generic products. Regulatory organizations have increasingly 
harmonized the requirements for marketing approval. FDA and EMEA increasingly 
share information about new drug candidates as the pharmaceutical industry continues 
to become a global industry. The sub-analysis for centrally approved molecules in 
Chapter 2 shows that even if variation due to marketing authorization across markets is 
singled out, different pricing and reimbursement procedures result in different market 
access times for new molecules. Ideally, data on authorization dates and pricing and 
reimbursement approval would allow explaining the exact nature of the delays in each 
market.
Similarly, delays do not capture the impact of country-specific patent or SPC protection
117 •  • •expiry dates and heterogeneity in local legislations regarding patents . Availability of 
patent expiry dates would enable to characterize the monopoly period during which the 
originator develops brand loyalty. The relative delay of the originator molecule in each 
market, however, is used to control for the reduced exclusivity period in each market. 
Furthermore, branded firm strategies employed to delay generic entry such as 
authorized generics cases are ignored. Although authorized generics have more serious 
implications in the US market due to the exclusivity offered to the first generics, which 
is not the case in Europe, the analysis can be extended to investigate the impact of 
branded firm strategies on the timing of generic adoption.
The price data used in this analysis represents ex-manufacturer prices rather than actual 
prices paid by the government, third-party insurer or patients. Ex-manufacturer prices 
are the relevant prices when investigating launch strategies of pharmaceutical 
corporations as they determine profits of the industry. However, in most markets both 
innovator and generic companies offer significant discounts off these list prices. IMS 
data does not take into account discount practices (Simoens 2007). In particular,
117 Patent validity and infringement issues are handled by different rules in each country; this 
increases financial costs as well as time burden on the generic manufacturers
226
variations in generic-company discounts offered to retail pharmacists may affect the 
incentives for substitution and the duration of the negotiation process. The analysis has 
tried to avoid issues of endogeneity by using lagged price and market size variables 
(also, the moving average over the last four quarters is used). The empirical analysis 
could be extended to include discounts and try alternative specifications to endogenize 
prices and entry.
In the context of generic entry, further research can be carried out to identify 
determinants of relative generic-branded medicine price levels and to estimate price 
sensitivities in individual markets, the main drivers of the market share captured by 
generics.
Finally, price controls and lower prices were found to discourage timely adoption both 
for new molecules and for generics. To what extent delayed or reduced entry affects 
total societal welfare cannot be inferred from the analysis in this thesis and could be 
explored as a future research question.
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APPENDIX A: Appendix to Chapter 1
Appendix A.l: Anatomic Therapeutic Classification
The ATC classification system divides drugs into different groups according to the organ or 
system on which they act and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. 
The drugs are divided into fourteen main groups (1st level), with one therapeutic subgroup 
(2nd level). The third and fourth levels are pharmacological/chemical therapeutic 
subgroups and the fifth level is the chemical substance. Classification in the IMS database 
is product based as defined by EphMRA118/ PBIRG classification, which is based on drug 
indication and use.
Table A.l ATC Classifications
ATC Level Coding Grouping Example
ATC1 1 Letter Anatomical A: Alimentary tract & metabolism
ATC2 2 Digits Therapeutic A 10: Drugs used in diabetes
ATC3 1 Letter Pharmacological A10B: Glucose lowering drugs
ATC4 1 Letter Chemical Subgroup A10BA: Biguanides
ATC5 2 Digits Chemical Substance A10BA02: Metformin
Source: (EphMRA/PBIRG 2009; Danish Medicines Agency 2010)
Table A.2 ATC 1 Categories
ATC1 Category
A Alimentary tract and metabolism
B Blood and blood forming organs
C Cardiovascular system
D Dermatologicals
G Genitourinary system and sex hormones
H Systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones and insulins
J Anti-infectives for systemic use
L Anti-neoplastic and immuno-modulating agents
M Musculoskeletal system
N Nervous system
P Anti-parasitic products, insecticides and repellents
R Respiratory system
S Sensory organs
V Various
118 European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association http://www.ephmra.org/
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A ppendix A.2: Expenditure on Health and Pharm aceuticals
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Figure A.l Total expenditure on health (% o f GDP) 
Source: OECD Health Data 2009
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Figure A.2 Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other medical non­
durables, % total expenditure on health (Source: OECD Health Data 2009)
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Appendix A.3: Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement (P&R) in US-EU5
Throughout 1990s, both the US and the EU have witnessed increased efforts to accelerate 
and harmonize the regulatory approval process. Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992 
required companies to pay user fees as part of their submissions for regulatory review 
which enabled increasing the review capacity and thus shortening the duration of the 
review process. FDA Modernization Act in 1997 provided a “fast track procedure” to 
facilitate the development and expedite the review of products intended for the treatment of 
serious or life-threatening conditions and with a potential to address unmet medical needs 
for such conditions. The EU established the EMEA (European Medicines Agency) in 1995 
for the scientific evaluation of applications for European marketing authorization for 
medicinal products. Under the centralized procedure, companies submit a single marketing 
authorization application to the EMEA. Once granted by the European Commission, a 
centralized (or ‘Community’) marketing authorization is valid in all EU and EEA-EFTA 
states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway)119.
The centralized EU procedure is compulsory for all medicinal products derived from 
biotechnology and other high technology processes, all human medicines intended for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases, autoimmune and 
other immune dysfunctions, and viral diseases, and all designated orphan medicines 
intended for the treatment of rare diseases. If the product does not belong to any of these 
categories, companies can submit an application for a centralized marketing authorization 
to the EMEA, provided the medicinal product constitutes a significant therapeutic, 
scientific or technical innovation, or the product is in any other respect in the interest of 
patient health120. The EMEA centralized procedure has been indicated to speed up the 
review process121. The Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development reported that 
European approval of new biotech drugs outpaced US approvals by 35 days during the 
period 1995-1999122. The centralized procedure has increased the role of pricing and 
reimbursement in launch delays since differences due to regulatory approval are eliminated.
119 EEA-EFTA: European Economic Area-European Free Trade Association
120 http://wvyw.emea.europa.eu/
121
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/Issues/2007/June/Europespeedsmedicinestomarketunderrevisedrules.asp
122 csdd.tufts.edu/_documents/www/Doc_309_12_892.pdf
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A second way to obtain marketing authorization in the EU is through the "mutual 
recognition procedure" whereby the originator submits for approval in one country and files 
for recognition in other countries. If the rapporteur country grants approval, the drug is 
approved automatically in reference countries unless an objection is made within 90 days.
In free-priced markets like the US, UK or Germany, branded pharmaceutical products can 
be launched after marketing authorization is granted; however, in other markets, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers may face additional hurdles following the review process of 
safety and efficacy data. Most OECD countries demand price approval and/or prior 
approval of eligibility for reimbursement before the product is commercialized (Jacobzone 
2000). The latest trend is the increasing importance of the fourth hurdle, i.e. demonstration 
of cost-effectiveness, for drug reimbursement or for obtaining a price premium.
The following sections provide more detailed country-specific information on P&R in the 
US-EU5.
A.3.1 United States
The US market is highly fragmented in terms of the variety of payers. Healthcare is covered 
predominantly by private health insurance sponsored by employers (58%), and federal- 
sponsored plans of Medicaid and Medicare for the poor and the elderly respectively. The 
federal government does not provide health insurance coverage to all through a centralized 
scheme as in other European markets. Medicare and Medicaid are the largest government- 
funded payers providing coverage for more than 60 million individuals (Sullivan, Watkins 
et al. 2009). As of 2009, approximately 15% of the US population remains uninsured which 
results in poor health outcomes for this section of the population123.
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Due to the absence of a government-sponsored universal health insurance plan and the 
variety of schemes for coverage, the federal government does not regulate the prices of 
pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical prices are determined predominantly by the free market. 
Free pricing has allowed manufacturers to capture higher margins in the US compared to
123 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin08/hlth08asc.html
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other markets. Drug price differentials between the US and other countries have become a 
highly debated political issue in the US.
US drug prices depend on the health insurance coverage of individuals, competition 
between substitute products including generics, market size, cost of R&D and price 
sensitivity of payers (large buying groups have influence through discount and rebate 
programs). Pharmacoeconomics and parallel importing may also affect pricing decisions in 
the US pharmaceutical market (Seget 2009), (Seget 2003), (Business Insights 2009b). 
Large buyers such as hospitals, managed care organizations, Medicaid and Medicare have a 
substantial bargaining power. In addition, there is de facto price regulation in the case of 
federal purchases such as the Veterans Health Administration and the Medicaid 
programme; pharmaceutical companies price drugs for these organizations on a negotiated 
discount basis (OECD 2008), (Seget 2003).
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
Reimbursement controls in the US play a major role due to the lack of price controls in 
containing costs and determining revenues of pharmaceutical manufacturers. The main 
reimbursement-related cost containment measures include preferred drug lists 
(formularies124), and cost-sharing in the form of deductibles125, coinsurance and tiered co­
payments (Seget 2003),(Business Insights 2009b).
Both private and public payers use formularies as a major reimbursement control. Drugs 
excluded from formularies are not reimbursed. Formularies aim to achieve savings by 
encouraging cost-effective or low-cost drug use as well as obtaining rebates from 
companies. Patient copayment levels in formularies are determined based on drug’s patent 
status, cost and clinical effectiveness. Copayment levels are tiered, usually between 10- 
20%, depending on whether the drug is a generic, preferred branded, non-preferred branded 
or specialty drug. Patients are given incentives to choose less expensive drugs in the lower 
tiers through lower copayment levels. OTC (over-the-counter) drugs are excluded from 
reimbursement.
124 L ist o f  drugs preferred by a particular health plan or employer prefers
125 Out-of-pocket payment threshold made before benefits become reimbursable
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Pharmacoeconomics
Pharmaceutical companies are not explicitly required to submit cost-effectiveness 
evaluations neither for US regulatory approval nor for price negotiations with private or 
public payers. However, some costly drugs are supported by such evaluations to defend 
high prices. In addition, several public and private agencies produce or use health 
technology assessment (HTA) reports126. Currently there are no established frameworks 
and thresholds for cost-effectiveness evaluations (Seget 2009). Multi-state HTA programs 
could be redundant and inefficient, and result in inconsistent coverage policies between 
states. Main federal funding body for publicly available HTAs in the US is the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Since 2003, AHRQ supports the generation of 
systematic evidence reviews by Evidence-Based Practice Centers to assess the 
effectiveness, comparative effectiveness, safety, and rarely the cost-effectiveness of 
medical technologies and interventions. The relevance of the AHRQ reports to inform 
coverage decisions in the private sector has been limited.
Generic Substitution
The US healthcare system has benefited from substantial cost savings due to increased 
generic use and generic competition. Generics accounted for 63-69% of all dispensed 
prescriptions in the US in 2007 and 2008 respectively, which is higher than in any of the 
EU5 markets (Seget 2009), (Business Insights 2008)127. Individual states may have 
different generic substitution regulations. However, many states indicate that drugs the 
FDA deems to be equivalent (Orange Book lists) may be substituted, or alternatively that 
drugs the FDA does not list as equivalent cannot be substituted. Positive formulary states 
identify generics that can be substituted while negative formulary states identify generics 
that cannot be substituted. Some states simply allow substitution for pharmaceutically 
equivalent products128.
126 For example, the Medicare Coverage D ivision w ith in  the Centre for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) is responsible for undertaking or commissioning H T A  reports to support considerations 
regarding national coverage decisions. Many state Medicaid programs support state-sponsored H T A  
activities for pharmaceuticals.
127 The US generic market is the w orld ’ s largest generics market, w ith  a size o f  $25 bn in 2007.
128 http://www.uspharmacist.eom/content/t/generic medications/c/9787/
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A.3.2 EU5
Unlike in the US, pharmaceutical expenditure in the EU is mostly reimbursed by social 
security systems, which increases the role of governments in the determination of 
pharmaceutical prices. The European market is characterized by significant price 
dependencies between member states. The principle of exhaustion of rights allows 
individuals or firms within the EU to trade goods across borders and prevents the proprietor 
from using those rights to interfere with any subsequent commercialization of the goods in 
question.
In the case of medicines, parallel importation129 is allowed if the product imported is 
identical or sufficiently similar to one already authorised for sale in the Member State of 
destination130 . Parallel importation cannot take place from within the EU to countries 
outside the EU since the idea of international exhaustion has been rejected by the European 
Court of Justice (Ganslandt and Maskus 1999). The introduction of the centralized 
procedure for market authorization has further facilitated parallel trade since standardized 
drug dosages are approved in all Member States. Package or labelling differences, which 
previously hindered parallel trade by increasing a trader’s costs of repackaging and 
labelling, were reduced.
The pricing and reimbursement of medicinal products in the EU has been regulated at the 
supranational level by the Transparency Directive since 1989. The Directive, however, 
does not affect national policies on price setting and on the determination of social security 
schemes, except for the stipulation of the main transparency objectives that guarantee 
public access to information on pricing and reimbursement131. This has resulted in a variety 
of pricing and reimbursement schemes across the EU.
129 Parallel imports are products imported from a Member State w ith  a lower price to another Member 
State where the product is sold at a higher price, outside the manufacturer's or its licensed distributor's 
formal channels.
130 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/medicines_en.htm
131 These include: 1. Adopting decisions w ith in  a lim ited time frame; 2. M aking decisions on objective 
and verifiable criteria; 3. N otify ing  decisions to the applicant and publishing the rationale behind the 
decisions; 4. Ensuring adequate jud ic ia l procedures for appealing against the decisions . This has 
resulted in diverse pricing and reimbursement schemes across the Member States.
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Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement schemes in the EU5 are summarized in Table 
A.3. Germany and the UK have traditionally focused on controlling demand with devolved 
budgets, i.e. constrained physician prescribing (Businessweek 2009). Branded 
pharmaceuticals are freely priced in Germany and the UK, except for company-level profit 
controls in the UK through the PPRS. France, Italy and Spain, on the other hand, have 
focused mainly on price controls. Branded drug prices in France, Italy and Spain are subject 
to statutory control through negotiations in France and Italy (before 2004 price 
determination was based on average EU prices) and cost-plus pricing in Spain. All three 
markets employ both internal and external reference pricing systems132 for price setting. 
Generic prices are controlled across all five markets in the EU5 with minimum discount 
requirements over originator prices.
All markets in the EU5, except for the UK, use reference-pricing systems for 
reimbursement decisions133. Germany, UK and Spain have negative lists whereas France 
and Italy employ positive lists. Italy and Spain have regional autonomy in reimbursement 
of prescription fees and generic substitution. Cost-effectiveness evaluations are used in 
reimbursement decisions in Germany and the UK for selected drugs through IQWiG and 
NICE respectively , as well as informally in other markets (Seget 2009).
132 Reference Pricing is a mechanism that controls drugs reimbursed by th ird  party payers. Under a 
reference pricing system (RPS), drugs are clustered into reference groups based on chemical (active 
ingredient), pharmacological (comparable active ingredients) or therapeutic equivalence (sim ilar 
therapeutic effects). In general, the reference price is the reimbursement price and the patient pays the 
difference between the actual retail price and the reference price. I f  the price is below the reference price 
and there is a copayment system, the patient pays a fraction o f  the reference price under a copayment 
system. Reference pricing aims to increase generic use and decrease pharmaceutical expenses by 
controlling the price at which the drugs are reimbursed.
133 Although not shown in the table, all markets have exemption provisions linked to age, income and 
disease for prescription fees and copayments
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Table A.3 Pharmaceutical P&R and Rational Drug Use in the EU5
France Germany Italy Spain UK
Pricing:
Outpatient
Reimbursable
Drugs
Price
negotiations Free pricing
Price
negotiations
Cost-plus pricing 
+ External 
referencing
Free pricing + 
profit control
Pricing: Generic 
Drugs Profit control
Free pricing 
with 10% 
discount for 
sickness funds
Minimum
20%
discount on 
original
Minimum
discount
Price control for 
most drugs
External Ref 
Pricing
Innovative 
drugs only 
referenced with 
Germany, Italy, 
Spain and UK
No
Yes, based 
on the 
average o f 
selected EU 
markets
Yes, based on EU 
average No
Internal Ref 
Pricing Yes
For
reimbursement
only
Yes Yes Limited
Positive/Negative
Lists Positive List Negative List Positive List
Positive and 
Negative List Negative List
Reimbursement
Levels
100%, 65%, 
35% 100% 100% 90% and 60% 100%
Reference 
Pricing System Limited (ATC5)
Yes
(ATC4-5)
Yes
(ATC5)
Yes
(ATC5) No
Out-of-Pocket
Expenses
0%, 35%, 65% 
coinsurance
10% 
copayment in 
the range €5- 
€10; no copay 
i f  drug price is 
30% below the 
reference price
Regional
prescription
fee
0%, 10%,40% 
co-insurance up 
to a maximum 
per item
Flat prescription 
fee o f £7.20
Generic (INN) 
prescribing
Encouraged, 
GPs must 
prescribe at 
least 15% a year
Indirectly 
encouraged 
via reference 
pricing classes
Some via 
reference 
pricing 
classes
Encouraged and 
rising with 
regional 
variations
GPs prescribe 
generics by INN
Generic
Substitution
Substitution 
extended but 
physician can 
overrule
Substitution
obligatory
unless
physician
overrules
Limited
(indicative)
substitution
rights
Substitution 
allowed but 
requires 
physician 
consent; also 
through RPS
Substitution 
allowed i f  
physician has 
prescribed by 
INN
Cost-
effectiveness
evaluations
No
Yes, for 
selected drugs 
through 
IQWiG
Applied for 
price 
negotiations 
only
No
Yes, for selected 
drugs through 
NICE
Guidelines HAS Guidelines IQWiQ-GBAGuidelines
AIFA
Guidelines
Significant 
variations across 
regions
NICE
Guidelines
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Budgets
Target budgets 
monitored by 
health insurance 
delegate
Target 
volumes for 
individual 
practices 
negotiated at 
regional levels
Budgets set 
by local 
health 
authorities
Drug budgets 
subject to fixed 
growth rates and 
paybacks
PCTs and GP 
practices given 
a budget
Price Cuts
12.5% brands 
and 7% generics 
on drugs in the 
market for 18 
months
Price freeze Price cuts
Since 2006, price 
cuts o f 20% on 
drugs marketed 
10 years
PPRS
Clawbacks
National, 
therapy and 
product specific 
price volume 
agreement
Mandatory 
annual rebates 
in cash
Price 
volume 
agreements 
based on 
annual 
expenditure 
ceilings
Clawbacks % o f 
annual sales 
based on total 
sales value
% o f pharmacy 
discounts 
clawbacked to 
NHS
INN: International Non-proprietary Name of the active ingredient 
Source: (Vogler 2008; Seget 2009)
A.3.2.1 France
The French population is almost universally covered (99% of the population) by statutory 
health insurance, a branch of the wider social security system. The share of public 
pharmaceutical expenditure in total pharmaceutical expenditure was 69% in 2006.
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Ex-factory prices in France for reimbursable products are negotiated between the Economic 
Committee for Health Care Products (CEPS) and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Prices 
mainly depend on the improvement in medical service (Amelioration du service medical 
rendu, ASMR134), price of comparator products, sales forecasts, target population, 
conditions for use, and prices in the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain for innovative products. 
Non-reimbursable drugs, drugs for hospital use and OTC products are free-priced. 
Wholesale margins, pharmacist margins and pharmacy retail prices are subject to 
regulation. Only innovative products that offer major, significant or moderate therapeutic 
progress (ASMR I, II or III) are subject to external referencing and are priced above the 
cheapest price in the remaining EU-5 for 5 years after inclusion in the positive list.
134 ASM R  is a five-level scale that evaluates the level o f medical service delivered by a new drug (I: 
major therapeutic progress; II-  significant progress in terms o f efficacy/side effects; I I I -  moderate 
progress in terms o f  efficacy/side effects; IV - m inor progress in terms o f  efficacy/clinical 
usefulness/side-effects; V - no therapeutic progress)
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Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have to apply for inclusion on positive lists in order to obtain 
reimbursement by the mandatory health insurance. There are two positive lists: one for 
reimbursable retail channel drugs and one for hospital drugs. Reimbursement by the Health 
Insurance Funds is conditional on an improvement in medical service (ASMR level) or 
savings in the cost of treatment offered by the new pharmaceutical product. 
Reimbursement rate depends on the medical service and improvement of medical service 
offered by the product, and the clinical benefit. There are three different rates of 
reimbursement: 100% for severe, chronic diseases such as cancer; 65% for drugs with 
major clinical benefit and 35% for all others. The difference between the retail price and the 
rate reimbursed is paid out-of-pocket by the patient.
Pharmacoeconomics
Economic evaluations are increasingly gaining importance in pricing negotiations for new 
drugs, in particular for drugs that claim a price premium, although the submission of such 
evaluations is not yet mandatory. Since 2008, National Authority for Health (HAS, Haute 
Autorite de Sante) has been given the responsibility to assess the most efficient therapeutic 
strategies and develop recommendations accordingly. However, how pricing and 
reimbursement of pharmaceuticals will be affected by this decision remains to be seen .
Generic Substitution
Generic substitution is allowed on a voluntary basis since 1999 and promoted through 
higher margins as a financial incentive to pharmacists (pharmacists are remunerated the 
same value both for branded and generic products). Physicians are encouraged to prescribe 
by INN name as the rise in physician visit prices depends on pharmaceutical expenditure 
levels. Generic drug use is promoted by the government and health insurance to reduce 
public expenditure. Generics with prices 50% lower than the originator are automatically 
included in the reimbursable drug list (Liste Securite Sociale et Collectivites).
A.3.2.2 Germany
The German healthcare system has adopted mandatory Social Health Insurance (SHI) with 
more than 200 competing sickness funds and a private-public mix of providers. About 85%
135 http://www.ispor.org/HTARoadMaps/France.asp# 1
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of the population was covered by comprehensive SHI in 2005. The share of public 
pharmaceutical expenditure in total pharmaceutical expenditure was 71.3% in 2005.
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Ex-factory prices are freely determined by manufacturers except for temporal prize freezes. 
There are no negotiations involving governmental agencies, direct price or profit controls 
employed. There is, however, regulation at the wholesaler and pharmacist level through 
fixed mark-ups for prescription drugs. Price setting by companies is affected by 
reimbursement regulations through the reference pricing system.
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
Germany does not have a positive list for pharmaceuticals that are reimbursed by the Social 
Health Insurance; every prescription drug that accesses the market is fully reimbursed with 
the exception of drugs for trivial diseases such as common colds and life-style drugs 
(Vogler 2008). Reimbursement is independent of patient subgroups or indications. Co­
payments are set at 10% of the drug price. Drugs with prices 30% below the reference price 
are not subject to co-payment. Upper limits for cost sharing exist for the poor and 
individuals with high healthcare costs.
Regulation of reimbursement through the reference price system (RPS) acts as an indirect 
price control mechanism since 1989. The reference price system dictates an upper limit for 
sickness fund reimbursements, and the remaining part is covered by the patient as an out- 
of-pocket payment. Reference groups usually are set at the active ingredient (ATC5) level 
but can include several active ingredients that are pharmacologically or therapeutically 
comparable. Not all drugs are subject to the RPS. If the efficacy or safety of a drug is 
superior to existing alternative drugs, prices can be set freely without any regulatory 
control; otherwise, prices are subject to reference pricing.
Pharmacoeconomics
Since 2004, the Institute for Quality and Efficiency (IQWiG) provides assistance with the 
therapeutic benefit assessment of new products to determine reimbursement status. IQWiG 
also ensures the reimbursement for drugs already on the market is correct through 
retrospective evaluations. Since 2007, IQWiG carries out cost-benefit assessments for drugs
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with therapeutic improvements, which are used to provide recommendations for a 
maximum reimbursement price for innovative drugs that are not included in reference 
pricing. In contrast to other HTA agencies such as NICE, IQWiG does not use the 
incremental-cost-effectiveness-ratio approach, but uses the efficiency frontier approach. 
Although Germany employs free-pricing, drugs with a negative cost-benefit-assessment 
may be subject to maximum prices .
Generic Substitution
Generics in Germany are subject to the same rules as original products. Generic use is 
encouraged in a number of different ways. Generic substitution is obligatory for 
pharmacists unless substitution is explicitly excluded on the prescription by the physician. 
Sickness funds may contract with generic manufacturers and pharmacies for generic 
substitution, which has increased the negotiating power of sickness funds for rebates from 
generic manufacturers. Generics companies have to give a 10% rebate on generic 
preparations to sickness funds since 2006.
Physicians in Germany were subject to drug budgets to control pharmaceutical expenses 
during 1993-2001. Since 2002, practice-specific prescription targets are employed; sickness 
funds have accepted target volumes and provide prescription feedback to SHI affiliated 
physicians. In 2007, a cap on average prescription costs was introduced for highly 
prescribed substances. Physicians exceeding the target by more than 10% have to reimburse 
the deficit. These measures have improved generic prescribing.
136 http://www.ispor.org/HTARoadMaps/Germany.asp
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A.3.2.3 Italy
Health coverage in Italy is provided by the National Healthcare System SSN (Servizio 
Sanitario Nazionale) with a decentralized system. Although pricing and reimbursement of 
products is mainly decided on the national level, regions can decide upon patient 
copayments resulting in price difference of pharmaceuticals for the patients across the 
country. The share of public pharmaceutical expenditure in total pharmaceutical 
expenditure was 67.13% in 2005.
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Until 2004, prices in Italy used external reference pricing to set prices with respect to the 
average European prices. Since 2004 prices in Italy are determined by negotiation based on 
several factors that include the degree of innovation, prices and consumption data in other 
EU countries, sales volume and market share estimates, epidemiology, target population of 
the drug, risk-benefit ratio compared to comparator products, improvements in quality of 
life and available pharmacoeconomic data.
The level of innovation within a therapeutic category for new products is classified as 
important, moderate and mild. Generally, premium pricing requires an important 
innovation rating; parity pricing requires at least a moderate innovation rating, with any 
mild innovations likely to result in a price discount.
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
Pharmaceutical companies apply for reimbursement on the National Pharmaceutical 
Formulary (PFN Prontuario Farmaceutico Nazionale). Criteria for including a new product 
on a positive list for reimbursement includes: product-specific criteria (therapeutic value, 
safety, alternatives, prescription status, patent status); economic criteria (cost-effectiveness, 
reference price, forecasts); and disease-specific criteria (severity, unmet needs, patient 
base). Prescription pharmaceuticals on the positive list are fully reimbursed. Non­
reimbursed products can be freely priced. Technical and pharmacological innovations, i.e. 
new molecular entities and novel modes of action, are granted provisional reimbursement 
approval subject to demonstrated therapeutic need; disease relevance to public health 
interests; and defined timelines for post-marketing data. For off-patent drugs, only the
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lowest priced version of the same active ingredient is reimbursed. Patients have to pay 
fixed prescription fees at the regional level and any copayments due to the internal 
reference pricing system.
Pharmacoeconomics
There are no formal requirements for cost-effectiveness evaluations or budget impact 
analysis for pricing and reimbursement decision making in Italy. However, such 
evaluations are used widely in price negotiations and reimbursement decisions, especially 
for innovative products seeking premium prices.
Generic Substitution
Generic substitution by the cheapest off-patent generic is encouraged unless prohibited by 
the physician. Generics have to offer a price discount of 20% with respect to the price of 
the originator product.
A.3.2.4 Spain
Healthcare in Spain is provided by the National Health Service SNS (Sistema Nacional de 
la Salud) and is decentralized to the seventeen autonomous regions that have full control of 
budgets and competence regarding public health (Vogler, Espin et al. 2009). The system 
provides universal coverage with general taxation financing. The central government, 
however, maintains the responsibility related to pharmaceutical pricing and 
reimbursement137. Regions have a degree of freedom to impose their own pharmaceutical 
price caps or cost-containment targets. The share of public pharmaceutical expenditure in 
total pharmaceutical expenditure was approximately %72 in 2007 (OECD 2008).
Pharmaceutical Pricing
In Spain, only reimbursed drugs are subject to price regulation; non-reimbursable 
prescription-only pharmaceuticals are freely priced (subject to price approval). Products 
excluded from public financing are put on the negative list and are subject to free pricing 
(there are two negative lists from 1993 and 1998 respectively). The two delistings in the
137 http://www.ispor.org/HTARoadMaps/Spain.asp
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Spanish pharmaceutical system in 1993 and 1998 were not effective in containing 
expenditures as excluded drugs were of low therapeutic value and was dampened by 
strategic drug substitution for which reimbursement was maintained (Costa-Font and Puig- 
Junoy 2007).
Spain employs external referencing and ‘cost plus’ pricing, which determines maximum 
drug prices based on manufacturer costs (R&D expenses, manufacturing and marketing 
expenditure) plus a premium. The maximum return, typically between 12-18%, depends on 
the relative innovativeness of the new product and the availability and prices of equivalent 
prices as well as external price comparisons and potential volume and value of sales. Other 
supplier-oriented cost-containment measures that have been applied include negative lists, 
internal reference pricing, price cuts, encouragement of generic substitution, and pharmacy 
discounts.
Generics are subject to the same regulations as other reimbursed prescription medicines. 
Generics in the reference price system must be priced at, or below, the reference price level 
although there are no official guidelines (Habl, Antony et al. 2006). For competitive 
reasons most generics manufacturers prefer to price their products below the reference price 
level (Vogler, Espin et al. 2009). Wholesaler and pharmacy margins are statutorily fixed for 
all reimbursable and non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals.
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
Reimbursement decisions precede the price decision, as non-reimbursable drugs are not 
subject to price controls. Reimbursement criteria in Spain include the severity of the 
disease; priorities of different population groups; therapeutic value, degree of innovation 
and efficacy of the drug; budget impact for the SNS compared to corresponding products; 
and availability of similar cheaper alternatives. Four different reimbursement levels are 
available: 100% (hospital drugs and ambulatory drugs for retirees), 90% (chronic disease 
drugs), 60% and 0 % (drugs on the negative lists).
The reference pricing system in Spain was adopted in 2000, with some modifications in 
2004 and 2006. Reference price groups are comprised of pharmaceuticals with the same 
active substance (ATC5), form and route of administration and have at least one generic 
version. Reference prices are based on the arithmetic mean of the three cheapest drugs in
244
terms of cost per treatment per day for each route of administration138. Since 2007, these 
products no longer have to be produced by different companies. Generic prices have to be 
at or below the reference price level. Different from the other markets, Spanish reference 
pricing system sets a maximum price level, rather than the maximum reimbursed price. If a 
pharmaceutical has a higher price than the reference price level, the pharmaceutical 
company pays the difference and the patient only pays the copayment for the reference 
price. Unlike in other markets, patients are not offered the option of paying the difference 
between the reference price and the retail price of pharmaceuticals (Vogler, Espin et al. 
2009). After the Spanish healthcare system was decentralized in 2002, regions focused on 
demand-side measures to contain costs and introduced their own regional maximum price 
reimbursement schemes, which were withdrawn with the modified reference price system 
in 2007.
Pharmacoeconomics
Submission of pharmacoeconomic studies by manufacturers is not mandatory; however, 
companies submit such studies to show the product’s budgetary benefits for pricing and 
reimbursement decisions. It is not clear to what extent pharmacoeconomic studies affect 
pricing and reimbursement decisions. A national HTA agency and seven regional HTA 
agencies coexist in the country. Regional HTA agencies are responsible for producing 
information on the efficacy, effectiveness, safety and efficiency of new health technologies. 
Proposals published for standardisation of economic analysis of health technologies have 
not yet received mandatory status. The new law in 2006 requires companies to provide all 
information regarding the technical, economic and financial aspects of new products, but no 
explicit rules have been indicated for pharmacoeconomic studies (Vogler, Espin et al. 
2009).
Generic Substitution
Generic substitution is allowed and is obligatory for pharmaceuticals under the RPS when 
the generic has the lowest price unless explicitly excluded by the physician. The new 
pharmaceutical law of 2006 promotes prescribing by the active ingredient name (INN). For 
INN prescriptions, the law requires that pharmacists dispense the pharmaceutical with the 
lowest price, and the generic version if prices are same with a generic one.
138 Products with ex-manufacturer prices below 2€ are excluded from reference pricing.
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A.3.2.5 UK
The English National Health Service (NHS) offers universal coverage for UK residents. 
Private insurance coverage in the UK is relatively low, compared to countries such as 
the US; however, the role of private healthcare is increasing in the form of healthcare 
financing and delivery139. The share of public pharmaceutical expenditure in total 
pharmaceutical expenditure was 75% in 2007 (OECD 2008).
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Branded prescription drug prices are indirectly controlled by the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS), a scheme that tries to balance the need NHS cost- 
containment and provision of incentives to the pharmaceutical industry for future R&D. 
The PPRS restricts the return on capital that can be made from sales to the NHS to 21% 
of a company’s total NHS sales. Pharmaceutical companies earning excess profits have 
to reduce their prices or make a repayment to the Department of Health (DoH).
The UK has a free pricing system for on-patent pharmaceuticals that enter the market 
following the grant of a marketing authorisation for a new active substance or for line 
extensions of these products within 5 year of the grant of the original authorization. 
DoH’s price agreement is required for any new product that has not been subject to a 
new active substance marketing authorisation. DoH accepts the price based on the price 
of other presentations of the same medicine or comparable products, forecast sales and 
the effect on the NHS bill, and the clinical need for the product. NHS list price of 
existing products is subject to the DoH’s agreement as well.
The most recent 2009 PPRS emphasizes value-based pricing and proposes a more 
systematic use of patient access schemes to improve patient access to medicines which 
have not initially been assessed as cost or clinically effective by NICE. New and more 
flexible pricing arrangements in the 2009 PPRS enable manufacturers to supply drugs to 
the NHS at lower initial prices, with the option of increasing prices if value is proven 
later. In addition, more flexibility is introduced for price increases of drugs already in 
the market subject to NICE recommendations (Department of Health December 2008).
The system for pricing generics is different from that for branded medicines. Generic 
prices are set at prevailing market levels, plus a margin counted towards pharmacy 
remuneration. Maximum Price Scheme was introduced in 2000 to limit reimbursement
139 http://www.ispor.org/HTARoadMaps/UK.asp
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prices of most commonly dispensed generic medicines. This scheme was replaced in 
2005 by a system based on average manufacturer prices after discount.
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement
In the NHS, restrictions are placed on what can be prescribed; any pharmaceutical on 
the limited list is excluded from National Health Service prescription. All items, which 
can be prescribed on the NHS, are fully reimbursable with a fixed copayment per item.
Pharmacoeconomics
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) provides independent 
guidance on the cost-effectiveness of new technologies and treatments as well as the 
existing technologies on the market since 2006. Currently pharmacoeconomic 
evaluations are not taken directly into account when setting prices, nor reimbursement 
status. However, technology appraisals carried out by NICE have an indirect impact on 
price. NICE guidance on whether a product should be used in the NHS highly depends 
on the price level of the pharmaceutical product. Submission of pharmacoeconomic 
evaluations is mandatory for all pharmaceuticals referred to NICE for technology 
appraisal (Vogler 2008).
The UK is the first market where innovative risk-sharing schemes for pharmaceutical 
reimbursement were applied in 2002. The NHS made an agreement with multiple 
sclerosis companies to reduce prices if cost-effectiveness targets were not met. Risk 
sharing agreements have involved caps on the length of reimbursement, manufacturer 
discounts and rebates for non-responding patients. The use of such risk sharing 
agreements has become more common in the UK over time and recently in Italy. The 
2009 PPRS provides a framework for risk sharing and flexible pricing in the UK and is 
expected to increase the importance of such agreements in providing market access to 
high-priced innovative therapies in the UK.
Generic Substitution
Generic prescribing is encouraged but not mandatory; as of 2009, substitution at the 
pharmacy level is only allowed if prescribed by INN. However, in early 2010, generic 
substitution will come into effect, which will allow dispensing an equivalent generic 
medicine unless substitution is excluded by a physician. The introduction of generic 
substitution together with price cut provisions in 2009 and 2010 is expected to decrease 
NHS spending on branded medicines 5% per annum over the lifetime of the scheme.
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A P P E N D IX  B: A p p en d ix  to  C h a p te r  2 
Appendix B .l: Descriptive Tables and Results
Table B.l Number of Markets Molecules Launched
# Markets Launched Freq. Percent Cum.
1 969 21.09 21.09
2 432 9.4 30.5
3 346 7.53 38.03
4 285 6.2 44.23
5 247 5.38 49.61
6 200 4.35 53.96
7 165 3.59 57.55
8 160 3.48 61.04
9 134 2.92 63.95
10 128 2.79 66.74
11 131 2.85 69.59
12 125 2.72 72.31
13 115 2.5 74.81
14 108 2.35 77.17
15 112 2.44 79.6
16 126 2.74 82.35
17 121 2.63 84.98
18 163 3.55 88.53
19 192 4.18 92.71
20 335 7.29 100
Total 4,594 100
Figure B.l Histogram and kernel density of failure times 
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Table B.2 Number o f Molecules by country and period o f first global launch
US&UK MOLECULES
[60-84) [84-95] [95-08] Total
Australia 311 156 217 684
Austria 272 165 243 680
Belgium 265 136 166 567
Canada 332 159 218 709
Finland 236 158 245 639
France 305 172 233 710
Germany 325 175 257 757
Greece 263 163 2 1 0 636
Italy 296 168 239 703
Japan 260 124 132 516
Netherlands 259 163 219 641
Poland 297 163 2 1 0 670
Portugal 213 116 1 1 0 439
South Africa 306 161 168 635
Spain 264 138 153 555
Sweden 196 149 226 571
Switzerland 309 170 227 706
Turkey 253 156 178 587
UK 385 194 266 845
US 385 194 266 845
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Table B.3 Mean and Median Launch Lags over Time
Country
US & UK Molecules (Non-generic)
1995-2008 1984-1995 1960-1984
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Australia 3.5980s) 1.752 8.1460s) 4.838 18.1430s) 12.252
Austria 2.1810s) 0.999 6.5140s) 3.42 19.2540s) 9.415
Belgium 5.7200s) 2.667 9.1370s) 3.666 19.7910s) 8.501
Canada 3.4310s) 1.336 7.402(*) 4 13.2570s) 6.084
Finland 2.2590s) 0.999 7.3970s) 3.337 22.804(*) 13.999
France 2.903(*) 1.585 6.4820s) 3.329 16.5580s) 6.585
Germany 1.444 0 . 6 6 8 4.7030s) 2 . 0 0 1 11.5760s) 3.001
Greece 4.1380s) 2.166 7.798(*) 4.58 22.250(*) 14.412
Italy 2.927 1.749 6.2270s) 3.584 16.0190s) 6.253
Japan 7.8850s) 6.582 12.4410s) 9.673 21.2180s) 11.414
Netherlands 3.042(*) 0.75 5.726(*) 1.837 19.1580s) 7.247
Poland 4.402(*) 3.001 9.3950s) 7.335 27.9800s) 26.497
Portugal 8.5210s) 13.254 12.8840s) 8.83 25.4360s) 19.162
S. Africa 5.590(*) 3.168 7.8770s) 4 21.7760s) 20.246
Spain 6.3180s) 2.667 1 0 .1 170s) 5.84 19.3090s) 7.077
Sweden 2.8090s) 0.747 8.3110s) 4.167 27.842(*) 27.83
Switzerland 2.964(*) 1.413 5.8420s) 2.828 12.799(*) 4.085
Turkey 5.7010s) 4 9.3810s) 6.834 25.803(*) 21.832
UK 1.27 0.75 3.151 1.914 8.817 3.083
US 0.665 0 . 0 0 1 3.602 2.664 10.052 7.666
OVERALL 3.829(*) 1.667 7.6360s) 4.085 18.8230s) 10.587
(*) largest observed analysis time is censored, mean is underestimated
Table B.3 presents the mean and median failure times in each country for molecules that 
first launched globally during 1995-2008, 1984-1995 and 1960-1984 respectively. The 
restricted mean times are reported, i.e. the area under the survival curve without 
exponentially extending the survival curve to zero. The median survival times 
correspond to the failure time when the probability of survival beyond t is 0.5, i.e. S(t) = 
0.5.
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Tables for Generic Molecules
Table B.4 Number o f  Generic Molecules by Period o f First Launch
Country 1960-1984 1984-1995 1995-2008 Total
Australia 157 57 31 245
Austria 115 55 29 199
Belgium 1 1 0 45 18 173
Canada 172 64 35 271
Finland 115 51 29 195
France 132 59 27 218
Germany 170 71 40 281
Greece 130 55 2 2 207
Italy 139 57 27 223
Japan 146 41 2 1 208
Netherlands 131 61 31 223
Poland 162 6 8 30 260
Portugal 95 51 2 1 167
S. Africa 1 0 0 52 24 176
Spain 1 2 0 53 25 198
Sweden 85 50 27 162
Switzerland 123 51 16 190
Turkey 128 51 26 205
UK 214 90 46 350
US 214 90 46 350
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Table B.5 Mean and median launch delays for generic molecules that launched in the US and UK
Country
1960-1984 1984-1995 1995-2008
Subjects Median Restrictedmean Subjects Median
Restricted
mean Subjects Median
Restricted
mean
Australia 199 24.586 27.460(*) 85 16 15.4460s) 42 8.085 7.425(*)
Austria 207 33.418 31.961(*) 8 6 14.001 16.248(*) 45 7.915 7.8770s)
Belgium 2 1 0 39.086 33.84300 89 17.084 18.075(*) 46 • 10.05200
Canada 2 0 0 17.333 22.390(*) 8 6 10.242 12.9810s) 40 6.916 6.56000
Finland 2 0 0 31.496 31.36700 89 16 16.5530s) 44 7.417 8.0980s)
France 205 29.752 31.178(*) 87 15.663 15.9120s) 46 8.914 8.6100s)
Germany 191 15.168 20.877(*) 83 12.167 12.7680s) 44 5.081 6.0600s)
Greece 2 0 0 32.838 30.055(*) 85 15.253 15.21500 46 8.413 9.26100
Italy 176 27.083 28.2940') 85 16.999 16.81700 46 9.339 8.37400
Japan 181 18.412 24.920(*) 8 8 22.412 18.78400 45 11.496 9.782(*)
Netherlands 191 32.832 32.0530s) 71 13.413 15.38600 42 6.418 7.45100
Poland 193 29.495 30.6110s) 84 11.086 13.11400 41 7.168 7.85800
Portugal 209 . 35.0850s) 8 6 16 15.92200 45 11.496 9.259(*)
S. Africa 154 31.247 32.2820s) 81 14.834 16.26100 42 8.832 8.91100
Spain 195 34.749 31.1470s) 83 13.919 16.11000 43 9.747 8.965(*)
Sweden 2 1 2 . 36.3880s) 90 15.001 16.57800 45 8.167 8 .1 1900
Switzerland 2 0 1 29.248 30.6540s) 89 15.918 17.17300 45 . 10.5300s)
Turkey 209 28.413 29.4810s) 82 16.085 15.29300 39 9.832 8.76700
UK 194 18.168 18.619 80 11.25 10.596 42 4.252 4.486
US 197 13.67 14.767 79 9.752 9.754 41 4.504 5.224
total 3924 26.831 28.6150s) 1688 14.579 15.31400 869 7.833 8.11700
(*) largest observed analysis time is censored, mean is underestimated
Table B.5 presents the mean and median failure times in each country for generics that first launched globally during 1995-2008, 1984- 
1995 and 1960-1984 respectively. The restricted mean failure times correspond to the area under the survival curve without exponentially 
extending the survival curve to zero. The median survival times represent failure times when the probability of survival beyond t is 0.5, i.e. 
S(t) = 0.5.
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Appendix B.2: Non-parametric Survival Analysis
In the context of survival analysis, main functions of interest are the survival 
function S ( t) , the hazard function h(t) and the cumulative hazard function H (t) . The 
survival function indicates the probability of surviving beyond time t or the 
probability that no failure event occurs prior to time t .
t
S(t) = P r(r > r) = l - F ( f ) = l - J f(u )d u
0
where T is a non-negative random variable that denotes the time to failure, F(t) is the 
cumulative distribution function of failure time and / ( / ) i s  the probability density 
function of failure time. The survivor function is a monotone, non-increasing function 
of time.
Sit) 6  [0,1],
SCO) = 1 and < o .
dt
Probability density function for the survival time is:
f i t )  l imP r ( f - r ^  + A/) 8F(<) ” ( 0
o At dt dt
where At is an infinitesimal interval of time and f ( t ) >  0.
The hazard function is defined as the instantaneous rate of failure. It is the limiting 
probability that the failure event occurs between time /and / + At conditional on 
survival up to time t , divided by the interval length A t .
/ / f x - l i m P r ( ^ 7’ < f  +  A < | 7 ’ - 0 - P r ( ^ 7’ < r  +  A0  1 1 _ . / ( 0
'  ’ At P r (T > t )  At S(t) At Sit)
hit) =
A/—>0
f i t )  f i t )
1 - F i t )  Sit) 
h(t) > 0 since both / ( / )  and S(t) are non-negative.
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The hazard rate measures the rate at which risk of failure is accumulated. The total 
risk accumulated up to time t is given by the cumulative hazard function (Cleves, 
Gould et al. 2008):
H(t) = J h(u)du
H (t) > 0 since h{t) > 0.
Given a random failure time T, the mean time to failure fij is defined as the area 
below the survival curve:
Hr = [  t f ( t ) d t  = S( t )d t .
The median failure fiT time is defined to be the 50th percentile of the failure time 
distribution. In general, survival time data have long, right-tails and the difference 
between the mean and the median may be considerable. I use the median delays to 
draw inferences where possible due to the skewed nature of the failure times.
Non-parametric methods make no assumptions about the functional form of the 
survivor function and the related hazard functions. They are, therefore, commonly 
used in order to avoid the assumption that some parametric model is correct if there is 
no valid reason a-priori (Hougaard 2000). A disadvantage of non-parametric analysis 
is that the effects of covariates are not modelled and the comparison of survival is 
carried out at a qualitative level across different covariate values (Cleves, Gould et al. 
2008).
I use the Kaplan-Meier estimate, also known as product limit estimate of the survivor 
function S(t) at time t . The Kaplan-Meier estimate assumes independent observation
times T^T2 ...Tn and corresponding failure indicators DliD2 ...Dn . For each time
point t the risk set is defined by the set of observations whose failure time is greater 
than or equal to t . The size of the risk set is given by the number of subjects under 
observation at time t ,  R(t) = 5^-1 {7/ > /}, where l{.} is the indicator function. Given
the fact that the subject has not failed at the beginning of the interval (/y_l5/y),  the
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conditional probability that the subject fails within the interval is 
Pj = Pr(/y_, < T < tj | tj_x < t ). The number of failures follows a binomial distribution
with probability parameter pj conditional on the number of non-failed individuals at
the beginning of the period. For any subject /at risk at the beginning of the period 
define a random variable DtJ with the binomial distribution:
Pr(D9 = l ) = ^ , P r ( A J = 0 ) = l - ^ .
The estimate of the conditional probability of failure within the interval is:
? i>» d .
Therefore, the estimate of the survivor function is given by (Kaplan and Meier 1958):
m =pr(r>o=n(i-p>nfn- ^
W  nj J
where n} is the number of subjects at risk, d} is the number of failures at time tj and 
t] ^  observed failure times. The estimate of the survival function is given
as the product over all observed failure times (i.e., country-molecule launches) less
A
than or equal to time t, S(t) is a right continuous decreasing step function with 
changes at times of failure. If the largest time value corresponds to a death, 
S(t) becomes eventually 0 ; otherwise, if the largest time value is censored the 
function will have a non-zero value at that time point and will be undefined afterward. 
In mean lifetime calculations, the survival time is assumed to be zero after the largest 
time to obtain the restricted mean survival estimate, which is a lower bound for the 
mean survival time. A safer way is the estimation of the median if the observation 
period is long enough for S(t) to cross 0.5. The standard error reported for the 
Kaplan-Meier estimate S(t) is given by Greenwood's formula:
d.
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The reported confidence interval bounds for S(t) are calculated asS(/)exp*±z“/2<7^ ,  
where z a/2 is the l - a / 2 quintile of the normal distribution, and <x2(/)is the 
asymptotic variance of ln{— lnS(/)| (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002).
I  in
jVj*
r , m 2n j - d j
J)
The real advantage of the non-parametric model is the fit, which can handle any 
distribution. However, a major disadvantage is that the hazard function is not defined 
for a discrete distribution and cannot be estimated. The discrete masses of Kaplan- 
Meier (and the corresponding discrete cumulative hazard estimates of Nelson-Aalen) 
have to be smoothed by kernel function smoothing to obtain estimates of the hazard 
function.
Appendix B.3: Semi-parametric Duration Analysis
The standard model for semi-parametric modelling is the Cox model (Cox 1972) 
according to which the hazard rate for the j'th subject depends on covariates 
z j = (zij »z 2j »•••» z Pj ) time t as follows:
A(/;z_,)=&o(/)exp(z,pJ
where p is a p x  1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimated from the data and
hQ(t) is the baseline hazard function for the standard set of conditions z = 0  which
describes the dependence of the hazard on time t . exp(zp) is the relative hazard, and
zp is the log-relative hazard. In the Cox semi-parametric model the baseline hazard
hQ(t) is not parameterized and is left unestimated but the effects of the covariates are
parameterized. The flexibility of the Cox model stems from the fact that no 
assumption is made about the shape of the hazard over time. The shape could be 
monotonic or non-monotonic but it is restricted to be the same for all subjects, in
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other words the subjects’ hazards are proportional to each other (Cleves, Gould et al. 
2008):
h[t\Zj) exp(z p j
— 7 r = ----- 7—^— r is constant over time if covariates z are time-
exp(zmP J
independent.
Exponentiated coefficients in the model give the ratio of the hazards for a one-unit 
change in the corresponding covariate:
p
h( f z  z  z z )  ^(,)exp 5>.fl + A
h ^ p Z 2j , . . ;Zk J ,...,Zpj] ^ (<) r £  z A
V'=1
= exp(A)
describes the change in the hazard on a logarithmic scale for a change in the
corresponding covariate z% of one unit, while all other covariates are kept fixed.
T h e r e f o r e , > 0 ,  i.e. exp(/?£.)> 1 is associated with an increased hazard rate. The
Cox PH model provides no estimate of the intercept as it is subsumed into the baseline 
hazard and handles time-varying covariates by splitting the data at the failure times in 
the sample. Parameters are estimated using the partial maximum likelihood, which 
works with likelihood contributions at each failure times, i.e. the conditional 
probabilities of observing the actual subject experiencing a failure given that there, 
was a failure at that time instant. Conditional on there being one failure at time 7}, the
failure time for subject i , and given the risk set 7?(7] ) , the probability that the failure
event belongs to subject i is given by:
Pr(i fails given the risk set R(T,)) = ^  fytTlOexpOtM-------
1 K ” Eye*(7;)W')<*P(zA>
Only p parameters contribute to the probability since baseline hazards cancel. The 
likelihood is defined as the product over all failure times:
L (B )=  FT fy)(7))exp(z iPjc)
1: failure times Z  (ZA >  ’
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Under the presence of time-varying covariates, the covariates are replaced by their 
values at the failure times:
\  i - r  M 7 / ) e x p { z ,(7 } )? * }
<: failure times T  (^  ) exp {zy (7} ) > '
Likelihood functions defined above are partial likelihoods since no assumptions are 
made about the baseline hazard at times when there is no failure. Estimates of 
p parameters are obtained by the maximization of the natural logarithm of the partial
likelihood function Z,(px). Different methods exist to break ties if multiple failures
occur at a given failure time (e.g., Breslow, Efron, exact marginal-likelihood method, 
and the exact partial-likelihood method). I use the Breslow method (1974) to deal 
with tied failures, which Stata assumes to be the default method (Breslow 1974)140.
The Cox model removes the effects of time very effectively and is extremely flexible 
regarding effects of covariates. One disadvantage of the Cox model is that the 
assumption of proportional hazards is influenced by heterogeneity; similarly for the 
hazard rate. If the distribution of the effect on the hazard of the neglected covariates 
follows a positive stable distribution141, the model still shows proportional hazards, 
but the regression coefficients are attenuated towards zero (Hougaard 2000).
140 Breslow method works well when the number of failures in the risk group is small relative to the 
size of the risk group
141 Strict stable distributions have the property that, with Y},..., Yn iid random variables, for each 
n there exists a normalizing constant c{ri) such that D(Y,Yi) = D{c(n)Y) where D{Y) is the
i=1
assumed distribution of Y . The constant c{n) takes form n110 with 6 £ (0,2], 6 being the 
characteristic exponent.
259
APPENDIX C: Appendix to Chapter 3
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Appendix C.l: Early Literature of Market Entry and Timing of Launch
The literature on time lags in the availability of pharmaceutical products across different 
countries started in the late 1960’s after the Thalidomide disaster and the resulting 1962 
Amendments in the USA (also known as Kefauver Harris Amendment or Drug Efficacy 
Amendment). These amendments aimed to prevent economic loss by regulating product 
quality and introduced a requirement for drug manufacturers to provide proof of the 
effectiveness and safety of all new drugs before approval, and stopped cheap generic 
drugs being marketed as expensive drugs under new trade names.
The term “drug lag” was coined and popularized by Wardell, a pharmacologist, whose 
publications increased awareness of the unavailability of new drugs in the US following 
the 1962 Amendments (Wardell 1973; Wardell 1974; Wardell 1978). Findings of 
studies by Wardell (1972, 1973, 1978) that analyze the rates and patterns of new drug 
introductions in the US and Britain during 1962-1971 and 1972-1976 showed that the 
US lagged behind Britain in terms of drug availability both in terms of time and clinical 
implications. During 1960-1961 the number of new drug introductions in the US was 
1.13 times the British while for 1966-1971 this ratio was only 0.52. The drug lag during
1962-1971 was most marked in cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, respiratory, diuretic and 
antibacterial drugs (Wardell 1973). Similarly, categories in which the US lagged behind 
Britain back in 1976 included cardiovascular, peptic ulcer and central nervous system 
drugs, including therapies for depression, epilepsy, and migraine (Wardell 1978). From 
an economical point of view, Peltzman (1973) demonstrated that the implication of such 
delays in the accessibility of new products is a significant welfare loss in the society 
(Peltzman 1973). Peltzman found that both R&D and the number of new chemical 
entities entering the market declined following the amendments.
Findings of Wardell were supported by (Grabowski 1980), (Berlin and Jonsson 1986), 
and (Kaitin 1989). Berlin and Jonsson (1986) compare the licensing times of new drugs 
during 1960-1982 for Sweden and five other countries (France, West Germany, Italy, 
Great Britain and USA). On average, NCE1 4 2  licensing dates are considerably later in 
Sweden, France, Italy and the USA than in West Germany and Great Britain. For NCEs 
introduced during the period 1960-82, the average time lag (after licensing in the first 
country) is 2.8 years in the first four countries, compared with 1.6 years in West
142 New Chemical Entity (NCE) is defined as any new molecular structure, excluding vaccines, 
diagnostic agents, and new salts, esters and dosage forms of previously approved compounds
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Germany and 1.3 years in Great Britain. The delay in all six countries is considerably 
longer during the period after 1970 than pre-1070 (Berlin and Jonsson 1986). Kaitin and 
Mattison (1989) show that the US continues to lag behind the UK in the availability of 
new drugs during 1983-1987 in terms of the length of the lag time (1.9 years for both 
1978-1982 and 1983-1987) (Kaitin, Mattison et al. 1989). Some studies suggested that 
when drug importance and withdrawals are taken into account the US drug lag is not 
evident or no worse than that of the other countries (de Haen 1975), (Coppinger, Peck et 
al. 1989).
Cullen (1983) considers the impact of market size, price levels, costs of gaining 
marketing approval and ease of marketing as influential factors on the diffusion process 
in terms of mean lags per country and the number of new products launched in each 
country (Cullen 1983)143. Cullen finds that forces that determine launch are different 
before 1969 and after 1969, which is confirmed later by findings of Parker (1984). 
While mean lags and the number of drugs launched before 1969 seems to be driven by 
commercial pull forces, the drugs launched after 1969 do not exhibit predictable 
diffusion patterns. Cullen explains this by the influence of regulations that changed 
diffusion from a commercial process to an administered process.
The first attempt by an economist to explain the pattern of pharmaceutical diffusion 
dates back to 1980. Grabowski studied the diffusion of 169 products launched during
1963-1975 into the UK, USA, France and West Germany, particularly focusing on the 
period before and after the 1962 Amendments. Grabowski (1980) provides the first 
regression analysis for the time delay in the literature that investigates the impact of 
regulatory stringency, market size, therapeutic importance rating of the FDA and 
national origin of the NCE (which is determined by the location of the R&D lab that 
made the discovery or the country where the discovering firm is owned). Grabowski 
shows that the US shifted from leading to lagging behind the UK and Germany in the 
post-1962 period. The lag with Europe was not confined to drugs with little or modest 
gain but also included drugs the FDA ranked as significant therapeutic advances. In 
general drugs with higher sales and higher therapeutic importance (as rated by the FDA) 
diffused more widely and more rapidly than less important products (Grabowski 1980).
143 The set of countries considered by Cullen (1983): UK, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, 
New Zealand and the US
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This study concludes that the major contributing factor to the lag is the change in 
regulation.
Parker (1984) investigates the impact of introduction date of the drug (higher 
international awareness and improved harmonization of registration requirements for 
new discoveries), regulatory tightness of countries, therapeutic importance, 
attractiveness of markets (wealth and size of the market) and the type of country 
(developed vs. developing) on launch delay of drugs across countries by using IMS 
volume data in 18 countries during 1954-1978. The set of countries considered is 
divided into rich and poor countries144,145. Arrival time lags are based on first marketing 
dates, which precludes the identification of delays caused due to regulatory delays (time 
from submission for MA to clearance) vs. companies actions (time from clearance to 
marketing). Parker observes a tendency for countries with tight regulatory procedures1 4 6  
to acquire drugs earlier than their less stringent counterparts do. In other words, tough 
regulation in a country does not necessarily imply longer regulatory delays, which 
contradicts findings from the recent literature. This can be explained by the fact that 
regulation during the observation period tended to be stricter in wealthier and bigger 
sized markets, i.e. in markets with a high commercial pull.
Therapeutically more important1 4 7  drugs in Parker’s sample tend to have higher sales 
and achieve wider global coverage (pre-1971) than their less important counterparts. 
Less developed economies have fewer drugs than their rich counterparts and the mean 
arrival time lags are larger for the less developed countries. However, after 1970, this 
pattern changes due to structural differences and redirection of company interests into 
less developed countries induced by regulation in developed markets. A limitation in 
this study is the limited availability of sales data; sales in 1976 or 1977 for each drug are 
used to approximate market attractiveness throughout the observation period. OLS 
regression of the time lag on the above-mentioned factors is not as methodologically 
strong as methods used in studies that are more recent.
144 Set of rich countries in Parker (1984): Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
UK, USA and West Germany
145 Set of poor countries in Parker (1984): Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, 
Philippines, Spain, Venezuela
146 Stringency of regulation is determined based on a questionnaire responses obtained from seven 
companies (absolute and relative regulatory tightness is assessed on a 1 to 5 scale ,where 1 indicates 
tightest regulatory character)
147 Therapeutic ratings are determined on a 1 to 5 scale by the Otago University Department of 
Pharmacology (class 1: fundamental importance, class 5: little or no advance)
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Over time, the US drug regulatory policy, highly criticized for causing a drug lag in the 
US, has served as a model for other countries (Von Grebmer 1980)148. Von Grebmer 
(1980) predicts that the international domino effect will lead to the disappearance of the 
US drug lag back in the 60’s. Similarly, de Haen (1975) predicts that the European and 
the US “drug lag” will be closed. The literature suggests that throughout 1990s Europe 
has had more regulation in the post-marketing phase in terms of price controls, which 
has reversed the balance of lags between the US and the EU over the past decade.
All of the researchers who conducted multi-country drug lag studies applied several 
criteria to identify significant or important NCEs. The most common approach was to 
define a set of consensus NCEs-about 25% of the total that were introduced in the 
majority of the countries studied (Coppinger, Peck et al. 1989). Barrel (1985) finds that 
there is a direct relationship between the therapeutic contribution of a new drug and its 
likelihood of achieving widespread introductions (Barral 1985). Parker (1984) reports a 
similar observation. If this finding is correct, most of one-market NCEs do not simply 
disperse among countries more slowly than others do: they are never going to be widely 
available due to their marginal therapeutic advantages.
Hass et al. (1984) study the survival of the NCEs in the US and the UK markets. For 
each year that NCEs were introduced in the US or UK during 1960-1982, Hass et al. 
identified those NCEs that were no longer marketed at the end of 1982 and produced a 
net measure of availability for the NCEs originally introduced in any given year (Hass, 
Portale et al. 1984). Substantially different discontinuation rates are observed depending 
on whether the NCE was mutually available or available exclusively in one market. 
Mutually available NCEs had a discontinuation rate of 1%, whereas exclusively 
available NCEs had a discontinuation rate of 14% in the US and 35% in the UK, most 
of the terminations being motivated by economic considerations and due to 
disappointing therapeutic contributions. This finding shows the importance of 
considering therapeutic benefits in the analysis of drug approval rates in addition to the 
number of approvals.
148 Pre-market drug regulation and approval came into Europe after 1962 with the thalidomide 
experience whereas regulatory controls in the US began around 1938 with the passage of the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. In 1962 Kefauver Harris Amendments extended FDA controls by requiring 
that companies prove safety and efficacy and demonstrate effectiveness through controlled clinical 
investigations, which was the main source for longer and costlier development periods for new drugs 
post-1962. Neither of countries other than the US required the IND (investigational new drug) 
procedure for clinical testing at that time
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Coppinger, Peck et al. (1989) find evidence that 1984 might have been the pivotal year 
in the history of drug introduction patterns between the US and the UK. After 1984, the 
drug lag for US no longer seems to persist; however, this is a tentative result as the 
study cautions that it might be placing too much weight on the numeric count of recent 
introductions from 1984-1987 compared to the period 1962-1983 (Coppinger, Peck et 
al. 1989). Kaitin compares the introduction of all new drugs approved in the US and the 
UK during Jan 1977- Dec 1987 and observes no change in the US lag time vis-a-vis UK 
during 1983-1987 (Kaitin, Mattison et al. 1989). Similarly, Kaitin concludes that there 
are small differences in discontinuations, which does not support the argument that 
delay protects the public from serious unforeseen adverse effects. Schweitzer, 
Schweitzer et al. (1996) compare the approval dates of 34 important pharmaceuticals 
that were approved in the US during 1970-1988 with the other G7 countries and 
Switzerland. Contrary to earlier findings this study finds that the US was relatively fast 
in approving drugs and that it does not suffer from a substantial drug lag (Schweitzer, 
Schweitzer et al. 1996).
One of the older studies by LaFrancis Popper et al (1994) tests the relationship among 
the types of regulation, product introductions and the timing of entry into the largest 
markets (US, Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, UK, Spain, and Canada) during 1970 
- 1989. The type of regulation is found to have a bigger impact on timing than the 
number of products launched. National formularies appear to have little relationship 
with product introductions or timing. Both generic substitution and national health plans 
slow product introductions. Compulsory out-licensing1 4 9  significantly increases the time 
to reach the market. Acceptance of non-domestic clinical testing is associated with a 
shorter time to market (LaFrancis Popper and Nason 1994).
Andersson (1992) reviews studies primarily related to the delay in introduction of new 
drugs and studies primarily related to the number of introduced new drugs. Most studies 
have found the US, Sweden, and Norway to have a long delay in the introduction of 
new drugs. The UK and (West) Germany in general have the shortest delays. There are 
also large differences in the number of introduced new drugs. In most studies, the US 
and Norway have introduced far fewer new drugs than any other industrialized country. 
In general (West) Germany, France, the UK, and Italy have introduced the largest
149 Companies can apply for a licence to manufacture, without the authorisation of the patent holder, 
pharmaceutical products for export to countries in need of medicines and facing public health 
problems
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number of new drugs. Regulatory processing time and regulatory stringency are 
associated with delays in introduction (Andersson 1992).
The impact of the stringency of the drug regulatory systems emerges as an important 
determinant of the drug lag in the early literature. However, the introduction of the UK 
Medicines Act in 1971 along with subsequent efforts of the FDA to speed the review 
process in the late 1970s and early 80s helped close the long-discussed gap between the 
US and the UK drug introductions. Economical factors, demand for particular drugs, 
differences in medical practice and culture became other important considerations for 
pharmaceutical firms during this period.
Impact of Drug Review Times
As described in Chapter 2, there are a couple of regulatory hurdles firms need to 
overcome before commercializing a new drug product. Once the firm has carried out the 
pre-clinical and clinical trials necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy (the first 
hurdle), the manufacturer submits the drug for market authorization. The review of the 
new product dossier by the regulatory authority (FDA150, EMEA1 51 or any national 
authority) and approval of marketing authorization (MA) has been termed as the 
second-hurdle. Chapter 2 provided descriptive evidence by using Kaplan-Meier 
estimates on how the stringency of marketing authorization affects the timing and 
availability of pharmaceutical product launches.
Several empirical studies in the literature have compared drug review times across 
different periods or countries as a determinant of differentials in launch delays. The 
pioneering work belongs to Dranove and Meltzer (1994) who model a Weibull 
parameterization of time-to-approval from the first worldwide patent application 
(discovery date) to new drug approval as a proxy of market entry or access to the drug 
in the US. The study uses US patent registers to collect the data for analysis. 
Explanatory variables used in the Weibull model are marketing importance of the drug 
(US sales volume and the number of countries the drug launched in), scientific
1 Oimportance (citations in medical textbooks, citations in medical journals and 
subsequent patent applications, and FDA ranking of therapeutic novelty), drug 
characteristics (whether it is indicated for old or young people, and whether it is for
150 Food and Drug Administration
151 European Medicines Agency
152 total number of articles indexed between 1962-1990 for each NME
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chronic vs. acute use) and firm characteristics (cumulative number of FDA approvals 
before the approval of the drug). This study confirms that more important drugs are 
developed and approved more rapidly. Within the US setting, this also translates to 
quicker launch since products do not have to go through pricing negotiations as in the 
EU. Importance is found to affect both the time from first worldwide patent application 
to new drug application (NDA) and time from NDA to NDA approval. Generally, 
quicker approval is observed if the firm is domestic which is confirmed by more recent 
studies that investigate launch in other markets, particularly in Europe. However, the 
generalizability of the results to the EU context is limited due to the different dynamics 
in the EU (Dranove and Meltzer 1994).
Several studies from the US have identified that firm attributes may have an effect on 
the review times, often favouring larger firms in terms of faster FDA approval times. 
Carpenter and Turenne (2004) analyze 766 new molecular entities submitted to the 
FDA from 1979 to 2000. Their findings suggest that large-firm advantage in 
pharmaceutical regulation is primarily due to two factors: ( 1 ) enhanced regulator 
familiarity with large firms (2 ) regulatory favour for “early entrants” to a disease 
market, induced from disease-specific consumer pressure for approvals. The analysis 
concludes that as much as 70% of observed large-firm advantage in expected FDA 
approval times can be attributed to these factors, and 30-55% to familiarity alone 
(Carpenter and Turenne 2004). Such evidence is lacking for the European context; 
however, it is likely that familiarity of the European regulators with large firms has also 
positively affected approval times for these firms.
The US witnessed a number of legislative acts passed in the 1980s and 1990s designed 
to encourage the development of innovative products, especially for rare, serious or life- 
threatening diseases, and to ensure that patients had timely access to these treatments. 
The Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development analysed clinical development and 
approval data for 554 therapeutics approved in the US from 1980-2001 to assess the 
impact of these modifications. Trends in the number of approved products and the 
clinical development and approval times indicated that the effects of these changes were 
generally beneficial during mid- to late-1990s, but that the gains have not been 
sustained in the early 2000s (Reichert 2003).
Thomas, McAuslaine et al. 1998 analyze data on review times for compounds approved 
between 1990 and 1995 in at least one of nine major pharmaceutical markets (Australia,
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Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US). Review times are 
shown to be decreasing in the majority of the markets. In 1995 the average review time 
was around two years in most countries. The study indicates that there are differences in 
the time a compound spends in review between authorities, even when the same 
compound is submitted in the same time frame (Thomas, McAuslaine et al. 1998). The 
differences could be attributed to the quality of the dossier submitted, company 
response time to questions raised during the review, and the ability of authorities to 
manage the review both effectively and efficiently. A later study by Carpenter, 
Chemew et al. (2003) suggest that some of the differentials could be due to staffing 
patterns and the capacities of the regulatory authorities (Carpenter, Chemew et al. 
2003). NDA review times shortened by 3.3 months for every 100 additional FDA staff 
during 1977-2000. In particular, the amount of funding available for the review stuff is
1 STfound to have an important influence on NDA review times .
In the European setting, the review process has been harmonized for certain disease 
areas since 1995 with the establishment of the centralized approval procedure. Under 
the centralized procedure, companies submit a single marketing authorization 
application to the European Medicines Agency and obtain the right to commercialize 
their product in all EU member states (plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). To 
enhance the quality and speed of drug development for products that go through the 
EMEA's centralized procedure, the European Commission has passed additional 
regulations such as exceptional circumstances approvals and orphan designations.
153 Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992,augmented the FDA’s budget through the 
charging of user fees
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Appendix C.l: Discrete Time Survival Analysis
Discrete-time survival analysis is concerned with the analysis of time-to-event data 
whenever survival times are intrinsically discrete or grouped into discrete intervals of 
time (interval censoring). Discrete-time survival methods can be fitted with the 
maximum likelihood method. Logit for the discrete-time logistic hazard model or 
cloglog for the discrete-time proportional hazards model can be used.
Estimation is applied to a specially organized dataset and the sample likelihood is 
written in a form identical to the likelihood of a binary dependent variable multiple 
regression model. The dataset is organized such that there is one observation for each 
period when the subject is at risk of experiencing the transition event. This is 
established by expanding the dataset with the “expand” command in Stata. Censoring 
variables are defined as in the Cox model (censoring variable is one if the failure occurs 
and zero otherwise). In addition, indicator variables (du) are defined such that the 
indicator variable is equal to one only if t equals the failure time and the subject is not 
censored; for all other periods, the indicator variable is zero.
Different from the Cox model, cloglog requires the definition of additional covariates to 
describe the pattern of duration dependence. Common examples for duration 
dependence specification include:
1 ) p-th order polynomial function of time, i.e. yxt + y2t 2 + y3t3 +... + yptp, where yt ’s are
shape parameters. With a quadratic specification t and t2 are added as variables; the 
interval hazard is U-shaped or inverse-U shaped (and hence non-monotonous duration 
dependence can be estimated). A cloglog specification with a quadratic specification is
cloglog | h [t,zj = yxt + y2t2 + Zjpx, and yt ’s are estimated together with Px.
2) Piecewise constant such that groups of months have the same hazard rate with
different hazards between groups. A piecewise constant specification can be defined by 
defining a set of dummy variables, with each group of periods sharing the same hazard 
rate. A semi-parametric model analogous to the Cox regression model can be defined 
using separate dummy variables for each duration interval.
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3) Discrete-time analogue to the continuous Weibull model can be obtained by a  ln(7). 
The shape of the hazard monotonically increases if a > 0, decreases if a  <0 or is 
constant if a  = 0 (Jenkins 2005).
If no duration variable is assigned, a model with a constant hazard rate is fitted. 
Discrete-time survival analysis is then fit by a binary dependent variable multiple 
regression model with dit as the dependent variable154. The cloglog command with dit 
as the dependent variable in Stata fits the probability of failure at t conditional on the 
covariates and the fact that failure prior to t has not occurred (i.e. the interval hazard rate 
is estimated as):
P ridjt (t) = \\T jk >t) = h(t,Z j) = \ -  exp(- exp(z + / ,) ) ,
where yt is a function of t that describes the duration dependence and Tj is the failure 
time of subject j . For example, for a quadratic specification the hazard is 
h(t,Z j) = \ -  exp(- expire + y - f  + z ; px)).
The marginal effect is given by:
dh—  = exp j-e x p (zyp + y ,)}exp(zJp + y,)/}J , 
which implies that the marginal effect has the same sign as the estimated parameter.
Clustering can be used in Stata to relax the independence assumption required by the 
complimentary log-log estimator. Clustering would assume independence between the 
clusters instead of individual observations. With cloglog, the transformation is not 
symmetric. Typically, cloglog is used when the negative or positive outcome is rare (in 
this chapter the rare event corresponds to the launch event). The log-likelihood function 
for cloglog with a quadratic specification is:
In Z = £  w, to F(ytt + y f  + z yP) + £  % In {l -  F{y{t + y f  + z,p)}
j e S  j t S
where S is the set of all observations j such that dJt= 1, F{z) = l-exp(-exp(z)) and Wj 
denotes the optional weights ( z . may include duration dependence terms).
154 Stata Reference Manual, Volume 1, 2009, page 21.
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Interpretation of Cox and Cloglog Estimates
Both cloglog and Cox provide the same estimates of p[or exp(p)] for regulation,
competition, molecule and firm characteristics in the launch hazard equations. Note that 
both for the Cox and Cloglog model, the marginal effect dh / dzi has the same sign as
the estimated parameter /?, since !%{t) > 0  and exp(.) > 0 .
Table C.l Comparison of cloglog and Cox models
Function Cloglog Cox
Hazard Rate: h 1 -  exp(- exp(zp + yt )) fy>(Oexp{zp}
Marginal Effect:
d h /
/d z ,
exp {-exp (z p + r , )} exp (zp + r,)P> ^(O exp{zp}$
ex p  (Pi)
ln (A '-l)  
In (/z — l)
h'
h
Note: h' is the new hazard rate when z/. increases by 1
Stata reports parameter estimates either in the exponentiated form exp(/?/)or non­
exponentiated form as pr  In the Cox model, exp(^) has an intuitive interpretation. If 
z;. increases by 1, the hazard becomes /z '(0  =  ^ o (O e x p { z (O P }e x P ( A ) =  ^ (O e x P ( A )  • 
exp(/?,) in the Cox model, therefore, shows by how much the hazard increases when 
the covariate z; is changed by 1 unit. The same interpretation, however, is not valid 
under the cloglog model (see Table A.2.1). With exp(/?/)> l for cloglog this implies 
that ln (/z '- l)  > ln ( f t - l ) , i.e. t i  >h but the effect is not multiplicative. Both in the Cox 
and the Cloglog models if exp(/?,) >1 (/?/ > 0 ), then an increase in z/ increases h. On 
the other hand, if exp(/?/) < 1  (/?/ < 0 ), an increase in zi decreases h.
Another commonly used approach for discrete hazard estimation is the logistic model. 
For short intervals, the logistic model becomes very similar to the discrete proportional 
hazards model. The logistic model is discussed in Appendix D.
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A ppendix C.3: D ata A nalysis
C.3.1 D escriptive Statistics
Table C.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Regressions
External Environment Descriptive Statistics
Regulatory Environment Description Mean StdDev Min Max
Expected Price ($/SU ) A vg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 42.87 174.92 0 3509.06
Relative Price High Price EU 0.29 0.46 0 1
Price Setting External Referencing 0.83 0.37 0 1
Market Environment
Expected Market Size (000 SUs) Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 24,736 96,220 0.001 2,413,040
GDP per capita ($) GDP per capita ($) 26,804 8,080 8,046 46,336
Population (000) Population (000s) 41,359 51,691 5,165 303,598
Age profile o f  the population %  Population > 65 yrs 15.31 3.36 5.32 22.11
Health profile o f  the population Life expectancy in yrs 78.61 2.73 69.5 82.8
Corruption Corruption Perception Index 7.06 1.93 3.1 10
Competitive Environment
Market Concentration M olecule Concentration in Ctry-ATC4(IHH) 55239.77 173633.80 304.76 8396584
Intermolecular Competition Number o f  M olecules in Ctry-ATC4 9.89 15.94 0 226
Generic Competition Numb, o f  M olecs with Generic Comp in Ctry-ATC4 7.85 16.25 0.01 198
Internal Environment
Firm Characteristics
Economies o f  Scope Firm Sales (global) in 2007 14,100,000 12,900,000 0 37,800,000
Number o f  Countries Firm has Launched in 15.71 7.05 1 20
Econom ies o f  Scale Firm's Total Number o f Molecules 453.51 401.01 1 1365
Local Firm Experience (number o f  m olecs launched) 112.14 121.50 1 769
Location o f  Firm Headquarters Dom estic Launch 0.11 0.31 0 1
Molecule/Product Characteristics
Therapeutic/Commercial Importance Global M olecule Sales in 2007 357,758 766,566 0 11,500,000
Molecule's Global Reach (total markets launched in) 15.40 3.09 10 20
Cumulative Markets Diffused at t Markets Launched in at t 3.82 5.77 0 20
Period o f  Launch (old vs. new m olec.) First Launch Before 1999 0.67 0.47 0 1
Note: all lags are by one quarter
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Number of Molecule Launches by Country
The number of molecules launched in each country varies considerably with respect to 
the market. Germany is the market with the highest number of molecules in total and 
the highest number of molecules that launched most recently. Sweden, Portugal, 
Finland, Netherlands exhibit a relatively low number of molecule launches. However, in 
some countries with high numbers of molecule launches, molecules can be potentially 
local without any commercial/therapeutic importance on a global scale (e.g. in Japan). 
The average number of countries a molecule launches is 7.9 (with a standard deviation 
of 6 .6 ); ignoring one-market molecules, the average number of markets a molecule 
reaches is 9.8 with a standard deviation of 6.3. About half of the molecules launched in 
less than 6  markets and about 2 1 % of the molecules launched in one market only.
Table C.3 Number of Molecules Launched by Country
Molecules that Launched during 1999-2008
PORTUGAL 505
SWEDEN 587
FINLAND 642
NETHERLANDS 727
SPAIN 769
BELGIUM 784
GREECE 999
AUSTRIA 1029
ITALY 1089
JAPAN 1145
CANADA 1149
SWITZERLAND 1158
TURKEY 1187
UK 1233
SAFRICA 1299
POLAND 1452
AUSTRALIA 1531
FRANCE 1563
US 1636
GERMANY 1913
All Molecules
SWEDEN 987
FINLAND 1173
NETHERLANDS 1343
PORTUGAL 1374
GREECE 1514
TURKEY 1665
BELGIUM 1675
CANADA 1749
SPAIN 1814
UK 1817
AUSTRIA 1829
SAFRICA 1885
JAPAN 1982
POLAND 2012
AUSTRALIA 2050
ITALY 2133
US 2138
SWITZERLAND 2242
FRANCE 2306
GERMANY 2662
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Table C.4 Mean Number o f  Corporations by Country (Brand and Generic Status)
Country
Mean 
Number o f  
Corporations
License/
Original
Brand
Unbranded Generic Non­generic
Australia 5.2 1.5 7.55 6 . 8 6 4.09
Austria 2.99 1.97 3.73 5.8 3.16
Belgium 2 . 6 8 2 . 0 1 2.79 5.74 3.74
Canada 4.05 1.58 6.51 8.35 3.36
Finland 2.31 2.09 4.53 4.95 2.34
France 4 1.79 8.43 10.56 5.78
Germany 1 0 . 8 8 8.99 11.89 19.22 1 1
Greece 3.18 1.54 1.91 15.17 1.95
Italy 4.31 2.4 10.92 16.41 4.54
Japan 7.37 1.94 9.29 17.42 10.7
Netherlands 5.17 7.86 8.47 9.95 7.83
Poland 3.77 2.15 5.61 7.67 3.43
Portugal 3.26 1.74 14 13.33 4.12
South Africa 3.62 1.61 4.03 7.87 3.97
Spain 4.06 2.49 12.96 13.2 7.38
Sweden 2.44 3.32 4.3 4.88 3.31
Switzerland 3.87 1 . 6 6 3.47 6.15 5.11
Turkey 4.08 1.62 8.91 7.4 3.8
UK 4.42 1.7 9.48 12.31 3.89
US 9.5 1.72 24.11 40.44 10.45
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Table C.5 Average Molecule Prices (prices per SU in $s)
Country
License /  
Original 
Brands
Other
Brands Unbranded Generic
Non-
Generic
Australia 0.47 0 . 1 1 0.136 0.124 0.342
Austria 0.575 0.161 0.327 0 . 2 2 1 0.497
Belgium 0.489 0.175 0.191 0.172 0.384
Canada 0.959 0 . 1 2 2 0.143 0.15 0.769
Finland 0.798 0.177 0.217 0.172 0.575
France 0.683 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 2 0 2 0.167 0.436
Germany 0.759 0.182 0.16 0.164 0.632
Greece 0.434 0.167 0.07 0.135 0.387
Italy 0.598 0.204 0.249 0.188 0.484
Japan 0.534 0.141 0.195 0.088 0.339
Netherlands 0.973 0.229 0.16 0.158 0.764
Poland 0.303 0.106 0.05 0.106 0.216
Portugal 0.351 0.144 0.343 0.241 0.272
South Africa 0.23 0.061 0.032 0.046 0 . 1 1
Spain 0.345 0.134 0.128 0.114 0.284
Sweden 0.795 0.136 0.108 0.113 0.558
Switzerland 0.873 0.171 0.283 0.255 0.583
Turkey 0 . 1 0 2 0.043 0.044 0.05 0.082
UK 0.607 0 . 1 1 2 0.115 0.126 0.5
US 2.173 0.314 0.144 0.171 1.896
Table C.5 shows the average molecule prices in individual countries with respect to 
branded versus generic categories. Prices are, however, not directly comparable as mix 
of dosage, form and strength for products are different across countries.
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C.3.2 Regression Results
Table C. 6 Marginal Effects for Cloglog and Cox Estimates (Molecules with First Launch after 1993)
Molecules with global 
launch post 1993
Marginal Effects in Cox Regressions Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t) Marginal Effects in Cloglog (semi-parametric)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Lagged Avg Non- 
Generic Price/SU in Ctry- 
ATC4
0.160***
[0.03]
0.001
[0.0007]
0.003
[0.08]
0.198***
[0.05]
0.004***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.004***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Log Lagged Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4
0.092***
[0.02]
0
[0.0005]
0.003
[0.06]
0.147***
[0.04]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
0.003***
[0.0004]
0.002***
[0.0004]
Log Population (000s) 0[0.0005]
-0.095
[2.15]
-0.001
[0.00]
-0.13
[0.08]
-0.002
[0.00]
-0.109
[0.08]
Population > 65 yrs 0[0.0004]
0
[0.01]
0.003***
[0.0005]
0
[0.0024]
0.003***
[0.0005]
0
[0.0023]
L ife  expectancy in yrs -0.002[0.00]
0.003
[0.07]
-0.010***
[0.0010]
0.003
[0.003]
-0.010***
[0.0010]
0.003
[0.003]
Log GDP per capita ($) 0.008[0.01]
0.051
[1.20]
0.052***
[0.01]
0.047*
[0.02]
0.052***
[0.01]
0.052*
[0.02]
Corruption Perception 
Index
0.001
[0.00]
0.003
[0.07]
0.003***
[0.0008]
0.003
[0.0028]
0.003***
[0.0009]
0.003
[0.0025]
Years since global launch 
(t)
0
[0.0010]
0.002
[0.0011]
0.003**
[0.0011]
0.004***
[0.0011]
Years since global launch 
squared (t2)
-0.000**
[0.0001]
-0.000***
[0.0001]
-0.001***
[0.0001]
-0.001***
[0.0001]
Country Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
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ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number o f Observations 58530 54794 54794 58530 58530 54794 54794 58530 58530 54794 54794 58530
LogLikelihood -16860 -15848 -15790 -16682 -10727 -10058 -10001 -10541 -10762 -10089 -10028 -10572
Akaike's Info Criteria 33765 31751 31671 33449 21506 20179 20100 21171 21573 20236 20150 21229
Bayesian Info Criteria 33972 32001 32081 33826 21740 20455 20537 21575 21788 20495 20569 21616
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates 
reported . Models (2) and (3) have fewer observations because data to control for country characteristics is not available for South Africa in the OECD database
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C.3.2.1 Multicollinearity
Table C.7 VIF estimates for Model 1
Parametric
Model 1
Variable VIF 1/VIF
tA2 9.16 0.109226
tA2 9.06 0.110355
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.27 0.440197
ATC1 == L 2.19 0.455908
ATC1 — N 2.14 0.467087
A TC1== J 2.03 0.491872
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 1.93 0.517876
year == 2000 1.60 0.624328
ATC1 == M 1.60 0.625011
year == 2001 1.59 0.628895
ATC1 =  S 1.56 0.642352
year == 2002 1.56 0.642789
ATC1 =  B 1.54 0.648456
year =  2003 1.53 0.652056
ATC1 =  G 1.51 0.663724
year =  2004 1.48 0.676272
ATC1 —  C 1.45 0.691575
year =  2005 1.43 0.697903
year == 2006 1.37 0.72777
ATC1== H 1.29 0.772777
ATC1== R 1.27 0.787184
ATC1 =  D 1.25 0.799051
year == 2007 1.21 0.824842
ATC1== V 1.15 0.866365
year =  2008 1.08 0.928658
Mean VIF 2.17
Semi-Parametric
Model 1
Variable VIF 1/VIF
ATC1 == L 2.19 0.456797
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.18 0.457802
ATC1 =  N 2.12 0.472167
ATC1 ==J 2.02 0.494289
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 1.91 0.524011
year =  2000 1.6 0.62633
A TC1== M 1.59 0.627956
year == 2001 1.58 0.631202
year == 2002 1.55 0.647097
ATC1 —  S 1.54 0.650973
ATC1 == B 1.52 0.658891
year =  2003 1.52 0.659233
ATC1 =  G 1.51 0.663748
year == 2004 1.45 0.689106
ATC1 =  C 1.45 0.69197
year =  2005 1.39 0.720139
year =  2006 1.33 0.752184
ATC1 == H 1.28 0.781191
ATC1 =  R 1.27 0.78811
A TC1== D 1.24 0.804415
year == 2007 1.17 0.853225
ATC1 == V 1.15 0.869405
year =  2008 1.04 0.959398
Mean VIF 1.55
Commands
xi: regress _d L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ i.year i.atcl _t _t2 
estat vif
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Table C.8 VIF estimates for Model 2
Parametric
Model 2
Variable VIF 1/VIF
LifeExp_ 10.78 0.0927
ln_GDPcap_ 10.38 0.0963
t 9.44 0.1059
tA2 9.44 0.1059
pcntover65_ 4.61 0.2168
CPI_ 4.25 0.2351
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.87 0.3486
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.83 0.3533
ATC1== L 2.2 0.4539
ATC1== N 2.14 0.4683
ATC1 =  J 2.02 0.4950
year =  2000 1.61 0.6203
year =  2001 1.61 0.6203
ln_popn_ 1.61 0.6230
year == 2002 1.6 0.6249
year == 2004 1.59 0.6272
year == 2003 1.59 0.6296
ATC1== M 1.58 0.6328
ATC1== B 1.56 0.6408
_Iyear_2005 1.54 0.6474
ATC1== S 1.53 0.6515
year == 2006 1.51 0.6604
ATC1== G 1.49 0.6694
ATC1 =  C 1.44 0.6952
year == 2007 1.32 0.7594
ATC1== H 1.31 0.7621
ATC1=  R 1.27 0.7870
ATC1== D 1.25 0.8012
ATC1== V 1.17 0.8553
year == 2008 1.1 0.9099
Mean VIF 2.96
Semi-Parametric
Model 2
Variable VIF 1/VIF
LifeExp_ 10.66 0.0938
ln_GDPcap_ 10.32 0.0969
pcntover65_ 4.58 0.2184
CPI_ 4.24 0.2361
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.78 0.3593
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.75 0.3639
ATC1 == L 2.2 0.4543
ATC1 == N 2.11 0.4729
ATC1 == J 2.01 0.4987
year == 2000 1.61 0.6220
year == 2001 1.61 0.6222
year == 2002 1.59 0.6290
ATC1 =  M 1.58 0.6343
ln_popn_ 1.57 0.6358
year =  2003 1.57 0.6363
year =  2004 1.57 0.6385
ATC1 =  B 1.54 0.6500
ATC1 =  S 1.52 0.6582
year == 2005 1.5 0.6670
ATC1 =  G 1.49 0.6697
year == 2006 1.47 0.6799
ATC1== C 1.44 0.6954
ATC1== H 1.3 0.7698
year =  2007 1.28 0.7824
ATC1== R 1.27 0.7885
ATC1== D 1.24 0.8052
ATC1 =  V 1.16 0.8594
year == 2008 1.07 0.9345
Mean VIF 2.46
Commands:
xi: regress _d L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ ln_popn_ pcntover65 
LifeExp_ ln_GDPcap_ CPI_ i.year i.atcl _t _t2
estat vif
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Table C.9 VIF estimates for Model 3
Parametric
Model 3
Variable VIF 1/VIF
ln_popn_ 13339.51 0.0001
country ==JAPAN 3942.07 0.0003
country = U S 2164.04 0.0005
country ==TURKEY 1795.79 0.0006
country ==ITALY 1112.16 0.0009
country =FRA NCE 1035.24 0.0010
country =GERM ANY 980.36 0.0010
country ==FINLAND 965.77 0.0010
country ==UK 586.20 0.0017
country ==POLAND 583.51 0.0017
country
=SWITZERLAND 549.94 0.0018
country — AUSTRIA 364.50 0.0027
country ==SPAIN 337.94 0.0030
LifeExp_ 288.25 0.0035
country =G REECE 237.72 0.0042
country ==BELGIUM 222.96 0.0045
country ==PORTUGAL 207.08 0.0048
country — SWEDEN 194.69 0.0051
ln_GDPcap_ 165.23 0.0061
country ==CANADA 142.29 0.0070
pcntover65_ 136.44 0.0073
CPI_ 38.20 0.0262
year == 2006 20.77 0.0482
year —  2005 17.16 0.0583
year == 2004 15.51 0.0645
year == 2007 14.41 0.0694
country
^NETHERLANDS 13.86 0.0721
year == 2003 9.90 0.1010
t 9.70 0.1030
tA2 9.58 0.1044
year =  2002 7.88 0.1269
year —  2001 5.53 0.1808
year —  2008 4.60 0.2173
year == 2000 3.03 0.3299
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 3.00 0.3330
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.94 0.3400
ATC1 = L 2.24 0.4470
Semi-Parametric
Model 3
Variable VIF 1/VIF
ln_popn_ 13305.64 0.0001
country ==JAPAN 3934.02 0.0003
country ==US 2158.56 0.0005
country ==TURKEY 1793.1 0.0006
country ==ITALY 1109.92 0.0009
country ==FRANCE 1032.99 0.0010
country ==GERMANY 977.98 0.0010
country =FINLAND 963.34 0.0010
country = U K 584.68 0.0017
country =PO LA N D 583.02 0.0017
country
==SWITZERLAND 548.57 0.0018
country ==AUSTRIA 363.65 0.0028
country ==SPAIN 337.23 0.0030
LifeExp_ 288.22 0.0035
country — GREECE 236.91 0.0042
country =BELG IUM 222.27 0.0045
country =PORTUGAL 206.33 0.0048
country =SW EDEN 194.17 0.0052
ln_GDPcap_ 165.07 0.0061
country — CANADA 141.9 0.0070
pcntover65_ 136.18 0.0073
CPI_ 38.17 0.0262
year == 2006 20.69 0.0483
year == 2005 17.1 0.0585
year == 2004 15.47 0.0646
year =  2007 14.35 0.0697
country
==NETHERLANDS 13.85 0.0722
year == 2003 9.88 0.1012
year =  2002 7.87 0.1271
year == 2001 5.53 0.1809
year =  2008 4.57 0.2190
year == 2000 3.03 0.3300
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.87 0.3481
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.85 0.3503
ATC1 =  L 2.23 0.4476
ATC1 == N 2.13 0.4692
ATC1 =  J 2.03 0.4921
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ATC1 == M 1.58 0.6315
ATC1== B 1.56 0.6429
ATC1== S 1.53 0.6537
ATC1—  G 1.5 0.6665
A TC1== C 1.45 0.6901
ATC1 =  H 1.31 0.7629
A TC1== R 1.28 0.7820
A TC1== D 1.25 0.7987
A TC1== V 1.17 0.8553
Mean VIF 640.41
ATC1 —  N 2.15 0.4647
ATC1 —  J 2.05 0.4886
ATC1 == M 1.59 0.6302
ATC1== B 1.58 0.6328
ATC1== S 1.55 0.6463
ATC1== G 1.50 0.6661
ATC1—  C 1.45 0.6900
ATC1== H 1.32 0.7557
ATC1== R 1.28 0.7802
ATC1== D 1.26 0.7947
ATC1== V 1.17 0.8516
Mean VIF 615.56
Commands: xi: regress _d L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ ln_popn_ 
pcntover65_ LifeExp_ ln_GDPcap_ CPI_ i.year i.atcl i.countrynosector _t _t2
estat vif
Table C.10 VIF estimates for Model 4
Parametric
Model 4
Variable VIF 1/VIF
t 9.54 0.1049
tA2 9.43 0.1061
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 3.05 0.3282
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.99 0.3339
country =JA PA N 2.26 0.4429
ATC1 = L 2.23 0.4483
country ==TURKEY 2.17 0.4602
ATC1 = N 2.16 0.4637
country ==POLAND 2.06 0.4847
ATC1—  J 2.06 0.4852
country — SAFRICA 1.95 0.5128
country — ITALY 1.87 0.5346
country ==FRANCE 1.85 0.5394
country — GREECE 1.84 0.5446
country ==CANADA 1.7 0.5867
country — BELGIUM 1.67 0.5997
country
— SWITZERLAND 1.66 0.6011
country — FINLAND 1.63 0.6133
ATC1 == M 1.61 0.6214
year == 2000 1.6 0.6240
year == 2001 1.59 0.6284
Semi-Parametric
Model 4
Variable VIF 1/VIF
L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.92 0.3425
L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ 2.9 0.3453
ATC1== L 2.23 0.4491
country ==JAPAN 2.21 0.4516
country ==TURKEY 2.17 0.4605
ATC1 ==N 2.13 0.4685
country ==POLAND 2.06 0.4849
ATC1 —  J 2.05 0.4878
country ==SAFRICA 1.95 0.5133
country ==ITALY 1.87 0.5351
country ==FRANCE 1.85 0.5401
country — GREECE 1.83 0.5456
country ==CANADA 1.7 0.5871
country ==BELGIUM 1.67 0.6001
country
— SWITZERLAND 1.66 0.6022
country — FINLAND 1.62 0.6156
ATC1 —  M 1.6 0.6240
year —  2000 1.6 0.6258
year — 2001 1.59 0.6305
country — PORTUGAL 1.57 0.6374
ATC1 —  S 1.55 0.6447
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ATC1 == S 1.57 0.6360
country ==PORTUGAL 1.57 0.6373
ATC1 == B 1.57 0.6389
country ==AUSTRIA 1.56 0.6418
year == 2002 1.56 0.6422
country ==SPAIN 1.54 0.6502
year == 2003 1.54 0.6513
ATC1 =  G 1.52 0.6589
country ==GERMANY 1.49 0.6705
year == 2004 1.48 0.6749
country = U K 1.48 0.6758
ATC1 = C 1.46 0.6837
country = U S 1.46 0.6866
year == 2005 1.43 0.6969
country ==SWEDEN 1.4 0.7126
year == 2006 1.38 0.7267
country
==NETHERL AND S 1.36 0.7372
ATC1 =  H 1.31 0.7634
ATC1 ==R 1.28 0.7797
ATC1 =  D 1.26 0.7925
year =  2007 1.22 0.8228
ATC1== V 1.17 0.8556
year == 2008 1.08 0.9250
Mean VIF 2.04
year == 2002 1.55 0.6463
country ==AUSTRIA 1.55 0.6470
ATC1 == B 1.54 0.6485
country = SPA IN 1.53 0.6517
year == 2003 1.52 0.6583
ATC1 == G 1.52 0.6591
country ==GERMANY 1.49 0.6733
country = U K 1.47 0.6799
ATC1 =  C 1.46 0.6840
year == 2004 1.46 0.6873
country ==US 1.45 0.6905
country ==SWEDEN 1.4 0.7145
year =  2005 1.39 0.7190
country
^NETHERLANDS 1.35 0.7410
year == 2006 1.33 0.7509
ATC1== H 1.3 0.7702
ATC1== R 1.28 0.7812
ATC1== D 1.25 0.7976
year == 2007 1.17 0.8513
ATC1 =  V 1.16 0.8592
year == 2008 1.05 0.9565
Mean VIF 1.67
Commands
xi: regress _d L3_ln_pr_SU_atc4Ctry_ L3_ln_SU_atc4Ctry_ i.year i.atcl 
i.countrynosector _t _t2  
estat vif
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C.3.2.2 Robustness Checks 
Time Effects
Table C.l 1 Robustness Check: Time Effects
Variables
Param eter Estimates by C loglog (quadratic in t) M arginal Effects in C loglog (quadratic in t)
1 2 3 4 (post- 99) 1 2 3
4 (post- 
99)
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU 
in Ctry-ATC4
0.084***
[0.0150]
0.077***
[0.0152]
0.087***
[0.0151]
0.060**
[0.0205]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003**
[0.0009]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 0.065***[0.0107]
0.061***
[0.0105]
0.067***
[0.0108]
0.058***
[0.0136]
0.003***
[0.0004]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
0.003***
[0.0004]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU 
in Ctry-ATC4 * ln(t)
-0 .0 2 0 **
[0.0072]
-0 .0 2 0 **
[0.0072]
-0 .0 0 1 **
[0.0003]
-0 .0 0 1 **
[0.0003]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 * 
ln(/)
-0.015***
[0.0043]
-0.014***
[0.0042]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
First Launch Before 1999 -0.285***[0.0775]
-0.282***
[0.0770]
-0 .0 1 1 ***
[0.0029]
-0 .0 1 1 ***
[0.0029]
Years since global launch (t) 0 .2 2 1 ***[0.0417]
0.140***
[0.0289]
0.263***
[0.0427]
0.384***
[0.0594]
0.009***
[0.0017]
0.006***
[0 .0 0 1 2 ]
0 .0 1 0 ***
[0.0017]
0.017***
[0.0027]
Years since global launch squared (Z2) -0.024***[0.0036]
-0.016***
[0.0027]
-0.024***
[0.0036]
-0.044***
[0.0099]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 58530 58530 58530 34560 58530 58530 58530 34560
LogLikelihood -10530.25 -10534.25 -10523.92 -6860.47 -10530.25 -10534.25 -10523.92 -6860.47
Akaike's Info Criteria 21154.507 21160.504 21143.849 13810.938 21154.507 21160.504 21143.849 13810.938
Bayesian Info Criteria 21576.44 21573.46 21574.76 14191.21 21576.44 21573.46 21574.76 14191.21
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. tandard errors clustered at molecule-countiy level (standard errors in brackets).
Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported. Model 4 estimates are for molecules that launched globally after 1999
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Table C.12 Robustness Check: Time Effects and Age o f Therapeutic Class
Variables Parameter Estimates by Cloglog (quadratic in t)
1 2
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 0 .1 2 1 ***
[0 .0 2 ]
0.126***
[0 .0 2 ]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 0.086***
[0 .0 1 ]
0.089***
[0 .0 1 ]
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 * 
TherapClassAge
-0.013**
[0 .0 0 ]
-0.013**
[0 .0 0 ]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 * TherapClassAge -0.006**[0 .0 0 ]
-0.006**
[0 .0 0 ]
Log Lagged Avg Non-Generic Price/SU in Ctry-ATC4 * ln(t) -0.006[0 .0 1 ]
Log Lagged Total SU in Ctry-ATC4 * ln(Z) -0 .0 1 0 *
[0 .0 0 ]
Years since global launch (/) 0.125***
[0.03]
0 1 9 7 ***
[0.04]
Years since globed launch squared (Z2) -0.017***
[0 .0 0 ]
-0 .0 2 2 ***
[0 .0 0 ]
Country Dummies Yes Yes
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 55432 55432
LogLikelihood -10054.95 -10051.72
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Akaike's Info Criteria 20203.9043 20201.4446
Bayesian Info Criteria 20623.28 20638.67
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.
Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported . 
Estimates for molecules that launched globally after 1993
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Market Structure and Competition
Table C.13 Robustness Check: Market Structure and Competition
Variables Parameter Estimates by Cloglog (quadratic in t) Marginal Effects in Cloglog (quadratic in t)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Lagged 
Avg Price/SU
0.069***
[0.0160]
0.097***
[0.0238]
0.073***
[0.0162]
0.086***
[0.0163]
0.003***
[0.0007]
0.004***
[0.0009]
0.003***
[0.0007]
0.004***
[0.0007]
Log Lagged 
Total SU in 
Ctry-atc4
0.047***
[0.0113]
0.081***
[0.0148]
0.006
[0 .0 1 2 2 ]
0.016
[0.0126]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0005]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0
[0.0005]
0 . 0 0 1
[0.0005]
Log Molecule 
Concentration 
in Ctry-atc4 
(IHH)
-0.065**
[0.0236]
-0.039
[0.0273]
-0.004
[0.0252]
-0.008
[0.0253]
-0.003**
[0 .0 0 1 0 ]
-0 . 0 0 2
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0
[0 .0 0 1 0 ]
Log Number 
of Molecules 
with Generic 
Comp in Ctry- 
ATC4
-0.013
[0 .0 1 2 1 ]
0
[0.0005]
Log Number 
of Molecules 
in Ctry-ATC4
0.281***
[0.0344]
0.278***
[0.0343]
0 .0 1 2 ***
[0.0014]
0 .0 1 2 ***
[0.0014]
Log Lagged 
Avg Price/SU 
* ln(t)
-0 .0 2 1 **
[0.0074]
-0 .0 0 1 **
[0.0003]
Log Lagged 
Total SU * 
ln(t)
-0.015***
[0.0043]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
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First Launch 
Before 1999
-0.358***
[0.0865]
-0.014***
[0.0034]
Years since 
global launch
a)
0.080**
[0.0270]
0.088**
[0.0312]
0.082**
[0.0273]
0.263***
[0.0438]
0.003**
[0 .0 0 1 2 ]
0.003**
[0 .0 0 1 2 ]
0.003**
[0 .0 0 1 2 ]
0 .0 1 1 ***
[0.0018]
Years since 
global launch 
squared (t2 )
-0.014***
[0.0028]
-0.013***
[0.0030]
-0.015***
[0.0028]
-0.024***
[0.0037]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
Country
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
Observations 54721 38098 54721 54721 54721 38098 54721 54721
LogLikelihood -10290.07 -6731.46 -10246.68 -10225.81 -10290.07 -6731.46 -10246.68 -10225.81
Akaike's Info 
Crit 20672.15 13556.92 20587.35 20551.62 20672.146 13556.92 20587.35 20551.62
Bayesian Info 
Crit 21082.01 13958.68 21006.12 20997.12 21082.01 13958.68 21006.12 20997.12
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in 
brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported
Firm Characteristics
Table C. 14 Robustness Check: Firm Effects
Variables Parameter Estimates by Cloglog (quadratic in t)
Marginal Effects in Cloglog 
(quadratic in t)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Lagged Avg Non- 
Generic Price/SU in 
Ctry-ATC4
0.069***
[0.0149]
0,071***
[0.0150]
0.073***
[0.0149]
0.082***
[0.0151]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Log Lagged Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4
0.064***
[0.0106]
0.066***
[0.0107]
0.062***
[0.0105]
0.074***
[0 .0 1 1 0 ]
0.003***
[0.0004]
0.003***
[0.0004]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
0.003***
[0.0004]
Log Firm Sales (global) 
in 2007
0 . 1 1 1 ***
[0.0126]
0.128***
[0.0140]
0.004***
[0.0005]
0.005***
[0.0005]
Log Number of 
Countries Firm has 
Launched in
0.217***
[0.0448]
0.009***
[0.0017]
Log Local Firm 
Experience (number of 
molecules launched)
0.084***
[0.0162]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Log Firm's Total Number 
of Molecules
0.074***
[0.0157]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Domestic Launch -0.04[0.0913]
0 .2 1 0 *
[0.1034]
-0 . 0 0 2
[0.0035]
0.009
[0.0047]
Log Lagged Avg Non- 
Generic Price/SU in 
Ctiy-ATC4 * ln(t)
-0 .0 2 0 **
[0.0072]
-0 .0 0 1 **
[0.0003]
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Log Lagged Total SU in 
Ctry-ATC4 * ln(t)
-0.015***
[0.0043]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
First Launch Before 1999 -0.344***[0.0760]
-0.013***
[0.0028]
Years since global launch 
(t)
0.124***
[0.0268]
0.118***
[0.0266]
0.104***
[0.0265]
0.310***
[0.0430]
0.005***
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0.005***
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0.004***
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0 .0 1 2 ***
[0.0017]
Years since global launch 
squared (t2 )
-0.016***
[0.0028]
-0.016***
[0.0028]
-0.015***
[0.0027]
-0.026***
[0.0037]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 58521 58530 58530 58521 58521 58530 58530 58521
LogLikelihood -10487.9 -10502.04 -10526.97 -10463.85 -10487.9 -10502.04 -10526.97 -10463.85
Akaike's Info Crit 21067.8 21098.1 21147.9 21027.7 21067.8 21098.1 21147.9 21027.7
Bayesian Info Crit 21480.7 21520.0 21569.9 21476.6 21480.7 21520.0 21569.9 21476.6
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in
brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported
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Molecule Characteristics
Table C.15 Robustness Check: Molecule Characteristics
Variables
Parameter Estimates by Cloglog 
(quadratic in t)
Marginal Effects in Cloglog 
(quadratic in t)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Log Lagged 
Price/SU
0.068***
[0.0151]
0.072***
[0.0152]
0.060***
[0.0151]
0.084***
[0.0153]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0006]
0.003***
[0.0006]
Log Lagged Total 
SU in Ctry-ATC4
0.053***
[0.0105]
0.053***
[0.0105]
0.054***
[0.0105]
0.062***
[0.0109]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
0 .0 0 2 ***
[0.0004]
Log Global 
Molecule Sales
0.074***
[0.0128]
0.003***
[0.0005]
Log Molecule’s 
Global Reach
1.521***
[0.1544]
1.531***
[0.1530]
0.059***
[0.0059]
0.059***
[0.0058]
Log Markets 
Launched in at t
-0.387***
[0.0443] 0.015***[0.0017]
Log Lagged Avg 
Price/SU * ln(t)
-0 .0 2 1 **
[0.0073]
-0 .0 0 1 **
[0.0003]
Log Lagged Total 
SU * ln(t)
-0.015***
[0.0042]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 2 ]
First Launch 
Before 1999
-0.276***
[0.0769]
-0 .0 1 0 ***
[0.0028]
Years since global 
launch (t)
0 .1 0 0 ***
[0.0264]
0.105***
[0.0267]
-0.085**
[0.0327]
0.276***
[0.0430]
0.004***
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
0,004***
[0 .0 0 1 1 ]
-0.003**
[0.0013]
0 .0 1 1 ***
[0.0017]
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Years since global 
launch squared
-0.015***
[0.0027]
-0.017***
[0.0028]
-0.003
[0.0029]
-0.026***
[0.0036]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
0
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
-0 .0 0 1 ***
[0 .0 0 0 1 ]
Number of Obs 58279 58530 58229 58530 58279 58530 58229 58530
LogLikelihood -10433 -10485 -10478 -10467 -10433 -10485 -10478 -10467
Akaike's Info Crit 20958 21061 21049 21031 20958 21061 21049 21031
Bayesian Info Crit 21370 21474 21461 21471 21370 21474 21461 21471
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported. Country, ATC1 and calendar-year dummies included
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Regulation: EU Subsample
Table C.16 Robustness Check: Regulation EU subsample
Variables
Parameter Estimates 
by Cloglog (quadratic in t)
Marginal Effects 
by Cloglog (quadratic in t)
1 2 3(post-99) 1 2
3
(post-99)
Log Lagged Avg 
Price/SU
0.096***
[0.017]
0.096***
[0.017]
0.102***
[0.022]
0.004***
[0.0007]
0.004***
[0.0007]
0.005***
[0.0010]
Log Lagged Total 
SU
0.072***
[0.012]
0.072***
[0.0124]
0.079***
[0.0162]
0.003***
[0.0005]
0.003***
[0.0005]
0.004***
[0.0007]
External
Referencing
-0.574***
[0.12]
-0.030***
[0.008]
High Price EU 0.823***[0.1322]
0.913***
[0.19]
0.042***
[0.008]
0.051***
[0.013]
Years since global 
launch (t)
0.154***
[0.0341]
0.154***
[0.0341]
0.574***
[0.0683]
0.007***
[0.0015]
0.007***
[0.0015]
0.026***
[0.0032]
Years since global 
launch squared 
(t2)
-0.021***
[0.0035]
-0.021***
[0.0035]
-0.068***
[0.0122]
-0.001***
[0.0002]
-0.001***
[0.0002]
-0.003***
[0.0006]
Number of Obs 39189 39189 23767 39189 39189 23767
LogLikelihood -7420.85 -7420.85 -4899.87 -7420.85 -7420.85 -4899.87
Akaike's Info Crit 14919.69 14919.69 9877.746 14919.69 14919.69 9877.746
Bayesian Info Crit 15254.16 15254.16 10192.71 15254.16 15254.16 10192.71
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level
(standard errors in brackets). Non-exponentiated parameter estimates reported . Country, ATC1 
and calendar-year dummies included
Figure C.l Distribution of Parameter Estimates
Distribution of Beta Estimates for Price Distribution of Beta Estimates for Volume
cloglog_price 3 cox_price cloglog_vol I I cox_vol
Note: C loglog with quadratic duration dependence
Table C .l 7 Descriptive statistics for parameter estimates o f expected price
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
cloglog_price 16 1.0715 0.030945 1 1.102
cox_price 16 1.106938 0.016834 1.072 1.136
Table C.l 8 Descriptive statistics for parameter estimates o f expected volume
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min M ax
c lo g lo g v o l 16 1.063125 0.018743 1.006 1.085
cox_vol 16 1.075687 0.02162 1.013 1.101
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Appendix C.4: Supplementary Data
Table C.l 9 Populations of Countries in 000s
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 18,925.86 19,153.38 19,413.24 19,651.44 19,895.44 20,127.36 20,394.79 20,697.88 21,015.04 21,015.69
Austria 7,992.32 8,011.57 8,043.05 8,083.80 8,117.75 8,174.73 8,233.31 8,281.95 8,315.38 8,337.61
Belgium 10,226.42 10,251.25 10,286.57 10,332.78 10,376.13 10,421.13 10,478.62 10,547.96 10,625.70 10,692.72
Canada 30,403.88 30,689.04 31,021.25 31,372.59 31,676.08 31,995.20 32,312.08 32,649.48 32,976.03 33,095.00
Finland 5,165.47 5,176.20 5,188.01 5,200.60 5,213.01 5,228.17 5,246.10 5,266.27 5,288.72 5,306.84
France 58,673.08 59,049.35 59,454.45 59,863.27 60,264.20 60,643.30 60,995.91 61,352.57 61,707.07 61,840.27
Germany 82,100.24 82,211.51 82,349.93 82,488.50 82,534.18 82,516.26 82,469.42 82,376.45 82,247.02 82,772.16
Greece 10,882.61 10,917.46 10,949.95 10,987.56 11,023.53 11,061.74 11,103.93 11,148.53 11,192.85 11,217.71
Italy 56,911.68 56,937.01 56,971.67 57,151.03 57,597.22 58,166.89 58,597.42 58,930.67 59,336.39 58,851.26
Japan 126,686 126,925.84 127,291 127,435.0 127,619 127,687. 127,768 127,769.5 127,770.8 127,567.9
Netherlands 15,812.09 15,925.51 16,046.18 16,148.92 16,225.30 16,281.78 16,319.87 16,346.10 16,381.69 16,389.96
Poland 38,270.00 38,258.48 38,248.08 38,232.30 38,195.18 38,180.25 38,161.31 38,132.28 38,115.97 37,926.87
Portugal 10,171.95 10,225.84 10,293.00 10,368.41 10,441.07 10,501.97 10,549.42 10,584.34 10,608.33 10,619.69
Spain 39,927.22 40,264.16 40,721.45 41,314.02 42,004.58 42,691.75 43,398.19 44,068.24 44,873.57 44,310.87
Sweden 8,857.88 8,872.11 8,895.96 8,924.96 8,958.23 8,993.53 9,029.57 9,080.51 9,148.09 9,195.18
Switzerland 7,144.00 7,184.25 7,229.85 7,284.76 7,339.00 7,389.63 7,437.11 7,483.93 7,550.02 7,617.04
Turkey 66,337.99 67,392.50 68,366.83 69,304.05 70,231.02 71,151.01 72,064.99 72,971.47 73,875.00 74,767.00
UK 58,684.43 58,886.07 59,113.50 59,323.50 59,557.34 59,845.84 60,238.38 60,587.35 60,975.36 61,411.69
US 279,040.2 282,194.31 285,112.03 287,888.0 290,447.6 293,191.5 295,895.9 298,754.8 301,621.2 303,597.7
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS
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Table C.20 Percentage o f the Total Population aged 65 and over
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 12.34 12.42 12.55 12.64 12.73 12.83 12.93 13.01 13.16 13.71
Austria 15.41 15.43 15.47 15.48 15.48 15.74 16.26 16.69 17.03 17.26
Belgium 16.68 16.80 16.90 16.98 17.07 17.17 17.22 17.16 17.08 17.07
Canada 12.45 12.55 12.65 12.73 12.84 12.96 13.08 13.24 13.41 13.63
Finland 14.77 14.92 15.08 15.25 15.46 15.72 15.94 16.23 16.49 16.63
France 15.94 16.06 16.16 16.24 16.30 16.38 16.44 16.44 16.47 16.50
Germany 16.09 16.45 16.85 17.28 17.75 18.32 18.94 19.53 19.93 20.06
Greece 16.31 16.63 17.00 17.36 17.69 17.98 18.32 18.54 18.60 18.57
Italy 17.97 18.27 18.56 18.86 19.12 19.35 19.60 19.84 2 0 . 0 0 20.28
Japan 16.72 17.37 17.96 18.54 19.05 19.48 20.16 20.82 21.49 2 2 . 1 1
Netherlands 13.54 13.58 13.63 13.68 13.78 13.94 14.15 14.37 14.60 14.86
Poland 12.03 12.24 12.47 12.71 1 2 . 8 6 13.05 13.21 13.35 13.44 13.40
Portugal 15.92 16.20 16.45 16.61 16.75 16.91 17.07 17.19 17.34 16.93
Spain 16.61 16.82 16.93 16.94 16.89 16.83 16.75 16.69 16.64 16.99
Sweden 17.33 17.26 17.22 17.18 17.16 17.21 17.27 17.33 17.43 17.69
Switzerland 15.22 15.34 15.49 15.61 15.66 15.77 15.91 16.10 16.31 16.54
Turkey 5.32 5.38 5.43 5.51 5.62 5.75 5.88 5.97 6.04 6 . 1 2
UK 15.81 15.81 15.86 15.91 15.96 15.99 16.00 15.99 16.04 16.17
US 12.47 12.43 12.39 12.36 12.38 12.38 12.42 12.47 12.56 12.74
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS
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Table C.21 Life expectancy at birth in years: total
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 79.0 79.3 79.7 80.0 80.3 80.6 80.9 81.1 81.3 81.5
Austria 77.8 78.1 78.6 78.8 78.8 79.3 79.5 79.9 80.1 80.3
Belgium 77.7 77.8 78.1 78.2 78.2 78.9 79.1 79.5 79.7 79.9
Canada 79.0 79.3 79.6 79.7 79.9 80.2 80.4 80.6 80.8 81.0
Finland 77.5 77.7 78.2 78.3 78.5 79.0 79.1 79.5 79.7 79.9
France 78.9 79.2 79.3 79.4 79.3 80.3 80.2 80.9 81.1 81.3
Germany 77.9 78.2 78.5 78.5 78.6 79.2 79.4 79.8 80.0 80.2
Greece 78.1 78.0 78.5 78.7 78.9 79.1 79.3 79.6 79.8 80.0
Italy 79.7 80.0 80.2 80.3 80.0 80.9 80.9 81.1 81.3 81.5
Japan 80.6 81.2 81.5 81.8 81.9 82.1 82.0 82.4 82.6 82.8
Netherlands 77.9 78.0 78.3 78.4 78.6 79.2 79.4 79.8 80.0 80.2
Poland 72.7 73.9 74.3 74.6 74.7 75.0 75.1 75.3 75.5 75.7
Portugal 76.2 76.7 77.0 77,2 77.4 78.3 78.1 78.9 79.1 79.3
Spain 78.9 79.4 79.7 79.8 79.7 80.3 80.4 81.1 81.3 81.5
Sweden 79.5 79.7 79.9 79.9 80.2 80.6 80.6 80.8 81.0 81.2
Switzerland 79.8 79.9 80.4 80.6 80.6 81.2 81.4 81.7 81.9 82.1
Turkey 69.5 70.5 70.6 70.8 71.0 71.2 71.4 71.6 71.8 72.0
UK 77.5 77.9 78.2 78.3 78.4 78.9 79.1 79.3 79.5 79.7
US 76.7 76.8 77.1 77.2 77.5 77.8 77.8 78.0 78.2 78.4
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS ( Values for 2006 (Canada, Italy and UK only), 2007, 2008 found by exponential smoothing 
with alpha = 0.95)
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Table C. 22 GDP per capita
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 26128.00 27232.66 28280.91 29610.50 31138.58 32429.03 33962.76 35666.18 37564.68 38171.90
Austria 27010.57 28736.22 28803.54 30224.83 31096.03 32589.24 33495.73 35259.30 37119.30 37722.37
Belgium 25299.27 27540.44 28435.39 29946.22 30146.26 31035.17 32063.15 33608.19 35382.25 35960.22
Canada 27135.32 28446.91 29334.25 29893.27 31241.85 32811.47 35002.25 36867.06 38500.34 39172.12
Finland 23697.79 25652.66 26652.45 27592.09 27703.31 29905.30 30695.44 32586.09 34717.98 35206.25
France 23615.51 25232.35 26643.27 27771.66 27409.80 28305.25 29758.69 31054.96 32686.29 33223.03
Germany 25141.67 25918.96 26861.69 27587.16 28579.34 29911.91 31379.56 32834.94 34390.73 34981.27
Greece 17031.88 18388.86 19933.54 21597.60 22577.14 24173.48 24928.09 26700.57 28422.97 28820.41
Italy 24196.44 25564.66 27133.58 26803.97 27149.36 27426.42 28122.31 29356.23 30381.22 30968.92
Japan 24252.39 25592.96 26194.58 26813.52 27483.13 29038.71 30310.34 32040.05 33626.15 34184.52
Netherlands 26932.89 29371.44 30795.78 31943.50 31716.39 33221.37 35110.66 37130.15 39224.72 39831.53
Poland 9996.32 10554.74 10953.15 11562.62 11990.23 13019.50 13785.77 14841.96 15988.54 16177.77
Portugal 16113.29 17066.80 17804.43 18446.85 18799.47 19178.42 20656.24 21656.33 22815.40 23182.19
Spain 19824.41 21295.34 22596.91 24066.50 24759.06 25967.88 27376.76 29519.98 31585.74 31994.16
Sweden 25800.81 27725.55 27970.84 29003.77 30075.94 32078.04 32298.10 34455.59 36603.11 37133.76
Switzerland 30210.38 31778.01 32473.09 33792.81 33695.78 34971.93 35839.14 38568.28 41101.45 41665.95
Turkey 8046.33 8724.35 8178.01 8216.67 8316.42 9595.48 10840.82 12074.14 12993.29 13136.67
UK 24248.96 26041.06 27585.03 28888.07 29863.24 31746.92 32694.74 34136.67 35668.88 36299.51
US 32994.19 34573.86 35307.95 36145.24 37489.17 39608.85 41718.04 43838.72 45488.88 46335.89
(unit of measure: US dollars, PPPs. Values for 2008 found by exponential smoothing with alpha = 0.85) 
Source: http://webnet.oecd.org/wbos/
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Table C.23 GDP deflators used to calculate real sales figures
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 96.17 1 0 0 104.01 106.59 110.38 114.15 119.23 124.67 129.57 134.65
Austria 98.26 1 0 0 101.76 103.22 104.44 106.59 108.51 110.43 112.93 115.65
Belgium 98.15 1 0 0 101.99 103.89 105.59 108.18 110.79 113.05 114.92 118.11
Canada 96.03 1 0 0 1 0 1 . 1 2 1 0 2 . 2 2 105.58 108.99 112.65 115.31 118.94 1 2 1 . 1 2
Finland 97.45 1 0 0 103.03 104.34 103.92 104.58 105.02 106.34 109.01 110.5
France 98.47 1 0 0 101.91 104.39 106.33 107.8 109.69 112.43 114.93 117.32
Germany 1 0 0 . 6 1 0 0 1 0 1 . 2 102.63 103.9 105.06 105.84 106.43 108.34 109.48
Greece 94.65 1 0 0 102.71 106.51 1 1 0 . 2 113.97 117.69 121.7 125.52 129.82
Italy 98.02 1 0 0 102.96 106.31 109.62 112.51 114.86 116.86 119.51 122.97
Japan 101.76 1 0 0 98.77 97.24 95.69 94.66 93.5 92.59 91.9 91.22
Netherlands 96.04 1 0 0 105.1 109.12 111.5 112.31 114.65 116.85 118.55 121.4
Poland 93.22 1 0 0 103.47 105.8 106.21 110.56 113.48 115.16 118.58 121.83
Portugal 97.06 1 0 0 103.67 107.76 111.16 113.88 116.77 119.97 123.54 126.63
South Africa 91.9 1 0 0 107.67 119 124.48 131.39 138.2 148.15 161.37 176.07
Spain 96.67 1 0 0 104.2 108.69 113.19 117.75 122.74 127.61 131.55 135.75
Sweden 98.55 1 0 0 102.3 103.96 105.98 106.23 107.15 109.13 112.78 115.94
Switzerland 98.88 1 0 0 1 0 0 . 8 101.27 102.28 102.87 103.17 104.78 106.28 107.34
Turkey 67.01 1 0 0 152.85 210.05 258.94 291.04 311.66 340.74 367.74 391.7
UK 98.72 1 0 0 1 0 2 . 2 105.39 108.61 111.4 113.97 117 120.56 123.68
US 97.87 1 0 0 102.4 104.19 106.4 109.46 113 116.57 119.68 122.09
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008.
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Table C.24 Corruption Perception Indexes o f Countries in the Dataset
Country 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 8.7 8.3 8.5 8 . 6 8 . 8 8 . 8 8 . 8 8.7 8 . 6 8.7
Austria 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8 8.4 8.7 8 . 6 8 . 1 8 . 1
Belgium 5.3 6 . 1 6 . 6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.3
Canada 9.2 9.2 8.9 9 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.7
Finland 9.8 1 0 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.4 9
France 6 . 6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.4 7.3 6.9
Germany 8 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8 . 2 8 . 2 8 7.8 7.9
Greece 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.7
Italy 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 5 4.9 5.2 4.8
Japan 6 6.4 7.1 7.1 7 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.3
Netherlands 9 8.9 8 . 8 9 8.9 8.7 8 . 6 8.7 9 8.9
Poland 4.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.6
Portugal 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6 . 6 6.3 6.5 6 . 6 6.5 6 . 1
Spain 6 . 6 7 7 7.1 6.9 7.1 7 6 . 8 6.7 6.5
Sweden 9.4 9.4 9 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3
Switzerland 8.9 8 . 6 8.4 8.5 8 . 8 9.1 9.1 9.1 9 9
Turkey 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.6
UK 8 . 6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8 . 6 8 . 6 8 . 6 8.4 7.7
USA 7.5 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.3
Source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/
* CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges 
between 1 0  (highly clean) and 0  (highly corrupt).
Table C.25 Pricing Schemes in the European markets
Country
Pricing Policy ReimbursementLists Reference Price System
Ext
R ef
a
Int
R e f
Pricing
Policy + List - List RPS
Year
Introduced Clusters
Austria 1 1 Statutory 1 0 0 - -
Belgium 1 1 Statutory 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 ATC5
Finland 1 1 Statutory 1 1 0 - -
France 1 1 Negotiation 1 0 1 2003 ATC5
Germany None 0 1 1 1989 ATC4,5
Greece 1 1 Statutory 0 1 1 2006 _ **
Italy 1 1 Negotiation 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 ATC5
Netherlands 1 Statutory 1 0 1 1991 ATC3,4,5
Poland 1 1 Statutory 1 0 1 1998 ATC3,4,5
Portugal 1 1 Statutory 1 0 1 2003 ATC5
Spain 1 1 Negotiation 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 ATC5
Sweden Statutory 1 0 0 1993* -
Switzerland 1 1 Statutory 1 0 1 2003 ATC5
UK 1 None 0 1 0 - -
Turkey 1 1 Statutory 1 0 1 2004 ATC5
SL hExternal Referencing, Internal Referencing 
* Ref Price System Abolished in 2002 
** Methodology has not been defined
APPENDIX D: Appendix to Chapter 4
Table D.l Market Environment for Generic Medicines
USA EU
Generic Medicines as a % of Total Market 63% 42%
Basic Product Patent 2 0  yrs 2 0  yrs
Data Exclusivity (Blocks market 
authorization procedures for generics) 5 years 8 +2 +(l) years
Patent Extensions (SPC etc) 14 yrs max 15 yrs
Bolar Provision (right to perform generic 
R&D before patent expiration)
Yes since 
1984 Yes since 2004
Immediate Generic Competition (Upon 
patent expiration) Yes No (due to P&R procedures)
Fees for Generic Registration No Yes (80,000-120,000 €)
Free Price Competition Yes No (not in most states)
Harmonized Regulatory and IP Requirements Yes No
Source: (Perry 2009)
Table D.2 Number of generic molecules that launched in each market -by local generic 
launch date
1981-
1985
1986-
1989
1990-
1995
1996-
1999
2 0 0 0 -
2004
2005-
2008 Total
AUSTRALIA 3 5 23 23 34 36 124
AUSTRIA 6 3 17 1 2 37 38 113
BELGIUM 1 2 8 7 31 29 78
CANADA 1 1 0 34 35 39 38 157
FINLAND 4 7 1 2 1 1 32 32 98
FRANCE 9 14 17 39 40 119
GERMANY 8 9 31 25 38 39 150
GREECE 1 1 15 16 19 24 32 117
ITALY 14 6 8 13 32 47 1 2 0
JAPAN 6 2 26 9 33 33 109
NETHERLANDS 5 6 24 24 35 2 1 115
POLAND 34 29 55 48 166
PORTUGAL 6 9 16 1 0 32 33 106
SAFRICA 1 4 13 15 43 40 116
SPAIN 3 1 2 15 2 1 27 40 118
SWEDEN 2 7 1 2 1 2 30 26 89
SWITZERLAND 5 3 1 1 1 2 18 36 85
TURKEY 3 14 28 25 29 46 145
UK 9 8 19 18 69 40 163
US 1 2 2 1 32 35 64 51 215
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Figure D .l Distribution o f  the number o f  countries where m olecules in the dataset have 
launched
Number of Molecules by First Global Generic Launch
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Figure D.2 The number o f molecules by first global generic launch
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Appendix D.l: Logistic Regression for Discrete Time Survival Analysis
The logistic model for discrete time specifications in survival analysis was primarily 
developed to analyse intrinsically discrete survival times, but it can also be applied to 
model the discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model. 
Logistic model is interpreted in terms of the proportional odds of failure (Singer and 
Willett 1993). Assuming monthly discrete intervals, the proportional odds model 
assumes that the relative odds of making a transition for individual j  in month t, given 
survival up to end of the previous month, is given by:
MO 
J-MO exp(z,p),
where h ( t , z A  is the discrete time hazard for month (interval) t for individual j ,  and 
Jtq (f) is the baseline hazard when Zj = 0 . Analogously to the proportional hazards 
model, the relative odds of failing is equal to the product of 1 ) a baseline relative odd 
common to all individuals /fy(f)/[l-/Jb(f)] 2 ) an individual specific scaling
factor, exp(zyp)- Taking logs:
logit h[t,Zj^ = In MO1-M 0 exp(z,p) = ln
MO
i-MO +zJP=n+z/P’
where y, = logit h0(t) = ]n{hQ( / ) / [ 1 -/iq (t)]}
The expression logith \ t ,Z j j  = In
\ - h ( t , Z j )
to define the logistic hazard model as:
= yt +z  .p can be alternatively written
h ( t , z j )  = -
+ exp {-yt ZyP)
In practice, it has been shown that if cloglog and logistic hazard models for discrete 
time survival analysis share the same duration dependence and covariate vector and the 
hazard rate is relatively small, then the estimates they yield are similar. This can be
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illustrated by writing the hazard rates in each model as a power series and using 
G = exv{yt +Zyp)(see Table D.3). When the probability of failure in each interval is 
small (i.e. h < 0 . 1 0  or less), then
yt + Zyp = log [ -lo g  (l -  /?)] < -2.25 in the cloglog model, and
y ,+ z y-p= log
1 - h
< -2.20 in the logistic model. In this case,
G = exp(y, + Zyp j = « exp (-2.2) » 0.10 and terms of the order G2 and higher are close
to zero and (l -  h) can be approximated by (l -  G) both for the cloglog and logit model.
In the instances where the hazard is small, therefore, the parameters of the logistic 
model and the proportional hazard model will be nearly equal (Abbott 1985; Jenkins 
2005).
Table D.3 Comparison of Cologlog and Logit Models
Cloglog model Logit model
f t+ Z /P  = log [ — log (l — ^ )] log
h
1 - h  = 1 C l G2 G3  (-1 )nGn 
2! 3! n\
l - G  + G 2 - G 3... + ( - l ) ”G"...
h (t*z j )  = l - e x p ( - e x p ( / ,+ z yp))
1
l + exp(-x( -zyP )
1! exp {- exp (zyp + /,)} exp (zyp + y,) p,
Pi exp(z jP + y,)
r - | 2
[l + exp(zyP + / ,) J
Note: G = ex p (^ + z^ p )
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Marginal Effects
The marginal effect of h with respect to Zj in the cloglog model is given by:
dh—  = exp j-exp(zyp + yt )J exp(zyp + , which implies that the marginal effect has
dZj
the same sign as the parameter estimate.
For the logit model the marginal effect of the covariate z,- on the hazard h can be found 
by:
1hj{t)=
[l+ ex p (-(zyp + /,) ) ]
Let m = 1 + exp(-(z S  + yt )) and h = ~  ; d%  =
J U /  0 2  i OU OZj
dh du 
du dzj [l + exp(-(z yP + X<))J
( * / i o A e xP (-(z yP + n))M-A-exp(-(zyP + ^ ))}  = - -------------- ----------
[l + exp(-(zyp + / ,) ) ] '
d h /  Pj exp(-(z yp + f t )) Pj exp(z yP + f t )
dZ‘ [l + exp(-(zyp + f t ) ) ] 2  [l + exp(zyp + f t ) ] 2
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A ppendix D.2: Data A nalysis
D.2.1 Em pirical Results
Table D.4 Parametric Duration Dependence: Coefficients for Base Case Cloglog and Logit Estimates for First Generic Launch
with yea r  dummies no ye a r  dummies
Variables C LO G LO G LO G IT C LO G LO G LO G IT
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expected Generic Price
LM A vgE xpP g 0.092* 0.139* 0.091* 0.143* 0 .101** 0 .2 1 0 *** 0 .102** 0 .2 1 8 ***
[0.0369] [0.0604] [0.0383] [0.0623] [0.0363] [0.0630] [0.0372] [0.0645]
L M A v g P b 0.091* 0.090* 0 .095** 0 .096**
[0.0368] [0.0381] [0.0359] [0.0367]
medRatioPgPb 0.386 0.477 -0.914 -1
[0.8662] [0.9048] [0.9538] [0.9769]
Expected M arket Size
ExpM arket S izeU S D 0.122** 0.129** 0 .1 9 8 *** 0 .2 0 7 ***
[0.0456] [0.0472] [0.0480] [0.0490]
ExpMarketS izeSU 0.057 0.062 0.118* 0 .125**
[0.0435] [0.0457] [0.0469] [0.0483]
LM A vg_U S D _m olC tr_ 0.117* 0 .124** 0 .153** 0 .16 0***
[0.0456] [0.0473] [0.0465] [0.0473]
avgGenShare_USD_ 0.003 0 0 .0 8 6 *** 0 .08 8***
[0.0159] [0.0163] [0.0141] [0.0143]
Com petition
Num G enFirm M ed -1.763 -L753  -1.756 -1.64 -1.633 -1.654 6 .0 9 5 ***  6 .2 3 8 ***  5 .0 3 1 *** 6 .2 3 9 ***  6 .3 8 1 ***  5 .1 6 4 ***
[0.9894] [0.9870] [0.9836] [1.0217] [1.0187] [1.0157] [0.9547] [0.9510] [0.9023] [0.9707] [0.9670] [0.9168]
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M olecule Characteristics
:
ln_lag_yrs 0.128* 0.113 0.126* 0.134* 0.118 0.132* 0.027 0.009 0.048 0.029 0.01 0.049
[0.0619] [0.0616] [0.0619] [0.0639] [0.0635] [0.0640] [0.0597] [0.0599] [0.0597] [0.0609] [0.0611] [0.0608]
ln_M olGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.04 0.009 -0.036 -0.04 0.012 -0.035 -0.083 -0.017 -0.063 -0.087 -0.02 -0.066
[0.0566] [0.0565] [0.0564] [0.0586] [0.0589] [0.0585] [0.0563] [0.0572] [0.0554] [0.0567] [0.0582] [0.0557]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirm Sales 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.023 0.021 0.02 0.025 0.022 0.021
[0.0189] [0.0188] [0.0189] [0.0195] [0.0194] [0.0195] [0.0180] [0.0178] [0.0178] [0.0183] [0.0181] [0.0181]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.028***
[0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0034]
InsequenceSq
0.339*** 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.350*** 0.345*** 0.350*** 0.414*** 0.410*** 0.399*** 0.424*** 0.419*** 0.407***
[0.0339] [0.0340] [0.0339] [0.0363] [0.0363] [0.0363] [0.0333] [0.0333] [0.0336] [0.0348] [0.0347] [0.0352]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes Yes
Number o f  observations 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698
Log Likelihood -2218.21 -2221.42 -2218.47 -2220.04 -2223.32 -2220.28 -2326.57 -2332.77 -2306.01 -2327.9 -2334.26 -2307.48
chi2 737.92 736.01 749.44 681.63 681.78 687.45 418.16 406.76 447.5 380.01 371.24 413.37
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4530.422 4536.85 4534.93 4534.08 4540.65 4538.56 4731.13 4743.53 4694.02 4733.79 4746.53 4696.95
Bayesian Info Criteria 4901.17 4907.59 4921.46 4904.83 4911.4 4925.08 5038.77 5051.17 5017.44 5041.44 5054.17 5020.37
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t +  
In (/ * /). Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.5 Non-parametric Duration Dependence: Coefficients for Base Case Cloglog and Logit Estimates for First Generic Launch
(Molecules with First Launch after 1993)_____________________________________________________________________________
With Calendar Year Dummies No Calendar Year Dummies
Coefficient Estimates CLOGLOG LOGIT CLOGLOG LOGIT
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expected Generic Price
LMAvgExpPg 0.052 0.063 0.055* 0.067 0.074** 0.141** 0.076** 0.146**
[0.0267] [0.0413] [0.0282] [0.0435] [0.0256] [0.0438] [0.0265] [0.0452]
L M A vgPb 0.051
[0.0266]
0.054
[0.0281]
0.073**
[0.0248]
0.074**
[0.0257]
medRatioPgPb 0.199
[0.6895]
0.318
[0.7224]
-1.743*
[0.7777]
-1.835*
[0.8011]
Expected Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.091**
[0.0341]
0.097**
[0.0365]
0.187***
[0.0369]
0.194***
[0.0378]
ExpMarketSizeSU 0.022
[0.0305]
0.022
[0.0331]
0.082*
[0.0323]
0.086*
[0.0334]
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.087*
[0.0341]
0.093*
[0.0366]
0.136***
[0.0351]
0.142***
[0.0360]
avgGenShare_USD_ 0.001
[0.0123]
-0.002
[0.0127]
0.095***
[0.0110]
0.097***
[0.0113]
Competition
NumGenFirmMed -1.779* -1.818* -1.791* -1.597* -1.627* -1.638* 5.761*** 5.904*** 4.683*** 5.905*** 6.065*** 4.855***
[0.7671] [0.7688] [0.7651] [0.7990] [0.8017] [0.7978] [0.7922] [0.7943] [0.7097] [0.8117] [0.8145] [0.7295]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_lag_yrs 0.071 0.065 0.071 0.074 0.067 0.073 0.015 0.004 0.023 0.017 0.005 0.025
[0.0372] [0.0371] [0.0372] [0.0390] [0.0388] [0.0390] [0.0353] [0.0348] [0.0349] [0.0363] [0.0357] [0.0361]
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ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.029 0.082* 0.033 0.036 0.093* 0.04 0.002 0.082* 0.022 0.005 0.087* 0.026
[0.0385] [0.0368] [0.0385] [0.0404] [0.0386] [0.0404] [0.0395] [0.0375] [0.0380] [0.0400] [0.0379] [0.0385]
Firm Characteristics
ln_globalFirmSales 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.012
[0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0150] [0.0150] [0.0150] [0.0136] [0.0135] [0.0131] [0.0139] [0.0138] [0.0134]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number o f observations 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104 41104
Log Likelihood -3302.54 -3306.22 -3302.93 -3294.88 -3298.66 -3295.2 -3505.01 -3516.33 -3465.35 -3503.12 -3514.59 -3463.26
chi2 14057.04 14280.89 14313.13 12763.67 12976.81 12988.19 17497.36 18261.92 18189.47 16603.75 17342.02 17238.23
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 6927.08 6934.44 6931.86 6911.76 6919.31 6916.4 7316.02 7338.65 7240.7 7312.23 7335.19 7236.52
Bayesian Info Criteria 8315.52 8322.88 8337.55 8300.2 8307.75 8322.09 8635.47 8658.1 8577.4 8631.68 8654.64 8573.22
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + 
In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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D.2.2 R obustness C hecks
D.2.2.1 Impact of Regulation
Table D.6 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Regulation (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
7
cloglog
7
logit
Regulation
LMAvgExpPg 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.129** 0.124** 0.146*** 0.141**
[0.0410] [0.0429] [0.0410] [0.0430] [0.0430] [0.0451] [0.0425] [0.0447]
L31n_ExpPg 0.139***
[0.0419]
0.135**
[0.0439]
InExpPg 0.146***
[0.0407]
0.141***
[0.0426]
L31n_Pb 0.141***
[0.0418]
0.136**
[0.0437]
medRatioPgPb -0.291
[0.9626]
0.016
[1.0066]
-0.067
[0.9588]
0.233
[1.0032]
RPS 0.161
[0.2421]
0.198
[0.2496]
GenSubst 0.43
[0.3548]
0.409
[0.3695]
LMAvgExpPgxlnT 0.012
[0.0177]
0.013
[0.0196]
Controls
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.132* 0.147** 0.127* 0.143* 0.130* 0.145** 0.131* 0.146** 0.122* 0.137* 0.129* 0.145** 0.129* 0.143*
[0.0534] [0.0561] [0.0529] [0.0556] [0.0532] [0.0558] [0.0533] [0.0560] [0.0543] [0.0569] [0.0534] [0.0560] [0.0527] [0.0555]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.647*** 0.682*** 0.644*** 0.679*** 0.646*** 0.681*** 0.647*** 0.683*** 0.650*** 0.683*** 0.646*** 0.682*** 0.645*** 0.679***
[0.0491] [0.0535] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0535] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0504] [0.0544] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0492] [0.0534]
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Molecule Charateristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.064 -0.069 -0.064 -0.07 -0.054 -0.059 -0.062 -0.067 -0.06 -0.065 -0.062 -0.068 -0.064 -0.069
[0.0634] [0.0669] [0.0630] [0.0664] [0.0625] [0.0664] [0.0632] [0.0667] [0.0659] [0.0693] [0.0632] [0.0667] [0.0631] [0.0665]
ln_lag_yrs 0.054 0.077 0.05 0.073 0.047 0.068 0.053 0.076 0.037 0.058 0.056 0.079 0.05 0.072
[0.0711] [0.0758] [0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0709] [0.0755] [0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0719] [0.0765] [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0710] [0.0758]
Firm Charateristics
ln_globalFirmSales -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0 0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0221] [0.0228] [0.0230] [0.0237] [0.0221] [0.0229] [0.0220] [0.0228]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
[0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037]
InsequenceSq 0.348*** 0.360*** 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.344*** 0.355*** 0.348*** 0.360*** 0.357*** 0.369*** 0.353*** 0.364*** 0.345*** 0.357***
[0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0348] [0.0378] [0.0345] [0.0376] [0.0358] [0.0389] [0.0354] [0.0385] [0.0345] [0.0375]
Heterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 19698 19698 19809 19809 19827 19827 19698 19698 18560 18560 19698 19698 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2083.37 -2082.67 -2095.24 -2094.59 -2092.62 -2091.99 -2083.12 -2082.32 -1955.74 -1955.23 -2083.01 -2082.36 -2095.04 -2094.47
chi2 798.35 668 790.37 662.33 799.72 671.3 803.27 671.83 776.35 644.57 802.81 670.53 795.13 666.84
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0
Akaike Info Criteria 4260.73 4259.34 4284.49 4283.18 4281.25 4279.98 4262.23 4260.64 4005.48 4004.47 4262.02 4260.73 4286.08 4284.93
Bayesian Info Criteria 4631.48 4630.09 4655.5 4654.2 4660.2 4658.93 4640.87 4639.27 4373.44 4372.42 4640.65 4639.36 4664.98 4663.84
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and In sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t  + 
In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.7 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Regulation (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
7
cloglog
7
logit
Regulation
LMAvgExpPg 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.126** 0.126** 0.151*** 0.152***
[0.0405] [0.0419] [0.0400] [0.0416] [0.0422] [0.0437] [0.0418] [0.0430]
L31n_ExpPg 0.146***
[0.0416]
0.148***
[0.0430]
InExpPg 0.156***
[0.0401]
0.158***
[0.0413]
L31n_Pb 0.154***
[0.0410]
0.155***
[0.0423]
medRatioPgPb -2.181*
[0.9771]
-2.180*
[1.0122]
-1.950*
[0.9764]
-1.949
[1.0115]
RPS 0.923***
[0.1981]
0.971***
[0.2051]
GenSubst 1.069**
[0.3255]
1.106**
[0.3402]
L MA vgExpPgx 1 nT 0.02
[0.0162]
0.018
[0.0174]
Controls
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.253*** 0.264*** 0.251*** 0.261*** 0.255*** 0.265*** 0.234*** 0.246*** 0.234*** 0.242*** 0.249*** 0.260*** 0.253*** 0.263***
[0.0549] [0.0564] [0.0546] [0.0560] [0.0547] [0.0562] [0.0551] [0.0566] [0.0559] [0.0570] [0.0547] [0.0563] [0.0544] [0.0558]
Competition
norm lH  Hatc4_gen 0.676*** 0.700*** 0.674*** 0.698*** 0.677*** 0.700*** 0.673*** 0.700*** 0.680*** 0.700*** 0.676*** 0.699*** 0.677*** 0.699***
[0.0489] [0.0523] [0.0488] [0.0521] [0.0496] [0.0527] [0.0480] [0.0515] [0.0502] [0.0531] [0.0488] [0.0522] [0.0495] [0.0526]
Molecule Charateristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.138* -0.136* -0.138* -0.137* -0.131* -0.130* -0.126* -0.127* -0.132* -0.131 -0.136* -0.135* -0.142* -0.140*
[0.0627] [0.0641] [0.0623] [0.0637] [0.0618] [0.0633] [0.0619] [0.0634] [0.0655] [0.0668] [0.0623] [0.0638] [0.0628] [0.0642]
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ln_lag_yrs -0.058 -0.052 -0.062 -0.056 -0.057 -0.052 -0.055 -0.049 -0.069 -0.068 -0.053 -0.048 -0.055 -0.049
[0.0670] [0.0691] [0.0668] [0.0689] [0.0677] [0.0697] [0.0653] [0.0675] [0.0681] [0.0700] [0.0668] [0.0689] [0.0677] [0.0697]
Firm Charateristics
ln_globalFirmSales 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.02
[0.0216] [0.0219] [0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0214] [0.0216] [0.0213] [0.0216] [0.0227] [0.0229] [0.0216] [0.0218] [0.0215] [0.0217]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.040***
[0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0033]
InsequenceSq 0.451*** 0.468*** 0.449*** 0.465*** 0.447*** 0.461*** 0.445*** 0.462*** 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.459*** 0.474*** 0.448*** 0.462***
[0.0326] [0.0349] [0.0326] [0.0349] [0.0329] [0.0353] [0.0327] [0.0351] [0.0335] [0.0361] [0.0331] [0.0356] [0.0327] [0.0351]
Heterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number o f observations 19698 19698 19809 19809 19827 19827 19698 19698 18560 18560 19698 19698 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2192.41 -2194.79 -2204.73 -2207.18 -2198.9 -2201.53 -2180.4 -2182.83 -2054.59 -2057.69 -2191.37 -2194.08 -2201.42 -2204.11
chi2 617.43 521.4 611.59 517.1 594.59 505 676.05 566.05 596.08 510.45 617.86 518.99 599.22 508.66
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0
Akaike Info Criteria 4462.82 4467.58 4487.46 4492.37 4477.8 4483.06 4440.79 4445.67 4187.19 4193.38 4462.74 4468.16 4482.83 4488.22
Bayesian Info Criteria 4770.46 4775.23 4795.32 4800.23 4793.59 4798.85 4756.32 4761.2 4492.51 4498.7 4778.27 4783.69 4798.59 4803.97
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log of squared months since risk onset, 
i.e. t + In (t *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.8 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Regulation (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
Regulation
LMAvgExpPg 0.091** 0.090** 0.091** 0.091** 0.085* 0.085* 0.084* 0.088*
[0.0317] [0.0334] [0.0317] [0.0334] [0.0332] [0.0350] [0.0373] [0.0404]
L31n_ExpPg 0.088**
[0.0318]
0.088**
[0.0335]
InExpPg 0.088**
[0.0318]
0.087**
[0.0334]
L31n Pb 0.089**
[0.0319]
0.088**
[0.0335]
medRatioPgPb -0.28
[0.7484]
-0.003
[0.7888]
-0.123
[0.7447]
0.155
[0.7846]
RPS 0.143
[0.1708]
0.134
[0.1755]
GenSubst 0.571*
[0.2498]
0.574*
[0.2543]
LMAvgExpPgxlnT 0.005
[0.0134]
0.001
[0.0150]
Controls
Market Size
ExpMarketS izeUSD 0.103** 0.117** 0.103** 0.117** 0.106** 0.119** 0.103* 0.116** 0.101* 0.114** 0.102* 0.116** 0.104** 0.117**
[0.0400] [0.0427] [0.0398] [0.0425] [0.0399] [0.0427] [0.0400] [0.0427] [0.0405] [0.0435] [0.0402] [0.0428] [0.0397] [0.0425]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.592*** 0.630*** 0.590*** 0.628*** 0.592*** 0.629*** 0.591*** 0.630*** 0.590*** 0.626*** 0.591*** 0.630*** 0.591*** 0.628***
[0.0414] [0.0451] [0.0413] [0.0449] [0.0414] [0.0450] [0.0413] [0.0450] [0.0425] [0.0460] [0.0413] [0.0449] [0.0413] [0.0449]
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Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.046 0.051 0.045 0.049 0.048 0.051 0.046 0.05 0.051 0.056 0.047 0.051 0.045 0.049
[0.0435] [0.0454] [0.0433] [0.0452] [0.0432] [0.0453] [0.0435] [0.0454] [0.0447] [0.0466] [0.0436] [0.0454] [0.0433] [0.0452]
ln_lag_yrs 0.067 0.075 0.068 0.076 0.067 0.074 0.067 0.075 0.064 0.068 0.068 0.075 0.068 0.076
[0.0463] [0.0491] [0.0461] [0.0489] [0.0463] [0.0490] [0.0462] [0.0490] [0.0475] [0.0502] [0.0463] [0.0492] [0.0462] [0.0489]
Firm Characteristics
ln^globalFirmSales -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.01 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
[0.0172] [0.0179] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0172] [0.0179] [0.0176] [0.0182] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0172] [0.0178]
Heterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number o f observations 41104 41104 41453 41453 41455 41455 41104 41104 38099 38099 41104 41104 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3142.53 -3129.6 -3159.48 -3146.61 -3153.11 -3140.57 -3142.21 -3129.33 -2939.21 -2926.13 -3142.42 -3129.59 -3159.31 -3146.53
chi2 11498.26 10439.78 11466.27 10400.91 11375.21 10351.42 11538.47 10478.01 10815.71 9771.07 11548.44 10476.95 11458.74 10411.68
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 6607.06 6581.19 6640.95 6615.22 6630.22 6605.14 6608.42 6582.67 6200.43 6174.26 6608.83 6583.18 6642.62 6617.05
Bayesian Info Criteria 7995.5 7969.63 8030.76 8005.03 8028.66 8003.58 8005.49 7979.73 7576.65 7550.48 8005.9 7980.25 8041.05 8015.49
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log of squared months since risk onset, 
i.e. t + In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.9 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Regulation (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
7
cloglog
7
logit
Regulation
LMAvgExpPg 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.101** 0.104** 0.112*** 0.122***
[0.0314] [0.0324] [0.0310] [0.0321] [0.0325] [0.0336] [0.0335] [0.0348]
L31n_ExpPg 0.107***
[0.0315]
0.112***
[0.0325]
InExpPg 0.108***
[0.0315]
0.112***
[0.0325]
L31n_Pb 0.112***
[0.0314]
0.115***
[0.0324]
medRatioPgPb 2.746***
[0.7879]
2.798***
[0.8213]
-2.566**
[0.7869]
-2.612**
[0.8208]
RPS 0.844***
[0.1427]
0.853***
[0.1462]
GenSubst 1.251***
[0.2413]
1.294***
[0.2483]
LMAvgExpPgxlnT -0.002
[0.0131]
-0.007
[0.0138]
Controls
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.219*** 0.227*** 0.220*** 0.228*** 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.218*** 0.227*** 0.215*** 0.223***
[0.0423] [0.0434] [0.0423] [0.0433] [0.0424] [0.0435] [0.0424] [0.0434] [0.0425] [0.0436] [0.0423] [0.0434] [0.0422] [0.0433]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.609*** 0.639*** 0.608*** 0.636*** 0.612*** 0.640*** 0.605*** 0.633*** 0.607*** 0.633*** 0.610*** 0.640*** 0.610*** 0.638***
[0.0418] [0.0447] [0.0417] [0.0446] [0.0421] [0.0449] [0.0413] [0.0443] [0.0432] [0.0456] [0.0416] [0.0445] [0.0420] [0.0448]
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Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.022 0.03 0.02 0.028 0.027 0.035 0.012 0.021 0.036 0.046 0.022 0.03 0.024 0.032
[0.0446] [0.0451] [0.0445] [0.0450] [0.0444] [0.0448] [0.0440] [0.0445] [0.0457] [0.0463] [0.0446] [0.0451] [0.0447] [0.0452]
ln_lag_yrs 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004
[0.0429] [0.0443] [0.0428] [0.0442] [0.0432] [0.0447] [0.0424] [0.0438] [0.0440] [0.0455] [0.0428] [0.0443] [0.0432] [0.0446]
Firm Characteristics
ln_globalFirmSales 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004
[0.0163] [0.0166] [0.0163] [0.0166] [0.0161] [0.0165] [0.0163] [0.0167] [0.0166] [0.0170] [0.0162] [0.0165] [0.0161] [0.0165]
Heterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 41104 41104 41453 41453 41455 41455 41104 41104 38099 38099 41104 41104 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3353.62 -3349.23 -3370.97 -3366.71 -3357.45 -3353.53 -3338.36 -3334.76 -3125.8 -3122.08 -3353.59 -3349.06 -3363.98 -3359.98
chi2 12061.1 11452.3 11997.6 11399.6 11899.4 11291.4 12339.8 11714.9 11570.5 10946.7 12069.6 11455.4 11963.5 11348.3
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 7013.24 7004.47 7047.93 7039.43 7022.89 7015.06 6984.73 6977.51 6557.59 6550.15 7015.18 7006.11 7035.96 7027.96
Bayesian Info Criteria 8332.69 8323.92 8368.68 8360.17 8352.28 8344.44 8312.8 8305.59 7865.43 7857.99 8343.25 8334.19 8365.33 8357.34
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log of squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + 
In (/ */). Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D. 10 Impact of Expected Generic Prices and Time Interaction
C loglog 1
C loglog 1 
(no year 
dummies) C loglog 2
Cloglog 2 
(no year 
dummies)
b/se/p b/se/p b/se/p b/se/p
L31n ExpPg 0.087 0.09
[0.05791 [0.05351
(0.132) (0.092)
L31n ExpPgxT 0.019 0.021
[0.01251 [0.01151
(0.136) (0.071)
LM AvgExpPg 0.088 0.097
[0.05901 [0.0533]
(0.134) (0.070)
LM AvgExpPgxT 0.002 0.002
[0.0010] [0.0010]
(0.087) (0.068)
Exp M arketS izeU S D 0.118* 0.241*** 0.121* 0.243***
[0.05291 [0.05441 [0.0534] [0.05481
(0.026) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000)
norm IHHatc4 gen 0.644*** 0.675*** 0.646*** 0.677***
[0.04911 [0.0487] [0.0492] [0.0489]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In lag yrs 0.058 -0.051 0.062 -0.049
[0.0700] [0.0660] [0.0703] [0.0662]
(0.410) (0.437) (0.381) (0.456)
In M olGlobalUSDAnnual -0.06 -0.134* -0.06 -0.135*
[0.0624] [0.0619] [0.0628] [0.0622]
(0.337) (0.030) (0.342) (0.030)
In globalFirmSales -0.003 0.02 -0.003 0.02
[0.0220] [0.02151 [0.0221] [0.02151
(0.881) (0.360) (0.875) (0.355)
sequence 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.041***
[0.0035] [0.00301 [0.0035] [0.0030]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
In sequenceSq -0.354*** -0.459*** -0.357*** 0.461***
[0.03511 [0.03301 [0.03501 [0.0331]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes No Y es No
N 19809 19809 19698 19698
11 -2093.45 -2202.42 -2081.17 -2190.19
chi2 803.04 612.52 811.06 619.3
aic 4282.9 4484.84 4258.35 4460.38
bic 4661.81 4800.6 4636.98 4775.91
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Standard errors in brackets and p-value in parantheses. 
Estimated by complementary log log regression
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D.2.2.2 Impact of Market Size
Table D.l 1 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Market Size (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.127*
[0.0529]
0.143*
[0.0556]
ExpMarketSizeSU 0.06
[0.0493]
0.071
[0.0520]
LMAvg USD molCtr_ 0.123*
[0.0534]
0.140*
[0.0562]
LMAvg_SU_molCtr_ 0.054
[0.0496]
0.066
[0.0524]
L3 In USD moleculeCtry i 0.103*
[0.0514]
0.116*
[0.0541]
L31n_SU_moleculeCtry i 0.044
[0.0473]
0.053
[0.0499]
ExpMSizeUSDxlnT
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.139*** 0.135** 0.188** 0.194** 0.138*** 0.134** 0.181* 0.189* 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.190** 0.197**
[0.0419] [0.0439] [0.0712] [0.0742] [0.0420] [0.0440] [0.0715] [0.0746] [0.0416] [0.0436] [0.0688] [0.0717]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.644*** 0.679*** 0.646*** 0.679*** 0.645*** 0.680*** 0.646*** 0.679*** 0.649*** 0.684*** 0.649*** 0.683***
[0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0534] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0493] [0.0534] [0.0484] [0.0527] [0.0486] [0.0527]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.064 -0.07 -0.011 -0.013 -0.061 -0.067 -0.006 -0.009 -0.036 -0.039 0.01 0.01
[0.0630] [0.0664] [0.0612] [0.0644] [0.0632] [0.0666] [0.0614] [0.0646] [0.0614] [0.0647] [0.0595] [0.0626]
ln_lag_yrs 0.05 0.073 0.038 0.058 0.049 0.072 0.036 0.057 0.036 0.057 0.025 0.044
[0.0709] [0.0756] [0.0712] [0.0757] [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0713] [0.0758] [0.0690] [0.0732] [0.0693] [0.0734]
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Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
[0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0227] [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0220] [0.0227] [0.0214] [0.0222] [0.0214] [0.0222]
Time since risk onset
sequence 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***
[0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037]
InsequenceSq 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.341*** 0.352*** 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.341*** 0.352*** 0.363*** 0.377*** 0.359*** 0.373***
[0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0376] [0.0338] [0.0368] [0.0338] [0.0368]
Heterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 20708 20708 20708 20708
Log Likelihood -2095.24 -2094.59 -2098.68 -2098.37 -2095.58 -2094.86 -2098.91 -2098.59 -2149.67 -2149.19 -2152.4 -2152.2
chi2 790.37 662.33 791.14 663.76 788.55 660.11 790.85 663.23 851 715.06 851.5 715.81
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4284.487 4283.184 4291.356 4290.748 4285.166 4283.73 4291.828 4291.181 4395.339 4394.377 4400.794 4400.41
Bayesian Info Criteria 4655.5 4654.2 4662.37 4661.76 4656.18 4654.74 4662.84 4662.19 4776.38 4775.41 4781.83 4781.45
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log of squared months since risk onset, i.e. t 
+ In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D. 12 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Market Size (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
1 1
cloglog logit
2 2 
cloglog logit
3 3 
cloglog logit
4 4 
cloglog logit
5 5 
cloglog logit
6 6 
cloglog logit
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeU SD  
ExpMarketSizeSU  
LM A v g U  S D m o lC tr_
LM Avg_SU_molCtr_
L3 In U S D m o lecu leC tiy
_i
L3 ln_SU moleculeCtry i 
ExpM SizeUSDxlnT
0.251** 0.261**  
* *
[0.0546] [0.0560]
0.165** 0.172**  
[0.0513] [0.0527]
0.220** 0.231** 
* *
[0.0546] [0.0562]
0.135** 0.141**  
[0.0511] [0.0525]
0.191** 0.200**  
* *
[0.0533] [0.0551]
0.115* 0.120*  
[0.0493] [0.0508]
Controls ■ : NP
Expected Generic Price  
L31n_ExpPg
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
M olecule Characteristics
0.146** 0.148**  
* *
[0.0416] [0.0430]
0.674** 0.698**  
* *
[0.0488] [0.0521]
0.301** 0.309**  
* *
[0.0714] [0.0733]
0.677** 0.699**  
* *
[0.0490] [0.0521]
0.143** 0.146**  
* *
[0.0418] [0.0431]
0.675** 0.699**  
* *
[0.0488] [0.0521]
0.269** 0.276**  
* *
[0.0714] [0.0733]
0.677** 0.699**  
* *
[0.0490] [0.0520]
0.156** 0.159**  
* *
[0.0417] [0.0432]
0.676** 0.700**  
* *
[0.0483] [0.0515]
0.262** 0.270**  
* *
[0.0689] [0.0709]
0.677** 0.700**  
* *
[0.0484] [0.0515]
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InM olG lobalUSDAnnual
-0.138* -0.137* -0.064 -0.06 -0.112 -0.111 -0.039 -0.035 -0.07 -0.068 -0.006 -0.001
[0.0623] [0.0637] [0.0617] [0.0632] [0.0621] [0.0635] [0.0613] [0.0628] [0.0596] [0.0614] [0.0585] [0.0603]
ln_lag_yrs -0.062 -0.056 -0.078 -0.074 -0.072 -0.067 -0.09 -0.086 -0.084 -0.08 -0.101 -0.098
[0.0668] [0.0689] [0.0670] [0.0690] [0.0667] [0.0689] [0.0668] [0.0689] [0.0658] [0.0680] [0.0658] [0.0680]
Firm Characteristics
In globalFirmSales 0.023 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016
[0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0215] [0.0217] [0.0213] [0.0217] [0.0214] [0.0217]
Time since risk onset
0.040** 0.041** 0.039** 0.041** 0.040** 0.042** 0.039** 0.041** 0.042** 0.044** 0.041** 0.043**
sequence * * * * * * * * * * * *
[0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0031]
InsequenceSq 0.449** 0.465** 0.445** 0.460** 0.450** 0.466** 0.446** 0.461** 0.462** 0.479** 0.458** 0.473**
* * * * * * * * * * * *
[0.0326] [0.0349] [0.0325] [0.0347] [0.0325] [0.0348] [0.0324] [0.0347] [0.0321] [0.0344] [0.0320] [0.0343]
H eterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies N o N o N o N o No No No N o N o N o N o N o
M odel Stats
Number o f  observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 20708 20708 20708 20708
Log Likelihood -2204.73 -2207.18 -2213.07 -2215.73 -2208.6 -2211.04 -2215.93 -2218.58 -2265.12 -2267.88 -2271.66 -2274.6
chi2 611.59 517.1 597.26 505.58 606.18 513 593.88 503.68 651.26 548.81 642.73 541.88
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4487.46 4504.14 4509.46 4495.19 4515.15 4613.76 4621.32 4627.19
Akaike Info Criteria
3
4492.37
4 5 8
4500.08 4509.86
2
4608.24
5 7 5
Bayesian Info Criteria 4795.32 4800.23 4812.01 4817.33 4803.06 4807.94 4817.72 4823.01 4917.83 4923.36 4930.92 4936.79
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t  + 
In (/ *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.13 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Market Size (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
6
cloglog
6
logit
Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD
ExpMarketSizeSU
LM A vg_U  SD_molCtr_
LM Avg_SU_molCtr_
L31n_USD_moleculeCtry
_i
L3 ln_SU moleculeCtry i 
ExpM SizeUSDxlnT
0.103**
[0.0398]
0.117**
[0.0425]
0.016
[0.0346]
0.023
[0.0375]
0.100*
[0.0400]
0.114**
[0.0428]
0.011
[0.0347]
0.018
[0.0376]
0.093* 0.105*
[0.0389] [0.0416]
0.014
[0.0332]
0.02
[0.0359]
Controls .
E xpected G eneric Price  
L31n_ExpPg
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
0.088**
[0.0318]
0.590**
*
0.088**
[0.0335]
0.628**
*
0.092
[0.0478]
0.589**
*
0.098
[0.0502]
0.625**
*
0.088**
[0.0318]
0.590**
*
0.087**
[0.0335]
0.628**
*
0.086
[0.0479]
0.589**
*
0.093
[0.0502]
0.625**
*
0.096**
[0.0312]
0.591**
*
0.096**
[0.0329]
0.629**
*
0.099*
[0.0461]
0.590**
*
0.104*
[0.0485]
0.626**
*
M olecule Characteristics 
InM olG lobalU SD A nnual
[0.0413]
0.045
[0.0449]
0.049
[0.0415]
0.112**
[0.0450]
0.122**
[0.0413]
0.048
[0.0450]
0.052
[0.0415]
0.116**
[0.0450]
0.126**
[0.0406]
0.05
[0.0442]
0.056
[0.0408]
0.112**
[0.0442]
0.123**
[0.0433] [0.0452] [0.0410] [0.0429] [0.0435] [0.0453] [0.0411] [0.0430] [0.0430] [0.0449] [0.0404] [0.0423]
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ln_lag_yrs 0.068 0.076 0.061 0.067 0.068 0.076 0.06 0.066 0.07 0.077 0.064 0.069
Firm Characteristics
[0.0461] [0.0489] [0.0462] [0.0489] [0.0461] [0.0489] [0.0462] [0.0490] [0.0451] [0.0478] [0.0453] [0.0479]
InglobalFirm  Sales -0.009 -0.008 -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.01 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
[0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0173] [0.0179] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0173] [0.0179] [0.0170] [0.0176] [0.0171] [0.0177]
H eterogeneity Controls 
ATC1 Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes
Country Dummies Y es Yes Y es Yes Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Y es Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number o f  observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 45020 45020 45020 45020
Log Likelihood -3159.48 -3146.61 -3164.34 -3152.08 -3159.88 -3146.96 -3164.42 -3152.17 -3252.8 -3238.29 -3257.11 -3243.13
chi2
11466.2
7
10400.9
1
11638.7
6
10579.5
1
11486.4
6
10416.4
8
11650.3
4
10591.4
4
11921.2
9
10838.0
4
12078.2
3
11002.3
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria
6640.95
3
6615.22
4
6650.67
3
6626.15
8
6641.76
5
6615.92
4
6650.83
5
6626.34
9
6829.60
2
6800.57
9
6838.22
7
6810.25
6
Bayesian Info Criteria 8030.76 8005.03 8040.48 8015.96 8031.57 8005.73 8040.64 8016.15 8241.41 8212.39 8250.03 8222.06
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + 
In (/ * /). Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.14 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Market Size (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit
Market Size
ExpMarketS izeU S D 0.220***
0.228**
*
ExpMarketSizeSU
LM Avg_USD_m olCtr_
[0.0423] [0.0433]
0.092*
[0.0357]
0.094*
[0.0367]
0.190**
*
0.197**
*
LM Avg_SU_molCtr_
L31n_USD_moleculeCtiy
1
[0.0418] [0.0429]
0.063
[0.0354]
0.065
[0.0363]
0.182**
*
0.189**
*I
L31n_SU_moleculeCtry_i
ExpM SizeUSDxlnT
[0.0412] [0.0425]
0.062
[0.0344]
0.063
[0.0354]
Controls IMMBWliB '
E xpected Generic Price 
L31n_ExpPg 0.107***
0.112**
*
0.180**
*
0.187**
*
0.104**
*
0.108**
♦ 0.151** 0.156**
0.107**
*
0.111**
* 0.153** 0.159**
Com petition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
[0.0315]
0.608**
*
[0.0325]
0.636**
*
[0.0491]
0.605**
*
[0.0505]
0.634**
*
[0.0314]
0.608**
*
[0.0324]
0.637**
*
[0.0486]
0.606**
*
[0.0501]
0.634**
*
[0.0312]
0.605**
*
[0.0323]
0.634**
*
[0.0473]
0.603**
*
[0.0489]
0.632**
*
M olecule Characteristics
[0.0417] [0.0446] [0.0421] [0.0448] [0.0417] [0.0446] [0.0421] [0.0447] [0.0412] [0.0440] [0.0414] [0.0440]
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InM olG lobalU SD A nnual
0.02 0.028 0.120** 0.132** 0.044 0.053
0.142**
*
0.155**
* 0.054 0.063
0.148**
♦
0.162**
*
[0.0445] [0.0450] [0.0419] [0.0423] [0.0443] [0.0448] [0.0417] [0.0421] [0.0440] [0.0447] [0.0413] [0.0418]
ln_lag_yrs 0.001 0.001 -0.015 -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019 -0.023 -0.004 -0.005 -0.019 -0.023
[0.0428] [0.0442] [0.0427] [0.0440] [0.0427] [0.0440] [0.0426] [0.0439] [0.0423] [0.0437] [0.0421] [0.0435]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirm Sales 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
[0.0163] [0.0166] [0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0162] [0.0166]
H eterogeneity Controls
ATC1 Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes Yes
Country Dummies Y es Yes Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Y es Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Y es Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Y es Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies N o No No No No No No No No No No No
Model Stats ■ . ■
Number o f  observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 45020 45020 45020 45020
Log Likelihood -3370.97 -3366.71 -3387.33 -3383.17 -3376.4 -3372.14 -3389.76 -3385.59 -3481.99 -3477.31 -3495.22 -3490.59
11997.6 11399.5 12557.0 11930.6 12122.9 11514.7 12655.6 12020.4 12069.7 11461.3 12571.7 11944.9
cniz 1 8 3 2 4 4 3 5 1 2 5 8
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7047.93 7039.42 7080.66 7072.34 7058.79 7050.28 7085.52 7077.18 ^7 /■% / -  /-v 7260.62 7296.44 7287.17Akaike Info Criteria
3 7 2 9 7 9 2 7
7269.98
8 8 9
Bayesian Info Criteria 8368.68 8360.17 8401.41 8393.09 8379.54 8371.03 8406.27 8397.93 8603.35 8594 8629.82 8620.55
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t  + 
In (t * t ) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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D.2.2.3 Impact of Competition
Table D.15 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Competition (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
NumbMolCtryAtc4
NumbMolCtryRETAtc4
NumGenFirmMed
0.645***
[0.0491]
0.680***
[0.0534]
0.003
[0.0074]
0.004
[0.0075]
0.004
[0.0077]
0.005
[0.0078]
-1.652 -1.528 -1.314 -0.869
firmSqMed
[0.9857] [1.0172] [1.9361]
-0.106
[0.5114]
[2.0172]
-0.207
[0.5349]
Controls
E xpected Generic Price  
L31n_ExpPg 0.138*** 0.134** 0.080* 0.080* 0.080* 0.080* 0.080* 0.079* 0.080* 0.079*
Expected M arket Size 
LMA vg USD m olCtr
[0.0420]
0.123*
[0.0440]
0.140*
[0.0382]
0.112*
[0.0397]
0.120*
[0.0384]
0.112*
[0.0398]
0.120*
[0.0374]
0.113*
[0.0388]
0.120*
[0.0374]
0.113*
[0.0387]
0.120*
M olecule Characteristics
[0.0534] [0.0562] [0.0455] [0.0473] [0.0455] [0.0473] [0.0449] [0.0466] [0.0449] [0.0467]
In_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.061 -0.067 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038
ln_lag_yrs
[0.0632]
0.049
[0.0666]
0.072
[0.0563]
0.122*
[0.0583]
0.128*
[0.0563]
0.122*
[0.0583]
0.128*
[0.0562]
0.121*
[0.0583]
0.127*
[0.0562]
0.122*
[0.0583]
0.128*
Firm Characteristics
[0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0620] [0.0640] [0.0620] [0.0640] [0.0618] [0.0638] [0.0618] [0.0637]
InglobalFirm Sales -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008
Time Since Risk Onset
[0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0190] [0.0195] [0.0190] [0.0195] [0.0189] [0.0194] [0.0189] [0.0195]
sequence 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***
[0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035]
InsequenceSq
0.345*** 0.356*** 0.331*** 0.342*** 0.331*** 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.346***
[0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0340] [0.0364] [0.0340] [0.0364] [0.0339] [0.0363] [0.0340] [0.0363]
H eterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es Y es Y es Yes
Model Stats
Number o f  observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2095.58 -2094.86 -2231.52 -2232.97 -2231.5 -2232.96 -2230.23 -2231.99 -2230.21 -2231.93
chi2 788.55 660.11 719.56 659.22 719.68 659.48 723.32 668.24 721.62 664.89
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4285.17 4283.73 4557.04 4559.93 4557.01 4559.91 4554.46 4557.98 4556.43 4559.86
Bayesian Info Criteria 4656.18 4654.74 4928.05 4930.94 4928.02 4930.92 4925.48 4928.99 4935.34 4938.76
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since 
risk onset, i.e. t  + In (/ *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.16 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Competition (no calendar year dummies)
Variables 1cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.675*** 0.699***
[0.0488] [0.0521]
NumbMolCtryAtc4_ -0.003 -0.003
[0.0073] [0.0074]
NumbMolCtryRETAtc4_ -0.001 -0.001
[0.0075] [0.0076]
NumGenFirmMed 6.295*** 6.443*** 10.800*** 11.110***
[0.9550] [0.9714] [1.9957] [2.0638]
firmSqMed -1.553* -1.603**
[0.6067] [0.6214]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.099** 0.101** 0.101** 0.102** 0.089* 0.090* 0.089* 0.089*
[0.0418] [0.0431] [0.0380] [0.0387] [0.0382] [0.0388] [0.0367] [0.0376] [0.0365] [0.0373]
Expected Market Size
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.220*** 0.231*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.166*** 0.175*** 0.164*** 0.172***
[0.0546] [0.0562] [0.0476] [0.0482] [0.0476] [0.0483] [0.0466] [0.0476] [0.0466] [0.0476]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.112 -0.111 -0.068 -0.073 -0.069 -0.073 -0.06 -0.064 -0.06 -0.065
[0.0621] [0.0635] [0.0572] [0.0576] [0.0572] [0.0576] [0.0556] [0.0561] [0.0555] [0.0560]
ln_lag_yrs -0.072 -0.067 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 0.014 0.015 0.024 0.026
[0.0667] [0.0689] [0.0592] [0.0603] [0.0591] [0.0602] [0.0595] [0.0608] [0.0591] [0.0604]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalF irmSales 0.022 0.022 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025
[0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0181] [0.0183] [0.0181] [0.0183] [0.0179] [0.0182] [0.0179] [0.0182]
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Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033***
[0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0032] [0.0034]
InsequenceSq 0.450*** 0.466*** 0.449*** 0.457*** 0 449*** 0.457*** q 4 ] \ *** 0.420*** -0.411*** -0.421***
[0.0325] [0.0348] [0.0321] [0.0334] [0.0321] [0.0334] [0.0332] [0.0347] [0.0333] [0.0348]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2208.6 -2211.04 -2369.12 -2370.47 -2369.18 -2370.53 -2340.88 -2342.28 -2337.28 -2338.64
chi2 606.18 513 344.69 322.29 344.69 322.18 407.39 371.58 409.98 371.69
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4495.2 4500.08 4816.23 4818.94 4816.36 4819.06 4759.76 4762.55 4754.55 4757.28
Bayesian Info Criteria 4803.06 4807.94 5124.09 5126.8 5124.22 5126.92 5067.62 5070.42 5070.31 5073.04
Note: *p<0.05, **p <  0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t 
+ In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.17 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Competition (with calendar year dummies)
Variables 1cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.590*** 0.628***
[0.0413] [0.0450]
NumbMolCtryAtc4_ 0 0.001
[0.0059] [0.0061]
NumbMolCtryRETAtc4_ 0 0.001
[0.0061] [0.0064]
N umGenF irmMed -1.754* -1.571* -0.849 -0.34
[0.7634] [0.7953] [1.5672] [1.6388]
firmSqMed -0.289 -0.397
[0.4353] [0.4611]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.088** 0.087** 0.048 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.048 0.052
[0.0318] [0.0335] [0.0274] [0.0290] [0.0275] [0.0291] [0.0268] [0.0284] [0.0269] [0.0284]
Expected Market Size
LM A vg_U S D_molCtr_ 0.100* 0.114** 0.088* 0.093* 0.088* 0.093* 0.086* 0.092* 0.086* 0.092*
[0.0400] [0.0428] [0.0345] [0.0370] [0.0345] [0.0370] [0.0340] [0.0364] [0.0340] [0.0365]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.048 0.052 0.031 0.039 0.031 0.039 0.033 0.039 0.033 0.04
[0.0435] [0.0453] [0.0388] [0.0407] [0.0388] [0.0407] [0.0383] [0.0403] [0.0384] [0.0404]
ln_lag_yrs 0.068 0.076 0.073 0.076 0.073 0.076 0.071 0.074 0.071 0.074
[0.0461] [0.0489] [0.0372] [0.0390] [0.0372] [0.0390] [0.0371] [0.0389] [0.0371] [0.0389]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales -0.009 -0.008 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
[0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0146] [0.0151] [0.0146] [0.0151] [0.0145] [0.0151] [0.0146] [0.0152]
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Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3159.88 -3146.96 -3322.12 3313.77 -3322.12 -3313.78 -3319.66 3311.95 3319.48 -3311.64
chi2 11486.46 10416.48 14404.27 13003 14404.07 13001.55 14082.64 12772 14163.2 12852.67
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 6641.77 6615.92 6966.25 6949.55 6966.25 6949.56 6961.31 6945.89 6962.95 6947.28
Bayesian Info Criteria 8031.57 8005.73 8356.05 8339.35 8356.05 8339.37 8351.12 8335.7 8361.39 8345.72
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, 
i.e. t + In (/ * /). Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
333
Table D.18 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Competition (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
1
cloglog
1
logit
2
cloglog
2
logit
3
cloglog
3
logit
4
cloglog
4
logit
5
cloglog
5
logit
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.608***
[0.0417]
0.637***
[0.0446]
NumbMolCtryAtc4_ -0.002
[0.0062]
-0.001
[0.0063]
NumbMolCtryRETAtc4_ -0.001
[0.0064]
0
[0.0066]
NumGenFirmMed 5.875***
[0.7945]
6.022***
[0.8137]
10.480***
[1.7792]
10.804***
[1.8136]
firmSqMed -1.627**
[0.5656]
- 1.686**
[0.5698]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.070** 0.072** 0.071** 0.073** 0.069** 0.071** 0.067** 0.070**
[0.0314] [0.0324] [0.0261] [0.0270] [0.0262] [0.0270] [0.0257] [0.0266] [0.0257] [0.0265]
Expected Market Size
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.154*** 0.160***
[0.0418] [0.0429] [0.0364] [0.0370] [0.0364] [0.0370] [0.0360] [0.0369] [0.0357] [0.0366]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ 0.044 0.053 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.03 0.023 0.026 0.023 0.026
[0.0443] [0.0448] [0.0395] [0.0400] [0.0396] [0.0400] [0.0390] [0.0395] [0.0389] [0.0394]
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ln_lag_yrs -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.016
[0.0427] [0.0440] [0.0346] [0.0355] [0.0346] [0.0355] [0.0352] [0.0361] [0.0350] [0.0360]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.016
[0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0134] [0.0137] [0.0134] [0.0137] [0.0135] [0.0138] [0.0136] [0.0139]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3376.4 -3372.14 -3562.78 -3560.75 -3562.8 -3560.77 -3526.15 -3524.35 -3520.93 -3518.98
chi2 12122.94 11514.74 16452.16 15625.57 16465.89 15637.74 17544.2 16656.66 17748.89 16839.8
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 7058.8 7050.29 7431.56 7427.5 7431.6 7427.53 7358.31 7354.7 7349.86 7345.96
Bayesian Info Criteria 8379.54 8371.03 8752.3 8748.25 8752.35 8748.28 8679.05 8675.44 8679.23 8675.33
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-countiy level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t  +  
In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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D.2.2.4 Impact of Molecule Characteristics
Table D.19 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for
Molecule Characteristics (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog logit cloglog logit cloglog logit
1 1 2 2 3 3
Molecule
MolGlobalReach -0.009
[0.0407]
-0.013
[0.0431]
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.061
[0.0632]
-0.067
[0.0666]
ln_MolGlobalUSDMedian_ -0.116
[0.0667]
-0.133
[0.0707]
ln_lag_yrs 0.051 0.071 0.049 0.072 0.037 0.058
[0.0707] [0.0746] [0.0710] [0.0757] [0.0710] [0.0758]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.138** 0.134** 0.138*** 0.134** 0 139*** 0.134**
[0.0427] [0.0447] [0.0420] [0.0440] [0.0416] [0.0437]
Expected Market Size
LMAvg USD molCtr_ 0.092* 0.107* 0.123* 0.140* 0.152** 0.173**
[0.0435] [0.0457] [0.0534] [0.0562] [0.0549] [0.0575]
Competition
norm IHHatc4 gen 0.642*** 0.677*** 0.645*** 0.680*** 0.646*** 0.682***
[0.0490] [0.0533] [0.0491] [0.0534] [0.0492] [0.0536]
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Firm Characteristics
InglobalFirmSales -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.0217] [0.0224] [0.0220] [0.0228] [0.0218] [0.0226]
sequence 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
[0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038]
InsequenceSq -0.347*** -0.359*** -0.345*** -0.356*** 0 344*** -0.355***
[0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0346] [0.0376]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats ..
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2096.28 -2095.6 -2095.58 -2094.86 -2093.88 -2092.8
chi2 785.49 656.23 788.55 660.11 779.78 651.61
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4286.56 4285.2 4285.17 4283.73 4281.76 4279.61
Bayesian Info Criteria 4657.57 4656.21 4656.18 4654.74 4652.78 4650.62
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0 .0 1 , ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard 
errors in brackets). Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to 
months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + In (/ * t ) . Year, ATC1 and 
Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.20 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for
Molecule Characteristics (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog
1
logit
1
cloglog
2
logit
2
cloglog
3
logit
3
Molecule
MolGlobalReach -0.062
[0.0383]
-0.061
[0.0393]
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.112
[0.0621]
-0.111
[0.0635]
InM olGlobalU SDMedian_ -0.241***
[0.0618]
-0.244***
[0.0636]
ln_lag_yrs -0.094 -0.088 -0.072 -0.067 -0.089 -0.082
[0.0670] [0.0691] [0.0667] [0.0689] [0.0664] [0.0688]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.139** 0.141** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.141***
[0.0427] [0.0441] [0.0418] [0.0431] [0.0413] [0.0426]
Expected Market Size
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.220*** 0.231*** 0.289*** 0.302***
[0.0431] [0.0443] [0.0546] [0.0562] [0.0542] [0.0557]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.670*** 0.694*** 0.675*** 0.699*** 0.682*** 0.705***
[0.0490] [0.0522] [0.0488] [0.0521] [0.0486] [0.0520]
Firm Characteristics
338
InglobalFirmSales 0.02 0.02 0.022 0.022 0.029 0.029
[0.0214] [0.0216] [0.0215] [0.0218] [0.0214] [0.0217]
sequence 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.041***
[0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032]
ln_sequenceSq -0.452*** -0.468*** 0.450*** -0.466*** .0.448*** -0.464***
[0.0323] [0.0345] [0.0325] [0.0348] [0.0324] [0.0348]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809 19809
Log Likelihood -2208.57 -2211.01 -2208.6 -2211.04 -2200.35 -2203.1
chi2 610.25 518.75 606.18 513 617.93 520.73
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4495.15 4500.01 4495.2 4500.08 4478.7 4484.2
Bayesian Info Criteria 4803.01 4807.87 4803.06 4807.94 4786.57 4792.06
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard 
errors in brackets). Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to 
months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and 
Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.21 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for
Molecule Characteristics (with calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog logit 
1 1
cloglog logit 
2 2
cloglog logit
3 3
Molecule Characteristics
MolGlobalReach 
InMolGlobalUSD Annual_ 
ln_MolGlobalUSDMedian_ 
ln_lag_yrs
-0.007 -0.005 
[0.0262] [0.0271]
0.059 0.068 
[0.0468] [0.0495]
0.048 0.052 
[0.0435] [0.0453]
0.068 0.076 
[0.0461] [0.0489]
0.025 0.024 
[0.0447] [0.0468] 
0.065 0.073 
[0.0461] [0.0488]
Controls
Expected Generic Price 
L31n_ExpPg
Expected Market Size 
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
Firm Characteristics
0.090** 0.090** 
[0.0316] [0.0333]
0.131*** 0.147*** 
[0.0312] [0.0328]
0.589*** 0.627*** 
[0.0412] [0.0449]
0.088** 0.087** 
[0.0318] [0.0335]
0.100* 0.114** 
[0.0400] [0.0428]
0.590*** 0.628*** 
[0.0413] [0.0450]
0.089** 0.089** 
[0.0318] [0.0334]
0.114** 0.132** 
[0.0402] [0.0428]
0.590*** 0.628*** 
[0.0412] [0.0449]
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InglobalFirmSales -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
[0.0171] [0.0177] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0171] [0.0178]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3160.65 -3147.81 -3159.88 -3146.96 -3160.47 -3147.66
chi2 11328.87 10279.03 11486.46 10416.48 11472.95 10393.23
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 6643.29 6617.62 6641.77 6615.92 6642.95 6617.31
Bayesian Info Criteria 8033.1 8007.42 8031.57 8005.73 8032.75 8007.12
Note: *p<0.05, **p <  0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard 
errors in brackets). Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to 
months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t +  In (t *t) . Year, ATC1 and 
Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.22 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for
Molecule Characteristics (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog logit 
1 1
cloglog logit 
2 2
cloglog logit 
3 3
Molecule Characteristics
MolGlobalReach
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_
ln_MolGlobalUSDMedian_
ln_lag_yrs
-0.028 -0.025 
[0.0281] [0.0284]
-0.015 -0.015 
[0.0434] [0.0448]
0.044 0.053 
[0.0443] [0.0448]
-0.003 -0.004 
[0.0427] [0.0440]
-0.026 -0.02 
[0.0432] [0.0442] 
-0.01 -0.01 
[0.0426] [0.0440]
Controls
Expected Generic Price 
L31n_ExpPg
Expected Market Size 
LM A vg_U S D_molCtr_
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
Firm Characteristics
0.109*** 0.114*** 
[0.0310] [0.0320]
0.229*** 0.240*** 
[0.0322] [0.0330]
0.606*** 0.634*** 
[0.0418] [0.0446]
0.104*** 0.108*** 
[0.0314] [0.0324]
0.190*** 0.197*** 
[0.0418] [0.0429]
0.608*** 0.637*** 
[0.0417] [0.0446]
0.110*** 0.114*** 
[0.0311] [0.0322]
0.234*** 0.243*** 
[0.0413] [0.0425]
0.607*** 0.635*** 
[0.0417] [0.0446]
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InglobalFirmSales 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007
[0.0161] [0.0165] [0.0162] [0.0166] [0.0161] [0.0165]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453 41453
Log Likelihood -3376.18 -3372.41 -3376.4 -3372.14 -3376.81 -3372.92
chi2 11809.27 11229.76 12122.94 11514.74 11956.61 11372.14
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 7058.37 7050.83 7058.8 7050.29 7059.62 7051.84
Bayesian Info Criteria 8379.11 8371.57 8379.54 8371.03 8380.37 8372.58
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard 
errors in brackets). Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to 
months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and 
Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.23 Robustness Check for Percent Retail Sales
Parametric Non-Parametric
Variables cloglog cloglog logit logit cloglog cloglog logit logit
(with year 
dummies)
(no year 
dummies)
(with year 
dummies)
(no year 
dummies)
(with
year
dummies)
(no year 
dummies)
(with year 
dummies)
(no year 
dummies)
% Retail Sales of Molecule
PercRetailUSD_ 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.005* 0.007** 0.005* 0.008**
[0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0038] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0025] [0.0024]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.159* 0.191* 0.159* 0.198* 0.161** 0.220*** 0.173*** 0.236***
[0.0763] [0.0797] [0.0782] [0.0801] [0.0498] [0.0483] [0.0517] [0.0494]
Expected Market Size
LMAvg_USD_molCtr_ 0.081 0.129* 0.09 0.138* 0.08 0.127** 0.091* 0.140**
[0.0580] [0.0584] [0.0602] [0.0598] [0.0414] [0.0430] [0.0436] [0.0443]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.724*** 0.734*** 0.748*** 0.758*** 0.695*** 0.708*** 0.734*** 0.747***
[0.0653] [0.0647] [0.0688] [0.0679] [0.0509] [0.0506] [0.0550] [0.0538]
Firm Characteristics
InglobalF irmSales 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.006 0.02 0.009 0.022
[0.0305] [0.0295] [0.0313] [0.0298] [0.0231] [0.0220] [0.0237] [0.0224]
ln_lag_yrs 0.156 0.072 0.17 0.083 0.057 0.016 0.069 0.026
[0.0889] [0.0837] [0.0924] [0.0858] [0.0579] [0.0548] [0.0604] [0.0562]
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Time since risk onset 
sequence
InsequenceSq
0.023***
[0.0051]
-0.348***
[0.0508]
0.042***
[0.0042]
-0.425***
[0.0467]
0.024***
[0.0053]
-0.364***
[0.0527]
0.044***
[0.0044]
_0.443***
[0.0484]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Monthly period Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 13528 13528 13528 13528 27057 27057 27057 27057
Log Likelihood -1314.59 -1347.55 -1314.65 -1347.58 -1989.91 -2054.61 -1984.72 -2050.94
chi2 416.89 357.76 369.35 322.64 6936.15 6859.53 6523.45 6504.18
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 2709.19 2761.09 2709.3 2761.17 4261.82 4377.22 4251.43 4369.89
Bayesian Info Criteria 3009.69 3009.01 3009.8 3009.08 5418.83 5476.78 5408.44 5469.45
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk 
onset, i.e. t + In (t *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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D.2.2.5 Impact of Firm Characteristics
Table D.24 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics (with
calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog logit 
1 1
cloglog logit
2 2
cloglog logit
3 3
cloglog logit 
4 4
Firm Characteristics
InLocalCorpSales
InglobalFirmSales
CorpGlobalReach
FirmMolDivAtT_
-0.015 -0.014 
[0.0278] [0.0297]
-0.002 -0.002 
[0.0220] [0.0228]
0.006 0.005 
[0.0088] [0.0092]
0 0 
[0.0002] [0.0002]
Controls
Expected Generic Prices 
L31n_ExpPg 0.143*** 0.139** 
[0.0433] [0.0455]
0.138*** 0.134** 
[0.0420] [0.0440]
0.136** 0.133** 
[0.0419] [0.0438]
0.130** 0.128** 
[0.0424] [0.0445]
Expected Market Size 
LM A vgU  S D_molCtr_ 0.124* 0.141* 
[0.0542] [0.0571]
0.123* 0.140* 
[0.0534] [0.0562]
0.126* 0.143* 
[0.0534] [0.0563]
0.113* 0.128* 
[0.0534] [0.0563]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.648*** 0.683*** 
[0.0490] [0.0533]
0.645*** 0.680*** 
[0.0491] [0.0534]
0.647*** 0.682*** 
[0.0486] [0.0529]
0.653*** 0.689*** 
[0.0487] [0.0529]
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Molecule Characteristics 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_
ln_lag_yrs
-0.055
[0.0648]
0.053
[0.0714]
-0.062
[0.0683]
0.077
[0.0762]
-0.061
[0.0632]
0.049
[0.0710]
-0.067
[0.0666]
0.072
[0.0757]
-0.07
[0.0617]
0.047
[0.0712]
-0.076
[0.0651]
0.07
[0.0758]
-0.073
[0.0618]
0.025
[0.0699]
-0.078
[0.0647]
0.046
[0.0747]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017***
[0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0038]
InsequenceSq 0.343*** 0.355*** 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.344*** 0.356*** 0.342*** 0.353***
[0.0347] [0.0377] [0.0346] [0.0375] [0.0345] [0.0374] [0.0346] [0.0376]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 19518 19518 19809 19809 20050 20050 20130 20130
Log Likelihood -2079.68 -2078.93 -2095.58 -2094.86 -2102.48 -2101.82 -2117.8 -2117.14
chi2 780.34 658.03 788.55 660.11 808.33 673.33 802.82 666.74
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4253.35 4251.86 4285.17 4283.73 4298.96 4297.63 4329.6 4328.28
Bayesian Info Criteria 4623.67 4622.18 4656.18 4654.74 4670.54 4669.21 4701.37 4700.04
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). 
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and In sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  
squared months since risk onset, i.e. t + In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.25 Robustness Check: Parametric Duration Dependence, Coefficient Estimates for Firm
Characteristics (no calendar year dummies)
Variables
cloglog logit 
1 1
cloglog logit 
2 2
cloglog logit 
3 3
cloglog logit 
4 4
Firm Characteristics
InLocalCorpSales 
InglobalF irmSales 
CorpGlobalReach 
F irmMolDivAtT_
0.063* 0.065* 
[0.0287] [0.0298]
0.022 0.022 
[0.0215] [0.0218]
0.001 0.001 
[0.0086] [0.0088]
0.000* 0.000* 
[0.0002] [0.0002]
Controls
Expected Generic Prices 
L31n_ExpPg 0.146*** 0.149*** 
[0.0436] [0.0450]
0.143*** 0.146*** 
[0.0418] [0.0431]
0.147*** 0.150*** 
[0.0416] [0.0430]
0.143*** 0.145*** 
[0.0418] [0.0431]
Expected Market Size 
LMA vg_USD_molCtr_ 0.222*** 0.232*** 
[0.0560] [0.0577]
0.220*** 0.231*** 
[0.0546] [0.0562]
0.219*** 0.229*** 
[0.0545] [0.0561]
0.213*** 0.223*** 
[0.0543] [0.0559]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.678*** 0.702*** 
[0.0487] [0.0520]
0.675*** 0.699*** 
[0.0488] [0.0521]
0.678*** 0.702*** 
[0.0488] [0.0521]
0.686*** 0.711*** 
[0.0484] [0.0517]
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Molecule Characteristics 
InMolGlobalU SD Annual_
ln_lag_yrs
-0.131*
[0.0637]
-0.065
[0.0675]
-0.130*
[0.0651]
-0.059
[0.0697]
-0.112
[0.0621]
-0.072
[0.0667]
-0.111
[0.0635]
-0.067
[0.0689]
-0.105
[0.0610]
-0.071
[0.0672]
-0.104
[0.0624]
-0.065
[0.0694]
-0.117
[0.0605]
-0.097
[0.0657]
-0.116
[0.0617]
-0.092
[0.0681]
Time Since Risk Onset
sequence 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.041***
[0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0032]
InsequenceSq 0.445*** 0.461*** 0.450*** 0.466*** -0.450*** 0.466*** 0.448*** 0.464***
[0.0328] [0.0350] [0.0325] [0.0348] [0.0324] [0.0347] [0.0325] [0.0348]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 19518 19518 19809 19809 20050 20050 20130 20130
Log Likelihood -2190.34 -2192.66 -2208.6 -2211.04 -2216.6 -2219.01 -2230.83 -2233.29
chi2 597.01 508.24 606.18 513 613.64 518.9 614.54 521.67
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4458.67 4463.33 4495.2 4500.08 4511.21 4516.02 4539.66 4544.58
Bayesian Info Criteria 4765.96 4770.61 4803.06 4807.94 4819.54 4824.35 4848.14 4853.07
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared 
months since risk onset, i.e. / +  In (/ * /) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.26 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics (with
calendar year dummies)
Variables cloglog logit 
1 1
cloglog logit 
2 2
cloglog logit 
3 3
cloglog logit 
4 4
Firm Characteristics
InLocalCorpSales
InglobalFirmSales
CorpGlobalReach
FirmMolDivAtT_
-0.026 -0.024 
[0.0222] [0.0240]
-0.009 -0.008 
[0.0172] [0.0178]
0.001 0.002 
[0.0068] [0.0072]
0 0 
[0.0002] [0.0002]
Controls
Expected Generic Price 
L31n_ExpPg
Expected Market Size 
LM A v g U  SD_molCtr_
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen
0.082* 0.081* 
[0.0324] [0.0342]
0.101* 0.116** 
[0.0401] [0.0429]
0.598*** 0.637*** 
[0.0412] [0.0451]
0.088** 0.087** 
[0.0318] [0.0335]
0.100* 0.114** 
[0.0400] [0.0428]
0.590*** 0.628*** 
[0.0413] [0.0450]
0.084** 0.084* 
[0.0318] [0.0335]
0.097* 0.111** 
[0.0400] [0.0428]
0.588*** 0.625*** 
[0.0411] [0.0447]
0.090** 0.091** 
[0.0322] [0.0340]
0.105** 0.120** 
[0.0403] [0.0431]
0.595*** 0.634*** 
[0.0411] [0.0448]
Molecule Characteristics 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_
ln_lag_yrs
0.053
[0.0440]
0.074
[0.0464]
0.057
[0.0460]
0.083
[0.0493]
0.048
[0.0435]
0.068
[0.0461]
0.052
[0.0453]
0.076
[0.0489]
0.048
[0.0432]
0.066
[0.0461]
0.052
[0.0451]
0.074
[0.0488]
0.037
[0.0437]
0.064
[0.0462]
0.039
[0.0455]
0.073
[0.0489]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model Stats
Number of observations 40874 40874 41453 41453 42088 42088 42058 42058
Log Likelihood -3134.84 -3121.77 -3159.88 -3146.96 -3179.06 -3166.07 -3192.97 -3179.68
chi2 11498.75 10393.66 11486.46 10416.48 11619.12 10535.08 11631.51 10557.9
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 6591.68 6565.55 6641.77 6615.92 6680.13 6654.13 6707.94 6681.36
Bayesian Info Criteria 7979.22 7953.08 8031.57 8005.73 8072.38 8046.38 8100.08 8073.5
Note: *p<0.05, **p <  0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared 
months since risk onset, i.e. t +  In (/ *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
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Table D.27 Robustness Check: Non-Parametric Time Duration, Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics (no calendar
year dummies)
Variables
cloglog
1
logit
1
cloglog
2
logit
2
cloglog
3
logit
3
cloglog
4
logit
4
Firm Characteristics 1
InLocalCorpSales 0.042
[0.0228]
0.044
[0.0237]
InglobalFirmSales 0.005
[0.0162]
0.005
[0.0166]
CorpGlobalReach -0.006
[0.0065]
-0.006
[0.0067]
FirmMolDivAtT_ 0
[0.0001]
0
[0.0001]
Controls
Expected Generic Price
L31n_ExpPg 0.104** 0.108** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.115***
[0.0321] [0.0331] [0.0314] [0.0324] [0.0311] [0.0321] [0.0312] [0.0322]
Expected Market Size
LM Avg_U SD_molCtr_ 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.184*** 0 0.196*** 0.204***
[0.0423] [0.0435] [0.0418] [0.0429] [0.0415] [0.0426] [0.0422] [0.0434]
Competition
norm_IHHatc4_gen 0.612*** 0.642*** 0.608*** 0.637*** 0.609*** 0.637*** 0.614*** 0.643***
[0.0420] [0.0450] [0.0417] [0.0446] [0.0415] [0.0443] [0.0416] [0.0445]
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Molecule Characteristics 
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_
ln_lag_yrs
0.044
[0.0452]
-0.004
[0.0432]
0.052
[0.0458]
-0.005
[0.0445]
0.044
[0.0443]
-0.003
[0.0427]
0.053
[0.0448]
-0.004
[0.0440]
0.049
[0.0439]
-0.003
[0.0427]
0.059
[0.0443]
-0.004
[0.0441]
0.033
[0.0446]
-0.009
[0.0425]
0.041
[0.0452]
-0.009
[0.0438]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monthly Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies No No No No No No No No
Model Stats
Number of observations 40874 40874 41453 41453 42088 42088 42058 42058
Log Likelihood -3349.43 -3344.94 -3376.4 -3372.14 -3395.61 -3391.48 -3409.2 -3404.71
chi2 11919.14 11315.89 12122.94 11514.74 12190.12 11570.41 12327.55 11731.62
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 7004.87 6995.89 7058.8 7050.29 7097.22 7088.96 7124.4 7115.42
Bayesian Info Criteria 8323.46 8314.48 8379.54 8371.03 8420.29 8412.03 8447.37 8438.38
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets).
Duration dependence is captured by sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared 
months since risk onset, i.e. t  + In (t *t) .  Year, ATC1 and Country Dummies not reported
353
D.2.3: M ulticollinearity
Table D.28 Variance Inflation Factors with number of generic firms in the market
Variable VIF J/VIF
NumGenFirmMed 244.7 0.0041
country =  US 187.5 0.0053
country - GERM ANY 102.13 0.0098
country =  ITALY 34.07 0.0293
country =  UK 14.49 0.0690
country =  POLAND 13.04 0.0767
country =  SPAIN 11.31 0.0884
country =  GREECE 11.19 0.0893
country =  JAPAN 10.65 0.0939
country == FRANCE 10.09 0.0991
year =  2003 8.05 0.1242
year == 2002 7.58 0.1319
year == 2004 7.52 0.1330
year =  2001 6.67 0.1500
year =  2005 6.61 0.1514
year == 2006 5.65 0.1770
Variable VIF 1/VIF
sequence 5.34 0.1872
country =  BELGIUM 5.09 0.1964
year =  2000 4.93 0.2029
InsequenceSq 4.22 0.2370
country —  CANADA 4.09 0.2443
year =  2007 3.94 0.2535
ExpMarketSizeUSD 3.84 0.2604
country =  SWITZERLAND 3.59 0.2788
country ==  PORTUGAL 3.2 0.3120
country =  TURKEY 3.17 0.3154
ATC1 =  N 2.88 0.3477
LMAvgExpPg 2.82 0.3552
country ==  S. AFRICA 2.63 0.3800
ATC1 = L 2.53 0.3946
ln_M olGlobalUSDAnnual_ 2.38 0.4204
country =  FINLAND 2.36 0.4229
Variable VIF 1/VIF
country =  SW EDEN 2.22 0.4514
ATC1 = = C 2.21 0.4527
ATC1 =  M 2.13 0.4690
country =  NETHERLANDS 2.01 0.4979
ATC1 =  R 1.89 0.5297
ATC1 =  J 1.86 0.5370
country =  BELGIUM 1.85 0.5394
ATC1 =  D 1.6 0.6257
ATC1 == H 1.59 0.6285
InglobalFirm Sales 1.55 0.6435
ATC1 =  G 1.55 0.6459
ln_lag_yrs 1.52 0.6584
ATC1 = S 1.2 0.8312
ATC1 =  B 1.12 0.8897
M ean V IF 16.58
Command:
xi: regress _d LMAvgExpPg ExpMarketSizeUSD NumGenFirmMed ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ ln_lag_yrs ln_globalFirmSales 
sequence InsequenceSq i.year i.countrynosector i.atcl 
estat vif
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Table D.29 Variance Inflation Factors with Herfindahl Index in ATC4
Variable VIF 1/VIF
year =  2003 7.71 0.1297
year =  2004 7.26 0.1377
year =  2002 7.21 0.1386
year =  2005 6.47 0.1545
year =  2001 6.11 0.1636
year —  2006 5.62 0.1781
sequence 5.34 0.1874
year =  2000 4.34 0.2305
In sequenceSq 4.21 0.2374
year =  2007 3.94 0.2539
ExpMarketSizeUSD 3.83 0.2608
country =  US 3.46 0.2893
ATC1 =  N 2.97 0.3362
LMAvgExpPg 2.81 0.3553
country =  S. Africa 2.63 0.3803
Variable VIF 1/VIF
ATC1 =  L 2.61 0.3835
country =  CANADA 2.49 0.4013
country =  GERMANY 2.4 0.4160
In MolGlobalUSDAnnual 2.38 0.4205
country == SPAIN 2.36 0.4245
country =  F INLAND 2.31 0.4332
ATC1 = C 2.22 0.4506
country =  PORTUGAL 2.19 0.4571
country =  GREECE 2.17 0.4606
country =  UK 2.15 0.4645
ATC1 =  M 2.14 0.4675
country =  AUSTRIA 2.07 0.4823
country =  TURKEY 2.06 0.4865
country == FRANCE 2.05 0.4879
country =  SWEDEN 2 0.4994
Variable VIF 1/VIF
country =  JAPAN 1.99 0.5016
country =  NETHERLANDS 1.95 0.5117
country =  POLAND 1.95 0.5128
ATC1 =  J 1.9 0.5271
ATC1 =  R 1.89 0.5286
country =  IT A LY 1.85 0.5402
country =  BELG IUM 1.84 0.5448
country =  SW ITZERLAND 1.79 0.5594
A T C 1 =  D 1.62 0.6154
A T C 1 = = H 1.59 0.6271
ln_globalF irmSales 1.56 0.6415
ATC1 =  G 1.55 0.6457
In lag yrs 1.52 0.6593
ATC1 = S 1.2 0.8302
norm IHHatc4_gen 1.2 0.8343
ATC1 =  B 1.12 0.8916
Mean V IF 2.91
Command:
xi: regress _d LMAvgExpPg ExpMarketSizeUSD norm_IHHatc4_gen ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ ln_lag_yrs In globalFirmSales sequence 
In sequenceSq i.year i.countrynosector i.atcl
estat vif
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Table D.30 Parametric Duration Dependence: Coefficients using Herfindahl Index as a proxy for competition
with calendar year dummies no calendar year dummies
Variables cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit cloglog cloglog cloglog logit logit logit
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expected Generic Price
LMAvgExpPg 0.150*** 0.218** 0.146*** 0.226** 0.154*** 0.325*** 0.156*** 0.335***
[0.0410] [0.0725] [0.0429] [0.0756] [0.0405] [0.0722] [0.0419] [0.0742]
LMAvg_Pb 0.151***
[0.0409]
0.146***
[0.0428]
0.159***
[0.0390]
0.159***
[0.0402]
medRatioPgPb -0.005
[0.9584]
0.304
[1.0083]
-1.391
[0.9505]
-1.422
[0.9865]
Expected Market Size
ExpMarketSizeUSD 0.132*
[0.0534]
0.147**
[0.0561]
0.253***
[0.0549]
0.264***
[0.0564]
ExpMarketSizeSU 0.077
[0.0520]
0.089
[0.0548]
0.180***
[0.0534]
0.187***
[0.0550]
L M A vg_U S D_molCtr_ 0.127*
[0.0537]
0.144*
[0.0567]
0.203***
[0.0554]
0.209***
[0.0567]
avgGenShare_USD_ 0.007
[0.0168]
0
[0.0175]
0.084***
[0.0139]
0.088***
[0.0143]
Competition
n o rm l H Hatc4_gen 0.647*** 0.648*** 0.647*** 0.682*** 0.683*** 0.683*** 0.676*** 0.679*** 0.664*** 0.700*** 0.702*** 0.688***
[0.0491] [0.0493] [0.0493] [0.0535] [0.0535] [0.0536] [0.0489] [0.0491] [0.0498] [0.0523] [0.0522] [0.0529]
Molecule Characteristics
ln_MolGlobalUSDAnnual_ -0.064 -0.019 -0.059 -0.069 -0.022 -0.066 -0.138* -0.073 -0.117 -0.136* -0.069 -0.112
[0.0634] [0.0626] [0.0635] [0.0669] [0.0660] [0.0671] [0.0627] [0.0627] [0.0628] [0.0641] [0.0643] [0.0648]
In lag yrs 0.054 0.046 0.053 0.077 0.067 0.076 -0.058 -0.07 -0.038 -0.052 -0.066 -0.032
[0.0711] [0.0714] [0.0713] [0.0758] [0.0759] [0.0761] [0.0670] [0.0673] [0.0667] [0.0691] [0.0694] [0.0689]
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Firm Characteristics
---------------
ln_gIobalFirmSales -0.003
[0.0221]
-0.004
[0.0221]
-0.003
[0.0220]
-0.002
[0.0228]
-0.004
[0.0229]
-0.002
[0.0228]
0.022
[0.0216]
0.019
[0.0216]
0.02
[0.0213]
0.022
[0.0219]
0.019
[0.0219]
0.019
[0.0216]
Time Since Risk Onset H N H l
sequence 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.035***
[0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0038] [0.0037] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0035]
ln_sequenceSq 0.348*** 0.344*** 0.348*** 0.360*** 0.356*** 0.360*** 0.451*** 0.447*** 0.431*** 0.468*** 0.462*** 0.445***
[0.0346] [0.0346] [0.0345] [0.0376] [0.0376] [0.0376] [0.0326] [0.0325] [0.0334] [0.0349] [0.0349] [0.0359]
Heterogeneity
ATC1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Model Stats . I i ■ ■  < 1 1 —  1
Number o f observations 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698 19698
Log Likelihood -2083.37 -2086.36 -2083.47 -2082.67 -2085.94 -2082.87 -2192.41 -2199.68 -2170.06 -2194.79 -2202.22 -2172.71
chi2 798.35 798.11 817.25 668 669.02 682.63 617.43 604.45 615.58 521.4 510.85 530.79
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Akaike Info Criteria 4260.73 4266.72 4264.94 4259.34 4265.87 4263.75 4462.82 4477.37 4422.13 4467.58 4482.45 4427.42
Bayesian Info Criteria 4631.48 4637.47 4651.46 4630.09 4636.62 4650.28 4770.46 4785.01 4745.55 4775.23 4790.09 4750.84
Note: *p<0.05, **p < 0 .0 1 , ***p<0.001. Standard errors clustered at molecule-country level (standard errors in brackets). Duration dependence is captured by 
sequence and ln sequence, which correspond to months since risk onset and the log o f  squared months since risk onset, i.e. t +  In (t *t) . Year, ATC1 and Country 
Dummies not reported
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Appendix D.3: Theoretical Appendix
D.3.1 Product Market Competition with Differentiated Goods
Following Singh and Vives (1984), consider N+l firms, 1 branded producer and N 
generic entrants, let consumers have the following utility function (Singh and Vives 
1984; Hackner 2000; Mestre-Ferrandiz 2003; Cellini, Lambertini et al. 2004; Motta 
2004):
V = y  + U(q0,q,,...qN )
Following the argument in Motta (2004) (see section 8.4, page 562), y  is the composite 
good and consumers maximize V by selecting {q^,q\,—qyi,y] subject to the budget 
constraint (Motta 2004):
P 0<10 + P\9\ + -  + Pn<1n + p yy  = R
The Lagrangian is:
L = y + U(qQ,q\,...qN) + A,[R-(pQq0 + P\q\ + -  + PnVn + Pyy)\  [1]
d £ JU «10 ,^ ^ ± N) _ x o ; = 01 j f  
dq, dq,,
dL
dy
= \ - X - p y =Q,
dL i?—  = R -  Po% -  P\<1\ -••••- Pn 9n  -  Py-y
By taking the composite good as the numeraire p y = 1 and Z = 1. The first order 
condition (FOC) with respect to the differentiated good market becomes:
dU(q0 ,qu ...qN ) _
 i ------------ = p idqt
This FOC can be analyzed independently of the market for the composite good. Motto 
(2004) specifies that the quasi-linearity in the utility function V justifies a partial 
equilibrium analysis of the differentiated good market.
Assume the following utility function:
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U(g0,q i , . . ^N ) = Y ia iqi
/  \
£?<2 +2r'E‘iiQj 
>*j
The FOC given by _ p.  defines the inverse demand equations:
dqt
P i = a i - P q i - y Y Jqj  [3] 
j* ‘
In matrix notation this system of equations can be represented as p = o -  B q. 
where p ' = [ p o , P i , - , P n ]> o' = [a0,a i,...,a w] and q' = [?o»?l.....
B =
P r  
r  P
r  r
r
P y 
y  P
= ( P - y ) l  + y O
where O is a matrix which has entries of 1 for each element and I is the identity matrix. 
Direct demand equations can be calculated from p = a  -  Bq as:
q = B ' ( a - p ) ,  [4]
where B , B , O and I have a dimension of ( N  + l)(N  + 1)
B~* = —5— I — y
p - y  ( P -  y)(P + y - N )
o
The inverse of B can be found as follows:
BB " 1 =1
Using O = (N + 1)0
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i P - r ) T ^ l 2 - { P - r i x O  + r - l — O - y x O 1 =1
( P - y )  (P - r )
Q! - ( /? - y ) x +y —-j—- -  y x ( N +1)| = 0
x ( p - y  + y(N + l)) = r  1
X =
( P - y )  
y
( P - y X P + r - N)
The diagonal entries of B - 1  are therefore
1 y B + y • N  — y----------   = — - — -------------------- -— , and off-diagonal entries are
P ~ r  ( P- r ) ( P  + r - N)  ( P- y ) ( P  + y N )
r
{ p - y X P  + y . N )
Using q = B (a -  p), the system of direct demand functions can be written as:
qt = — - -—^—  (a • -     V  (afr -  Pk)  for i
(P -  r)(P + r - N)  ( P - r ) ( P  + r - N ) £ ;
B + y • N  — y Let k  -  — —— - -----------— , k  > 0 since P > y .
(P -  yXP + y - N)
yand t = ---------- ------------- , r > 0 and k  > r since B > y > 0.
( P - r ) ( P  + r - N )
( \
9i = K - a i - T ' £ i a k - K - p j + r ^ P k  [5]
V k * i k±i
Note that since k > t  , own-price effect is greater than the cross-price effect.
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D.3.2 Equilibrium  with a B randed Stackelberg Leader and TV Generic 
E ntran ts
This game analytic problem consists of two stages: in the first stage the branded 
Stackelberg leader sets the price; in the second stage N  identical generic entrants 
simultaneously determine their equilibrium prices.
P g (Po)
i = 0 branded product
N  generics
The relevant concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium) and the equilibrium is found by "backward induction". First, consider the 
case where N  generic products compete simultaneously in price given the price of the 
originator product, assuming there are no capacity or quantity constraints. Each generic 
entrant maximizes its profits given the number of entrants and the branded price. 
Consider the one-shot optimization problem of generics:
\
MaxTIj =qj (pj  ~ C j )  =
Pi
K-ai - r Y J(X k - K 'Pi + T'L P k ( P i ~ ci ) ~ Fi
k*i k*i y
m
FOC: — i '- = ~K(Pi ~Ci) + *■•«,• = °>
dPi
^2j-j
[  - f  = - 2 k  < 0 , FOC is sufficient for optimality]
dp, }
Assume generic entrants are symmetric, i.e. Cj = cg and a , = a g , implies demand
functions and FOC conditions for generic entrants are symmetric. Therefore, in 
equilibrium prices will be identical p t = p g , i e  {l,..., iV}. Plugging in these values into
the FOC condition:
( - 2 k + t  - (N - \ ) ) -  p g + K ’Cg +K-ag - T ( a 0 + ( N - \ ) - a g } + T-p0 =0
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K-cg +K-ag - T ( a 0 + ( N - l ) - a g ) + T-p0 
P^ Po> 2k - t - ( N - \ )  '
- &  =    > 0 ,  since 2jc—r -(JV—1) = 2 ^  + ^ , ( jV~ 1) > 0
8p0 2 /r-r-(JV -1 ) ( P - y X P  + y-N)
Plugging in the values for k , r  , the following reaction function is obtained:
, {cg + « g ) { P + r ( N - \ ) ) - y a 0 - y { N - \ ) a g + y p 0 [55 
gU?0j (>9-r ) ( ^  + r Af)(2>9 + r ( iV -l))
D.3.2.1 Findings
Finding 1. The generic price level and the branded price are strategic complements, i.e. 
equilibrium prices of the generic fringe increase as the branded price increases, holding 
the number of entrants, P  and degree of differentiation fixed.
Proof:
For N  and y , p  (and hence if/ = y  / p ) fixed:
dPs  _____________ r
?>Po ( P - r ) ( P + r * r ) { 2 p + y ( N - i ) )
>o.
Equilibrium prices are derived assuming there is no price cap for the equilibrium price 
level of the branded product. If the branded prices are capped and pushed downward, 
then prices of generics will be pushed down as well and incentives for generic entry will 
decrease.
f r .   ( 3 f r . r g ( 2 » - l ) )
dPo8N ( P - r )  ( p  + y N ) 2 (2p  + y ( N - \ ) f
*
i.e. as N  increases the response of p g to changes in p$ decreases.
1 5 5 Pg(po)  should satisfy: p g (p0) > 0  and p g (p0) > c g and p g (pQ) > a g since
pi - a i =Pqi + r Y j qj
j * i
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Finding 2 . Generic prices decrease in the number of generic entrants if P > y >  0.25. 
Proof:
P g ( P o )  =
_ { c g + a g ){P + y { N - \ ) ) - r - a 0 - y - ( N - \ ) a g + y p o
Ce - y ) { P + y N ) ( 2 p + y { N - \ ))
dpg_
dN { P - y ) { P + y N ) ( 2 p + y ( N - \ ) ) ^ 3l3+r^2N  c « } < 0
<=> (3p  + y ( 2 N - 1 ) )P g ~ c g > 0  given the fact that p g > cg in equilibrium (i.e. 
positive mark-up over marginal cost).
Note: 3/? + ^ (2A ^-l)> 3^  + /(2 A ^ -l)  = 2/(A^ + l)since p >  y  by assumption. 
(3P + y ( 2 N - l ) ) p g - c g >2r ( N  + \ ) p g - c g >4ypg - c g 
(Last inequality obtained by setting A = 1).
A lower bound on y  can be defined by using the fact that p g > cg in equilibrium, 
otherwise generics would have no incentives to enter.
(3p + y ( 2 N - \ ) ) p g - c g >4ypg - c g > P g ~ c g  > 0 o 4 / > l o  /> 0 .2 5  ■
To find the equilibrium quantity levels:
?/ =
r \
K - a j - T ^ a k  - K - P i + T ^ P k
k*i  y k*i
qg =(K-ag - T - a 0 - T - ( N - \ ) ' a g } - t c -p g +T-pQ+ T - ( N - \ ) - p g 
qg = K-ag - T - a 0 - T - ( N - l ) - a g +T-p0 - ( K - T - ( N - l ) ) - p g 
qg =/c-ag - T - a 0 - T ' ( N - l ) - a g + t  • P q - ( k - t  - ( N - !))•  p g
K " (Xg — T • GCq — T • ( N  — 1) • OCg  +  T • P q = p g ( 2 k  -  X • (N  -1)) -  K • Cg
qg = p g ( 2 K - T - ( N - l ) ) - K - c g - ( t c - T - ( N - l ) ) - p g 
qg = p g ( 2 f c - T - ( N - l ) - K  + T - ( N - \ ) ) - K - c g = K ’( pg ~cg ) [8 ]
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Therefore:
2
n g = { p g - cg ) ^ g = K\ p g - cg)  - p
d n g d n „  dp„ ( , dps
—  ~  = H p s - cs ) w <0dN dpg dN
dp„
Since — — < 0 and price mark-up is positive P a ~ c Q> 0, generic profits are decreasing
dN  s s
in the number of entrants.
n g = K { p g - cg ) ~ F
Plugging in/? (/?0) =
K'Cg + x - a g - T ( a 0 +( N- X) -ag } + T- p 0
2k - t - (N-X)
n g = K-
K-Cg+K-oCg - r ( a 0 + (N -1)• ) + r • /?o
2k - t -(N-X)
- c , - F
Finding 3. Generic profits are decreasing in fixed costs of entry and the marginal cost 
of generic manufacturers.
e n g
dc
2 K
g
K-Cg+tC'CXg-r^a0 + ( N- X) -a g ) + T-p0
2k - t - {N -X)
- c g
K
2k - x ' {N -X)
- 1
ang = 2 K \ P g - C g )\ K <0
Since p g > cg and K
2k - t >{N -X) 2p  + y{N-X)
Finding 4. Generic profits are increasing in a g . 
Proof:
an
da
g =  2 k  '
K-cg +K-ag - r [ a Q +(Ar-l)-arg ) + r-/?0
g 2k - T ' { N -X)
- c .
an,
dag
= 2K-{P g - C g ) p > 0.
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¥
n g can be expressed in terms o f  the parameters f t , y  by using
P g ( P o )  =
_ { cg+<xg ){P + r ( N - \ ) ) - y - a o - y - ( , N - \ ) a g +y-Pq
( / } - r ) ( 0 + r N ) ( 2 / 3 + r { N - \ ) )
and
k  —
P + y  • N - y
(P -  r ) ( P+r - N)
_ p  + y - N - y  
g ~ ( P - y X P + r - N )
(cg+ag){P+y(N- l))-y-ao-r<N- i)ag+r-Po 
{ P - y ) { P  + rN){2/3 + y { N - \ ) )
— C8 - F
Market entry decision of generic firms depends on the expected profit levels. If returns 
are sufficient to cover the fixed entry cost, i.e. if profits are positive, generics decide to
enter156
Since
an8
dN
< 0, generic profits will decrease as the number of generics increases. The
maximum number of generics that the market can bear is given by n g (N  max) = 0 . 
Mnax is given by the root of the polynomial:
P + y - N - y
( P - y X P + y N )
(cg +ag ) ( p + y ( N - l ) ) - r - a 0 - r - ( N - \ ) a g + y p 0
( / 3 - r ) ( P+y N) {2 0+r( N- \ ) )
- c . - F  = 0
Price optimization for the branded product:
f  \
n 0  = ( / ’0 - co ) 9 o>where 9o= - K 'Po+TY . P k
V k * i  y k * i
q0 =(ic-a0 - TNa g ' ) -K -p0 + T N- p g (p0)
Plugging in p g (p0) =
K-cg + K-ag - T ( a 0 + ( N - l ) - a g ) + r - p 0
156 Fixed market entry costs represent research costs before drug launch (including bioequivalence 
tests).
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6
c0
Po =
^2k2 - kt(N - \ ) - t  ^+ [2k2 - kt( N - \ ) - T 2N^aQ - rN(K + 2r)ag +tN kcf
2^2/c2 - kt( N - 1) - rJ
Plugging this back into the reaction function of generics:
K - C g + K ' C C g - T i c C Q + i N - V t ' C l ^  +  T - p Q
P* {P0>= 2k - x ~(N- 1)
P g ( P o )  =
+ T'
K-Cg+K-dg - r ( a 0 + ( N -l)'<*g)
2k - t -{N - \ )
Cq[2k2 - kt{ N - \ ) - t  ^+ (2k2 - kt( N - \ ) - t2N^gcq -TN(K + 2r)ag +tN kc^
2^2k2 -  kt( N - 1) -  r j
P s = \ K + T
tNk
2^2k2 -  kt(N -1) -  r j
2k - kt( N - \ ) - t>-C„ + T-— :------------------ rCQ
2^2k2 - kt( N - l ) - r j
+
k - t(N-I ) tN ( k + 2t)--------    f  ------------- --------- --------
2k - t - (N-\ )  2^2k2 - kz( N - 1) -  r j
T-T 2k2 -  kt(N -1) -  t2N  
2^2k2 -  kt(N -1) -  rJ
a0.
P g = \
t2N
1 -
2 ^ 2 a£-2  - K r ( A f - l ) - r j
2 k 2  -  k t ( N  - 1) -  t 2 N  
2 ^ 2 k 2 -  k t ( N  - 1) -  r j
>KCg + - C Q +
k  -  t ( N  - 1)  t 2 N ( k  +  2 t )
2 k - t - ( N - \ )  2 ^ 2 k 2  - k t ( N - 1) - r j
Ctr
raQ. +
367
REFERENCES
Abbott, R. D. (1985). "Logistic Regression in Survival Analysis." American Journal of 
Epidemiology 121(3): 465-471.
Acemoglu, D. and J. Linn (2004). "Market Size In Innovation: Theory and Evidence 
From The Pharmaceutical Industry." Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3): 1049- 
1090.
Adams, C. P. and V. V. Brantner (2006). "Estimating the cost of new drug 
development: Is it really $802 million?" Health Affairs 25(2): 420-428.
Adriaen, M., K. De Witte, et al. (2007). "Pricing Strategies of Originator and Generic 
Medicines following Patent Expiry in Belgium." Journal of Generic Medicines 5(3): 
175-187.
Andersson, F. (1992). "The drug lag issue: The debate seen from an international 
perspective." International Journal of Health Services 22(1): 53-72.
Andersson, K., G. Bergstrom, et al. (2007)." Impact of a generic substitution reform on 
patients’ and society’s expenditure for pharmaceuticals." Health Policy 81(2-3)(2-3): 
376-84.
Andersson, K., G. Bergstrom, et al. (2007). "Impact of a Generic Substitution Reform 
on Patients’ and Society's Expenditure for Pharmaceuticals." Health Policy 81(21: 376- 
384.
Anis, A. H., D. P. Guh, et al. (2003). "Lowering generic drug prices: less regulation 
equals more competition." Medical care: 135-141.
Annon, A. (1994). A Drug Tsar is Bom, The Economist.
Appelt, S. (2009). Early Entry and Trademark Protection-an Empirical Examination of 
Barriers to Generic Entry, Munich Graduate School of Economics.
Aronsson, T., M. A. Bergman, et al. (2001). "The Impact of Generic Drug Competition 
on Brand Name Market Shares-Evidence from Micro Data." Review of Industrial 
Organization 19(41: 423-433.
Aronsson, T., M. A. Bergman, et al. (2001). "The impact of generic drug competition on 
brand name market shares-Evidence from micro data." Review of Industrial 
Organization 19(4): 423-433.
Bae, J. P. (1997). "Drug patent expirations and the speed of generic entry." Health 
Services Research 32(1): 87.
Bain, A. D. (1962). "The growth of television ownership in the United Kingdom." 
International Economic Review 3(21: 145-167.
Bain, J. S. (1956). Barriers to new competition: their character and consequences in 
manufacturing industries. Harvard Univ. Press.
368
Banait, N. S. (2005). "Authorized Generics: Antitrust Issues and the Hatch-Waxman 
Act." from http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/IP/Authorized Generics.pdf.
Barral, P. E. (1985). Ten Years of Results in Pharmaceutical Research Throughout the 
World.O975-1984). Prospective et Sante Publique.
Battisti, G. and P. Stoneman (2003). "Inter-and intra-firm effects in the diffusion of new 
process technology." Research Policy 32(9): 1641-1655.
Berlin, H. and B. Jonsson (1986). "International dissemination of new drugs: a 
comparative study of six countries." Managerial and Decision Economics 7(4): 235- 
242.
Bemdt, E. R., L. Bui, et al. (1997). The Roles of Marketing, Product Quality and Price 
Competition in the Growth and Composition of the US Anti-Ulcer Drug Industry. 
Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon, eds.. The Economics of New Goods. Vol. 
58 of NBER Studies in Income and Wealth. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago 
Press: 277-328.
Besanko, D., D. Dranove, et al. (2009). Economics of strategy. Wiley-India.
Bloom, N. and J. Reenen (1998). Regulating drug prices: where do we go from here?, 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 19: 321-342.
Bolten, B. M. and T. DeGregorio (2002). "From the Analyst's Couch: Trends in 
development cycles." Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 1(5): 335-336.
Bongers, F. and H. Carradinha (2009). How to increase patient access to generic 
medicines in European Healthcare Systems. EGA. Accessed 23 Sep 2009, Available at: 
http://www.egagenerics.com/doc/ega increase-patient-access update 072009.pdf.
Branes, J. M. (2007). Patent technology: transfer and industrial competition Nova 
Science Publishers.
Braveman, P. and S. Gruskin (2003). "Defining equity in health." Journal of 
epidemiology and community health 57(4): 254.
Brekke, K. R., I. Konigbauer, et al. (2007). "Reference pricing of pharmaceuticals." 
Journal of Health Economics 26(3): 613-642.
Breslow, N. (1974). "Covariance analysis of censored survival data." Biometrics: 89-99.
Bresnahan, T. F. and R. J. Gordon (1997). The economics of new goods. University of 
Chicago Press.
Brook, R., J. Ware, et al. (1983). "Does free care improve adults' health? Results from a 
randomized controlled trial.." New England Journal of Medicine 309: 1426-1434.
Brook, R., J. Ware, et al. (1984). The Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults: 
Results from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Santa Monica, Available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R3055.pdf.
369
Busfield, J. (2003). "Globalization and the pharmaceutical industry revisited." 
International Journal of Health Services 33?3): 581-605.
Business Insights (2008). The Top 10 Generic Pharmaceutical Companies. Positioning, 
Performance and SWOT analyses.
Business Insights (2009b). The US Pharmaceutical Market Outlook to 2014. Market 
trends, leading players and forecasts. B. I. Ltd.
Businessweek. (2009). "European Leadership Forum 2009. Healthcare Roundtable 
Summary." from
http://www.bwevents.com/elf/09reports/Healthcare%20RT%20Summarv.pdf.
Buzzelli, C., A. Kangasharju, et al. (2006). "Impact of Generic Substitution on 
Pharmaceutical Prices and Expenditures in OECD Countries " Journal of 
Pharmaceutical Finance. Economics & Policy 15(1): 41-63.
Buzzelli, C., A. Kangasharju, et al. (2006). "Impact of Generic Substitution on 
Pharmaceutical Prices and Expenditures in OECD Countries " oumal of Pharmaceutical 
Finance. Economics & Policy 15(1): 41-63.
Cabral, L. (2010). "Barriers to Entry." from
http://pages.stem.nvu.edu/~lcabral/publications/barriers%2 0 to%2 0 entrv.pdf.
Cabral, L. M. B. (2000). Introduction to industrial organization. The MIT Press.
Cabrales, A. (2003). "Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and 
Public Policy." Department of Economics and Business. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
Economics Working Papers.
Carlton, D. W. (2005). Barriers to Entry, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 11645.
Carpenter, D., M. Chemew, et al. (2003). "Approval Times For New Drugs: Does The 
Source Of Funding For FDA Staff Matter?" Health Affairs 17.
Carpenter, D. and M. Turenne (2004). Why Do Bigger Firms Receive Faster Drug 
Approvals?
Caves, R. E., M. D. Whinston, et al. (1991). Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition 
in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 
Microeconomics. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution: 1-48.
CBO (2006). Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry.
Cellini, R., L. Lambertini, et al. (2004). "Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free 
entry: a cautionary note." Research in Economics 58(2): 125-133.
Charles River Associates (2004). Innovation in the pharmaceutical sector: A study 
undertaken for the European Commission.
370
Christie, A. F. and F. Rotstein (2008). "Duration of Patent Protection: Does One Size Fit 
All?" Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 3(6): 402-408.
Chryssochoidis, G. M. and V. Wong (1998). "Rolling Out New Products Across 
Country Markets: An Empirical Study of Causes of Delays." Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 15(1): 16-41.
Cleves, M., W. Gould, et al. (2008). An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata. 
Stata Press.
Comin, D. and B. Hobijn (2003). Cross-Country Technology Adoption: Making the 
Theories Face the Facts. Staff Reports. Staff Report no. 169. F. R. B. o. N. York. New 
York.
Coppinger, P. L., C. C. Peck, et al. (1989). "Understanding comparisons of drug 
introductions between the United States and the United Kingdom. Reply." Clinical 
pharmacology and therapeutics 46(2): 139-145.
Coscelli, A. (2000). "The importance of doctors' and patients' preferences in the 
prescription decision." Journal of Industrial Economics: 349-369.
Costa-Font, J., C. Courbage, et al. (2009). The Economics of New Health Technologies. 
Oxford University Press.
Costa-Font, J. and J. Puig-Junoy (2007). Institutional change, innovation and regulation 
failure: evidence from the Spanish drug market, Policy Press. 35: 701-718.
Cox, D. R. (1972). "Regression models and life tables." J: 187-220.
Cullen, R. (1983). "Pharmaceuticals inter-country diffusion." Managerial and Decision 
Economics 4(2): 73-82.
Danish Medicines Agency. (2010). "The ATC System." from 
http://www.dkma.dk/! 024/visUKLSArtikel.asp?artikein>=7748.
Danzon, P. (2001). "Reference Pricing: Theory and Evidence." Reference pricing and 
pharmaceutical policy: Perspectives on economics and innovation. Springer. Barcelona: 
86-126.
Danzon, P. M. and L.-W. Chao (2000a). "Does Regulation Drive out Competition in 
Pharmaceutical Markets?" Journal of Law and Economics 43: pp. 311-357.
Danzon, P. M. and L. Chao (2000a). "Cross-national Price Differences for 
Pharmaceuticals: How Large and Why?" Journal of Health Economics 19: 159-195.
Danzon, P. M. and L. Chao (2000b). "Does Regulation Drive out Competition in 
Pharmaceutical Markets?" Journal of Law and Economics 43(2): 311-357.
Danzon, P. M. and A. Epstein (2005). Launch and Pricing Strategies of Pharmaceuticals 
in Interdependent Markets. iHEA Conference.
371
Danzon, P. M. and A. J. Epstein (2008). "Launch and Pricing Strategies of 
Pharmaceuticals in Interdependent Markets." NBER Working Paper No. W 14041
Danzon, P. M. and M. F. Furukawa (2008). "International prices and availability of 
pharmaceuticals in 2005." Health Affairs 27(1): 221-233.
Danzon, P. M. and J. D. Ketcham (2004). Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for 
Medicare: Evidence from Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Cutler DM. 
Garber AM. eds. Frontiers in Health Policy Research (National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Volume 7). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press: 1-54.
Danzon, P. M. and E. L. Keuffel (2007). Regulation of the Pharmaceutical- 
Biotechnology Industry, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Danzon, P. M., Y. Wang, et al. (2005). "The Impact of Price Regulation on the Launch 
Delay of New Drugs - Evidence from Twenty-Five Major Markets in the 1990s." Health 
Economics 14: 269-292.
Datamonitor (2009). Global Drug Retail Industry Profile.
de Haen, P. (1975). "The drug lag—does it exist in Europe?" The Annals of 
Pharmacotherapy 913): 144-150.
Denicolo, V. (1996). "Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length." Journal of 
Industrial Economics 44: 249-265.
Department of Health (December 2008). The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
2009.
Dewick, P. and M. Miozzo (2002). "Sustainable technologies and the innovation- 
regulation paradox." Futures 34(9-10): 823-840.
DG Competition (2009). Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report, Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquirv/staff working paper p 
art 1 .pdf.
DiMasi, J. A. (2002). "The Value of Improving the Productivity of the Drug 
Development Process: Faster Times and Better Decisions." PharmacoEconomics 20: 1.
DiMasi, J. A., R. W. Hansen, et al. (2003). "The price of innovation: new estimates of 
drug development costs." Journal of Health Economics 22(2): 151-185.
Dixit, A. K., R. S. Pindyck, et al. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton 
University Press Princeton, NJ.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, et al. (2002). "The Regulation of Entry." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117(1): 1-37.
Dranove, D. and D. Meltzer (1994). "Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?" 
RAND Journal of Economics 25(3).
372
Dylst, P. and S. Simoens (2010). "Generic Medicine Pricing Policies in Europe: Current 
Status and Impact." Pharmaceuticals 3: 471-481.
EFPIA. (2009). "The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures ", from 
http://www.efpia.eu/Content/Default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=4883.
Ekelund, M. (2001). Competition and Innovation in the Swedish Pharmaceutical 
Market, Stockholm School of Economics.
Ekelund, M. (2001). Generic Entry Before and After the Introduction of Reference 
Prices. Competition and Innovation in the Swedish Pharmaceutical Market. Stocholm. 
Chapter 4: 1-17.
Ekelund, M. and B. Persson (2003). "Pharmaceutical Pricing in a Regulated Market." 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 298-306.
Ellison, G. and S. F. Ellison (2007). "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of 
Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration." NBER Working Paper.
Enemark, U., K. Moller, et al. (2006). The Impact of Parallel Imports on 
Pharmaceuticals. University of Denmark. Odense. Center for Applied Health Services 
Research and Technology Assessment.
EphMRA/PBIRG. (2009). "Who We Are, What We Do." from 
http://www.pbirg.com/Media.aspx7fHAboutUs.WhoWhat.
European Generic Medicines Association (2007a). 2007 Market Review: The European 
Generic Pharmaceutical Markets. E. G. M. Association. Brussels.
European Generic Medicines Association. (2007b). "Generics Market Shares: Selected 
European Countries ", from http://www.egagenerics.com/fac-indstats.htm.
Faden, L. B. and K. I. Kaitin (2008). "Assessing the Performance of the EMEA's 
Centralized Procedure : A Comparative Analysis with the US FDA." Drug Information 
Journal 42(1): 45-56.
FDA. (2010). "What Are Generic Drugs?", from
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuvingUsingMedicineSafelv/ 
UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm 144456.htm.
Frank, R. G. and D. S. Salkaver (1992). "Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for 
Pharmaceuticals." Southern Economic Joumal(October): 165-79.
Frank, R. G. and D. S. Salkever (1997). "Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals " Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6(1): 75-90.
Frank, R. G. and D. S. Salkever (1997). "Generic entry and the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6(1): 75-90.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1985). "Pre-emption and Rent Equalisation in the Adoption 
of New Technology." Review of Economics Studies 52: 383-401.
373
Ganslandt, M. and K. E. Maskus (1999). "Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products 
in the European Union." World.
Ganslandt, M. and K. E. Maskus (2004). "Parallel imports and the pricing of 
pharmaceutical products: evidence from the European Union." Journal of Health 
Economics 23(5): 1035-1057.
Garattini, L. and S. Ghislandi (2006). "Off-Patent Drugs in Italy." The European Journal 
of Health Economics 701: 79-83.
Garattini, L. and S. Ghislandi (2007). "Should we really worry about launch delays of 
new drugs in OECD countries?" The European Journal of Health Economics 8(1): 1-3.
Garber, A. M. and J. Skinner (2008). "Is American Health Care Uniquely Inefficient?" 
The journal of economic perspectives: a journal of the American Economic Association 
22(4): 27.
Gassmann, O., G. Reepmeyer, et al. (2008). Leading pharmaceutical innovation: trends 
and drivers for growth in the pharmaceutical industry. Springer Verlag.
Gemmill, M. C., J. Costa-Font, et al. (2007). "In search of a corrected prescription drug 
elasticity estimate: a meta-regression approach." Health economics 16(6): 627-643.
Gerdtham, U. G. and D. Lundin (2004). "Changes in Drug Spending for Different Age 
Groups during the 1990s? Evidence from Sweden." Expert Review of Pharmaco- 
economics and Outcomes Research 4f3h 343-51.
Geroski, P. A. and S. Machin (1991). "Market dynamics and entry."
Giaccotto, C., R. E. Santerre, et al. (2005). "Drug Prices and Research and Development 
Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry." The Journal of Law and 
Economics 48(1): 195-214.
Gilbert, R. and R. Shapiro (1990). "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth." RAND 
Journal of Economics 210): 106.
Gilbert, R. J. (1989). "Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency." Handbook of 
industrial organization 1: 475-535.
Golec, J. H., S. P. Hegde, et al. (2008). Pharmaceutical R&D Spending and Threats of 
Price Regulation. Available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract= 1106963.
Golec, J. H. and J. A. Vernon (2006). European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation, Firm 
Profitability, and R&D Spending, NBER Working Paper No. 12676.
Gorka, E. (2009). "Generics at the crossroads: Will Europe lead the way forward." 
Journal of Generic Medicines 6(3): 193-205.
Grabka, M. M., J. Schreyogg, et al. (2006). "The impact of co-payments on patient 
behavior: evidence from a natural experiment." Medizinische Klinik 101(6): 476-484.
374
Grabowski, H. and J. Vernon (1990). "A new look at the returns and risks to 
pharmaceutical R&D.” Management Science 36(7): 804-821.
Grabowski, H. and J. Vernon (2000). "The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research 
and Development Expenditures " Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10: 201-215.
Grabowski, H. G. (1980). "Regulation and the International Diffusion of 
Pharmaceuticals." The International Supply of Medicines: 5-36.
Grabowski, H. G. and J. Vernon (1992). "Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competition 
in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act." Journal of Law and Economics 35(2): 
195-198.
Graham, J. R. (2001). "Seeing Through the Snow: Is Canada's Government, or its Weak 
Economy, Responsible for Low Drug Prices? ." Regulation Magazine 24(1): Available 
at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=267247 or DOI: 10.2139/ssm.267247.
Griliches, Z. (1957). "Hybrid com: An exploration in the economics of technological 
change." Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society: 501-522.
Grootendorst, P., E. Pierard, et al. (2009). "Life-expectancy gains from pharmaceutical 
drugs: a critical appraisal of the literature." Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics and 
Outcomes Research 9(4): 353-364.
Gruber, H. and F. Verboven (2001). "The evolution of markets under entry and 
standards regulation—the case of global mobile telecommunications." International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 19(7): 1189-1212.
Haas, J. S., K. A. Phillips, et al. (2005). "Potential savings from substituting generic 
drugs for brand-name drugs: medical expenditure panel survey, 1997-2000." Annals of 
internal medicine 142(11): 891.
Habl, C., K. Antony, et al. (2006). Surveying, Assessing and Analysing the 
Pharmaceutical Sector in the 25 EU Member States. OBIG (Osterreichisches 
Bundesinstitut fur Gesundheitswesen).
Hackner, J. (2000). "A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated 
oligopolies." Journal of Economic Theory 93(2): 233-239.
Hall, B. H. and B. Khan (2003). "Adoption of new technology." NBER working paper.
Hass, A. E., D. B. Portale, et al. (1984). New Drug Introductions. Discontinuations, and 
Safety Issues in the United States and the United Kingdom. 1960-1982. National 
Technical Information Service, US Dept, of Commerce.
Hassett, K. A. (2004). Price Controls and the Evolution of Pharmaceutical Markets. 
American Enterprise Institute (AED.
Healy, E. M. and K. I. Kaitin (1999). "The European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products' Centralized Procedure for Product Approval: Current Status." Drug 
Information Journal 33: 969-978.
375
Hellerstein, J. K. (1998). "The importance of the physician in the generic versus trade­
name prescription decision." RAND Journal of Economics 29(1): 108-136.
Henderson, R. and I. Cockbum (1996). "Scale, scope, spillovers: the determinants of 
research productivity in drug discovery." RAND Journal of Economics 27(1): 32-59.
Heuer, A., M. Mejer, et al. (2007). "The National Regulation of Pharmaceutical Markets 
and the Timing of New Drug Launches in Europe." Kiel Advanced Studies Working 
Paper. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Hirschler, B. (2010). "UK Coalition Government Could End Free Drug Pricing." 
Reuters. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE64005G2010Q525.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). "Moral hazard and observability." The Bell Journal of 
Economics: 74-91.
Hougaard, P. (2000). Analysis of multivariate survival data. Springer.
Hudson, J. (2000). "Generic take-up in the pharmaceutical market following patent 
expiry A multi-country study." International Review of Law & Economics 20(2): 205- 
221 .
Hurwitz, M. A. and R. E. Caves (October 1988). "Persuasion or Information?
Promotion and the Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals." Journal of 
Law and Economics 31(2): 299-320.
Huskamp, H. A. and J. M. Donohue (2008). "Generic Entry, Reformulations and 
Promotion of Ssris in the US." PharmacoEconomics 26(7): 603.
Iizuka, T. (2009). "Generic Entry in a Regulated Pharmaceutical Market." Japanese 
Economic Review 60: 63-81.
Iizuka, T. (2009). "Generic Entry in a Regulated Pharmaceutical M arket" Japanese 
Economic Review 60(1): 63-81.
Ioannides-Demos, L. L., J. E. Ibrahim, et al. (2002). "Reference-based pricing schemes: 
effect on pharmaceutical expenditure, resource utilisation and health outcomes." 
Pharmacoeconomics 20(91: 577-591.
Ireland, N. and P. Stoneman (1986). "Technological diffusion, expectations and 
welfare." Oxford Economic Papers 38(2): 283-304.
Jacobzone, S. (2000). Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social 
and Industrial Goals. OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers. No. 
40. OECD Publishing.
Jaffe, A. B. and R. N. Stavins (1995). "Dynamic incentives of environmental 
regulations: The effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion." 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29(3): 43-63.
Jenkins, S. (2005). Survival Analysis, Chapter 3, Available at: 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/teaching/stepheni/ec968/pdfs/ec9681notesv6.pdf.
376
Jorge, M. F. (2009). "The Generic Industry is Changing and will Require New Global 
Strategies and Policies." Journal of Generic Medicines 6 : 97-98.
Jorge, M. F. (2010). "Research and Development: The Generic Industry must Play a 
Central Role in Setting up Partnerships with Governments." Journal of Generic 
Medicines 7: 111-112.
Jung, K. and F. Lichtenberg (2006). "The Effect of Drug Vintage on Mortality: 
Economic Effect of New Drugs." Korean Journal of Health Policy Administration 
16(4): 147-168.
Kaitin, K. I. (1989). "Reply to" Understanding Comparisons of Drug Introductions 
Between the United States and the United Kingdom"." Clin Pharmacol Ther 46(2): 146- 
8 .
Kaitin, K. I., N. Mattison, et al. (1989). "The drug lag: an update of new drug 
introductions in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 1977 through 1987." 
Clinical pharmacology and therapeutics 46(2): 121.
Kalbfleisch, J. D. and R. L. Prentice (2002). "The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time 
Data (2002) New York." NY: Wilev-Interscience.
Kalo, Z., N. Muszbek, et al. (2007). "Does therapeutic reference pricing always result in 
cost-containment? The Hungarian evidence." Health Policy 80(3): 402-412.
Kanavos, P. and J. Costa-Font (2005). "Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in Europe: 
Stakeholder and Competition Effects " Economic Policy 20(44): 751-798.
Kaplan, E. L. and P. Meier (1958)." Nonparametric estimation from incomplete 
observations." J Am Stat Assoc 53: 457.
Karwal, V. (2006). "The changing competitive landscape in the global generics market: 
Threat or opportunity?" Journal of Generic Medicines 3(4): 269.
Kessler, D. P. (2004). "The Effects of Pharmaceutical Price Controls on the Cost and 
Quality of Medical Care: A Review of the Empirical Literature."
Kong, Y. and J. R. Seldon (2004). "Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in 
Pharmaceutical Markets." Review of Industrial Organization 25(1): 71-86.
Konigbauer, I. (2007). "Advertising and generic market entry." Journal of Health 
Economics 26(2): 286-305.
Kyle, M. (2007). "Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies." The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 89(1): 88-99.
Kyle, M. K. (2006). "The Role of Firm Characteristics in Pharmaceutical Product 
Launches." The RAND Journal of Economics 37(3): 602-618.
Kyle, M. K. (2007). Strategic responses to parallel trade. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
377
Kyle, M. K. and R. National Bureau of Economic (2007). Strategic responses to parallel 
trade. National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
LaFrancis Popper, K. M. and R. W. Nason (1994). "The drug lag: a 20-year analysis of 
six country markets." Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 13(2): 290-299.
Lakdawalla, D. N., D. P. Goldman, et al. (2009). US Pharmaceutical Policy In A Global 
Marketplace, Health Affairs. 28: wl38.
Lanjouw, J. O. (2005). "Patents, Price Controls and Access to New Drugs: How Policy 
Affects Global Market Entry."
Lexchin, J. (2004). "Are new drugs as good as they claim to be?" Australian Prescriber 
27: 2-3.
Lexchin, J. (2004). "The effect of generic competition on the price of brand-name 
drugs." Health Policy 68(1): 47-54.
Lexchin, J. (2006). "Do Manufacturers of Brand Name Drugs Engage in Price 
Competition? An Analysis of Introductory Prices." CMAJ 174(8).
Li, X., D. Guh, et al. (2007). "The impact of cost sharing of prescription drug 
expenditures on health care utilization by the elderly: own-and cross-price elasticities." 
Health Policy 82(3): 340-347.
Lichtenberg, F. (2003a). "Impact of Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence from 
Longitudinal Disease Level Data from 52 countries, 1982-2001."
Lichtenberg, F. (2003b). Pharmaceutical Innovation, Mortality Reduction, and 
Economic Growth. Measuring the Gains from Medical Research: An Economic 
Approach. K. Murphy and R. Topel. IL, USA, University of Chicago Press: 74-109.
Lichtenberg, F. and T. J. Philipson (2002). "The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property 
Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the US Pharmaceutical 
Industry." Journal of Law and Economics XLV.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (1996). "Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People Out of 
Hospitals?" American Economic Review 8 6 : 384-388.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (2004). "Sources of US longevity increase, 1960-2001." The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 44(3): 369-389.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (2005). "The Impact of New Drug Launches on Longevity: Evidence 
from Longitudinal, Disease-Level Data from 52 Countries, 1982-2001." International 
Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 5(1): 47-73.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (2010). "The effect of drug vintage on survival: Micro evidence from 
Puerto Rico's Medicaid program." Advances in Health Economics and Health Services 
Research 22: 273-292.
378
Lichtenberg, F. R., P. Grootendorst, et al. (2009). 'The Impact of Drug Vintage on 
Patient Survival: A Patient-Level Analysis Using Quebec's Provincial Health Plan 
Data." Value in Health 12(6): 847-856.
Lopez-Casasnovas, G. and J. Puig-Junoy (2000). "Review of the literature on reference 
pricing." Health policy 54(2): 87-123.
Lu, Z. J. and W. S. Comanor (1998). "Strategic pricing of new pharmaceuticals." The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 80: 108-118.
Magazzini, L., F. Pammolli, et al. (2004). "Dynamic competition in pharmaceuticals." 
The European Journal of Health Economics 5(2): 175-182.
Mansfield, E. R. and B. P. Helms (1982). "Detecting multicollinearity." American 
Statistician 36(3): 158-160.
Martikainen, J., I. Kivi, et al. (2005). "European prices of newly launched reimbursable 
pharmaceuticals-a pilot study." Health policy 74(3): 235-246.
Mason, C. H. and W. D. Perreault Jr (1991). "Collinearity, power, and interpretation of 
multiple regression analysis." Journal of Marketing Research 28(3): 268-280.
McAfee, R. P., H. M. Mialon, et al. (2003). "What is a Barrier to Entry?", from 
http://www.mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/Barriers2Entrv.pdf.
McPake, B., L. Kumaranayake, et al. (2002). Health economics: an international 
perspective, Routledge.
Merino-Castello, A. (2003). Impact of the Reference Price System on the 
Pharmaceutical Market: a Theoretical Approach. PhD Thesis. Chapter 1. Available at: 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/524.pdf.
Merlis, M. (2000). Explaining the Growth in Prescription Drug Spending: A Review of 
Recent Studies. Report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Conference on Pharmaceutical Pricing Practices. Utilization and Costs.
Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (1999). "The impact of generic goods in the pharmaceutical 
industry." Health economics 8(7).
Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2003). "Reference prices and generic medicines: What can we 
expect?" Journal of Generic Medicines 1: 31-38.
Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2003). "Referene Prices: the Spanish Way." Investigaciones 
Economicas XXVII(l): 125-149.
Metcalfe, S. (1995). "The economic foundations of technology policy: equilibrium and 
evolutionary perspectives." Handbook of the economics of innovation and technological 
change: 409-512.
Meyer, B. D. (1995). "Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics." Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics 13(2): 151-161.
379
Moreno-Torres, I., J. Puig-Junoy, et al. (2009). "Generic entry into the regulated Spanish 
pharmaceutical market" Review of Industrial Organization 34(4): 373-388.
Moreno-Torres, I., J. Puig-Junoy, et al. (2007). "Generic entry into a regulated 
pharmaceutical market." Available at: 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/1014.pdf.
Mossialos, E. and A. Oliver (2005). "Pharmaceutical Regulation in Four European 
Countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom." International 
Journal of Health Care Planning and Management 20.
Mossialos, E., T. Walley, et al. (2004a). Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving 
for Efficiency. Equity and Quality.
Mossialos, E., T. Walley, et al. (2004b). Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: an 
overview. Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving for Efficiency. Equity and 
Quality: Chapter 1.
Mossinghoff, G. J. (1999). "Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process." Food and Drug Law Journal 54: 187-194.
Motta, M. (2004). Competition policy: theory and practice. Cambridge Univ Pr.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1972). "The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply." American Economic 
Review 62: 428-431.
O.F.T (2007). The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, Office of Fair Trading.
OECD (2005b). Health Technologies and Decision Making. Paris.
OECD. (2007). "Competition and Barriers to Entry." from 
http ://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/59/37921908.pdf.
OECD (2008). OECD in Figures 2008. OECD Health Policy Studies.
OECD (2008). Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies in a Global Market. OECD Health 
Policy Studies.
OECD (2009). Health at a Glance 2009: OECD Indicators, OECD
Olsen, J. A. (1997). "Theories of justice and their implications for priority setting in 
health care." Journal of Health Economics 16(6): 625-639.
Parker, J. E. S. (1984). The International Diffusion of Pharmaceuticals, Macmillan Press 
Ltd.
Pavcnik, N. (2000). "Do pharmaceutical prices respond to insurance?" NBER Working 
Paper 7685.
Pearce, J. A. (2006). "How Companies Can Preserve Market Dominance after Patents 
Expire " Long Range Planning 390): 71-87.
380
Peltzman, S. (1973). "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 
Drug Amendments." Journal of Political Economy 81(5): 1049.
Peny, J. M. and J. Covilard (2007). "What is the Value of Authorized Generic 
Agreements? Assessments on the French M arket.." Journal of Generic Medicines 4(2): 
106-116.
Pereira, J. (1993). "What does equity in health mean?" Journal of Social Policy 22(01): 
19-48.
Permanand, G. (2006). EU pharmaceutical regulation : the politics of policy-making.
Perry, G. (2006). "The European Generic Pharmaceutical Market in Review: 2006 and 
beyond." Journal of Generic Medicines 4(1): 4-14.
Perry, G. (2009). Sustaining Eu Healthcare Systems through Sustainable Generic 
Competition. Brussels, EGA.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (1993). PMA Annual Survey Report: Trends 
in US Pharmaceutical Sales and R&D. Washington, DC.
Puig-Junoy, J. (2004). "Incentives and pharmaceutical reimbursement reforms in 
Spain." Health Policy 67(2): 149-165.
Regan, T. L. (2007). "Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the 
prescription drug market." International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Reichert, J. M. (2003). "A guide to drug discovery: Trends in development and approval 
times for new therapeutics in the United States." Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 2: 
695-702.
Reiffen, D. and M. R. Ward (2005). "Generic Drug Industry Dynamics." Review of 
Economics and Statistics 87(1): 37-49.
Reinganum, J. F. (1981). "Market structure and the diffusion of new technology." The 
Bell Journal of Economics 12(2): 618-624.
Rodrigues, V. (2006). "Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in 
Pharmaceutical Markets: Comment." Review of Industrial Organization 28(2): 183-187.
Rodriguez, P., K. Uhlenbruck, et al. (2005). "Government corruption and the entry 
strategies of multinationals." Academy of Management Review 30(2): 383-396.
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations. The Free Press.
Rovira, J. (2009). Intellectual Property Rights and Pharmaceutical Development. The 
Economics of New Health Technologies. J. Costa-Font, C. Courbage and A. McGuire.
Rudholm, N. (2001). "Entry and the number of firms in the Swedish pharmaceuticals 
market." Review of Industrial Organization 19(3): 351-364.
381
Saha, A., H. Grabowski, et al. (2006). "Generic competition in the US pharmaceutical 
industry." International Journal of the Economics of Business 13(1): 15-38.
Sanchez, C. M. and J. E. Post (1998). "The impact of environmental regulation on the 
adoption of innovation: How electric utilities responded to the clean air act amendments 
of 1990." JAI Press 15: 45-88
Santerre, R. E. and S. P. Neun (2010). Health Economics. Theory. Insights, and 
Industry Studies. Joe Sabatino.
Sassi, F., L. Archard, et al. (2001). "Equity and the economic evaluation of healthcare." 
Health technology assessment (Winchester. England) 5(3): 1.
Scherer, F. M. (2000). "The Pharmaceutical Industry." Handbook of Health Economics 
Volume IB, Chapter 25: 1299-1332.
Schoffski, O. (2002). "Diffusion of Medicines in Europe."
Schulz, A. (2004). "Evolving Dynamics of US and European Generics Markets."
Journal of Generic Medicines 2(1): 23-32.
Schumpeter, J. (1984). The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press.
Schweitzer, S. O. and W. S. Comanor (2007). Controlling Pharmaceutical Prices and 
Expenditures. Changing the US Health Care System: Key Issues in Health Services 
Policy and Management. R. M. Andersen, T. H. Rice and G. F. Kominski, Jossey-Bass: 
157-182.
Schweitzer, S. O., M. E. Schweitzer, et al. (1996). "Is there a US Drug Lag? The Timing 
of New Pharmaceutical Approvals in the G-7 Countries and Switzerland." Medical Care 
Research and Review 53(2): 162.
Scott Morton, F. M. (1999). "Entry Decisions in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry." 
Rand Journal of Economics 30(3): 421-440.
Scott Morton, F. M. (2000). "Barriers to entry, brand advertising, and generic entry in 
the US pharmaceutical industry." International Journal of Industrial Organization 18(7): 
1085-1104.
Scottom, B. (2009). Generics Growth Strategies. Cost Containment and M&A Shape 
the Global Generics Industry, Business Insights Ltd.
Seget, S. (2003). Pharmaceutical Pricing Strategies: Optimizing Returns Throughout 
R&D and Marketing, Business Insights Ltd.
Seget, S. (2009). Pharma Pricing and Reimbursement Outlook. Optimizing Price and 
Market Access in a Recessionary Climate, Business Insights Ltd.
Serra-Sastre, V. (2008). Technology Diffusion in Health Care: A Microeconomic 
Analysis of the NHS. London, London School of Economics and Political Science.
PhD.
382
Serra-Sastre, V. and A. McGuire (2009). Diffusion of Health Technologies: Evidence 
from the Pharmaceutical Sector. The Economics of New Health Technologies. J. Costa- 
Font, C. Courbage and A. McGuire.
Sheppard, A. W., R. H. Shaw, et al. (2006). Top 20 environmental weeds for classical 
biological control in Europe: a review of opportunities, regulations and other barriers to 
adoption, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road Oxford OX 4 2 DQ UK. 
46: 93-117.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993). "Corruption." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108(3): 599-617.
Simoens, S. (2007). "International Comparison of Generic Medicine Prices." Current 
Medical Research and Opinions 23(11): 2647-2654.
Simoens, S. (2008). "Innovation through Generic Medicines: Is it Time for a Pan- 
European Policy?" Journal of Generic Medicines 6(1): 3-8.
Simoens, S. and S. de Coster (2006). Sustaining Generic Medicines Markets in Europe. 
Belgium, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Research centre for pharmaceutical care and 
pharmaco-economics. Available at: http://www.egagenerics.com/doc/simoens- 
renort 2006-04.pdf.
Singer, J. D. and J. B. Willett (1993). "It's about time: Using discrete-time survival 
analysis to study duration and the timing of events." Journal of Educational and 
Behavioral Statistics 18(2): 155.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984). "Price and quantity competition in a differentiated 
duopoly." The RAND Journal of Economics: 546-554.
Snyder, L. D., N. H. Miller, et al. (2003). The effects of environmental regulation on 
technology diffusion: the case of chlorine manufacturing, American Economic 
Association Publications. 93: 431-435.
Sood, N., H. de Vries, et al. (2009). "The effect of regulation on pharmaceutical 
revenues: Experience in nineteen countries." Health Affairs 28(1): wl25.
Stem, S. (1996). Market Definition and the Returns to Innovation: Substitution Patterns 
in Pharmaceutical Markets. MIT Sloan School & NBER, Available at: 
http://www.kellogg.northwestem.edu/facultv/sstem/htm/NEWresearchpage/Publication 
s/Stem%20RX%20Demand.pdf.
Stigler, G. J. (1968). "Barriers to entry, economies of scale, and firm size." GJ Stigler. 
The Organization of Industry, Irwin. Homewood 101: 67-70.
Stigler, G. J. (1971). "The theory of economic regulation." The Bell journal of 
economics and management science 2(1): 3-21.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2009). Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation. 
Government and Markets: Toward A New Theory of Regulation. Cambridge.
383
Stoneman, P. (2001). "Financial Factors and the Inter Firm Diffusion of New 
Technology: A Real Options Model." EIFC-Technology and Finance Working Papers.
Stoneman, P. (2002). The economics of technological diffusion. Wiley-Blackwell.
Stoneman, P. and G. Battisti (1997). "Intra-firm diffusion of new technologies: the 
neglected part of technology transfer." International Journal of Industrial Engineering 4: 
270-283.
Suh, D. C., S. W. Schondelmeyer, et al. (1998). "Price trends before and after patent 
expiration in the pharmaceutical industry." Journal of Research in Pharmaceutical 
Economics 9(2): 17-32.
Sullivan, S. D., J. Watkins, et al. (2009). "Health Technology Assessment in Health- 
Care Decisions in the United States." Value in Health 12(2).
Tabata, Y. and C. Albani (2008). "Globalising Clinical Development in Japan." Journal 
of Commercial Biotechnology 14(1): 73-78.
Thomas, F. (2006). "Toward a treaty on safety and cost-effectiveness of 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices: enhancing an endangered global public good." 
Globalization and Health 2.
Thomas, K. E., N. McAuslaine, et al. (1998). "A study of trends in pharmaceutical 
regulatory approval times for nine major markets in the 1990s." Drug Information 
Journal.
Thomas, L. G. (1994). "Implicit industrial policy: the triumph of Britain and the failure 
of France in global pharmaceuticals." Industrial and Corporate Change 3(2): 451.
Thomas, L. G. (2001). The Japanese Pharmaceutical Industry: The new drug lag and the 
failure of industrial policy. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Thomas, N. B. (2008). "Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals: A Review of Legal, 
Economic, and Political Aspects." Value in Health 11(5).
Tirole, J. (1990). Chapter 10: Research and Development and the Adoption of New 
Technologies. The Theory of Industrial Organization MIT Press.
Uhlenbruck, K., P. Rodriguez, et al. (2006). "The impact of corruption on entry 
strategy: Evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies." 
Organization Science 17(3): 402.
Uyama, Y., T. Shibata, et al. (2005). "Successful bridging strategy based on ICH E5 
guideline for drugs approved in Japan&ast." Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 
78(2): 102-113.
Van Tielen, R., J. Genaert, et al. (1998). "The Demographic Impact on Ambulatory 
Pharmaceutical Expenditure in Belgium." Health Policy 45(1): 1-14.
Vemon, J. (2005). "Examining the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical 
R&D investment." Health Economics 14(1): 1-17.
384
Vemon, J. A. (2003). "The relationship between price regulation and pharmaceutical 
profit margins." Applied Economics Letters 10(8): 467-470.
Vemon, J. A. (2005). "Examining the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical 
R and D investment." Health Economics 14: 1-16.
Vemon, J. A., J. H. Golec, et al. (2006). "The Economics of Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation and Importation: Refocusing the Debate " American Journal of Law and 
Medicine 32(2/31: 175.
Viscusi, W. K., J. M. Vemon, et al. (2005). Economics of regulation and antitrust. MIT 
press Cambridge, MA.
Vogler, S. (2008). Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information Report.
Vogler, S., J. Espin, et al. (2009). "Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement 
Information (PPRI) -  New PPRI Analysis Including Spain." Pharmaceuticals Policy and 
Law 11: 213-234.
Von Grebmer, K. (1980). Commentary to Part I: The Multinational Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Evidence of Product Diffusion and Technology Transfer. The International 
Supply of Medicines. R. B. Helmes. Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research.
Wallsten, S. (2005). "Regulation and internet use in developing countries." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 53(2): 501-523.
Wardell, W. M. (1973). "Introduction of new therapeutic drugs in the United States and 
Great Britain: an international comparison." Clin Pharmacol Ther 14(5): 773-90.
Wardell, W. M. (1974). "Therapeutic implications of the drug lag." Clin Pharmacol 
Ther 15(1): 73-96.
Wardell, W. M. (1978). "The drug lag revisited: comparison by therapeutic area of 
patterns of drugs marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 through 
1976." Clin Pharmacol Ther 24(5): 499-524.
Weimer, D. L. and A. R. Vining (2005). Policy analysis: Concepts and practice. Pearson 
Prentice Hall.
Wertheimer, A. I. and T. M. Santella (2004). "Pharmacoevolution: the advantages of 
incremental innovation." IPN Working Papers on Intellectual Property. Innovation and 
Health.
West, P. and J. Mahon (2003). Benefits to Payers and Patients from Parallel Trade.
York: University of York.
Winkelmann, R. (2004). "Co-payments for prescription drugs and the demand for 
doctor visits-Evidence from a natural experiment." Health Economics 13(11): 1081- 
1089.
385
Wittner, P. (2004). Growth Strategies in Generics: Innovative and aggressive strategies 
and their impact on branded pharmaceuticals. London.
Wong, V. (2002). "Antecedents of international new product rollout timeliness." 
International Marketing Review 19(2): 120-132.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The 
MIT press.
Wright, B. D. (1983). "The Economics of Investment Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts." American Economic Review 73: 691-707.
WTO OMC. (2003). "TRIPS and pharmaceutical patents, Fact Sheet." 2008, from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trins e/tripsfactsheet pharma e.pdf.
Xie, H., G. McHugo, et al. (2003). "Using discrete-time survival analysis to examine 
patterns of remission from substance use disorder among persons with severe mental 
illness." Mental Health Services Research 5(1): 55-64.
Yi, S. S. (1999). "Entry, licensing and research joint ventures." International journal of 
industrial organization 170): 1-24.
Zweifel, P., F. Breyer, et al. (2009). Health economics. Springer Verlag.
386
